I General Sherman's Report, "Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p.407.

§ " Agate," " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 389.

|| Ilurlbut's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 400.

*H Prentiss's Report.

pended for about half an hour, as the enemy's movements were concealed.* This proved a valuable respite to the Federals, pend ing which, report coming to that quarter that the enemy was form ing in line of battle some distance off, on the right flank, General Johnston led Chalmers's and Jackson's brigades back across the ravine and southeast three quarters of a mile to the right, until the right of Chalmers rested on Lick Creek bottom, Jackson form ing on his left. Here they were halted for about half an hour, while the position of the enemy (Stuart's brigade) was being ascer tained, f

After General Breckinridge's two brigades had passed head quarters in their movement to the right, General Beauregard sent Johnson's brigade, of General Folk's corps, as a further reinforce ment to the right; and, thereupon, at about 9.20 A.M., moved with his staff to a more advanced position, on the road to Pittsburg, now giving more particular attention to the conflict on the left.* Here General Euggles's division, of General Brngg's corps, the second line of attack, had come into position on General Ilardee's left, and was ready to grapple with General Sherman, who, sup ported now by all of McClernand's division and Wright's regi ment of Wallace's second brigade,§ was endeavoring to cling to the position of Shiloh.

The severity of the contest, thus far, was attested by the large number of wounded found on the way. A great many stragglers were also met, whom General Beauregard's staff || and escort pres ent were at once employed in reorganizing and leading forward to their regiments. As General Iltiggles's division, the left of General Bragg's line, was inclining to the right before making its direct movement forward, an interval occurred between the lead ing brigade, Gibson's, and its two other brigades, Anderson's and Pond's.T A brigade of General Folk's division, believed to be Russell's,'** which had been ordered forward by General Beaure-

* Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Official Reports of Battles," p. 257. f Generals Withers's, Chalmers's, and Jackson's Reports, " Confederate Re ports of Battles, 1 ' pp. 235, 257, 265.

I Reports of General Bcauregard's Staff, in Appendix. § Colonel Wright's Report, " Rebellion Record," p. 370. || Reports of General Beauregard's Staff, in Appendix. IT General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 227. ** Major Clack's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 317. I.—19

gard, opportunely filled this vacant space, thus completing the sec ond line in that quarter, and supporting the assault of Ilindman's division upon McClernand and Yeatch, who were then striving to hold the position from which Sherman's left brigade had been mostly routed, and was now wholly slipping away.

Still farther to the left, Anderson's brigade formed the second line along the ridge, with Hodgson's battery, which went at once into vigorous action.


Across the ravine, and on the opposite dominating ridge, were General Sherman's remaining brigades, supporting their batteries, with an infantry advance thrown out to the edge of the boggy ravine which here divided the two lines of battle. It was a swamp so overgrown with shrubs, saplings, and vines thickly interwoven, as to require, in many places, the use of the knife to force a pas sage."" As Anderson's regiments went down the slope and forced their way through the swamp thicket, they encountered a severe fire from the enemy's artillery and musketry, and, as they charged up the opposite hill, they were partially broken by some scatter-ii)"* forces from the first line and from the right. All, however,


were rallied together and held for a time, under cover of the brow r of the hill occupied by General Sherman, while Hodgson's guns threw a destructive fire upon the opposite Federal battery; and the neighboring forces on the right, supported by another battery, moving around the swamp and thicket, poured a flank fire upon General Sherman's left.f What remained of Hildebrand's bri gade now wholly gave way, throwing disorder into McClernand's forces, who were driven back, abandoning Waterhouse's six guns ; and as Taylor's battery now slackened under Hodgson's fire, An derson's brigade again ascended the slope with three regiments of Pond's brigade, on the left, supported by two sections of Ketch-urn's batteiy. By this front and flank charge, General Sherman was forced to fall back with McDowell's and Buckland's brigades to the Purdy and Hamburg roads; thus, by ten o'clock, abandon ing his entire line of camps.;£ As the attacking lines vigorously

* General Patton Anderson's Report, "Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 301.

t This was one of the batteries which had been placed in position by General Trudeau, volunteer aide-de-camp of General Polk, acting under instructions of General Beauregnrd, who was present at the time.

I Colonel Buckland's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 372.

followed, Buckland's brigade began rapidly to dissolve; Behr's battery was abandoned without tiring a shot* from its new posi tion, and the remains of Sherman's division fell farther back on the right of McClernand's, which had been well rallied, and formed on the line of its camps, with Veatch's cleft brigade allotted on its right and left. In taking his new position, General Sherman was enabled somewhat to relieve McClernand,f who was under a se vere attack, by delivering his retreating fire upon the flank of the assailing force in that quarter.

