Chapter I
1814
ON THE OCEAN
Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of
Rodgers — Cruise of the
Constitution — Her unsuccessful chase of La Pique — Attack
on the
Alligator — The Essex captured — The Frolic captured — The
Peacock captures the Epervier — Commodore Barney’s
flotilla — The
British in the Chesapeake — The Wasp captures the
Reindeer and
sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the Adams — The
privateer
General Armstrong — The privateer Prince de Neufchâtel — Loss
of
the gunboats in Lake Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Summary.
DURING
this year the blockade of the American coast
was kept up
with ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like
hawks
off every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft;
they
almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to
lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On
the
northern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious
winter
gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; the
ropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were
coated
with ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten
and
crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn
and
hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they
traversed
continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the
privateers,
harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships
confined
to port; “no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without
imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the
numerous
British
squadrons.”
But the sloops of war, commanded by officers
as skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as
ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some
dark
night, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt,
under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harder
the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast
the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most
untiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have
mentioned
as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for
this
kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers
of
superior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-decked
ship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built
corvettes of the Cyane’s class. The danger of recapture
was too
great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were
generally
destroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were
chosen
right in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternation
caused were very great.
Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the
coast in couples
or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were
blockaded
by a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which
cruised
a squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74
gun-ship
Ramillies. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the
coast contained
razees or two-deckers. The boats of the Hogue, 74, took
part in
the destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge
in
April; and those of the Superb, 74, shared in a similar
expedition
against Wareham in
June.
The command
on
the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir
Alexander
Cochrane. The main British force continued to lie in the
Chesapeake,
where about 50 sail were collected. During the first part of this
year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May
he was relieved by Rear-Admiral
Cockburn.
The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the
beginning of 1814
was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only
making a few prizes of not much value. She then turned toward the
American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence
proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached
on Feb. 18th. The light was passed in the night, and shortly
afterward
several sail were made out, when the President was at once
cleared
for
action.
One of these strange sail was the Loire, 38 (British),
Captain Thomas
Brown, which ran down to close the President, unaware of
her force;
but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made
off.
The President did not pursue,
another
frigate and a gunbrig being in
sight.
This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both
sides; one American writer calls the Loire the Plantagenet,
74;
James, on the other hand, states that the President was
afraid to
engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter
declined
the combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to
this
is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that “the
admiralty
had issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to
engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America.” Coupling this
order with the results of the combats that had already taken place
between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set
down
as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing
to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say
that a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute
about
engaging any frigate.
On Jan. 1st, the Constitution, which had
been lying in Boston harbor
undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of
Captain Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate Nymphe
had been
lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the
Constitution was in condition, in obedience to the order
already
mentioned. Captain Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the
14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun
schooner
Pictou, with a crew of 75 men. After making a few other
prizes
and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the
23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona
passage,
with the British 36-gun frigate Pique (late French Pallas),
Captain
Maitland. The Constitution at once made sail for the Pique,
steering
free;
the
latter
at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but
when
the latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force and
immediately made all sail to escape; the Constitution,
however,
gained steadily till 8 P.M., when the night and thick squally
weather
caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on
board
the prohibitory order issued by the
admiralty,
and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light
for his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied with this,
and
wishes to prove that both ships were desirous of avoiding
the combat.
He says that Captain Stewart came near enough to count “13 ports and
a bridle on the Pique’s main-deck,” and “saw at once that
she was
of a class inferior to the Guerrière or Java,” but
“thought the
Pique’s 18’s were 24’s, and therefore did not make an
effort to
bring her to action.” He portrays very picturesquely the grief of
the Pique’s crew when they find they are not going to
engage; how
they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain
Maitland
reads them his instructions, but “fails to persuade them that
there
had been any necessity of issuing them“; and, finally, how the
sailors,
overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time
grog, — which was certainly remarkable. As the Constitution
had
twice captured British frigates “with impunity,” according to
James
himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter
with a ship which she “saw at once was of an inferior class” to
those
already conquered? Even such abject cowards as James’ Americans
would
not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course neither Captain
Stewart
nor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was
armed with 24-pounders.
It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how
utterly untrustworthy
James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476)
the Constitution had now “what the Americans would call a
bad crew,”
whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been “picked.”
Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no
case
was an American ship manned with a “picked” crew, but the nearest
approach to such was the crew the Constitution carried in
this
and the next cruise, when “she probably possessed as fine a crew
as ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men,
and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to
fight
the ship without her
officers.”
The statement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most
skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a
greatly
inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately,
such
denial is needless, Captain Stewart’s account being fully
corroborated
in the Memoir of Admiral Durham, written by his nephew, Captain
Murray, London, 1846.
The Constitution arrived off the port of
Marblehead on April 3d,
and at 7 A.M. fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates Junon,
Captain Upton, and Tenedos, Captain Parker. “The American
frigate
was standing to the westward with the wind about north by west and
bore from the two British frigates about northwest by west. The
Junon and Tenedos quickly hauled up in chase, and
the Constitution
crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the
Tenedos rather gaining upon her, the Constitution
started her
water and threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other
articles.
At 11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, who
were now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 P.M.
the Constitution anchored in the harbor of Marblehead.
Captain
Parker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no
defences;
but the Tenedos was recalled by a signal from the
Junon.”
Shortly afterward the Constitution
again put out, and reached Boston unmolested.
On Jan. 29, 1814, the small U.S. coasting schooner Alligator,
of
4 guns and 40 men, Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchor
in the mouth of Stone River, S. C., when a frigate and a brig were
perceived close inshore near the breakers. Judging from their
motions
that they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr.
Basset
made his preparations
accordingly.
At half-past seven six boats were observed
approaching cautiously under cover of the marsh, with muffled
oars;
on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades and
musketry, coming on at full speed; whereupon the Alligator
cut
her cable and made sail, the wind being light from the southwest;
while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who
were
then not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fell
astern. At this moment the Alligator grounded, but the
enemy had
suffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the
attack,
rowing off down stream. On board the Alligator two men
were killed
and two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by a
grape-shot while standing at the helm; and her sails and rigging
were much cut. The extent of the enemy’s loss was never known;
next
day one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injured
and containing the bodies of an officer and a
seaman.
For his skill
and
gallantry Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a time
his exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expeditions
along
that part of the coast. The Alligator herself sank in a
squall on
July 1st, but was afterward raised and refitted.
It is much to be regretted that it is almost
impossible to get at
the British account of any of these expeditions which ended
successfully for the Americans; all such cases are generally
ignored
by the British historians; so that I am obliged to rely solely
upon
the accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in the
world, could hardly be perfectly accurate.
At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was still
cruising in the Pacific.
Early in January the Essex, now with 255 men
aboard, made the South
American coast, and on the 12th of that month anchored in the
harbor
of Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re-christened the Essex
Junior, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes
and 10
eighteen-pound carronades. Of course she could not be used in a
combat
with regular cruisers.
On Feb. 8th, the British frigate Phœbe, 36,
Captain James Hilyar,
accompanied by the Cherub, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor
Tucker, the
former carrying 300 and the latter 140
men,
made their appearance,
and apparently proposed to take the Essex by a coup de
main.
They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the Cherub falling
to leeward;
while the Phœbe made the port quarter of the Essex,
and then,
putting her helm down, luffed up on her starboard bow, but 10 or
15 feet distant. Porter’s crew were all at quarters, the
powder-boys
with slow matches ready to discharge the guns, the boarders
standing
by, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; every thing was
cleared
for action on both frigates. Captain Hilyar now probably saw that
there was no chance of carrying the Essex by surprise,
and, standing
on the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter’s health; the
latter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar not to fall foul.
The British captain then braced back his yards, remarking that if
he did fall aboard it would be purely accidental. “Well,” said
Porter, “you have no business where you are; if you touch a
rope-yarn
of this ship I shall board
instantly.”
The Phœbe, in her then position, was completely
at the
mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agitated, assured
Porter that he meant nothing hostile; and the Phœbe
backed down,
her yards passing over those of the Essex without touching
a rope,
and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly afterward the two
captains
met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on
his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to the
latter’s forbearance, Porter need be under no apprehension as to
his breaking the neutrality.
The USS Essex.
Painting by Joseph Howard.
The British ships now began a blockade of the port.
On Feb. 27th,
the Phœbe being hove to close off the port, and the Cherub
a
league to leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the Essex
interpreting this as a challenge, took the crew of the Essex
Junior
aboard and went out to attack the British frigate. But the latter
did
not await the combat; she bore up, set her studding-sails, and ran
down to the Cherub. The American officers were intensely
irritated
over this, and American writers have sneered much at "a British 36
refusing combat with an American 32.” But the armaments of the two
frigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make
comparison.
When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and
the
water so smooth that the British ships fought at their own
distance;
and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter’s carronades, this
really made the Cherub more nearly suited to contend with
the Essex
than the latter was to fight the Phœbe. But when the Essex
in
fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the Essex Junior
aboard,
was to windward, the circumstances were very different; she
carried
as many men and guns as the Phœbe, and in close combat,
or in
a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her. Still,
Hilyar’s
conduct in avoiding Porter except when the Cherub was in
company
was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a
man
of his tried courage.
On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the
harbor on the first
opportunity, so as to draw away his two antagonists in chase, and
let the Essex Junior escape. This plan had to be tried
sooner than
was expected. The two vessels were always ready, the Essex
only
having her proper complement of 255 men aboard. On the next day,
the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the Essex
parted
her port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward, so she
got under way, and made sail; by several trials it had been found
that she was faster than the Phœbe, and that the Cherub
was
very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship,
only fearing for his consort. The British vessels were close in
with
the weather-most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could
weather
them, and hauled up for that purpose. Just as he was rounding the
outermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his
safety,
a heavy squall struck the Essex, and when she was nearly
gunwale
under, the main-top-mast went by the board. She now wore and stood
in for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of her
crippled condition she could not gain it; so she bore up and
anchored
in a small bay, three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile from
a detached Chilian battery of one gun, the Essex being
within
pistol-shot of the
shore.
The Phœbe and Cherub now bore down
upon her,
covered with ensigns, union-jacks, and motto flags; and it became
evident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as he
saw that Porter was disabled. So the Essex prepared for
action,
though there could be no chance whatever of success. Her flags
were
flying from every mast, and every thing was made ready as far as
was possible. The attack was made before springs could be got on
her cables. She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude the
possibility of Captain Hilyar’s passing ahead of
her;
so his two ships
came cautiously down, the Cherub taking her position on
the
starboard bow of the Essex, and the Phœbe under
the latter’s
stern. The attack began at
4 P.M.
Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the
Cherub, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran
down
and stationed herself near the Phœbe. The latter had
opened with
her broadside of long 18’s, from a position in which not one of
Porter’s guns could reach her. Three times springs were got on the
cables of the Essex, in order to bring her round till her
broadside
bore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they
were
hauled taut. Three long 12’s were got out of the stern-ports, and
with these an animated fire was kept up on the two British ships,
the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. A good many of
Porter’s crew were killed during the first five minutes, before he
could bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer
much,
and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour’s fight between the three
long 12’s of the Essex, and the whole 36 broadside guns of
the
Phœbe and Cherub, the latter were actually driven
off. They
wore, and again began with their long guns; but, these producing
no visible effect, both of the British ships hauled out of the
fight
at 4.30. “Having lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay,
appearances looked a little inauspicious,” writes Captain Hilyar.
But the damages were soon repaired, and his two ships stood back
for the crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her
port-quarter,
the Phœbe at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside,
while
the Cherub kept under way, using her long bow-chasers.
Their fire
was very destructive, for they were out of reach of the Essex’s
carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bear
on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 5.20, and tried to close
with
his antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts sail was made. The
flying-jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut. That
sail
was hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore-sail let fall, though
the
want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless. Still the
Essex drove down on her assailants, and for the first time
got
near enough to use her carronades; for a minute or two the firing
was tremendous, but after the first broadside the Cherub
hauled
out of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of the
action confined herself to using her bow-guns from a distance.
Immediately afterward the Phœbe also edged off, and by
her
superiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was
enabled
to choose her own distance, and again opened from her long 18’s,
out of range of Porter’s
carronades.
The
carnage
on board the Essex had now made her decks look like
shambles. One
gun was manned three times, fifteen men being slam at it; its
captain
alone escaped without a wound. There were but one or two instances
of flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying
splinters
while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades,
and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they
could
stand. At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman,
named
Bissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin. Using his
handkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to his American
shipmates: “I left my own country and adopted the United States,
to fight for her. I hope I have this day proved myself worthy of
the country of my adoption. I am no longer of any use to you or to
her, so good-by!” With these words he leaned on the sill of the
port,
and threw himself
overboard.
Among the very few men who flinched was one named William Roach;
Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not to
be found. He was discovered by a man named William Call, whose leg
had been shot off and was hanging by the skin, and who dragged the
shattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, trying to
get a shot at him. Lieutenant J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off above
the knee, and his life might have been saved had it been amputated
at once; but the surgeons already had rows of wounded men waiting
for them, and when it was proposed to him that he should be
attended
to out of order, he replied: “No, doctor, none of that; fair
play’s
a jewel. One man’s life is as dear as another’s; I would not cheat
any poor fellow out of his turn.” So he stayed at his post, and
died from loss of blood.
Captain David Porter.
Painting possibly by John Trumbull.
Finding it hopeless to try to close, the Essex
stood for the land,
Porter intending to run her ashore and burn her. But when she had
drifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her
flat
aback and paid her head off shore, exposing her to a raking fire.
At
this moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding the Junior,
pulled out
in a boat, through all the fire, to see if he could do any thing.
Three of the men with him, including an old boatswain’s mate,
named
Kingsbury, had come out expressly “to share the fate of their old
ship” so they remained aboard, and, in their places, Lieutenant
Downes took some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up a
tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the wind gave Porter a
faint
hope of closing; and once more the riddled hulk of the little
American
frigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up to
avoid
close quarters; the battle was his already, and the cool old
captain
was too good an officer to leave any thing to chance. Seeing he
could not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet-anchor and
let go. This brought the ship’s head round, keeping her
stationary;
and from such of her guns as were not dismounted and had men
enough
left to man them, a broadside was fired at the Phœbe. The
wind
was now very light, and the Phœbe, whose main- and
mizzen-masts
and main-yard were rather seriously wounded, and who had suffered
a great loss of canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a
number
of shot between wind and
water,
and was thus a good
deal
crippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. It was hoped that she
would drift out of gun-shot, but this last chance was lost by the
parting of the hawser, which left the Essex at the mercy
of the
British vessels. Their fire was deliberate and destructive, and
could
only be occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the long
12’s
of the Essex. The ship caught fire, and the flames came
bursting
up the hatchway, and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many of
the crew were knocked overboard by shot, and drowned; others
leaped
into the water, thinking the ship was about to blow up, and tried
to swim to the land. Some succeeded; among them was one man who
had
sixteen or eighteen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the
muzzle
of his gun. The frigate had been shattered to pieces above the
water-line, although from the smoothness of the sea she was not
harmed
enough below it to reduce her to a sinking
condition.
The
carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty;
the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer was knocked
overboard by a splinter, and drowned; his little negro boy,
“Ruff,”
came up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deliberately leaped
into the sea and shared his master’s fate. Lieutenant Odenheimer
was also knocked overboard, but afterward regained the ship. A
shot,
glancing upward, killed four of the men who were standing by a
gun,
striking the last one in the head and scattering his brains over
his comrades. The only commissioned officer left on duty was
Lieutenant
Decatur McKnight. The sailing-master, Barnwell, when terribly
wounded,
remained at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of the
255
men aboard the Essex when the battle began, 58 had been
killed,
66 wounded, and 31 drowned (“missing”), while 24 had succeeded in
reaching shore. But 76 men were left unwounded, and many of these
had been bruised or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knocked
down by the windage of a passing shot. While the young midshipman,
Farragut, was on the ward-room ladder, going below for
gun-primers,
the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struck
full in the face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back on him.
They
fell down the hatch together, Farragut being stunned for some
minutes.
Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an old
quartermaster
named Francis Bland, a shot coming over the fore-yard took off the
quartermaster’s right leg, carrying away at the same time one of
Farragut’s coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, but he
died
for lack of a tourniquet, before he could be attended to.
Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the Essex
surrendered
and was taken possession of. The Phœbe had lost 4 men
killed,
including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the
Cherub, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded.
Total,
5 killed and 10
wounded.
The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to
their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had
been able to fire ten shot to the Americans’ one.
The conduct of the two English captains in attacking
Porter as soon
as he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very
careful
to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good
condition,
does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been
withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all
the
worse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship’s previous
escape entirely to Porter’s forbearance on a former occasion when
the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the
British
captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the
neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very
differently
from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil
War, — witness the capture of the Florida. And after the
battle
was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as
the participators in the fight, have showered upon the British
captains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts
and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are
decidedly foolish. Hilyar’s conduct during the battle, as well as
his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a
minor
matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly
just and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard
Douglass:
“The action displayed all that can reflect
honor
on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his
crew,
which, without the assistance of the Cherub, would have
insured
the same termination. Captain Porter’s sneers at the respectful
distance the Phœbe kept are in fact acknowledgments of
the ability
with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of
his
arms; it was a brilliant affair.” While endorsing this criticism,
it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author’s
comments
upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the Macedonian.
To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against
Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the Macedonian
had
lost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18’s to oppose to her
antagonist’s 24’s, and that the latter was assisted by the
corvette
Adams; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully
double
or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of
surrendering
when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of
his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater
loss
and damage on his antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord
Douglass says, the defence of the Macedonian brilliantly
upheld
the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did
that of the Essex show for the American navy; and if
Hilyar’s
conduct was “brilliant,” that of Decatur was more so.
This was an action in which it is difficult to tell
exactly how to
award praise. Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and
skill
with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to
destroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the
precision of his fire. The Cherub’s behavior was more remarkable
for extreme caution than for any thing else. As regards the mere
fight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contend
successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the
few guns that were available were served with the utmost
precision.
As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed
since
the time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two long
days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew
to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his
race,
and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim “sea-beggars” of
Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic
king,
and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the
great
floating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut’s account is
forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of “derring do” in that,
the
heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter
says:
“The defence of the Essex, taking into consideration our
superiority
of force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having
lost
her main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave
defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter
and
those under his command. Her colors were not struck until the loss
in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered
condition
so seriously bad as to render all further resistance
unavailing.”
He also bears very candid testimony to
the defence of the Essex having been effective enough to
at one
time render the result doubtful, saying: “Our first attack * * *
produced no visible effect. Our second * * * was not more
successful;
and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay,
appearances looked a little inauspicious.” Throughout the war no
ship was so desperately defended as the Essex, taking into
account
the frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhances
the merit of a defence. The Lawrence, which suffered even
more,
was backed by a fleet; the Frolic was overcome by an equal
foe;
and the Reindeer fought at far less of a disadvantage, and
suffered
less. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended
with
any thing like the resolution she displayed.
But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether
Porter’s course,
after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the
best
that could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could
have
been better than Farragut’s, although of course his judgment was
ex post facto, as he was very young at the time of the
fight.
“In the first place, I consider our original and
greatest error was
in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in
sailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind.
If we had come in contact with the Phœbe we should have
carried
her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her
greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire
and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced
our top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as
unless
they did so it would have been no chase, the Cherub being
a dull
sailer.”
“Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we
had no chance
of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run
ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and
fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on
fire.
But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a spring
on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it
was
exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on.”
But it must be remembered that when Porter decided
to anchor near
shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar’s
deliberate
and treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere
disregard
of neutrality. Whatever international moralists may say, such
disregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to be
gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as
to
counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral
power, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he
first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two
ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked
Porter, considering the destruction of the Essex as
outweighing
the insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectly
justifiable. In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to
do,
but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the even
of hostilities, his ship would be the captured one, and he
owed
his escape purely to Porter’s over-forbearance, under great
provocation
Then he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on the
neutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter
was
disabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong language to use
about a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as any
outsider must consider Warrington’s attack on the British brig
Nautilus in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any
outsider
must consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith
with
Porter.
After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and
courteously to the
prisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for
it would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages.
But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. It
was to be expected that the Essex would make her escape as
soon
as practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bring
her to action. Instead of this he always declined the fight when
alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the Essex
instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed,
hoping to bring the Phœbe to action single-handed. It
must be
remembered that the Essex was almost as weak compared to
the
Phœbe, as the Cherub was compared to the Essex.
The latter
was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by
the following comparison. In the action the Essex fought
all six
of her long 12’s, and the Cherub both her long 9’s,
instead of
the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly
used. This gives the Essex a better armament than she
would have
had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be
seen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept in
mind, that while in the battles between the American 44’s and
British 38’s, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in
reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18’s of
their opponents, in this case the Phœbe’s full weight
18’s had
a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12’s
of the Essex.
All accounts agree as to the armament of the Essex.
I have taken
that of the Phœbe and Cherub from James; but
Captain Porter’s
official letter, and all the other American accounts make the
Phœbe’s broadside 15 long 18’s and 8 short 32’s, and give
the
Cherub, in all, 18 short 32’s, 8 short 24’s, and two long
nines.
This would make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I
would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the
question rested solely on James’ veracity; but he probably took
his
figures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the
difference
between long guns and carronades, it appears that the Essex
was
really nearly intermediate in force between the Phœbe and
the
Cherub. The battle being fought, with a very trifling
exception,
at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled
ship
throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throwing
273 lbs., who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positions
where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist
could
not return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a single
instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds.
The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter
agree substantially
in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the Essex,
are found in the “Life of Farragut.” But although the British
captain
does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally
tried to belittle Porter’s conduct. It is much to be regretted
that
we have no British account worth paying attention to of the
proceedings
before the fight, when the Phœbe declined single combat
with the
Essex. James, of course, states that the Phœbe did
not decline
it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would
be valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action is
grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar’s report.
One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar’s
account of Porter’s loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the
Essex was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies
this,
thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There
is really no need of the corroboration of Porter’s letter, but he
has it most fully in the “Life of Farragut,” p. 37: “The men came
rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were
torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this
could
not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * *
*
One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body
which
had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days,
he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West
Indies.” The third unfounded statement in James’ account is that
buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the
Essex, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No
authority
is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He
ends
by stating that “few even in his own country will venture to speak
well of Captain David Porter.” After these various paragraphs we
are certainly justified in rejecting James’ account in toto.
An
occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of
a good many facts does not invalidate a man’s testimony with
regard
to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and
systematic
perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong
doubt on a historian’s remaining statements, unless they are
supported
by unquestionable authority.
But if British historians have generally given
Porter much less than
his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns,
his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done
in
similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances
in the case of the Essex for her having carronades only,
but utterly
fail to allude to the Cyane and Levant as having
suffered under
the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut
both ways.
The Essex having suffered chiefly above the
waterline, she was
repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the
voyage
to England, where she was added to the British navy. The Essex
Junior
was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New
York,
on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman
Lyman,
and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British
prisoners on board the Essex Junior. McKnight and Lyman
accompanied
the Phœbe to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a
Swedish vessel,
were taken out of her by the Wasp, Captain Blakely, and
were lost
with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New
York in safety. Of the prizes made by the Essex, some were
burnt
or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so,
after nearly two years’ uninterrupted success, the career of the
Essex terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least
her
officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example
of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match
elsewhere.
The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to
sea was the
Frolic, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out
early
in February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large
Carthagenian
privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside,
nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the
20th of April, lat. 24° 12’ N., long. 81° 25’ W., she fell in with
the British 36-gun frigate Orpheus, Captain Pigot, and the
12-gun
schooner Shelburne, Lieutenant Hope, both to leeward. The
schooner
soon weathered the Frolic, but of course was afraid to
close, and
the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to
escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors
cut
away, and finally the guns thrown overboard — a measure by means of
which both the Hornet, the Rattlesnake, and the Adams
succeeded
in escaping under similar circumstances, — but all was of no avail,
and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably
acquitted
both officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers the
surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown
overboard.
As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in
several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty
meanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington’s dictum on the
surrender (“Memoirs,” vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently
considered
as perfectly honorable.
A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock,
Captain Lewis Warrington,
sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the
28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47’ N., long. 80°
7’ W., several sail were made to
windward.
These were a small convoy of
merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the
18-gun brig-sloop Epervier, Captain Wales, 5 days out of
Havana,
and with $118,000 in specie on
board.
The Epervier when discovered was steering north by east,
the wind
being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually
round to the southward, and the Epervier hauled up close
on the
port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the Peacock
came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A.M. the
vessels were within gun-shot, and the Peacock edged away
to get
in a raking broadside, but the Epervier frustrated this by
putting
her helm up until close on her adversary’s bow, when she rounded
to
and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard
broadside of the Peacock at 10.20 A.M. These first
broadsides took
effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the
Peacock’s fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot
in the
starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her
fore-sail
and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the
Epervier eased
away
when abaft her foe’s beam, and ran off
alongside
of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the
starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The Peacock’s fire
was now
very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary’s hull, on which
it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The
Epervier coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the
loss of
head-sail, Captain Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but
they
refused, saying “she’s too heavy for
us,”
and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled
down.
Illustrations of the action between Peacock and Epervier between
10.10 and 11.05.
Except the injury to her fore-yard, the Peacock’s
damages were
confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays,
and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting,
all
told, of 166 men and
boys,
only two were wounded,
both
slightly. The Epervier, on the other hand, had 45
shot-holes in
her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the
side,
main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded
severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of
her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by
Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any
official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14
severely
and slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers,
and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades
(according
to the American
prize-lists;
Captain Warrington says 32’s). Otherwise she was armed
as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very “tubby,” being
as broad as the Peacock, though 10 feet shorter on deck.
Allowing,
as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we
get the
That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10,
the relative
execution done was as 12 is to 1, and the Epervier
surrendered
before she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the Epervier
closely resembles that of the Argus. In both cases the
officers
behaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was
heavier,
in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the Argus,
nor the crew of the Epervier fought with the determined
bravery
displayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of the
war. But it must be added that the Epervier did worse than
the
Argus, and the Peacock (American) better than the Pelican.
The gunnery of the Epervier was extraordinarily poor; “the
most
disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces
and the enemy hardly
scratched.”
James states that after the first two or
three
broadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the
others
were dismounted by the fire of the Peacock; that the men
had not
been exercised at the guns; and, most important of all, that the
crew (which contained “several foreigners,” but was chiefly
British;
as the Argus was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad.
The
Peacock, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well
as
excellent gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over the
fore-yard
had been sent down and fished, the fore-sail set up, and every
thing
in complete order
again;
the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though
great
exertions had to be made to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson,
first
of the Peacock, was put in charge as prize-master. The
next day
the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates
were
discovered in the north, to leeward. Captain Warrington at once
directed
the prize to proceed to St. Mary’s, while he separated and made
sail
on a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him,
as he was confident that the Peacock, a very fast vessel,
could
outsail
them.
The plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the
first
of May, and the ship three days afterward. The Epervier
was purchased
for the U.S. navy, under the same name and rate. The Peacock
sailed
again on
June 4th,
going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores; then
she stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and
afterward
cruised off Cork, the mouth of the Shannon, and the north
of Ireland,
capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great
consternation.
She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels that
had been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal,
Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching New
York,
Oct. 29th. During this cruise she encountered no war vessel
smaller
than a frigate; but captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some
containing
valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men.
On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner Ballahou, 6,
Lieutenant King, while
cruising off the American coast was captured by the Perry,
privateer,
a much heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes’ duration.
The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the
British to turn
their energies altogether to America; and in no place was this
increased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a great
number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports
had assembled, in preparation for the assault on Washington and
Baltimore. The defence of these waters was confided to Captain
Joshua
Barney,
with a flotilla of gun-boats. These
consisted
of three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of barges, which
were often smaller than the ship’s boats that were sent against
them.
These gun-boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and each
carried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or
12-pounders.
They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult to
believe that they were handled to the fullest advantage.
On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block sloop Scorpion
and
14 smaller “gun-boats,” chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth of
the Patuxent, and chased the British schooner St. Lawrence
and
seven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the
Dragon, 74, which in turn chased Barney’s flotilla into the
Patuxent,
where she blockaded it in company with the Albion, 74.
They were
afterward joined by the Loire, 38, Narcissus, 32,
and Lasseur,
18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard’s Creek,
while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth. A deadlock now
ensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the
ships’
boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats. On the 8th, 9th, and
11th skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats came
up till they caught sight of Barney’s flotilla, and were promptly
chased off by the latter, which, however, took good care not to
meddle with the larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the
artillery, with two long 18-pounders, assisted by the marines,
under
Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to cooperate from the
shore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. On
the 26th the joint attack took place most successfully; the Loire
and Narcissus were driven off, although not much damaged,
and the
flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7
wounded. But in spite of this small success, which was mainly due
to Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts with
his gun-boats. The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showed
at Bladensburg prove conclusively that their ill success on the
water
was due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the
men.
At the same period the French gun-boats were even more
unsuccessful,
but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs.
Barney’s flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet
until August 22d,
and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington. The
history of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on
Baltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, and
will be but briefly alluded to here. On August 20th Major-General
Ross and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and
marines,
moved on Washington by land; while a squadron, composed of the
Seahorse, 38, Euryalus, 36, bombs Devastation,
Ætna, and
Meteor, and rocket-ship Erebus, under Captain James
Alexander
Gordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near
Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the Menelaus, 38, was
sent
“to create a diversion” above Baltimore. Sir Peter’s “diversion”
turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to
attack
120 Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life,
while fifty of his followers were placed hors de combat
and the
remainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but
three
wounded.
The American army, which was to oppose Ross and
Cockburn, consisted
of some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only
about
1,500 British had time to become engaged. The fight was really
between
these 1,500 British regulars and the American flotilla men. These
consisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors,
some
of whom served under Captain Barney, who had a battery of two 18’s
and three 12’s, while the others were armed with muskets and
pikes,
and acted with the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly,
inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amounted
to 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men,
including the two captains, who were wounded and captured, with
the
guns.
Ross took Washington and burned the public buildings;
and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned the Columbia,
44,
and Argus, 18, which were nearly ready for service.
Captain Gordon’s attack on Fort Washington was
conducted with great
skill and success. Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as fired
upon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliating
conditions. Captain Gordon was now joined by the Fairy,
18, Captain
Baker, who brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral
Cochrane;
and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very
difficult
to navigate. Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two
44’s, Guerrière and Java, tried to bar their
progress, but had
not sufficient means. On September 1st an attempt was made to
destroy
the Devastation by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th
the attempt
was repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men,
but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, under
Captain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with the loss of his
second
lieutenant killed, and some twenty-five men killed or wounded. The
squadron also had to pass and silence a battery of light
field-pieces
on the 5th, where they suffered enough to raise their total loss
to
seven killed and thirty-five wounded. Gordon’s inland expedition
was
thus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost; it was
a most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains
and
crews engaged in it.
Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land
early in September.
On the 13th an indecisive conflict took place between the British
regulars and American militia, in which the former came off with
the honor, and the latter with the profit. The regulars held the
field, losing 350 men, including General Ross; the militia
retreated
in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was also
unsuccessful. At 5 A.M. on the 13th the bomb vessels Meteor,
Ætna, Terror, Volcano, and Devastation,
the rocket-ship
Erebus, and the frigates Severn, Euryalus,
Havannah, and
Hebrus opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other
fortifications
being occasionally fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade was
kept up between the forts and ships until 7 A.M. on the 14th, when
the British fleet and army retired.
I have related these events out of their natural
order because they
really had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is
necessary
to mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events.
The British and American accounts of the various gun-boat attacks
differ widely; but it is very certain that the gun-boats
accomplished
little or nothing of importance. On the other hand, their loss
amounted
to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward
raised,
and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed
that
of the British barges captured by them from time to time or
destroyed
by the land batteries.
The purchased brig Rattlesnake, 16, had been
cruising in the
Atlantic with a good deal of success; but in lat. 40° N., long.
33° W.,
was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig’s
commander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all his
guns except two long nines; and on June 22d he was captured by
the Leander, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C.
B.
The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the Wasp,
22, Captain
Johnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very
fine
crew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was said
not to have been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, at all
events, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever
better
manned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. The Wasp
slipped unperceived through the blockading frigates, and ran into
the mouth of the English Channel, right in the thick of the
English
cruisers; here she remained several weeks, burning and scuttling
many ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 A.M., in lat. 48° 36’ N.,
long. 11° 15’ W.,
while in chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on the
weather-beam. This was the British brig-sloop Reindeer,
18,
Captain William
Manners,
with a crew
of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas.
Like the Peacock (British) the Reindeer was only
armed with
24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he was
to do battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there was no
more
gallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men
who cared but little for odds of size or strength. As the day
broke,
the Reindeer made sail for the Wasp, then lying in
the west-southwest.
The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness
of the sea was
hardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the
northeast.
Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as the
latter
came slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the
weather
that the vessels kept almost on even keels. It was not till
quarter
past one that the Wasp’s drum rolled out its loud
challenge as
it beat to quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put
about
and stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1.50 the
brig
also tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful captains
being bent on keeping the weather-gage. At half past two the Reindeer
again tacked, and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the Wasp,
who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at
2.50, put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little
forward
the port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the Reindeer
hoisted
her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the Wasp’s
weather-quarter. At 17 minutes past three, when the vessels were
not sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing the
shifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To this
the Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and
fired,
with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and
would
have been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined
than
the Wasp’s. At 3.26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did
not
get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns
from aft forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the
brig
lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was
terribly
destructive. The concussion of the explosions almost deadened what
little way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung over them like a
pall. The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the
odds
in weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the Reindeer,
where both sides played their parts so manfully. Captain Manners
stood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again and
again. A grape-shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him
to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to his
feet, cheering on the seamen. The vessels were now almost
touching,
and putting his helm aweather, he ran the Wasp aboard on
her
port
quarter, while the
boarders
gathered forward, to try it with the steel. But the Carolina
captain
had prepared for this with cool confidence; the marines came aft;
close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in their
hands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up the
pikemen.
As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust at
one another through the open port-holes, while the black smoke
curled
up from between the hulls. Then through the smoke appeared the
grim
faces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough;
for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play. But
those
who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, escaped only to be
riddled
through by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands,
the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back. The
attack was foiled, though the Reindeer’s marines kept
answering
well the American fire. Then the English captain, already mortally
wounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but death
could conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang,
sword
in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed him
with a will. At that instant a ball from the Wasp’s
main-top
crashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand
the sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face to
the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yet
floated the flag for which he had given his life. No Norse Viking,
slain over shield, ever died better. As the British leader fell
and
his men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to board; with
wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the hammock nettings, there
was a moment’s furious struggle, the surviving British were slain
or driven below, and the captain’s clerk, the highest officer
left,
surrendered the brig, at 3.44, just 27 minutes after the Reindeer
had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the Wasp had
responded.
Capture of the Reindeer by the Wasp
Both ships had suffered severely in the short
struggle; but, as with
the Shannon and Chesapeake, the injuries were much less
severe
aloft than in the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The
Wasp’s hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a
24-pound shot
had passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 11 were
killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly.
The Reindeer was completely cut to pieces in a line with
her ports;
her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck. Of
her crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34
were wounded, nearly all severely.