About the hour that General Sherman's last camps were car ried, and his troops were being driven back upon the line of the Purdy road, the battle broke along the front formed by Generals W. II. L. Wallace and Ilurlbut, who had selected strong defensive positions. Here, after the line of battle had been formed beyond General Prentiss's camps, a fortunate shell, from Jlobertson's bat tery, striking amid one of Hurlbut's, stampeded the entire bat tery, horses and caissons, as well as guns, being abandoned, though the latter were spiked by other artillerists.^: By direction of Gen eral Ilardee, then on his way towards the left, Colonel Adams made a skirmishing reconnoissance to feel the enemy's strength. He was then ordered by General Bragg to advance, but found his men short of ammunition. At this moment General Breckin-ridge's division was led into position by Colonel Augustin, of General Beauregard's staff,§ on Colonel Adams's right, while Cheatham's division (Bushrod Johnson's and Stevens's brigades), sent to the same quarter by General Beauregard, came up on its left.] These two divisions now joined their lines and engaged the. enemy, while Adams's (Gladdcn's) brigade fell to the rear. Johnson's two right regiments, which had become temporarily de tached by reason of the features of the ground, were ordered sep arately into action by General Bragg, and unfortunately remained separated from the rest of the brigade and their commander dur ing the day.^f

Wallace's and Ilurlbut's divisions, deliberately posted and han-

* General Sherman's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 407.

t Ibid.

I General Ilurlbut's Report, " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 400.

§ See Colonel Augustin's Report, in Appendix.

|| General Cheatham's Report.

IF General Bushrod Johnson's Report.

died with skill, maintained a stubborn resistance to the attack. Consisting mostly of troops who had served at Donelson, they gallantly formed their lines, notwithstanding the surprise and dis order through which they had been ushered into the conflict.

Shortly after ten o'clock, the enemy being reported very strong in the centre—that is, along "Wallace's front—General Beauregard reinforced that point by Trabue's brigade,* of General Breckin-ridge's division, which he had held near his headquarters. A little before that time Stuart's forces had also been reached.f This offi cer, when warned, at half-past seven, by General Prentiss, of the presence of the Confederates, had formed his three regiments in line of battle on a ridge faced by a ravine and watercourse emptying into Lick Creek, and awaited developments, until, seeing the Confed erates penetrating on Prentiss's rear, he called for support from Hurlbut, who despatched him an Illinois regiment and a battery, which took position on his right. It was scarcely ten o'clock when his skirmish line, thrown out on another ridge, in front, was driven in by the attacking forces, who planted a battery there and shelled his lines, Jackson's brigade opening the conflict under General Johnston's personal ordei'4 Stuart, upon going to the right, found that the 71st Ohio regiment, together with Hurlbut's Illinois bat talion and battery, had taken flight.§ A similar fate had overtaken the 52d Tennessee, of Chalmers's brigade, when, shortly before, it had received the fire of Stuart's skirmishers; and, excepting two companies of soldierly behavior, it was ordered out of the lines.jj Stuart's other two regiments, after being forced back some dis tance, were still farther withdrawn, and formed along the brow of a hill, numbering now a force of eight hundred men. His posi tion was protected by a fence and thick undergrowth, with an open field in front and a ravine on the left; and here, without ar tillery, he maintained a creditable resistance against greatly supe rior numbers.!"

* See Major Brent's Report, in Appendix.

t "Agate," "Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. Doc. p. 391.

I Report of Colonel Joseph Wheeler, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 275.

§ Stuart's Report.

1 Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 257.

"T Stuart's Report mentions no artillery but the battery sent him by Hurlbut, which went away; as to infantry, he was greatly outnumbered.


All the forces on each side were now in action. The Confed erate front line, as, according to the conformation of the ground, it developed the positions of the enemy and the needs of reinforce ments, had been extended on its right and left, and filled, at in tervening points, by the troops of the second and third, or reserve lines. With a general direction from northwest to southeast, oblique to the Tennessee River, and its right thrown back, the order of the Federal forces was, from right to left, as follows : Sherman's remaining troops ; McClernand's division, with a por tion of Yeatch's brigade, of Hurlbut's division ; and, beyond a wide interval, Stuart's isolated brigade, on the extreme left.

The Confederate forces in opposing order, left to right, were: Two brigades (Pond's and Anderson's) of Ruggles's division, of Bragg's corps; one brigade (Russell's) of Folk's corps ; Hardee's three brigades (Cleburne's, Wood's, and Ilindman's), with Gibson's brigade, of Ruggles's division, and Trabue's, of Breckinridge's di vision, in support or filling up the line ; Cheatham's division, of Folk's corps, and Breckinridge's division, with Gladden in rear; and on the extreme right, at the distance of about three quarters of a mile, Withers's division (Jackson's and Chalmers's brigades), of Bragg's corps, carrying on the attack against Stuart under Gen eral Johnston.