It is thus seen that the Reindeer
fought at a greater disadvantage
than any other of the various British sloops that were captured in
single action during the war; and yet she made a better fight than
any of them (though the Frolic, and the Frolic
only, was defended
with the same desperate courage); a pretty sure proof that heavy
metal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for
the
American victories. “It is difficult to say which vessel behaved
the
best in this short but gallant
combat.”
I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders than
Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praise
attaches to both crews. The British could rightly say that they
yielded purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and the Americans,
that the difference in execution was fully proportioned to the
difference in force. It is difficult to know which to admire most,
the wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred before the
fight,
the perfect training and discipline that their crews showed, the
decision and promptitude with which Captain Manners tried to
retrieve
the day by boarding, and the desperate bravery with which the
attempt
was made; or the readiness with which Captain Blakely made his
preparations, and the cool courage with which the assault was
foiled.
All people of the English stock, no matter on which side of the
Atlantic they live, if they have any pride in the many feats of
fierce prowess done by the men of their blood and race, should
never
forget this fight; although we cannot but feel grieved to find
that
such men — men of one race and one speech; brothers in blood, as
well
as in bravery — should ever have had to turn their weapons against
one another.
The day after the conflict the prize’s foremast went
by the board,
and, as she was much damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her,
put a portion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and
with
the remainder proceeded to France, reaching l’Orient on the 8th
day
of July.
On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30
volunteers of the New York
flotilla
concealed
themselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by surprise the
Eagle tender, which contained a 32-pound howitzer and 14
men, 4
of whom were wounded.
On July 12th, while off the west coast of South
Africa, the American
brig Syren was captured after a chase of 11 hours by the Medway,
74, Captain Brine. The chase was to windward during the whole time,
and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard all her boats,
anchors, cables, and spare
spars.
Her commander, Captain
Parker,
had died, and she was in charge of Lieutenant N. J. Nicholson. By a
curious
coincidence, on the same day, July 12th, H. M. cutter Landrail,
4
of 20 men, Lieutenant Lancaster, was captured by the
American
privateer Syren, a schooner mounting 1 long heavy gun,
with a crew
of 70 men; the Landrail had 7, and the Syren 3 men
wounded.
On July 14th Gun-boat No. 88, Sailing-master George
Clement, captured
after a short skirmish the tender of the Tenedos frigate,
with
her second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10
seamen.
The Wasp stayed in l’Orient till she was
thoroughly refitted, and
had filled, in part, the gaps in her crew, from the American
privateers
in port. On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making two
prizes
during the next three days. On Sept. 1st she came up to a convoy
of
10 sail under the protection of the Armada, 74, all bound
for
Gibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round the merchant-men like
a hawk, and though chased off again and again by the
line-of-battle
ship, always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, and finally
actually succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, laden
with
iron and brass cannon, muskets, and other military stores of great
value. At half past six on the evening of the same day, in lat.
47°
30’ N., long. 11° W., while running almost free, four sail, two on
the starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more to leeward,
were
made
out.
Captain Blakely at once made sail for the most weatherly of the four
ships in sight, though well aware that more than one of them might
prove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all of unknown force.
But the determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by such
considerations. He probably had several men less under his command
than in the former action, but had profited by his experience with
the Reindeer in one point, having taken aboard her
12-pounder
boat carronade, of whose efficacy he had had very practical proof.
The chase, the British brig-sloop Avon, 18,
Captain the Honorable
James
Arbuthnot,
was steering almost
southwest; the wind, which was blowing fresh from the southeast,
being a little abaft the port beam. At 7.00 the Avon began
making
night signals with the lanterns, but the Wasp,
disregarding these,
came steadily on; at 8.38 the Avon fired a shot from her
stern-chaser,
and shortly afterward another from one
of her lee or starboard guns. At 20 minutes past 9, the Wasp
was
on the port or weather-quarter of the Avon, and the
vessels interchanged
several hails; one of the American officers then came forward on
the forecastle and ordered the brig to heave to, which the latter
declined doing, and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. The
Wasp then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound carronade into her,
to which
the Avon responded with her stern-chaser and the aftermost
port
guns. Captain Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversary
would try to escape, and ran to leeward of her, and then ranged up
alongside, having poured a broadside into her quarter. A close and
furious engagement began, at such short range that the only one of
the Wasp’s crew who was wounded, was hit by a wad; four
round shot
struck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered a good deal in
her rigging. The men on board did not know the name of their
antagonist;
but they could see through the smoke and the gloom of the night,
as her black hull surged through the water, that she was a large
brig; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be discerned,
clustering in the
tops.
In
spite of the darkness the Wasp’s fire was directed with
deadly
precision; the Avon’s gaff was shot away at almost the
first
broadside, and most of her main-rigging and spars followed suit.
She was hulled again and again, often below water-line; some of
her
carronades were dismounted, and finally the main-mast went by the
board. At 10.00, after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had been
completely silenced and Captain Blakely hailed to know if she had
struck. No answer being received, and the brig firing a few random
shot, the action recommended; but at 10.12 the Avon was
again
hailed, and this time answered that she had struck. While lowering
away a boat to take possession, another sail (H. B. M. brig-sloop
Castilian, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen astern. The men
were again
called to quarters, and every thing put in readiness as rapidly as
possible; but at 10.36 two more sail were seen (one of which was
H. B. M. Tartarus,
20
).
The braces being cut away, the Wasp was put before the
wind until
new ones could be rove. The Castilian pursued till she
came up
close, when she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, the
weather-quarter of the Wasp, cutting her rigging slightly.
Repeated
signals of distress having now been made by the Avon
(which had
lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the Castilian tacked
and stood
for her, and on closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had her
crew been taken out when she went down.
Counting the Wasp’s complement as full
(though it was probably
two or three short), taking James’ statement of the crew of the
Avon as true, including the boat carronades of both
vessels, and
considering the Avon’s stern-chaser to have been a
six-pounder,
we get the
It is self-evident that in
the case of this action the odds, 14 to
11, are neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as
14 to 1, nor for the rapidity with which, during a night
encounter,
the Avon was placed in a sinking condition. “The gallantry
of the
Avon’s officers and crew cannot for a moment be questioned;
but
the gunnery of the latter appears to have been not one whit better
than, to the discredit of the British navy, had frequently before
been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judging from the
specimen
given by the Castilian, is it likely that she would have
performed
any
better.”
On the other hand, “Captain
Blakely’s conduct on this occasion had all the merit shown in the
previous action, with the additional claim of engaging an enemy
under circumstances which led him to believe that her consorts
were
in the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer-like way in which
the Avon was destroyed, and the coolness with which he
prepared
to engage the Castilian within ten minutes after his first
antagonist
had struck, are the best encomiums on this officer’s character and
spirit, as well as on the school in which he had been
trained.”
The Wasp now cruised to the southward and
westward, taking and
scuttling one or two prizes. On Sept. 21st, lat. 33° 12’ N., long.
14° 56’ W., she captured the brig Atalanta, 8, with 19
men, which
proved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one of the
midshipmen,
Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah in
safety
on Nov. 4th. Meanwhile the Wasp kept on toward the
southeast. On
Oct. 9th, in lat. 18° 35’ N., long. 30° 10’ W., she spoke and
boarded
the Swedish brig Adonis, and took out of her Lieutenant
McKnight and
Mr. Lyman, a master’s mate, both late of the Essex, on
their way
to England from Brazil.
This was the last that was ever heard of the gallant
but ill-fated
Wasp. How she perished none ever knew; all that is certain
is that
she was never seen again. She was as good a ship, as well manned,
and as ably commanded as any vessel in our little navy; and it may
be doubted if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war of
her
size and strength that could have stood against her in fair fight.
As I have said, the Wasp was manned almost
exclusively by Americans.
James says they were mostly Irish; the reason he gives for the
assertion being that Captain Blakely spent the first 16 months of
his
life in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par with another piece
of logic which I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to
prove
is that Americans are cowards. Accordingly, on p. 475: “On her
capstan
the Constitution now mounted a piece resembling 7 musket
barrels,
fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, and
each barrel threw 25 balls. * * * What could have impelled the
Americans
to invent such extraordinary implements of war but fear,
down-right
fear?” Then a little further on: “The men were provided with
leather
boarding-caps, fitted with bands of iron, * * * another strong
symptom
of fear!” Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply evidence
of an unsound mind; it is not so much malicious as idiotic. I only
reproduce it to help prove what I have all along insisted on, that
any of James’ unsupported statements about the Americans, whether
respecting the tonnage of the ships or the courage of the crews,
are not worth the paper they are written on; on all points
connected
purely with the British navy, or which can be checked off by
official
documents or ships’ logs, or where there would be no particular
object
in falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, from the
diligence
and painstaking care he shows, and the thoroughness and minuteness
with which he goes into details.
A fair-minded and interesting English
critic,
whose remarks are
generally very just, seems to me to have erred somewhat in
commenting
on this last sloop action. He says that the Avon was first
crippled
by dismantling shot from long guns. Now, the Wasp
had but one
long gun on the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action with
the shortest and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues
that
the Avon, like the Peacock, “was hulled so low
that the shot-holes
could not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circumstance only.”
It certainly cannot be said when a brig has been dismasted, has
had
a third of her crew placed hors de combat, and has been
rendered
an unmanageable hulk, that she yields only because she has
received
a few shot below the water-line. These shot-holes undoubtedly
hastened
the result, but both the Peacock and the Avon
would have
surrendered even if they had remained absolutely water-tight.
The Adams, 28, had been cut down to a sloop
of war at Washington,
and then lengthened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting
on each side 13 medium 18’s, or columbiads, and 1 long 12, with a
crew of 220 men, under the command of Captain Charles Morris, late
first lieutenant of the
Constitution.
She slipped out of
the
Potomac and past the blockaders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastward
to the African coast and along it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas,
thence to the Canaries and Cape de Verd. She returned very nearly
along the Equator, thence going toward the West Indies. The cruise
was unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and
ivory,
being made. In hazy weather, on March 25th, a large Indiaman (the
Woodbridge) was captured; but while taking possession the
weather
cleared up, and Captain Morris found himself to leeward of 25 sail,
two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were making for him, and
it took him till the next day to shake them off. He entered
Savannah
on May 1st and sailed again on the 8th, standing in to the Gulf
Stream, between Makanillan and Florida, to look out for the
Jamaica
fleet. He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failed
to do him much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 74,
two frigates, and three brigs. The Adams hovered on their
skirts
for a couple of days, but nothing could be done with them, for the
merchant-men sailed in the closest possible order and the six war
vessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed
northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where she met with nothing
but
fogs and floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. On
July 4th she made out and chased two sail, who escaped into the
mouth
of the Shannon. After this the Adams, heartily tired of
fogs and
cold, stood to the southward and made a few prizes; then, in lat.
44° N., long. 10° W., on July 15th, she stumbled across the
18-pounder
36-gun frigate Tigris, Captain Henderson. The frigate was to
leeward,
and a hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of cutting away her
anchors and throwing overboard some of her guns that the Adams
held her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Captain Morris and his
first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, had been the first and second
lieutenants of Old Ironsides in Hull’s famous cruise, and
they
proved that they had not forgotten their early experience, for
they
got out the boats to tow, and employed their time so well that by
sunrise the frigate was two leagues astern. After 18 hours’ more
chase the Adams dropped her. But in a day or two she ran
across
a couple more, one of which, an old bluff-bows, was soon thrown
out;
but the other was very fast, and kept close on the corvette’s
heels.
As before, the frigate was to leeward. The Adams had been
built
by contract; one side was let to a sub-contractor of economical
instincts, and accordingly turned out rather shorter than the
other;
the result was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack
than
on the other. In this chase she finally got on her good tack in
the
night, and so
escaped
Captain Morris now turned homeward.
During
his two cruises he had made but 10 prizes (manned by 161 men),
none
of very great value. His luck grew worse and worse. The continual
cold and damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew were
prostrated by the disease; and the weather kept on foggy as ever.
Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the Rifleman, Captain
Pearce) was
discovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick weather. The
fog
grew heavier, and early on the morning of Aug. 17th the Adams
struck
land — literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the Isle of
Haute,
and had to throw over provisions, spare spars, etc., before she
could
be got off. Then she entered the Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles up
it to Hampden. The Rifleman meanwhile conveyed
intelligence of
her whereabouts to a British fleet, consisting of two
line-of-battle
ships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop transports,
under
the joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffeth and Lieutenant-General
Sherbrooke.
This expedition accordingly went into the Penobscot
and anchored
off Castine. Captain Morris made every preparation he could to
defend
his ship, but his means were very limited; seventy of his men were
dead or disabled by the scurvy; the remainder, many of them also
diseased, were mustered out, to the number of 130 officers and
seamen
(without muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30
regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with squirrel guns,
ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc., — in all between 500 and 550
men
,only 180 of whom,
with 50 muskets among them, could be depended upon. On Sept. 3d
the
British advanced by land and water, the land-force being under the
direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 600
troops,
80 marines, and 80
seamen.
The flotilla was composed of
barges, launches, and rocket-boats, under the command of Captain
Barry of the Dragon, 74. In all there were over 1,500 men.
The
seamen of the Adams, from the wharf, opened fire on the
flotilla,
which returned it with rockets and carronades; but the advance was
checked. Meanwhile the British land-forces attacked the militia,
who acted up to the traditional militia standard, and retreated
with
the utmost promptitude and celerity, omitting the empty formality
of firing. This left Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his
number, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the corvette
and retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars behaved well, and
no attempt was made to molest them. None of Captain Morris’ men
were hit; his loss was confined to one sailor and one marine who
were too much weakened by scurvy to retreat with the others, who
marched to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten men
killed
or wounded.
On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, commanded by
Mr. Thomas M.
Pendleton, captured off Sapoleo Bar, Ga., the British privateer
Fortune of War, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35
men. She
made a brief resistance, losing two of her
men.
On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops Hermes
and Carron,
and 18-gun brig-sloops Sophie and Childers, and a
force of 200
men on
shore,
attacked Fort Bowyer, on
Mobile Point, but were repulsed without being able to do any
damage
whatever to the Americans. The Hermes was sunk and the
assailants
lost about 80 men.
Captain Samuel C. Reid.
by John Wesley Jarvis in 1815.
On the 26th of September, while the
privateer-schooner General
Armstrong, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of one long
24,
eight long 9’s, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of
Fayal,
a British squadron, composed of the Plantagenet, 74,
Captain Robert
Floyd, Rota, 38, Captain Philip Somerville, and Carnation,
18,
Captain George Bentham, hove in
sight.
One or more boats were sent in by the British, to
reconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, according to the
American accounts, to carry her by a coup de main. At any
rate,
after repeatedly warning them off, the privateer fired into them,
and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, with springs on his
cables, nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which was not
long deferred. At 8 P.M. four boats from the Plantagenet
and three
from the Rota, containing in all 180
men,
under the command of
Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the Rota, pulled
in toward
the road, while the Carnation accompanied them to attack
the schooner
if she got under way. The boats pulled in under cover of a small
reef of rocks, where they lay for some time, and about midnight
made the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot gun, and
immediately afterward with their long 9’s, while the boats replied
with their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly on amidst a
terrific
fire of musketry from both sides, laid the schooner aboard on her
bow and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage enough, the
British
hacking at the nettings and trying to clamber up on deck, while
the
Americans fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of their
assailants and thrust the foremost through with their long pikes.
The boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the forecastle
all
three of the American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and the
men were giving back when Captain Reid led all the after-division
up and drove the British back into their boats. This put an end to
the assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being saved
as the shore was so near; two others were captured, and but three
of the scattered flotilla returned to the ships. Of the Americans,
2 were killed, including the second lieutenant, Alexander O.
Williams,
and 7 were wounded, including the first and third lieutenants,
Frederick A. Worth and Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were
killed
and 86 were wounded; among the former being the Rota’s first and
third lieutenants, William Matterface and Charles R. Norman, and
among the latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant of
marines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner’s long 24 had
been knocked off its carriage by a carronade shot, but it was
replaced
and the deck cleared for another action. Next day the Carnation
came in to destroy the privateer, but was driven off by the
judicious
use the latter made of her “Long Tom.” But affairs being now
hopeless,
the General Armstrong was scuttled and burned, and the
Americans
retreated to the land. The British squadron was bound for New
Orleans,
and on account of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was late
in arriving, so that this action may be said to have helped in
saving
the Crescent City. Few regular commanders could have done as well
as Captain Reid.
On October 6th, while Gun-boat No. 160 was convoying
some coasters
from Savannah, it was carried by a British tender and nine
boats.
The gun-vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from St.
Mary’s, and the boats approached with muffled oars early in the
morning. They were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the
defence
though short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. Of the
gun-boat’s 30 men but 16 were fit for action: those, under
Sailing-master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially,
fought with the greatest gallantry; his thigh was broken by a
grape-shot at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his other
leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust through by
a pike and had received two sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds
would
have been enough to put an ordinary man hors de combat.
On October 11th, another desperate privateer battle
took place.
The brigantine Prince-de-Neufchâtel, Captain Ordronaux, of
New
York, was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 17 guns,
and originally possessing a crew of 150
men.
She had made a very successful cruise, having on board
goods
to the amount of $300,000, but had manned and sent in so many
prizes
that only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners
were
confined in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, but had
drifted off to such a distance that she was unable to take part in
the fight. At mid-day, on the 11th of October, while off
Nantucket,
the British frigate Endymion, 40, Captain Henry Hope,
discovered
the privateer and made sail in
chase.
At 8.30 P.M., a calm having come on, the frigate despatched 5
boats,
containing 111
men,
under the command of the first lieutenant, Abel
Hawkins,
to take the brigantine; while the latter triced up the boarding
nettings, loaded the guns with grape and bullets, and prepared
herself
in every way for the coming encounter. She opened fire on the
boats
as they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and a most
desperate
engagement ensued. Some of the British actually cut through the
nettings and reached the deck, but were killed by the
privateersmen;
and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, three others drifted off,
and the launch, which was under the brigantine’s stern, was taken
possession of. The slaughter had been frightful, considering the
number of the combatants. The victorious privateersmen had lost
7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9
untouched!
Of the Endymion’s men, James says 28, including the first
lieutenant
and a midshipman, were killed, and 37, including the second
lieutenant
and a master’s mate, wounded; “besides which the launch was
captured
and the crew made prisoners.” I do not know if this means 37
wounded,
besides the wounded in the launch, or
not;
of the prisoners captured 18 were
wounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55
wounded,
and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10
prisoners; but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much
matter.
It was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering how
short-handed
the brigantine was, it reflected the highest honor on the American
captain and his crew.
After their repulse before Baltimore the British
concentrated their
forces for an attack upon New Orleans. Accordingly a great fleet
of line-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under
Vice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of
store-ships
and transports, containing the army of General Packenham, appeared
off the Chandeleur Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in these
parts consisted of the ship Louisiana and schooner Carolina
in
the Mississippi river, and in the shallow bayous a few gun-boats,
of course without quarters, low in the water, and perfectly easy
of entrance. There were also a few tenders and small boats. The
British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, shallow inlet
called Lake Borgne on the 12th; on this inlet there were 5
gun-boats
and 2 small tenders, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Catesby
Jones.
It was impossible for the British to transport their troops across
Lake Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was destroyed.
Accordingly, on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with
24-, 18-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying
980 seamen and marines, under the orders of
Captain
Lockyer,
pushed off from the Armide, 38, in three
divisions;
the first under the command of Captain Lockyer, the second under
Captain
Montresor, and the third under
Captain Roberts.
Lieutenant
Jones
was at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux Islands, when he
discovered, on the 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward
Port
Christian. He at once despatched the Seahorse of one
6-pounder
and 14 men, under Sailing-master William Johnston, to destroy the
stores at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, where
she was assisted by two 6-pounders. There the British attacked her
with seven of their smaller boats, which were repulsed after
sustaining
for nearly half an hour a very destructive
fire.
However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it
from being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile Lieutenant Jones got
under
way with the five gun-vessels, trying to reach Les Petites
Coquilles,
near a small fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was
light
and baffling, and the current very strong, the effort was given
up,
and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux Island passage at
1 A.M. on the
14th.
The other tender, the Alligator, Sailing-master
Sheppard,
of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next morning trying to
get to her consorts, and taken with a rush by Captain Roberts and
his
division. At daybreak Lieutenant Jones saw the British boats about
nine
miles to the eastward, and moored his 5-gun vessel abreast in the
channel, with their boarding nettings triced up, and every thing
in readiness; but the force of the current drifted two of them,
Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down the pass and out of line,
No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their exact force was as
follows:
No. 156, Lieutenant Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 12-pound
carronades); No. 163, Sailing-master Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns
(1 long 24 and 2 12-pound carronades); No. 162, Lieutenant Robert
Speddes,
35 men, 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 light sixes); No. 5,
Sailing-master
John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (1 long 24, 4 12-pound carronades);
No. 23, Lieutenant Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (1 long 32 and 4
light sixes). There were thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of
14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces amounted,
as I have said, to 980 men, and (supposing they had equal numbers
of 24’s, 18’s and 12’s,) the flotilla threw seven hundred and
fifty-eight pounds of shot. The odds of course were not as much
against the Americans as these figures would make them, for they
were stationary, had some long, heavy guns and boarding nettings;
on the other hand the fact that two of their vessels had drifted
out of line was a very serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds
were great enough, considering that he had British sailors to deal
with, to make it any thing but a cheerful look-out for Lieutenant
Jones;
but nowise daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat the
American
officers and seamen prepared very coolly for the fight. In this
connection it should be remembered that simply to run the boats on
shore would have permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen
to
do so.
The Battle of Lake Borgne.
By Thomas Hornbrook.
Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antagonist.
When he had reached
a point just out of gun-shot, he brought the boats to a grapnel,
to let the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after the
fatigue of their long row. When his men were rested and in good
trim
he formed the boats in open order, and they pulled gallantly on
against
the strong current. At 10.50 the Americans opened fire from their
long guns, and in about 15 minutes the cannonade became general on
both sides. At
11:50.
Captain
Lockyer’s
barge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obstinate struggle
ensued,
“in which the greater part of the officers and crew of the barge
were
killed or
wounded,”
including
among the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and his
equally
gallant first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the Seahorse
frigate, mortally.
At the same time Lieutenant Tatnall (of the Tonnant) also laid
his
barge aboard the gun-boat, only to have it sunk; another shared
the
same fate; and the assailants were for the moment repulsed. But at
this time Lieutenant Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery
during
the assault, as forethought in preparing for it, received a
dangerous
and disabling wound, while many of his men received the same fate;
the boarding nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. Several
more barges at once assailed the boats, the command of which had
devolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the latter,
fighting
as bravely as his commander, was like him severely wounded,
whereupon
the boat was carried at 12.10. Its guns were turned on No. 163,
and
this, the smallest of the gun-boats, was soon taken; then the
British
dashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a very gallant defence, in
which Lieutenant Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24
dismounted
by the recoil, and was next carried; finally, No. 23, being left
entirely alone, hauled down her flag at
12:30.
The Americans had
lost
6 killed and 35 wounded; the British 17 killed and 77 (many
mortally)
wounded. The greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in
boarding
No. 156, and also the next two gun-boats.
I have in this case, as usual, taken each
commander’s account of
his own force and loss. Lieutenant Jones states the British force to
have been 1,000, which tallies almost exactly with their own
account;
but believes that they lost 300 in killed and wounded. Captain
Lockyer, on the other hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three
additional light guns. But on the main points the two accounts
agree
perfectly. The victors certainly deserve great credit for the
perseverance, gallantry and dash they displayed; but still more
belongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate courage
with which they fought, although with the certainty of ultimate
defeat
before them, — which is always the severest test of bravery. No
comment
is needed to prove the effectiveness of their resistance. Even
James
says that the Americans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieutenant
Jones
displayed great personal bravery, and that the British loss was
very
severe.
On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat up the
quarters of the
British encamped on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was
opened by Captain Patterson in the schooner Carolina, 14;
she was
manned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 12-pound carronades
and one long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved, till
opposite
the bivouac of the troops and so close to the shore that his first
command to fire was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened a
slaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, and kept it up
without suffering any loss in return, as long as the attack
lasted.
But on the 27th the British had their revenge, attacking the
little
schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to ascend the current on
account
of the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The assailants had a
battery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot and shell, while the only gun
of the schooner’s that would reach was the long 12. After half an
hour’s fighting the schooner was set on fire and blown up; the
crew
escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded.
The
only remaining vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats,
was the Louisiana, 16, carrying on each side eight long
24’s. She
was of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, throwing during
the course of the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very
little
in
return.
Afterward the American
seamen and marines played a most gallant part in all the
engagements
on shore; they made very efficient artillerists.
Source.
The first 5 small vessels
that are bracketed were to cruise under
Commodore Porter; the next 4 under Commodore Perry; but the news
of peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of the
vessels under this catalogue were really almost ready for sea at
the end of 1813; and some that I have included in the catalogue of
1815 were almost completely fitted at the end of 1814, — but this
arrangement is practically the best.
There were also a good many
gun-boats, which I do not count, because,
as already said, they were often not as large as the barges that
were sunk and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, etc.
LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH.
Taking into account the
losses on the lakes, there was not very much
difference in the amount of damage done to each combatant by the
other;
but both as regards the material results and the moral effects,
the
balance inclined largely to the Americans. The chief damage done
to our navy was by the British land-forces, and consisted mainly
in forcing us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the
ocean
our three sloops were captured in each case by an overwhelming
force,
against which no resistance could be made, and the same was true
of the captured British schooner. The Essex certainly
gained as
much honor as her opponents. There were but three single ship
actions,
in all of which the Americans were so superior in force as to give
them a very great advantage; nevertheless, in two of them the
victory
was won with such perfect impunity and the difference in the loss
and damage inflicted was so very great, that I doubt if the result
would have been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the
other
case, that of the Reindeer, the defeated party fought at a
still
greater disadvantage, and yet came out of the conflict with full
as much honor as the victor. No man with a particle of generosity
in his nature can help feeling the most honest admiration for the
unflinching courage and cool skill displayed by Captain Manners and
his crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering the sneers of so
many
of the British authors at the “wary circumspection” of the
Americans)
that Captain Manners, who has left a more honorable name than any
other
British commander of the war, excepting Captain Broke, behaved with
the greatest caution as long as it would serve his purpose, while
he showed the most splendid personal courage afterward. It is this
combination of courage and skill that made him so dangerous an
antagonist; it showed that the traditional British bravery was not
impaired by refusing to adhere to the traditional British tactics
of rushing into a fight “bull-headed.” Needless exposure to danger
denotes not so much pluck as stupidity. Captain Manners had no
intention
of giving his adversary any advantage he could prevent. No one can
help feeling regret that he was killed; but if he was to fall,
what
more glorious death could he meet? It must be remembered that
while
paying all homage to Captain Manners, Captain Blakely did equally
well.
It was a case where the victory between two combatants, equal in
courage and skill, was decided by superior weight of metal and
number
of men.
Chapter IV
1815
THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS
The war on land generally disastrous — British send
great expedition
against New Orleans — Jackson prepares for the defence of the
city — Night
attack on the British advance guard — Artillery duels — Great battle
of January 8, 1815 — Slaughtering repulse of the main attack — Rout
of the Americans on the right bank of the river — Final retreat of
the British — Observations on the character of the troops and
commanders engaged.
WHILE
our navy had been successful, the war on land
had been for
us full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a
loosely
knit confederacy, the sparse population scattered over a great
expanse
of land. Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of power in
1800, the nation’s ability to maintain order at home and enforce
respect abroad had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years’
nerveless
reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us impotent for attack
and almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose
views
and theories had a profound influence upon our national life, was
perhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the
presidential
chair; being almost purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to
grapple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even excepting
his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man
less
fit to guide the state with honor and safety through the stormy
times
that marked the opening of the present century. Without the
prudence
to avoid war or the forethought to prepare for it, the
Administration
drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy prepared
by the Federalists twelve years before, and weakened rather than
strengthened during the intervening time, saved us from complete
and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginia
made no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by “the
nation in arms”; the exponents of this particular idea, the
militiamen,
a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the
field.
The regulars were not much better. After two years of warfare,
Scott
records in his autobiography that there were but two books of
tactics
(one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara
frontier;
and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance that
he had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided into
squads, in the school of the soldier and school of the
company.
It is small wonder that
such
troops were utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the
end,
the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and the
administration of the War Department continued to be a triumph of
imbecility to the very
last.
With the
exception
of the brilliant and successful charge of the Kentucky mounted
infantry
at the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in
the
North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer
of
1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy’s Lane,
though
reflecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, was
for the former a defeat, and not a victory, as most of our writers
seem to suppose.
But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a
contest between the
two branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on the
part of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidly
growing one of these same two branches; and this last portion of
the struggle, though attracting comparatively little attention,
was
really much the most far-reaching in its effect upon history. The
triumph of the British would have distinctly meant the giving a
new
lease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a
time,
of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, of
the march of English civilization across the continent. The
English
of Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when their
race would reach to a worldwide supremacy.
There was much fighting along our Western frontier
with various Indian
tribes; and it was especially fierce in the campaign that a
backwoods
general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against the
powerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in
like
a wedge between the United States proper and their dependency, the
newly acquired French province of Louisiana. After several
slaughtering
fights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe Bend,
the
power of the Creeks was broken for ever; and afterward, as there
was much question over the proper boundaries of what was then the
Latin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the
Spaniards
and drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile the British, having made
a successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia and
Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the most
formidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against the
outlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson of necessity
became.
Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was
the
theatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was
played.
Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the
quaking delta
thrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong
torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city of
New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost,
once
and again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king,
there
was a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so
freely
through the veins of its citizens; joined by purchase to the great
Federal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save
that of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need had
come upon the city; for against it came the red English, lords of
fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels — ships of the
line — frigates and sloops — under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way
to New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop ships,
with
aboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and
hardy veterans of the
Peninsular War,
who had been trained for seven years
in the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one
of the bravest and ablest of all Wellington’s brave and able
lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham.
On the 8th of December 1814, the foremost vessels,
with among their
number the great two-decker Tonnant, carrying the
admiral’s flag,
anchored off the
Chandeleur Islands;
and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easily
breasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by
boats
through the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river
ten
miles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming.
There
was but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that
was
the presence in the bayous of five American gun-boats, manned by
a hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieutenant-commanding
Catesby
Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain
Nicholas
Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors and
marines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century of
unbroken ocean warfare. The gun-boats were moored in a
head-and-stern
line, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up,
and every thing ready to do desperate battle; but the British
rowed
up with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of great
guns and musketry; the vessels were grappled amid fierce
resistance;
the boarding-nettings were slashed through and cut away; with
furious
fighting the decks were gained; and one by one, at push of pike
and
cutlass stroke the gun-boats were carried in spite of their
stubborn
defenders; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while
the
assailants had lost a hundred men, and the assailed about half as
many.
There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the
troops; and as the
scattered transports arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and
ferried
through the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed
craft;
and finally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong,
under
General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal Viller�, and
camped on
the bank of the
river,
but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed
a
certain prize, almost within their grasp.
Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their
very gates, nothing
save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the
Crescent
City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. Andrew Jackson,
having
utterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacy
that had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughty
Spaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of his
rugged intellect and indomitable will to the one object of
defending
New Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. He
had hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated them
with an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Born
and brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, and
knowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish and
preserve the strictest martial law in the city without in the
least
quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring
energy
he united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt
to attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with ready
grasp the slightest vantage-ground, and never giving up a foot of
earth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a
defensive
game when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he always
followed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to this
wild soldiery. In after-years he did to his country some good and
more evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New
Orleans
without profound and unmixed thankfulness.
He had not reached the city till December 2d, and
had therefore but
three weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal
Government,
throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence of
Louisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort
were
sent to it, nor were any measures taken for its
aid.
The inhabitants had been in a state
of
extreme despondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for they
had no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factional
divisions;
but after his coming there was
nothing but the utmost enthusiasm displayed, so great was the
confidence
he inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition.
Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all the
important positions, the whole population working night and day at
them; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce of
war material that the city contained was seized; martial law was
proclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every thing
being rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence.
Jackson’s forces were small. There were two war
vessels in the river.
One was the little schooner Carolina, manned by regular
seamen,
largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built ship Louisiana,
a powerful corvette; she had of course no regular crew, and her
officers
were straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of the
maritime population of New Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged
Yankees,
Portuguese and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen,
dark-skinned
Spaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served
under
the bold privateersman Lafitte, — all alike were taken, and all
alike
by unflagging exertions were got into shape for
battle.
There
were
two regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundred
men, raw and not very well disciplined, but who were now drilled
with great care and regularity. In addition to this Jackson raised
somewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There were
some Americans among them, but they were mostly French
Creoles,
and one band had in its formation
something
that was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of
color,
who had gathered to defend the land which
kept the men of their race in slavery; who were to shed their
blood
for the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but
bondage;
who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren might
live on ignobly as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger
instance
than this of the irony of fate.
But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on these
troops New Orleans
could not have been saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers of
Tennessee, who, under their Generals, Coffee and Carroll, were
pushing
their toilsome and weary way toward the city. Every effort was
made
to hurry their march through the almost impassable roads, and at
last,
in the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, the day of which
the British troops reached the river bank, the vanguard of the
Tennesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of form and grim of
face; with their powder-horns slung over their buckskin shirts;
carrying
their long rifles on their shoulders and their heavy
hunting-knives
stuck in their belts; with their coon-skin caps and fringed
leggings;
thus came the grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of the
Horse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager to
pit
themselves against the trained regulars of Britain, and to throw
down the gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of the
island
English. Accustomed to the most lawless freedom, and to giving
free
reign to the violence of their passions, defiant of discipline and
impatient of the slightest restraint, caring little for God and
nothing
for man, they were soldiers who, under an ordinary commander,
would
have been fully as dangerous to themselves and their leaders as to
their foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men the one best fitted
to manage such troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before
the
ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than their own; and their
sullen,
stubborn wills were bent as last before his unyielding temper and
iron hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he typified their
passions and prejudices, their faults and their virtues; he shared
their hardships as if he had been a common private, and, in turn,
he always made them partakers of his triumphs. They admired his
personal prowess with pistol and rifle, his unswerving loyalty to
his friends, and the relentless and unceasing war that he waged
alike
on the foes of himself and his country. As a result they loved and
feared him as few generals have ever been loved or feared; they
obeyed
him unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without flinching or
murmuring,
and they ever made good on the field of battle the promise their
courage held out to his judgment.
It was noon of December 23d when General Keane, with
nineteen hundred
men, halted and pitched his camp on the east bank of the
Mississippi;
and in the evening enough additional troops arrived to swell his
force
to over twenty-three hundred
soilders.
Keane’s encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly covered with
fields and farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded on one
side by the river, on the other by gloomy and impenetrable cypress
swamps; and there was no obstacle interposed between the British
camp and the city it menaced.
At two in the afternoon word was brought to Jackson
that the foe had
reached the river bank, and without a moment’s delay the old
backwoods
fighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At once, and as if
by magic, the city started from her state of rest into one of
fierce
excitement and eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; in
every
quarter the war-drums were beaten; while, amid the din and clamor,
all the regulars and marines, the best of the creole militia, and
the vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee, — forming a total of
a little more than two thousand
men,
— were assembled in great haste, and the gray of the
winter twilight saw them, with Old Hickory at their head, marching
steadily along the river bank toward the camp of their foes.
Patterson,
meanwhile, in the schooner Carolina, dropped down with the
current
to try the effect of a flank attack.