The contest now went on in all parts of the field, without any important incident or change, during the remainder of the morn ing and the early afternoon. About eleven o'clock, General John ston, leaving Withers's division, passed over to the rear of General Breckinridge's, and remained directing its movements. Previous ly to this General Bragg had, by understanding with General Polk, taken position near the right centre and General Polk near the left centre, while General Ilardee remained at the extreme left. General Beauregard, following the general movement, main tained a central position in rear.

In the succession of ravines, ridges, and woods, the Federals had, every where, natural defensive positions more or less strong, which their opponents were compelled to carry by assault. These were attacked with great bravery and heavy loss of life, but not with that concert and massing of forces essential to decisive effects, though this fact was, in some measure, due to the concealed char acter of the country, which, in most parts, admitted of no contin uous view of any large body of troops. General officers in imme-

diate direction of their commands were too intent upon the efforts of brigades, and even regiments, thus losing sight of the disjointed remainder, and neglecting to combine efficiently the service of the artillery and infantry. Brigades and regiments, as well as batter ies, were often, for this reason, at a stand-still without orders; and sometimes, from the same lack of cohesion, bodies of our own troops were mistaken for the enemy and even fired into on the flank or rear, and thrown into some confusion. Other commands, after casualties, remained without leadership from a ranking offi cer, until so reported to General Beauregard, and by him supplied through his staff. Straggling also began early in the day, a great many men being engaged in the plunder of the captured camps, while numbers made their way to the rear. General Beauregard used part of the cavalry, under his staff and escort, to drive them out of the camps, and when collected, they were formed into bat talions, officered as well as could be done under the circumstances, and again sent forward. Thus all loose or halting commands were attached to the readiest lines of movement, or to those needing reinforcement. At about half-past twelve, part of Pond's brigade and two regiments of Cleburne's brigade, united under Colonel Pond, with a battery and squadron of cavalry, were ordered to as sail the Federal right. Here, between twelve and one o'clock, Sherman's and McClernand's forces began to fall back,* and, at half-past one, General Beauregard ordered General Ilardee to throw the cavalry f upon the retreating regiments, sending a force by a circuitous way, and under screen of the woods, against the right rear, so as to cut them off. The movement was vigorously executed, though a part of the force, carried too far by its ardor, and coming upon an unseen body of the enemy in a wood, was re pulsed ; but the remainder, under Morgan, charged and drove back the retreating battalions, capturing a number of guns. At two o'clock, General Beauregard again sent orders to General liar-dee J to push the enemy's right with vigor, and Sherman's and McClernand's troops now rapidly gave way, the larger part of them retiring towards Snake Creek, where they remained aside from the scene of conflict; another part retreating upon Wallace's camps,

* Reports of Colonels Hare and Crocker," Rebellion Record," vol. iv. pp. 376-378. t See Staff Reports in Appendix. I Ibid.

while Yeatch's brigade fell back towards the landing, where, later, it reunited with Ilurlbut's division.

The way was now open for an advance of tl>3 Confederate left against "Wallace's division, which was, at that time, the advanced Federal right. Posted on a ridge under cover of a thicket, and supported by artillery, this division had unflinchingly held its ground, repelling with slaughter every attack made upon it. Un der the orders of General Bragg, who was directing the move ments against its left, between eleven and three o'clock, Ilindman's division was led to the assault, but repulsed under a murderous fire,* its gallant commander falling severely wounded. It was rallied and led to a second charge, but with no better success. Gibson's brigade was then sent up, without artillery support, in four bloody, detached, and unavailing assaults, f its flank raked by a battery, and its front covered by the fire of the infantry posted in the thicket on the ridge. After these repulses, General Bragg abandoned the task and passed farther to the right, in the direc tion of Breckinridge's division.J

Meanwhile "Withers's division (Chalmers's and Jackson's bri gades) had been gradually forcing back Stuart's two regiments, sweeping with its right the edge of the Tennessee bottom, until, about three o'clock, Chalmers's brigade was struck by the shells of the Federal gunboat " Tyler," and moved away from the river.§ As Stuart's force, winding its way through ravines to Pittsburg Landing, went out of view, and no other enemy appeared in that quarter, the division, wheeling on its left, by order of Withers, in accordance with the general plan of battle, | advanced upon the sound of the neighboring conflict, where Breckinridgc's and Cheatham's forces were warmly engaged with those of llurlbut and Prentiss. General Johnston had been some three quarters of an hour in rear of Brcckinridge's division^ (the right of the main line of battle), while, under a galling fire and at great cost, it had steadily held its position, until he decided to lead it to the charge.