Meanwhile the British had spent the afternoon in
leisurely arranging
their camp, in posting the pickets, and in foraging among the
farm-houses.
There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended huge campfires
were
lit, at which the hungry soldiers cooked their suppers
undisturbed.
One division of the troops had bivouacked on the high levee that
kept
the waters from flooding the land near by; and about half past
seven
in the evening their attention was drawn to a large schooner which
had dropped noiselessly down, in the gathering dusk, and had come
to
anchor a short distance offshore, the force of the stream swinging
her
broadside to the
camp.
The
soldiers
crowded down to the water’s edge, and, as the schooner returned no
answer to their hails, a couple of musket-shots were fired at her.
As if in answer to this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly
the
harsh voice of her commander, as he sung out, “Now then, give it
to
them for the honor of America” ; and at once a storm of grape
hurtled
into their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only field-pieces
with
Keane were two light 3-pounders, not able to cope with the Carolina’s
artillery; the rocket guns were brought up, but were speedily
silenced;
musketry proved quite as ineffectual; and in a very few minutes
the
troops were driven helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced
to
shelter themselves behind it, not without having suffered severe
loss.
The night
was now as black as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires,
beaten about and scattered by the schooner’s shot, burned with a
dull red glow; and at short intervals the darkness was momentarily
lit up by the flashes of the Carolina’s guns. Crouched
behind the
levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, listening in painful
silence to the pattering of the grape among the huts, and to the
moans and shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. Things
continued
thus till toward nine o’clock, when a straggling fire from the
pickets
gave warning of the approach of a more formidable foe. The
American
land-forces had reached the outer lines of the British camp, and
the
increasing din of the musketry, with ringing through it the
whip-like
crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the whole British army
to the shock of a desperate and uncertain strife. The young moon
had
by this time struggled through the clouds, and cast on the
battle-field
a dim, unearthly light that but partly relieved the intense
darkness.
All order was speedily lost. Each officer, American or British, as
fast
as he could gather a few soldiers round him, attacked the nearest
group of foes; the smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle,
when,
if unhurt, he would rally what men he could and plunge once more
into
the fight. The battle soon assumed the character of a multitude of
individual combats, dying out almost as soon as they began,
because
of the difficulty of telling friend from foe, and beginning with
ever-increasing fury as soon as they had ended. The clatter of the
firearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud
commands
of the officers, the defiant shouts of the men, joined to the
yells
and groans of those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible
a
noise and tumult that it maddened the coolest brains. From one
side
or the other bands of men would penetrate into the heart of the
enemy’s
lines, and would there be captured, or would cut their way out
with
the prisoners they had taken. There was never a fairer field for
the
fiercest personal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were
of
little service, and the fighting was hand to hand. Many a sword,
till
then but a glittering toy, was that night crusted with blood. The
British soldiers and the American regulars made fierce play with
their bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with their long
hunting-knives.
Man to man, in the grimmest hate, they fought and died, some by
bullet
and some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More than one in
his
death agony slew the foe at whose hand he himself had received the
mortal wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, locked in
the
death grip. Again the clouds came over the moon; a thick fog crept
up from the river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of the
battlefield; and long before midnight the fighting stopped
perforce,
for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were such that no one
could
see a yard away. By degrees each side drew
off.
In sullen silence
Jackson marched his men up the river, while the wearied British
returned to their camp. The former had lost over two
hundred,
the latter nearly
three
hundred
men; for the darkness and confusion that added to
the horror, lessened the slaughter of the battle.
Jackson drew back about three miles, where he halted
and threw up
a long line of breastworks, reaching from the river to the morass;
he left a body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. All the
English troops reached the field on the day after the fight; but
the rough handling that the foremost had received made them
cautious
about advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept behind the
levee all day by the Carolina, which opened upon them
whenever
they tried to get away; nor was it till dark that they made their
escape out of range of her cannon. Christmas-day opened drearily
enough for the invaders. Although they were well inland, the
schooner,
by greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach them, and she
annoyed them all through the
day.
and as the Americans
had
cut the levee in their front, it at one time seemed likely that
they
would be drowned out. However, matters now took a turn for the
better.
The river was so low that the cutting of the levee instead of
flooding
the
plain
merely filled the shrunken
bayous,
and rendered it easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns;
and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Edward Packenham,
arrived
to take command in person, and his presence gave new life to the
whole army. A battery was thrown up during the two succeeding
nights
on the brink of the river opposite to where the Carolina
lay; and
at dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell was opened
upon
her from eleven guns and a
mortar.
She
responded briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew up, to the
vengeful joy of the troops whose bane she had been for the past
few
days. Her destruction removed the last obstacle to the immediate
advance of the army; but that night her place was partly taken
by the mounted riflemen, who rode down to the British lines, shot
the sentries, engaged the out-posts, and kept the whole camp in a
constant state of
alarm.
In the morning
Sir
Edward Packenham put his army in motion, and marched on New
Orleans.
When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, and to his great
surprise, stumbled on the American army. Jackson’s men had worked
like beavers, and his breastworks were already defended by over
three
thousand fighting
men,
and by half a
dozen
guns, and moreover were flanked by the corvette Louisiana,
anchored
in the stream. No sooner had the heads of the British columns
appeared
than they were driven back by the fire of the American batteries;
the field-pieces, mortars, and rocket guns were then brought up,
and a sharp artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the
Louisiana handled their long ship guns with particular
effect;
the British rockets proved of but little
service
and after a stiff fight, in which they had two field-pieces
and a light mortar
dismounted,
the British artillerymen
fell back on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off his whole army
out of cannon shot, and pitched his camp facing the intrenched
lines
of the Americans. For the next three days the British battalions
lay quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have brought to
bay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach of his tusks,
waiting
a chance to close in.
Packenham, having once tried the strength of
Jackson’s position,
made up his mind to breach his works and silence his guns with a
regular battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up from the
ships,
and a battery was established on the bank to keep in check the
Louisiana. Then, on the night of the last day of the year,
strong
parties of workmen were sent forward, who, shielded by the
darkness,
speedily threw up stout earthworks, and mounted therein fourteen
heavy
guns,
to face the
thirteen
mounted in Jackson’s lines,
which were but three hundred yards distant.
New Year’s day dawned very misty. As soon as the
haze cleared off
the British artillerymen opened with a perfect hail of balls,
accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mortar shells. The Americans
were taken by surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with equal
fury and greater skill. Their guns were admirably handled; some by
the cool New England seamen lately forming the crew of the Carolina,
others by the fierce creole privateersmen of Lafitte, and still
others
by trained artillerymen of the regular army. They were all old
hands,
who in their time had done their fair share of fighting, and were
not to be flurried by any attack, however unexpected. The British
cannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell
their
shot; more slowly but with surer aim, their opponents answered
them.
The cotton bales used in the American embrasures caught fire, and
blew
up two powder caissons; while the sugar hogsheads of which the
British
batteries were partly composed were speedily shattered and
splintered
in all directions. Though the British champions fought with
unflagging
courage and untiring energy, and though they had long been versed
in war, yet they seemed to lack the judgment to see and correct
their
faults, and most of their shot went too
high.
On the other
hand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the field
against
them, not only fought their guns well and skilfully from the
beginning,
but all through the action kept coolly correcting their faults and
making more sure their aim. Still, the fight was stiff and well
contested. Two of the American guns were disabled and 34 of their
men were killed or wounded. But one by one the British cannon were
silenced or dismounted, and by noon their gunners had all been
driven
away, with the loss of 78 of their number.
The Louisiana herself took no part in this
action. Patterson had
previously landed some of her guns on the opposite bank of the
river,
placing them in a small redoubt. To match these the British also
threw up some works and placed in them heavy guns, and all through
New Year’s day a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river
between
the two water-batteries, but with very little damage to either
side.
For a week after this failure the army of the
invaders lay motionless
facing the Americans. In the morning and evening the defiant,
rolling
challenge of the English drums came throbbing up through the
gloomy
cypress swamps to where the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lying
behind their log breastworks, and both day and night the stillness
was at short intervals broken by the sullen boom of the great guns
which, under Jackson’s orders, kept up a never-ending fire on the
leaguering camp of his
foes.
Nor could the
wearied British even sleep undisturbed; all through the hours of
darkness the outposts were engaged in a most harassing bush
warfare
by the backwoodsmen, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets,
and allowed none of those who were on guard a moment’s safety or
freedom from
alarm.
But Packenham was all the while steadily preparing
for his last and
greatest stroke. He had determined to make an assault in force as
soon as the expected reinforcements came up; nor, in the light of
his past experience in conflict with foes of far greater military
repute than those now before him, was this a rash resolve. He had
seen the greatest of Napoleon’s marshals, each in turn, defeated
once and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees by
the Duke of Wellington; now he had under him the flower of the
troops
who had won those victories; was it to be supposed for a moment
that
such
soldiers
who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured the
forts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a
mud
wall guarded by rough backwoodsmen? That there would be loss of
life
in such an assault was certain; but was loss of life to daunt men
who had seen the horrible slaughter through which the stormers
moved
on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian? At
the
battle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham’s troops
then
formed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was
now
to be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of a
surety,
the dashing general who had delivered the decisive blow on the
stricken
field of
salamanca,
who had taken part in
the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of
Continental
Europe, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of
volunteers,
militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter,
whose
name had never been heard of outside of his own swamps, and there
only as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indian
tribes. Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank attack. Under his
orders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up which
the British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This
was
to permit the passage of a number of ships’ boats, on which one
division was to be ferried to the opposite bank of the river,
where
it was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and
water-battery
on the west side, flank Jackson’s main position on the east
side.
When
this canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, two
thousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the
evening
of the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made at
daybreak on the following morning. Packenham had under him nearly
10,000
fighting men; 1,500 of these, under Colonel Thornton were to cross
the river and make the attack on the west bank. Packenham himself
was to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was
to
be made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the left
moved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commanded
the
reserve.
Jackson’s
position was held by a total of 5,500
men.
Almost all British
writers underestimate their own force and enormously magnify that
of the Americans. Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson’s relative
strength, writing: “About 6,000 combatants were on the British
side;
a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the
teeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy
artillery.”
Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets only
“bristled” metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americans
were armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a
heavier
“load” of artillery than did the American lines. Gleig says that
“to
come nearer the truth” he “will choose a middle course, and
suppose
their whole force to be about 25,000 men,” (p. 325). Gleig, by the
way, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startling
evolution of the Americans, namely, that “without so much as
lifting
their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one
arm over the wall and discharged them” at the British. If any one
will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in
one
hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the
object
aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in
his senses attempting it. On the right was posted the Seventh
regular
infantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both French
Creoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen,
who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth
regiment;
while the rest of the line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians
and
over 1,600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 creole
militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of a
bayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi,
and
some other troops in reserve; making in all 4,700 men on the east
bank. The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and
were
very much weaker. Commodore Patterson had thrown up a
water-battery
of nine guns, three long 24’s and six long 12’s, pointing across
the river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking
Jackson.
This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting
three
field-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched
from
the river about 200 yards into the plain. The line of defence was
extended by a ditch for about a quarter of a mile farther, when it
ended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there
were
no defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very poor militia
officer,
was in command, with a force of 550
Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night
before
the engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed,
undisciplined, and worn out with
fatigue.
All through the night of the 7th a strange,
murmurous clangor arose
from the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the lines
of their slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade as the
ground
was thrown up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the rumble of
the
artillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of the
battalions as they shifted their places or marched off under
Thornton, — all these and the thousand other sounds of warlike
preparation were softened and blended by the distance into one
continuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the
American
sentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow. By midnight
Jackson
had risen and was getting every thing in readiness to hurl back
the
blow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. Before
the dawn broke his soldiery was all on the alert. The bronzed and
brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns. The
creole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to
take
all phases of life joyously; but that morning their gayety was
tempered
by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. They had more at stake
than any other men on the field. They were fighting for their
homes;
they were fighting for their wives and their daughters. They well
knew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle and
very cruel in
victory;
they well
knew
the fell destruction and nameless woe that awaited their city
should
the English take it at the sword’s point. They feared not for
themselves;
but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a
dull terror of what that day might bring upon those they
loved.
The Tennesseeans were troubled by no such
misgivings. In saturnine, confident silence they lolled behind
their
mud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into the
gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, hour after hour, the two
armies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the
light
of day.
At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled
through the morning
mist they glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the English,
where
their scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four
hundred
yards from the American breastworks. There stood the matchless
infantry
of the island king, in the pride of their strength and the
splendor
of their martial glory; and as the haze cleared away they moved
forward, in stern silence, broken only by the angry, snarling
notes
of the brazen bugles. At once the American artillery leaped into
furious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of
the
invaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amid
the tumult of that iron storm the heavy red column moved steadily
on toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeans
were standing in motionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of the
open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run.
Then a fire of hell smote the British column. From the breastwork
in front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as
rank
after rank the wild marksmen of the backwoods rose and fired,
aiming
low and sure. As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the
British
column under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, the
reeling files staggered and gave back. Packenham, fit captain for
his valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying
round
him, sprang forward with ringing cheers. But once again the
pealing
rifle-blast beat in their faces; and the life of their dauntless
leader went out before its scorching and fiery breath. With him
fell the other general who was with the column, and all of the men
who were leading it on; and, as a last resource, Keane brought up
his stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn mountaineers
rushed
on, only to die as their comrades had died before them, with
unconquerable courage, facing the foe, to the last. Keane himself
was struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column,
quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge
beyond
reach of the leaden death that overwhelmed their comrades. Nor did
it fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the right
of the American line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie,
who, when the confusion caused by the main attack was at its
height,
rushed forward with impetuous bravery along the river bank. With
such headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of his
troops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars and
artillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbed
muskets, and were butchered to a man. Without delay Rennie flung
his men at the breastworks behind, and, gallantly leading them,
sword in hand, he, and all around him, fell, riddled through and
through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave though they were, the
British soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail,
for if they stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dismay
they
fled back along the river bank, to the main army. For some time
afterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was
gradually
silenced; the repulse was entire and complete along the whole
line;
nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank
give
any hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing
overthrow.
Meanwhile Colonel Thornton’s attack on the opposite
side had been
successful, but had been delayed beyond the originally intended
hour.
The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought
through
to the Mississippi caved in, and choked the
passage,
so that only enough got through to take over
a half of Thornton’s force. With these, seven hundred in
number,
he crossed, but as he did not allow
for the current, it carried him down about two miles below the
proper
landing-place. Meanwhile General Morgan, having under him eight
hundred
militia
whom it was of
the utmost importance to have kept together, promptly divided them
and sent three hundred of the rawest and most poorly armed down to
meet the enemy in the open. The inevitable result was their
immediate
rout and dispersion; about one hundred got back to Morgan’s lines.
He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven
hundred
regulars. So he stationed the four hundred best disciplined men to
defend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting three
guns, which covered his left; while the two hundred worst
disciplined
were placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his
right,
with their flank resting in air, and entirely
unprotected.
This
truly phenomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the certain defeat
of his troops, no matter how well they fought; but, as it turned
out, they hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up the river,
first
attacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire;
deploying his men he then sent a strong force to march round and
take Morgan on his exposed right
flank.
There, the already demoralized
Kentucky
militia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered,
and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, and
after firing a single volley they took to their
heels.
This exposed the
flank
of the better disciplined creoles, who were also put to flight;
but
they kept some order and were soon
rallied.
In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his
water-battery
and marched off with his sailors, unmolested. The American loss
had
been slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though among
their dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton.
This success, though a brilliant one, and a disgrace
to the American
arms, had no effect on the battle. Jackson at once sent over
reinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, and
preparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position. But
it was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it had
been recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could not
be held without additional
troops.
The total British loss on both
sides
of the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majority
of whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most of
the remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Americans
had lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the main
attack. On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor the
Forty-fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat.
The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost
every thing,
and they knew it. There was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a
fourth of their fighting men had fallen; and among the officers
the
proportion was far larger. Of their four generals, Packenham was
dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Their
leader, the ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravest
men were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them;
and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on
the
green fields where they had fought and had fallen. It was useless
to make another trial. They had learned to their bitter cost, that
no troops, however steady, could advance over open ground against
such a fire as came from Jackson’s lines. Their artillerymen had
three times tried conclusions with the American gunners, and each
time they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. They
would never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, for
Jackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the
west
bank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded.
Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed, than the Americans
again began their old harassing warfare. The heaviest cannon, both
from the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the British
camp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted
riflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and annoying,
skirmishing
with their pickets and outposts.
The British could not advance, and it was worse than
useless for
them to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time,
were reinforced, yet Jackson’s forces augmented faster than
theirs,
and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the two
armies. There was but one thing left to do, and that was to
retreat.
They had no fear of being attacked in turn. The British soldiers
were
made of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down even
by such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, and
nothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have had
a fair chance at their adversaries in the open; but this chance
was
just what Jackson had no idea of giving them. His own army, though
in part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part of
untrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets;
and
the wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far too much wit to
hazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasoned
veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in his
own manner. So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch on
Lambert; and on the night of January 18th the latter deserted his
position, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving
eighty
wounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon behind
him.
A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the
troops
were embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners,
were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk of
the army reached the transports unmolested. At the same time, a
squadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort
Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off
when
the fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also
returned;
and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The object was to capture
Fort Bowyer, which contained less than four hundred men, and,
though
formidable on its sea-front,
sea-front,
was incapable of defence when regularly attacked on its land side.
The British landed, February 8th, some 1,500 men, broke ground,
and
made approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continual
fire, which killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 British; by that
time the battering guns were in position and the fort capitulated,
February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.
Immediately afterward the news of peace arrived and all
hostilities
terminated.
In spite of the last trifling success, the campaign
had been to the
British both bloody and disastrous. It did not affect the results
of the war; and the decisive battle itself was a perfectly useless
shedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was
fought.
Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the
United
States. Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and New
Orleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating
defeats
in trying to repel the invasions of Virginia and Maryland, the
signal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for
the
preservation of the national honor. This campaign was the great
event of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle
as
regards numbers that took place during the entire struggle; and
the
fact that we were victorious, not only saved our self-respect at
home,
but also gave us prestige abroad which we should otherwise have
totally lacked. It could not be said to entirely balance the
numerous
defeats that we had elsewhere suffered on land — defeats which had
so
far only been offset by Harrison’s victory in 1813 and the
campaign
in Lower Canada in 1814 — but it at any rate went a long way
toward making the score even.
Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent
figure that
appeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above any
other commander, American or British, that it produced.
It will be difficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that he
performed. In three weeks’ fighting, with a force largely composed
of militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice the
size of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of the
ablest of European generals. During the whole campaign he only
erred
once, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetent
officer, in command of the forces on the west bank. He suited his
movements admirably to the various exigencies that arose. The
promptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knew
of the near approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city;
for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of being
able to advance at once, they were forced to delay three days,
during
which time Jackson entrenched himself in a position from which he
was never driven. But after this attack the offensive would have
been not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson,
adopting the mode of warfare which best suited the ground he was
on and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to
fight
him where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to the
pure defensive — a system condemned by most European
authorities,
but which has at times succeeded to admiration
in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw
Mountain,
and Franklin. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson’s
success
was in no wise owing either to chance or to the errors of his
adversary.
As far as fortune favored
either side, it was that of the
British;
and Packenham
left nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movements
that his experience in European war did not justify his making.
There
is not the slightest reason for supposing that any other British
general would have accomplished more or have fared better than he
did.
Of course Jackson owed much to the nature
of the ground on which he fought; but the opportunities it
afforded
would have been useless in the hands of any general less ready,
hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory.
A word as to the troops themselves. The British
infantry was at that
time the best in Europe, the French coming next. Packenham’s
soldiers
had formed part of Wellington’s magnificent peninsular army, and
they lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. Their conduct
throughout was admirable. Their steadiness in the night battle,
their patience through the various hardships they had to undergo,
their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they
showed
in time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full as
ready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that
their
soldierly qualities were of the highest order. As much cannot be
said of the British artillery, which, though very bravely fought
was clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case with
the American guns. The courage of the British officers of all arms
is mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore to
the total on the lists of the killed and wounded.
An even greater meed of praise is due to the
American soldiers, for
it must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to
veterans;
and indeed, nothing but Jackson’s tireless care in drilling them
could have brought them into shape at all. The regulars were just
as good as the British, and no better. The Kentucky militia, who
had only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed and
totally undisciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of New
York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had
previously shown themselves to be. They would not stand in the
open
at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with better
men. The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes,
and
well trained, behaved excellently, and behind breastworks were as
formidable as the regulars. The Tennesseeans, good men to start
with,
and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were in
their own way unsurpassable as soldiers. In the open field the
British regulars, owing to their greater skill in manoeuvring, and
to their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were
unprovided,
could in all likelihood have beaten them; but in rough or broken
ground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and
woodsmen,
would probably have given them the advantage; while the extreme
deadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to
storm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it would
have been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of
the
best regular troops of Europe. The American soldiers deserve great
credit for doing so well; but greater credit still belongs to
Andrew
Jackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart
and
strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the
United
States produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to the
beginning of the Great Rebellion.
APPENDIX A
TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH
AND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR
IN 1812-15
According to Act of Congress (quoted in “Niles’
Register,” iv, 64),
the way of measuring double-decked or war-vessels was as follows:
“Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part
of stern port,
above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part
above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accounted
the depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth,
multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the
depth;
divide by 95; quotient is tonnage.”
Niles states that the British mode, as taken from
Steele’s Shipmaster’s
Assistant, was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and
measure
distance between such line and the after part of the stern port at
the load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line in
parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point
immediately
over the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtract
from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is
ship’s
extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the
load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of
the ship’s breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of
keel
for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the
plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main
wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is
to be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be the
length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94.
Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary
manner, with no
regard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what is
of more importance, the British method differed from the American
so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally
about 15 per cent. larger than if measured by British rules. This
is the exact reverse of the statement made by the British naval
historian, James. His mistake is pardonable, for great confusion
existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing
the tonnage of their own ships. When the President was
captured,
her officers stated that she measured about 1,400 tons; in reality
she tonned 1,576, American measure. Still more singular was the
testimony of the officers of the Argus, who thought her to
be of
about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by
British
measurement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurred
also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the
three
44-gun frigates of the Constitution’s class, is in the
letter of
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on
Dec. 24, 1798,
where they are expressly said
to
be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy
list
that mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul
Hamilton
in one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444
tons.
Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was
changed,
and their tonnage was put down as 1,607. James takes the American
tonnage from Secretary Hamilton’s letter as 1,444, and states
(vol.
vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English. But in
reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1,576; so that
even according to James’ own figures the British way of
measurement
made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did;
actually
the difference was nearer 290 tons. James’ statements as to the
size
of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere
guesswork,
as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than they
were according to the official navy lists. Thus, the Constitution,
President, and United States, each of 1,576, he
puts down as of
1,533; the Wasp, of 450, as of 434; the Hornet, of
480, as of 460;
and the Chesapeake, of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the
other hand
the Enterprise, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the Argus
of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the Peacock, Frolic,
etc.,
of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different
standards
of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from
the
British vessels, but even among the various American vessels
themselves.
And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only were
there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements,
but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be
the same measurement. A ship, that, according to the British
method
of measurement was of a certain length, would, according to the
American method, be about 5 per cent. longer; and so if two
vessels
were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal
tonnage. For example, James in his “Naval Occurrences” (p. 467)
gives
the length of the Cyane’s main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This
same Cyane was carefully surveyed and measured, under
orders from
the United States navy department, by Lieutenant B. F. Hoffman, and in
his published
report
he gives, among the other dimensions: “Length of spar-deck,
124 feet 9 inches,” and “length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches.”
With
such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of
computing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not
surprising
that according to the American method the Cyane should
have ranked
as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of
any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements
of comparative tonnage. Thus he makes the Hornet 460 tons,
and
the Peacock and Penguin, which she at different
times captured,
about 388 each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain
Biddle,
who commanded the Hornet in her two successful actions,
had their
prizes measured. The Peacock sank so rapidly that Lawrence
could
not get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be
four
feet shorter and half a foot broader than the Hornet. The
British
naval historian, Brenton (vol. v, p. 111), also states that they
were of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory
evidence
from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and
had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of
course, final. He reports that the Penguin was by actual
measurement
two feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the Hornet,
and with
thicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared to the Hornet’s
480 — a
difference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is
corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the
Epervier after she was captured by the Peacock.
Those two vessels
were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on
the navy lists. The American Peacock and her sister ships
were
very much longer than the brig sloops of the Epervier’s
class,
but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English
sloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were;
thus
the Levant, which was to have mounted the same number of guns
as
the Peacock, had much more beam, and was of greater
tonnage,
although of rather less length. The Macedonian, when
captured,
ranked on our lists as of 1,325
tons,
the
United States as of 1,576; and they thus continued until,
as I
have said before, the method of measurement was changed, when the
former ranked as of 1,341, and the latter as of 1,607 tons. James,
however, makes them respectively, 1,081, and 1,533. Now to get the
comparative force he ought to have adopted the first set of
measurements
given, or else have made them 1,081 and 1,286. Out of the twelve
single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38-gun
frigates
like the Macedonian, and seven with 18-gun brig sloops of
the
Epervier’s class; and as the Macedonian and Epervier
were both
regularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our
antagonists
in those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the
Enterprise and the Boxer, in which the latter was
captured; the
Enterprise was apparently a little smaller than her foe,
but had
two more guns, which she carried in her bridle ports.
As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it
comparatively, and
not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as
estimated
by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on
the lakes has been already noticed.
APPENDIX B
PREVIOUS HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES NAVY
Very few students of naval history will deny that in
1812 the average
American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same
strength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the average
French ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each case
the same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nation
to “the aptitude of the American character for the sea,” and the
Briton similarly writes that ” the English are inherently better
suited
for the sea than the French.” Race characteristics may have had
some
little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only
a little), and it is possible that they somewhat affected
the
outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the
main cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats of
two preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americans
were at war with one another.
During the years 1798-1800, the United States
carried on a desultory
conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just
built, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the Chesapeake,
carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the Constellation
which
carried 24’s, a 36, while the Washington, rating 24, was
really
much heavier than the Boston, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799,
after
an hour’s conflict, the Constellation captured the French
frigate
Insurgente; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed
and
wounded. The Constitution carried but 38 guns; 28 long
24’s, on
the main-deck, and 10 long 12’s on the quarter-deck, with a crew
of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), L’Insurgente
carried
26 long 12’s, 10 long 6’s, and 4 36-pound carronades; the
Americans
report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in
actual
(not nominal) weight of shot the Constitution was
superior by
about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men.
This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but
of course the long 24’s of the Constellation made it impossible
that
L’lnsurgente, armed only with long 12’s, should contend
with her.
As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little
difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns,
repair
damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than
any other French historian; but I think his details are generally
wrong. In this case he gives the Constellation 12’s,
instead of
the 24’s she really carried; and also supplies her with 10
32-pound
carronades — of which species of ordnance there was then not one
piece
in our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carried
by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed
her armament, having 28 long 18’s on the main-deck, ten 24-pound
carronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12’s on the
forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered
and
fought a drawn battle with La Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii,
pp.
201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long
18’s,
10 long 8’s, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was an
American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400
men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thus
radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report
of the British captain Milne, who, in the Seine frigate,
captured
La Vengeance in the same year, and then reported her
armament as
being 28 long 18’s, 16 long 12’s, and 8 36-pound carronades, with
326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirely
independently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident
that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over
the Constellation’s armament.
Thus in this action the American frigate fought a
draw with an
antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44
was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the “28-gun frigate,”
Boston, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9’s on the
main-deck,
and on the spar-deck 8 long 6’s (or possibly 12-pound carronades)
captured, after two hours action, the French corvette Berceau,
of 24 guns, long 8’s; the Boston was about the same size
as her
foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as
ten to nine. She lost 15, and the Berceau 40 men. Troude
(iii,
p. 219) gives the Berceau 30 guns, 22 long 8’s, and 8
12-pound
carronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force with
the Boston. But I question if Troude really knew anything
about
the combatants; he gives the Boston (of the same size and
build
as the Cyane) 48 guns — a number impossible for her to
carry. He
continually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third)
volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon,
giving her a broadside fifty per cent. heavier than it should be
(p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a
British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p.
417).
He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous.
The United States schooner Experiment, of 12
guns, long 6’s, and
70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner La
Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of
60 men,
and 30 passengers; and the Enterprise, the sister vessel
of the
Experiment, captured numerous strong privateers. One of
them, a
much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight.
She was the Flambeau brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100
men, of
whom half were killed or wounded. The Enterprise had 3
killed and
7 wounded.
Comparing these different actions, it is evident
that the Americans
were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years
1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous
single contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending
almost
invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each
couple. The 12-pounder frigate Daedalus captured the
12-pounder
frigate Prudente, of equal force. The British 18-pounder
frigate
Sybille captured the frigate Forte, armed with 52
guns, 30 of
them long 24’s on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as
heavy as the Constitution. The Sybille lost 22 and
the Forte
145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate Clyde,
with
the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate Vestale,
which
lost 32. The cutter Courser, of twelve 4-pounders and 40
men,
captured the privateer Guerrière, of fourteen 4-pounders
and 44
men. The cutter Viper, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men,
captured
the privateer Suret, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men.
The 16-gun
ship-sloop, Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf,
14, Lejoille,
6, and Ligurienne, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured
the
Ligunenne. The 30-gun corvette Dart captured by
surprise the
38-gun frigate Desir�e. The Gypsey, of ten
4-pounders and 82
men, captured the Quidproquo, of 8 guns, 4- and
8-pounders, and
98 men. The schooner Milbrook of sixteen 18-pounder
carronades
and 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer Bellone, of
24 long
8’s and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the
Vengeance had escaped from the Constellation (or
beaten her off,
as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate Seine,
which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American did
in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her
commander,
Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the
Constellation, accomplished what the latter failed to do.
Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear
that, while the
Americans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, they
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British.
From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very
different. The single
combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besides
it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a
great
deal of trouble — the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and
Troude
differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as
treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British
were
very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships
behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing
from much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was captured
when opposed by an equal force — although there were some brilliant
exceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; their
frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often
they sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallant
fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period;
in 1781 the Minerve, 32, resisted the Courageous,
74, till she
had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her
gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the Bellepoule,
32,
had performed a similar feat with the Nonsuch, 64, while
the
Capricieuse, 32, had fought for five hours before
surrendering
to the Prudente and Licorne, each of force equal
to herself.
She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two
antagonists.
Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them
with
the fight in which the British ship Glasgow, 20, beat off
an
American squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to
herself,
or with the time when the Ariadne, 20, and Ceres,
14, attacked
and captured without resistance the Alfred, 20, the latter
ship
being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her
consort
the Raleigh, 32. At that period the average American ship
was
certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same
force, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little,
inferior
to the average British ship of equal strength.
Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical
prowess, separated
but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans
made a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while the
Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their
heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place.
In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French were
unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step
in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the
latter were ahead of the French.
The explanation of these changes is not difficult.
In 1782 the American
war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were
unpracticed,
the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and
discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French
marine
was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability
and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews
thoroughly
trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the
sea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry,
etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists;
their
slight average inferiority in seamanship may, it is
possible, be
fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that,
when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen
aboard
are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the
revolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, had
let the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of
the
service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to
frightful
reverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the service
from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had
established
for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent
material
to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant
and
arduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the
most
unflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in
1812
raised it far above even the high English standard. During all
these
three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not
fall
off, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary,
did fall off, while the American navy advanced by great
strides
to the first place.
APPENDIX C
After my work was in press I
for the first time came across Prof.
J. Russell Soley’s “Naval Campaign of 1812,” in the “Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute,” for October 20, 1881. It is
apparently the precursor of a more extended history. Had I known
that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of
this
kind I certainly should not have attempted it myself.
In several points our accounts differ. In the action
with the
Guerrière his diagram differs from mine chiefly in his
making the
Constitution steer in a more direct line, while I have
represented
her as shifting her course several times in order to avoid being
raked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on her
starboard-quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the
Guerrière is taken from the Constitution’s
muster-book (in the
Treasury Department at Washington), which contains the names of
all
the British prisoners received aboard the Constitution
after the
fight. The various writers used “larboard” and “starboard” with
such perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the loss
of the Guerrière’s mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which
account
to adopt; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcile
the conflicting statements was by making the mast act as a rudder,
first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and then
to bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her
speed,
and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm
with
the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but,
in this view, it rather delayed Hull’s raking than helped him. If
Professor Soley’s account is right, I hardly know what to make of
the statement in one of the American accounts that the Constitution
“luffed across the enemy’s bow,” and of Cooper’s statement (in
Putnam’s Magazine) that the Guerrière’s bowsprit
pressed against
the Constitution’s “lee or port quarter.”
In the action of the Wasp with the Frolic,
I have adopted James’
statement of the latter’s force; Professor Soley follows Captain
Jones’ letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18
pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James was
that his account of the Frolic’s force agrees with the
regular
armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her two
carronades on
the topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake; he
makes her chase-guns long 12’s, but all the other British brigs
carried 6’s; he also gives her another gun in broadside, which he
calls a 12-pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his
father)
a 32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in;
I excluded it because the two American officials differed in their
account of it, because I did not know through what port it could
be fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted and
lashed to the forecastle. The Wasp left port with 138 men;
subtracting
the pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on
board
during the action. As the battle was fought, I doubt if the loss
of
the brig’s main-yard had much effect on the result; had it been
her
object to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails
enabled
her antagonist to cross her stern (as in the case of the Argus
and Pelican), the accident could fairly be said to have
had a decided
effect upon the contest. But as a short time after the fight began
the vessels were running nearly free, and as the Wasp
herself was
greatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross her
foe’s stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference.
The brig’s head-sails were all right, and, as she was not
close-hauled,
the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably
purely
due to the slaughter on her decks.
The Wasp Boarding the Frolic
Professor Soley represents the combat of the States
and Macedonian
as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after the first forty
minutes.
I have followed the English authorities and make it a running
fight
throughout. If Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity in
loss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the
American
fire; according to my diagram the chief cause was the incompetency
of the Macedonian’s commander. In one event the difference
was
mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly in
the tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as to
how soon Carden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was
enabled
to close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking
place
later than Professor Soley has done; very possibly I am wrong.
Could
my work now be rewritten I think I should adopt his diagram of the
action of the Macedonian.
But in the action with the Java it seems to
me that he is mistaken.
He has here followed the British accounts; but they are
contradicted
by the American authorities, and besides have a very improbable
look.
When the Constitution came round for the second time, on
the port
tack, James declares the Java passed directly across her
stern,
almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by
astonishment
or awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the
manoeuvre
was repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the Java’s
crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, and
they continued for an hour and a half afterward; it is impossible
to believe that they would have foreborne to fire more than one
gun
when in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had the
men been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone would
have
fired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels
were
such as indicated on Professor Soley’s diagram the Java
would herself
have been previously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which was
not the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, per se, a
decidedly
apocryphal look; and besides they are flatly contradicted by the
American accounts which state distinctly that the Java
remained
to windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack
Professor
Soley represents the Java as forereaching on the Constitution;
I have reversed this. At this time the Java had been much
cut up
in her rigging and aloft generally, while the Constitution
had
set much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged
ahead
and wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul
Professor
Soley has drawn the Constitution in a position in which
she would
receive a most destructive stern rake from her antagonist’s whole
broadside. The positions could not have been as there represented.
The Java’s bowsprit came foul in the Constitution’s
mizzen rigging
and as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually
round
till when they separated the ships were in a head and stern line.
Commodore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once “kept away
to avoid being raked,” while the loss of the head-sails aboard the
Java would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the
two
ships would again be running parallel, with the American to
leeward.
I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this
instance the British report of their own force and loss. This was
the last defeat that the British officially reported; the
admiralty
were smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxious
at all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as witness
Mr. Croker’s response to Lord Dundonald’s speech in the House).
There
is every reason for believing that in this case the reports were
garbled; exactly as at a later date the official correspondence
preceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tampered with before
being put before the public (see McCarthy’s “History of our Own
Times” ).
It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action
between the Hornet
and Peacock, although it was so short, the accounts
contradicting
one another as to which ship was to windward and which on the
“larboard
tack;” and I do not know if I have correctly represented the
position
of the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant
Conner
reported the number of men aboard the Hornet fit for duty
as 135;
Lawrence says she had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be at
quarters. This would make an original complement of 150, and
tallies
exactly with the number of men left on the Hornet after
the action
was over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his account of the total
number
of souls aboard. The log-book of the Hornet just before
starting
on her cruise, states her entire complement as 158; but 4 of these
were sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 men,
but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likely
than that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness,
desertion, or dismissal. At any rate the discrepancy is very
trivial.
In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probably
overestimated the number of the Hornet’s crew; this seems
especially
likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war our
vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier
in the contest. If such is the case, the Hornet and Penguin
were
of almost exactly equal force.
My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon
the various
historians of the war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor
Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism;
yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But in
commenting
on the actions of 1812, I think the Professor has laid too much
stress
on the difference in “dash” between the combatants. The Wasp
bore
down with perfect confidence to engage an equal foe; and the Hornet
could not tell till the Peacock opened fire that the
latter was
inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile
vessel. In the action with the Guerrière it was Hull and
not Dacres
who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying to
keep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be
remembered
that neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the close
work began; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So with
the Macedonian; James particularly says that she did not
know the
force of her foe, and was confident of victory. The Java,
however,
must have known that she was to engage a superior force. In
neither
of the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance
to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was won
with such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, although
by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their
antagonists
did. It must always be remembered that until this time it was by
no means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than 18’s to put
on frigates; exactly as at a little later date it was vigorously
contended that 42-pounders were no more effective guns for
two-deckers
than 32-pounders were. Till 1812 there had been no experience to
justify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that
in the first five actions it cannot be said that the British
showed
any especial courage in beginning the fight; it was more
properly
to be called ignorance. After the fight was once begun they
certainly
acted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of
the
Frolic’s defence has never been surpassed.
But admitting this is a very different thing from
admitting that
the British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants
were
about on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me,
were
always to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were;
on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as Commodore
Rodgers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake
Ontario, the commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, and perhaps
Commodore Decatur, but as a rule either side jumped at the chance
of a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and common
sense, not one of timidity. The United States did not
“avoid close
action” from over-caution, but simply to take advantage of her
opponent’s rashness. Hull’s approach was as bold as it was
skilful;
had the opponent to leeward been the Endymion, instead of
the
Guerrière, her 24-pounders would not have saved her from
the fate
that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the
Americans
were as bold in beginning action, and as stubborn in continuing
it,
as were their foes — although no more so. Neither side can claim any
superiority on the average, though each can in individual cases,
as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A
prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon as
exceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave; yet such a
case
is almost exactly parallel to that of the captain of the Macedonian.
APPENDIX D
In the “Historical Register
of the United States” (Edited by T. H.
Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. 1 p. 105 (State Papers), is a
letter
from Lieutenant L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, both
of the Nautilus, dated Sept. 13, 1812, in which he says
that of
the six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of
English
birth, four were native-born Americans, and two naturalized
citizens.
He also gives a list of six men who deserted, and entered on the
Shannon, of whom two were American born — the birthplaces of
the
four others not being given. Adding these last, we still have but
six men as the number of British aboard the Nautilus, It
is thus
seen that the crack frigate Shannon had American deserters
aboard
her — although these probably formed a merely trifling faction of
her crew, as did the British deserters aboard the crack frigate
Constitution.
On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from Geo.
S. Wise, purser
of the Wasp, stating that twelve of that ship’s crew had
been
detained “under the pretence of their being British subjects”; so
that nine per cent. of her crew may have been British — or the
proportion may have been very much smaller.
On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from
Commodore J. Rodgers,
in which he states that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M.
ships, Moselle and Sappho, taken out of the
captured packet
Swallow; and that these muster-rolls show that in August
1812,
one eighth of the crews of the Moselle and Sappho,
was composed
of Americans.
These various letters thus support strongly the
conclusions reached
on a former page as to the proportion of British deserters on
American
vessels.
In
A Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore
Joshua Barney, from
Autographical Notes and Journals (Edited by Mary Barney, Boston,
1832), on pages 263, and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla
destroyed
in the Patuxent. It consisted of one gun-boat, carrying a long 24;
one cutter, carrying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound
carronades, and thirteen row barges, each carrying a long 18 or 12
in the bow, with a 32-pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. On
p. 256, Barney’s force in St. Leonard’s creek, is described as
consisting of one sloop, two gun-boats, and thirteen barges, with
in all somewhat over 500 men; and it is claimed that the flotilla
drove away the blockading frigates, entirely unaided; the infantry
force on shore rendering no assistance. The work is of some value,
as showing that James had more than doubled the size, and almost
doubled the strength, of Barney’s various gun-boats.
It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Commodore Barney
describes the
Dutch-American frigate South Carolina, which carried a
crew of
550 men, and was armed with 28 long 42’s on the maindeck, and 12
long 12’s on the spardeck. She was far heavier than any of our
44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch for anything under the
rank of a 74. This gives further emphasis to what I have already
stated — that the distinguishing feature of the war of 1812, is not
the introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had been
in use among various nations for thirty years previously, but the
fact that for the first time the heavy frigate was used to the
best
possible advantage.
APPENDIX E
In the last edition of
James’ Naval History of Great Britain,
published in London, in 1886, by Richard Bentley & Son, there
is
an appendix by Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the war of 1812,
mainly
to my account thereof.
Mr. Powell begins by stating with na�f solemnity
that “most British
readers will be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the
infinite
pains taken by William James to render his history a monument of
accuracy, and notwithstanding the exposure he brought upon
contemporary
misstatements, yet to this day the Americans still dispute his
facts.”
It is difficult to discuss seriously any question with a man
capable
of writing down in good faith such a sentence as the above. James
(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well how to be
accurate;
but if Mr. Powell will read the comments on his accounts which I
have appended to the description of almost every battle, he will
see that James stands convicted beyond possibility of doubt, not
merely of occasional inaccuracies or errors, but of the
systematic,
malicious, and continuous practice of every known form of wilful
misstatement, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion
of the false to the lie direct. To a man of his character the
temptation was irresistible; for when he came to our naval war, he
had to appear as the champion of the beaten side, and to explain
away defeat instead of chronicling victory. The contemporary
American
writers were quite as boastful and untruthful. No honorable
American
should at this day endorse their statements; and similarly, no
reputable Englishman should permit his name to be associated in
any
way with James’ book without explicitly disclaiming all share in,
or sympathy with, its scurrilous mendacity.
Mr. Powell’s efforts to controvert my statements can
be disposed
of in short order. He first endeavors to prove that James was
right
about the tonnage of the ships; but all that he does is to show
that
his author gave for the English frigates and sloops the correct
tonnage by English and French rules. This I never for a moment
disputed. What I said was that the comparative tonnage of
the
various pairs of combatants as given by James was all wrong; and
this Mr. Powell does not even discuss. James applied one system
correctly to the English vessels; but he applied quite another to
the American (especially on the lakes). Mr. Powell actually quotes
Admiral Chads as a witness, because he says that his father
considered
James’ account of the Java’s fight accurate; if he wishes
such
testimony, I can produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters,
and
Rodgers of 1812, who insist that I have done much less than
justice
to the American side. He says I passed over silently James’
schedule
of dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is a mistake; I
showed
by the testimony of Captains Biddle and Warrington and Lieutenant
Hoffman that his comparative measurements (the absolute
measurements
being of no consequence) for the American and British sloops are
all wrong; and the same holds true of the frigates.
Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly as
he does with
the tonnage — that is, he seeks to show what the absolute
weight
of the British shot was; but he does not touch upon the point at
issue, the comparative weight of the British and American
shot.
When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell is
driven to conclude
that what I aver must be accurate, because he thinks the Confiance
was the size of the General Pike (instead of half as large
again;
she mounted 30 guns in battery on her main deck, as against the
Pike’s 26, and stood to the latter as the Constellation
did to
the Essex), and because an American writer (very properly)
expresses
dissatisfaction with Commodore Chauncy! What Mr. Powell thinks
this
last statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. In the
body
of my work I go into the minute details of the strength of the
combatants in the lake action; I clearly show that James was
guilty
of gross and wilful falsification of the truth; and no material
statement I make can be successfully controverted.
So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher authority,
Mr. Frank Chiswell,
has recently published some articles which tend to show that my
conclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels (not as to the
lake
vessels, which are taken from different sources) are open to
question.
In the appendix to my first edition I myself showed that it was
quite
impossible to reconcile all the different statements; that the
most
that could be done was to take one method and apply it all
through,
admitting that even in this way it would be impossible to make all
the cases square with one another.
Mr. Chiswell states that “the American tonnage
measurements, properly
taken, never could give results for frigates varying largely from
the
English tonnage.” But a statement like this is idle; for the
answer
to the “never could” is that they did. If Mr. Chiswell
will turn
to James’ Naval Occurrences, he will find the Chesapeake
set down
as 1,135 tons, and the Macedonian as of 1,081; but in the
American
Navy lists, which are those I followed, the Chesapeake is
put down
as of 1,244 tons. A simple application of the rule of three shows
that even if I accepted James’ figures, I would be obliged to
consider
the Macedonian as of about 1,185 tons, to make her
correspond with
the system I had adopted for the American ships.
But this is not all. James gives the length of the Macedonian
as
154 ft. 6 in. In the Navy Department at Washington are two plans
of the Macedonian. One is dated 1817, and gives her length
as
157 ft. 3 in. This difference in measurement would make a
difference
of 20 odd tons; so that by the American mode she must certainly
have been over 1,200 tons, instead of under 1,100, as by the
British
rules. The second plan in the Navy Department, much more elaborate
than the first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 164 ft.; it
is probably this that Emmons and the United States Navy lists have
followed — as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the Macedonian
1,325. Since finding the plan of 1817, however, I think it
possible
that the other refers to the second vessel of the name, which was
built in 1832. If this is true, then the Macedonian (as
well as
the Guerrière and Java) should be put down as
about 120 tons
less than the measurements given by Emmons and adopted by me; but
even if this is so, she must be considered as tonning over 1,200,
using the method I have applied to the Chesapeake.
Therefore,
adopting the same system that I apply to the American 38-gun
frigates,
the British 38-gun frigates were of over 1,200, not under 1,100,
tons.
As for the Cyane, James makes her but 118
ft. and 2 in. long, while
the American Peacock he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieutenant
Hoffman’s
official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., and the plans in
the
State Department at Washington make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in
length. I care nothing for the different methods of measuring
different
vessels; what I wish to get at is the comparative measurement, and
this stands as above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very
reverse
of that indicated by James’ figures.
Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them some ten
feet shorter
than the American ship-sloops. In the Washington archives I can
find no plan on record of the measurements of the captured
Epervier; but in the Navy Department, volume 10, of the
“Letters
of Master Commandants, 1814,” under date of May 12th, is the
statement
of the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston that she measured 467
tons
(in another place it is given as 477). James makes her 388; but as
he makes the American Wasp 434, whereas she stands on our
list
as of 450, the application of the same rule as with the frigates
gives us, even taking his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when
measured
as our ships were. But the measurements of the Surveyor of the
Port
who examined the Epervier are corroborated by the
statements of
Captain Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the Penguin.
Biddle
reported that the latter was two feet shorter and a little broader
than his own ship, the Hornet, which was of 480 tons. This
would
correspond almost exactly with the Surveyor’s estimate.
It still seems impossible to reconcile all these
conflicting statements;
but I am inclined to think that, on the whole, in the sea (not the
lake) vessels I have put the British tonnage too high. On the
scale
I have adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun frigates and
18-gun
sloops like the Hornet and Wasp, the British 38-gun
frigates ought
to be put down as of a little over 1,200, and the British 18-gun
sloops as of between 400 and 450, tons. In other words, of the
twelve
single-ship actions of the war five, those of the Chesapeake
and
Shannon, Enterprise and Boxer, Wasp
and Frolic, Hornet
and Peacock, Hornet and Penguin, were
between vessels of nearly
equal size; in six the American was the superior about in the
proportion
of five to four (rather more in the case of the frigates, rather
less in the case of the brigs); and in one, that of the Argus
and
Pelican, the British sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat
similar ratio.
This correction would be in favor of the British.
But in a more
important particular I think I have done injustice to the
Americans.
I should have allowed for the short weight of American metal on
the
lakes, taking off seven per cent, from the nominal broadsides of
Perry and Macdonough; for the American ordnance was of exactly the
same quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the British was
brought over from England, and must have shown the same
superiority
that obtained on the sea-going ships.
Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that both the
Guerrière
and the Java, which were originally French ships, still
carried
French 18’s on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20
pounds
should be added to the broadside weight of metal of each. The
American
accounts stated this to be the case in both instances; but I paid
no heed to them until my attention was called to the fact that the
English had captured enormous quantities of French cannon and shot
and certainly used the captured ordnance on some of their ships.
In writing my history I have had to deal with a mass
of confused
and contradictory testimony, which it has sometimes been quite
impossible to reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced by
the calculated mendacity of James and some others of the earlier
writers, both American and British. Often I have had simply to
balance
probabilities, and choose between two sets of figures, aware that,
whichever I chose, much could be said against the choice. It has,
therefore, been quite impossible to avoid errors; but I am
confident
they have been as much in favor of the British as the Americans;
and in all important points my statements are substantially
accurate.
I do not believe that my final conclusions on the
different fights
can be disputed. James asserts that the American ships were
officered
by cunning cowards, and manned to the extent of half their force
in
point of effectiveness by renegade British. I show that the
percentage
of non-American seamen aboard the American ships was probably but
little greater than the percentage of non-British seamen aboard
the
British ships; and as for the charges of cowardice, there were but
two instances in which it could be fairly urged against a beaten
crew — that of the British Epervier and that of the American
Argus
(for the cases of Sir George Collier, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy,
Yeo, the commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, etc., etc.,
cannot be
considered as coming under this head). James states that there was
usually a great superiority of force on the side of the Americans;
this is true; but I show that it was not nearly as great as he
makes
it, and that in dealing with the lake flotillas his figures are
absolutely false, to the extent of even reversing the relative
strength
of the combatants on Lake Champlain, where the Americans won,
although
with an inferior force. In the one noteworthy British victory,
that
of the Shannon, all British authors fail to make any
allowance for
the vital fact that the Shannon’s crew had been drilled
for seven
years, whereas the Chesapeake had an absolutely new crew,
and had
been out of port just eight hours; yet such a difference in length
of drill is more important than disparity in weight of metal.
As a whole, it must be said that both sides showed
equal courage
and resolution; that the Americans usually possessed the advantage
in material force; and that they also showed a decided superiority
in fighting skill, notably in marksmanship.
Notes
- Squadrons.
Captain Broke’s letter of challenge
to Captain Lawrence.
— Roosevelt’s Note.
- June. James, vi. 474.
— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Cockburn. James, vi, 437.
— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Action. Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20,
1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Off. James, vi, 412. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Sight. “Naval Monument,”p. 235. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Free. Letter of Captain Stewart, April 8, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Admiralty. James,vi, 477. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Officers. Cooper, ii, 463. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Junon. James, vi, 479. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Accordingly. Letter of Sailing-master Basset, Jan. 31, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Seaman. Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 21, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. They afterward took on board enough men from British merchant-vessels to raise their complements respectively to 320 and 180. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Instantly. “Life of Farragut,”p. 33. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Shore. Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 4 P.M. Mean time. Porter says 3.45; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attack lasted half an hour; the latter, but 10 minutes. I accordingly make it 20. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Carronades. American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the Essex, and out of reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently proper in this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight the Essex at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, at that which least suited her. He, of course, wished to win the victory with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. His conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Overboard. This and most of the other anecdotes are taken from the invaluable “Life of Farragut,” pp. 37-46. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Water. Captain Hilyar’s letter.James says the Phœbe had 7 shot between wind and water,and one below the water-line. Porter says she had 18 12-pound shot below the water-line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration; and James is probably farther wrong still. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Condition. An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop Reindeer. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Wounded. James says that most of the loss was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the Essex;this is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the last were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, and there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of the time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns as would bear. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Douglass. “Naval Gunnery,” p. 149. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Her. Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Unavailing. James (p. 419) says: “The Essex, as far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned), had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Captain Porter, thinking by exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly,” etc., etc. This would be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications, were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states that he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the “remainder are either killed or wounded.” It is by wilfully preserving silence about this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will be observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, and says the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255 men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111 killed and wounded. James’ silence about Hilyat’s last sentence enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quite on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly destroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar’s own letter it is thus seen that Porter’s loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There still remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, which can be compared in tabular form:
The explanation probably is that Hilyar’s “42 wounded” do not include Porter’s “27 slightly wounded,” and that his “161 prisoners” include Porter’s “25 who reached shore,” and his “25 who reached shore” comes under Porter’s “31 missing.” This would make the accounts nearly tally. At any rate in Porter’s book are to be found the names of all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received pensions from the American government, which, if the returns were false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception. It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have counted in the Essex Junior’s crew, which would entirely account for the discrepancies. In any event it must be remembered that he makes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and not 69, as James says. The latter’s statement is wilfully false, as he had seen Hilyar’s letter. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Windward. Official letter of Captain Warrington, April 29. 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Board. James, vi, 424. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Away. According to some accounts she at this time tacked. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Us. James, “Naval Occurrences,” p. 243. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Boys. “Niles’ Register,” vi. 196, says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington’s letter of June 1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives. The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men, and did not number 185 — vide James. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Prize-lists. American State Papers, vol. xiv, p. 427. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Scratched. “Memoirs of Admiral Codrington,” i, 322. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Again. Letter of Captain Warrington, April 29, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Them. Letter of Captain Warrington, May 4, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- June 4th. Letter of Captain Warrington, Oct. 30,1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Barney. He was born at Baltimore, July 7, 1759; James, with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Decatur, by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being born in Maryland, Virginia. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Guns. The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular regiments would have given the Americans this battle — which is open to doubt. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Long. 11° 15’ W. Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8,1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Manners. James, vi, 429. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Port. Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper starboard: it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the relative positions of the craft. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Combat. Cooper, ii, 287. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Flotilla. Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Spars. Letter of Captain Brine to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12. 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 4. James, vi, 436: his statement is wrong as regards the privateer. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Seamen. Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, July 15, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Out. Official letter of Captain Blakely, Sept. 8, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Arbuthnot. James, vi, 432. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Stern-chaser. James, vi, 432. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Tops. Captain Blakely’s letter. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 20. “Niles’ Register,” vi.216. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Better. James, vi, 435. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Trained. Cooper, ii, 291. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Critic. Lord Howard Douglass, “Treatise on Naval Gunnery,” p. 416. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Annapolis. “Autobiography of Commodore Morris,” Annapolis, 1880, p. 172. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Escaped. This statement is somewhat traditional; I have also seen it made about the John Adams. But some old officers have told me positively that it occurred to the Adams on this cruise. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Sherbrooke. James, vi, 479. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. “Autobiography of Commodore Morris.” — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Seamen. James, vi. 481. Whenever militia are concerned James has not much fear of official documents and lets his imagination run riot; he here says the Americans had 1,400 men, which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this species of force. His aim being to overestimate the number of the Americans in the various engagements, he always supplies militia ad libitum, to make up any possible deficiency. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. Letter from Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. Mary’s, Sept. 12, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Shore. James, vi, 527. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Sight. Letter of Captain S. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1814; and of John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal, Oct. 5, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. James, vi, 509: Both American accounts say 12 boats, with 400 men, and give the British loss as 250. According to my usual rule, I take each side’s statement of its own force and loss. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Boats. Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct. 12, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. “History of American Privateers,” by George Coggeshall, p. 241, New York, 1876. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Chase. James, vi, p. 527. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. According to Captain Ordronaux; James does not give the number, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, and the crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were unwounded, and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included these last among his "37 wounded.”— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Not. I think James does not include the wounded in the launch, as he says 28 wounded were sent aboard the Saturn; this could hardly have included the men who had been captured. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Lockyer. James, vi, 521. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Roberts. Letter of Captain Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Dec. 18, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Fire. James, vi, 521. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 14th. Official letter of Lieutenant Jones,March 12, 1815. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 11:50. Lieutenant Jones’ letter. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Wounded. Captain Lockyer’s letter. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- 12:30. Minutes of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851. — Roosevelt’s Note
The date 1851 above possible should be 1815. — Transcribers’ note.
- Return. Cooper, ii, p. 320. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Year. Am. State Papers, xiv, p. 828; also Emmons’ statistical “History.”— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Company. “Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott,” written by himself (2 vols., New York, 1864), i, p. 115. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Last. Monroe’s biographer (see “James Monroe,” by Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks he made a good Secretary of War. I think he was as much a failure as his predecessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed on him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact that he never gave him a particle of practical help. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Peninsular War. “The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England.”(“History of the War in the Peninsula,” by Major-General Sir W. F. P.Napier,K. C. B. New Edition. New York, 1882, vol. v, p. 200.) For discussion of numbers, see farther on. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Chandeleur Islands. See, ante, p.343. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- River. Letter of Major-General John Keane,Dec. 26, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Aid. “Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana” (by Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Divisions. Latour, 53. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Battle. Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 20, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Creoles. Latour, 110. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Color. Latour, 111. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Soilders. James (“Military
Occurrences of the Late War,” by Wm. James, London, 1818), vol.
ii,
p. 362, says 2,050 rank and file; the English returns, as already
explained, unlike the French and American, never included
officers,
sergeants, drummers, artillerymen, or engineers, but only “sabres
and
bayonets” (Napier, iv, 252). At the end of Napier’s fourth volume
is given the “morning state” of Wellington’s forces on April 10,
1814.
This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7,431 officers, sergeants, and
trumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to get at the real
British
force in action, even supposing there are no artillerymen or
engineers
present, 13 percent, must be added to the given number, which
includes
only rank and file. Making this addition, Keane had 2,310 men. The
Americans greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it
4,980. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men.
General Jackson,
in
his official letter, says only 1,500; but Latour. in a detailed
statement, makes it 2,024; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoons
who marched with the column, but being on horseback had to stay
behind,
and took no part in the action. Keane thought he had been attacked
by 5,000 men.
— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Camp. I have taken my account of the
night
action chiefly from the work of an English soldier who took part
in
it; Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig’s “Narrative
of
the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and
New
Orleans.” (New edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 286-300.) — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Loss. General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British
suffered
but a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says (p. 288): “The
deadly shower of grape swept down numbers in the camp”. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Off. Keane
writes: “The enemy thought it prudent to retire, and did not again
dare to advance. It was now 12 o’clock, and the firing ceased on
both sides”; and Jackson: “We should have succeeded? in capturing
the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o’clock,
occasioned some confusion?. I contented myself with lying on the
field that night.” Jackson certainly failed to capture the
British;
but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their march
till
he was in condition to meet and check them. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Hundred. 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Hundred. 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I
take
the official return for each side, as authority for the respective
force and loss. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Day. “While sitting at
table,
a loud shriek was heard?. A shot had taken effect on the body of
an unfortunate soldier? who was fairly cut in two at the lower
portion of the belly!” (Gleig, p. 306.)— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Plain. Latour, 113. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Mortar. Gleig, 307. The
Americans
thought the battery consisted of 5 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says
9
field-pieces (9 — and 6-pounders), 2 howitzers, and a mortar. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Alarm. Gleig, 310. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. 3,282 men in all, according to
the Adjutant-General’s return for Dec. 28, 1814. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Service. Latour,
121. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Dismounted. Gleig, 314. The official
returns show a loss of 18 Americans and 58 British, the latter
suffering
much less than Jackson supposed. Lossing, in his “Field Book of
the
War of 1812,” not only greatly overestimates the British loss, but
speaks as if this was a serious attack, which it was not.
Packenham’s
army, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American
intrenchment,
and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field-pieces were
unable
to contend with the American artillery.
— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Guns. 10 long 18s and 4 24-pound carronades
(James,
ii, 368). Gleig says (p. 318), “6 batteries, mounting 30 pieces of
heavy cannon.” This must include the “brigade of field-pieces” of
which James speaks. 9 of these, 9 — and 6-pounders, and 2 howitzers,
had been used in the attack on the Carolina; and there
were also
2 field-mortars and 2 3-pounders present; and there must have been
1 other field-piece with the army, to make up the 30 of which
Gleig
speaks. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Thirteen. viz.: 1 long 32, 3 long
24s,
1 long 18, 3 long 12s, 3 long 6s, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small
carronade (Latour, 147); and on the same day Patterson had in his
water-battery 1 long 24 and 2 long 12s (see his letter of Jan.
2d),
making a total of 16 American guns. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Them.The British historian, Alison, says (“History of
Europe,”
by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 1852,
vol.
xii. p. 141): “It was soon found that the enemy’s guns were so
superior
in weight and number, that nothing was to be expected from that
species
of attack.” As shown above, at this time Jackson had on both sides
of
the river 16 guns; the British, according to both James and Gleig,
between 20 and 30. Jackson’s long guns were 1 32, 4 24s, 1 18, 5
12s,
and 3 6s, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packenham had 10 long 18s. 2
long 3s, and from 6 to 10 long 9s and 6s, thus throwing between
228
and 258 pounds of shot; while Jackson had but 1 howitzer and 1
carronade
to oppose 4 carronades, 2 howitzers, 2 mortars, and a dozen rocket
guns;
so in both number and weight of guns the British were greatly
superior. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- High. In strong
contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye-witness, states the
true reason of the British failure: (“Memoir of Admiral Sir Edward
Codrington,” by Lady Bourchier, London, 1873, vol. i, p. 334.) “On
the 1st we had our batteries ready, by severe labor, in situation,
from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to
destroy
and silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a
well-arranged storm. But, instead, not a gun of the enemy appeared
to suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till”
too
late. “Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected,
and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon.”— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Foes. Gleig, 322. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Alarm. Gleig, 323. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Soldiers. Speaking of Souk’s overthrow a few months
previous to this battle, Napier says (v, 209): “He was opposed to
one of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of
unconquerable
troops. For what Alexander’s Macedonians were at Arbela,
Hannibal’s
Africans at Cannae, Caesar’s Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon’s
Guards
at Austerlitz — such were Wellington’s British soldiers at this
period. Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their
natural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them
invincible.”— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Salamanca. It was about 5 o’clock when
Packenham
fell upon Thomières. From the chief to the lowest soldier, all
[of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant
Packenham,
the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle. The
British
columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners,
standing
up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape
into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in
a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored
to display a front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmishers
with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed lines
into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing
supports Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence,
formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenham
had first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated
strength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on
the enemy’s left. (Napier, iv, 57, 58. 59.)— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Side. “A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a
canal into the Mississippi to convey a force to the right bank,
which might surprise the enemy’s batteries on that side. I do
not know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but,
as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he did
not place much dependence upon it.” (Codrington, i, 335.)— Roosevelt’s Note.
- 10,000. James (ii, 373) says the British “rank and file”
amounted to 8,153 men, including 1,200 seamen and marines. The
only
other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the
attack
on the right bank, when he says “about 200” were with Thornton,
while
both the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the number 300;
so
he probably underestimates their number throughout, and at least
300
can be added, making 1,500 sailors and marines, and a total of
8,453.
This number is corroborated by Major McDougal. the officer who
received
Sir Edward’s body in his arms when was killed; he says (as quoted
in the “Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the
Peninsular
War,” by John William Cole, London. 1856, vol. ii, p. 364) that
after
the battle and the loss of 2,036 men, “we had still an effective
force of 6,400,” making a total before the attack of 8,436 rank
and
file. Calling it 8,450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13.3 per
cent,
for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 9,600
men. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Reserve. Letter of Major-General John Lambert to
Earl
Bathurst, Jan. 10, 1815. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Jackson’s. 4,698 on the east
bank,
according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert
Butler,
for the morning of January 8th. The details are as follow:
These figures tally almost exactly with those given
by Major Latour,
except that he omits all reference to Col. Slaughter’s command,
thus
reducing the number to about 4,100. Nor can I anywhere find any
allusion
to Slaughter’s command as taking part in the battle; and it is
possible
that these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the
river
by Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded
5,000 men.
On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana
militia — 260 of the First
regiment, 176 of the Second, and 110 of the Sixth. Jackson had
ordered
500 Kentucky troops to be sent to reinforce them; only 400
started,
of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received arms from the
Naval
Arsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546
already on the west bank. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Men. Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in
wretched
plight; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250
more;
and thus Jackson’s army received an addition of 750 very badly
disciplined soldiers.
“Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long
expected, are armed,
and the arms they have are not fit for use.” (Letter of Gen.
Jackson
to the Secretary of War, Jan. 3d.) Having kept a constant watch on
the British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make
the
main attack on the east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk
of
his force on that side. His works consisted simply of a mud
breastwork,
with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line
from
the river on his right across the plain, and some distance into
the
morass that sheltered his left. There was a small, unfinished
redoubt
in front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thirteen pieces of
artillery were mounted on the works. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Officer. He committed every possible fault, except showing lack
of
courage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of a narrow
part
of the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson’s
approval
(Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very short
distance
inland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely
defenceless on account of their flanks being unprotected. He did
not
mount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines, as he
ought
to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he
promptly
divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a
small
number of absolutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, with
their flank in the air; while a much larger number of older troops
were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong
breastwork,
with their flanks covered. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Fatigue. Latour, 170. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Victory. To prove this, it is only needful
to quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself;
referring,
it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a
hostile
country. “It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities
and
outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of sight of
their
officers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding
officers
of the regiments that outrages are not committed There is not an
outrage of any description which has not been committed on a
people
who have uniformly received them as friends.” “I really believe
that
more plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than by
any other that ever was in the field.” “A detachment seldom
marches
that a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not
committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed
eight people since the army returned to Portugal.” “They really
forget
every thing when plunder or wine is within reach.”— Roosevelt’s Note.
- Loved. That these fears were just can be seen by the following quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Napier, who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must be remembered that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile. “Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers’ heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos. On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled.” (Vol. iii, 377). And again: “This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes — one atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity — a Portuguese adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers. and the disorder continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town.” Packenham himself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses, and has been foully slandered by many early American writers. Alluding to these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: “Pre-eminently distinguished for detestion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected?” (Vol. v, p. 31.) Napier possessed to a very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere (iii, 450), after giving a most admirably fair and just account of the origin of the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good deal of justice, to the Americans of 1812, as “a people who (notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their general government, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe.” — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Overthrow. According to their official returns the British loss
was
2,036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater.
Latour
is the only trustworthy American contemporary historian of this
war,
and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and
loss.
Most of the other American “histories” of that period were the
most
preposterously bombastic works that ever saw print. But as regards
this battle, none of them are as bad as even such British
historians
as Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other battles,
notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to lessen the
seeming force of his side are generally of much the same
character.
For instance, Latour says that 800 of Jackson’s men were employed
on works at the rear, on guard duty, etc., and deducts them;
James,
for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means one
reduces Jackson’s total force to 4,000, and the other gives
Packenham
but 7,300. Only 2,000 Americans were actually engaged on the east
banks. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Passage. Codrington, i, 386. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Number. James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Admiral Cochrane in his letter (Jan. 18th) says 600 men, half sailors; and Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 being sailors: adding 13 1/3 per cent. for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get 680 men. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Militia. Latour, 164-172.) — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Unprotected. Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj.-Gen. Wm. Carroll presiding. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Flank. Letter of Col.
W. Thornton, Jan. 8. 1815. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Heels. Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan. 13, 1815. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Rallied. Alison outdoes himself in recounting this feat. Having reduced the British force to 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, “though defended by 22 guns and 1,700 men.” Of course, it was physically impossible for the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there were but 3 guns, and by halving the force on one side and trebling it on the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans just sixfold what it was, — and is faithfully followed by other British writers. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Troops. The British Col.
Dickson,
who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2,000 men would
be
needed to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to
retire.
(Lambert’s letter, Jan. 10th.) — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Him. Letter of General Jackson, Jan. 19th, and of General Lambert, Jan. 28th. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Sea-Front. “Towards the sea its
fortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it is
little better than a block-house. The ramparts being composed of
sand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank,
are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within
pistol-shot
of the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as much
wanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There are no
bomb-proof
barracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find
protection
from shells; indeed, so deficient is it in common-lodging rooms,
that great part of the garrison sleep in tents — With the
reduction
of this trifling work all hostilities ended.” (Gleig, 357.)
General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for
surrendering so
quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely impossible to act
otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort’s
defenders. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Authorities. Thus Napier says (vol. v, p. 25): “Soult fared as most
generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of
numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and
undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against
accomplished
commanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers.”
And
again (p. 150), “Offensive operations must be the basis of a good
defensive system.” — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Adversary. The reverse has been stated again and again
with very great injustice, not only by British, but even by
American
writers (as e.g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his “Andrew Jackson as a
Public Man,” Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is reached by
Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his “Memoirs of
British Generals,” ii, p. 364): “Sir Edward Packenham fell, not
after an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment when
the arms of victory were extended towards him”; and by James, who
says (ii, 388): “The premature fall of a British general saved an
American city.” These assertions are just on a par with those made
by American writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the
Chesapeake from capturing the Shannon.
British writers have always attributed the defeat
largely to the
fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack with
fascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if this had any
effect on the result. Some few of the men with ladders did reach
the ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would have
been shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of the
column was never able to advance through the fire up to the
breastwork,
and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have
helped
it. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any
defeat;
but on this occasion the truth is simply that the British regulars
found they could not advance in the open against a fire more
deadly
than they had ever before encountered.] — Roosevelt’s Note.
- British. E.g.: The
unexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through;
the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were
filled,
instead of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was only
blown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather
delayed
the advance of arms and reinforcements, etc., etc.] — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Did. “He was the next man to look to after Lord
Wellington”
(Codrington, i, 339). — Roosevelt’s Note. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Dec. 24, 1798. “American State Papers,” xiv, 57. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Report. “American State Papers,” xiv, p.
417. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Tons. See the work of
Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records. — Roosevelt’s Note.
- Actual. French shot was really very much heavier than the
nominally
corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from
Captain
T. L. Simmon’s work on “Heavy Ordnance” (London, 1837, p. 62) will
show:
— Roosevelt’s Note.
Text prepared by:
- Colby Brown
- Ishani Colombage
- Bruce R. Magee
- Shinoko Shibuyou
- Scott Weber
- Kameron Wilson
Source
Roosevelt, Theodor. “Chapter I & IV.” The Naval War of 1812, or the History of The United States Navy During the Last War With Great Britain, to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans. Uniform ed. Vol. II. Philadelphia: Gebbie, 1902. 1-85; 211-332. Internet Archive. 30 Apr. 2008. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.
<https:// archive.org/ details/ navalwarof 1812or02roos>.
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