* General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 228. t General Gibson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles,'' p. 286. J General Bragg's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 228. § General Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 258, and General Jackson's Report, p. 26G.

|| General "Witliers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 236. IF Governor Harris's letter to General Bcauregard, see Appendix.

The enemy's force was driven to the next ridge beyond, and Breck-inridge's line was re-formed under a severe fire, when Governor Harris,* volunteer aid, returning from the delivery of an order to Colonel Statham, to charge a battery on their immediate left, found General Johnston wounded. This was between two and half-past two o'clock. Sustaining him in the saddle, Governor Har ris withdrew him to a ravine, about one hundred yards in the rear, where, within half an hour, that patriotic and noble soldier breathed his last. Meanwhile, General Hurlbut, informed by Stu art that his left flank was uncovered by the latter's forced retreat,f shifted his right (Lanman's) brigade to his left, and ordered Wil-liams's brigade and Prentiss's command to fall back steadily, thus endeavoring to meet the flanking movement of Withers's division. Adjutant-General Jordan had come upon this quarter of the field at half-past two, shortly after General Johnston's withdrawal, and finding Breckinridge's division at rest, ordered it to charge the enemy in front,:]; posted behind a fence in the border of a wood. He gave the order in the name of General Johnston, not knowing at the time of his whereabouts or mortal wound. General Breck-inridge advanced steadily, forcing the enemy back from their po sition.

While this was going on, and after the Federal right had been broken and driven back, General Beauregard, having ordered Gen eral Hardee to reorganize his forces for another onslaught, turned his attention to that quarter of the field, in the centre, where the enemy's obstinate resistance had baffled General Bragg's previous efforts. He advanced in that direction portions of Anderson's and Gibson's brigades, two detached batteries, and several battalions just formed from stragglers and scattered commands. At this moment Colonel Marshall J. Smith's Crescent regiment, of New Orleans, came up from the extreme left, with Colonel Looney's 38th Tennessee, and, seeing General Beauregard, raised a gallant cheer, which immediately drew upon the spot the concentrated fire of the enemy. General Beauregard, bidding them " go forward and drive the enemy into the Tennessee,"§ attached to them an-

* Governor Harris's letter to General Beauregard, see Appendix, f General Hurlbut's Report, " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 401. I General Cheatham's Report.

§ Colonel Marshall J. Smith's Report, " Confederate Official Reports of Bat tles," p. 343.

other battalion formed of stragglers, and sent them in the same direction, to support two batteries (Hodgson's and another) which he had just ordered ahead. Here a vigorous artillery fire was now combined with the efforts of the infantry, under Generals Polk and Kuggles, and the stubborn enemy began to relax his hold.*

But, farther down on the right, Generals Prcntiss and Ilurlbut were still contending so strongly that Generals Breck in ridge and Crittenden called earnestly on Jackson and Chalmers for assist-ance.f The flanking march of these two latter brigades was met by Lanman's brigade, supported by powerful artillery, and there a fierce, exhausting contest ensued.

As General Beauregard, in advance of the Shiloh meeting-house, was directing the movement beyond McClernand's camps, Governor Harris reached him, shortly after three o'clock, and informed him of General Johnston's death. This was a great shock to General Beauregard, who had not anticipated the possibility of such a loss, and who knew what effect it would produce upon the troops, es pecially those who had formed part of General Johnston's original command. He sent immediate intelligence of the sad event to the corps commanders, enjoining silence concerning it, and, at the same time, gave orders to push the attack vigorously in all quar ters of the field.

Wallace's right was now attacked by Looney's and Marshall J. Smith's regiments, of Anderson's brigade, and by a portion of Gib son's, under General Polk. The remains of Hindman's division and Gladden's brigade, with Cheatham's and Breckinridge's forces, were pressed against his left; and Prentiss's command, with a portion of Ilurlbut's, was attacked with great determination by General Bragg; while Jackson and Chalmers were assailing Ilurl but in front and on the left flank. The latter, as he withdrew, attempted to make a stand on the line of his camps, but, to avoid being cut off, fell back, at about four o'clock, upon Pittsburg Land ing, thus allowing Chalmers and Jackson to move upon the flank of the line formed by Prentiss and Wallace.

While all these forces were closing upon Wallace and Prcntiss,

* See, in " Confederate Reports of Battles," Ruggles's Report, p. 282, Ander son's Report, p. 304, and Hoge's Report, p. 291. t Report of General Jackson, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 2G5.

General Hardee was engaged on the left with McClernand's regi ments and the remnants of Sherman's command. Hearing from a staff officer"- that a brigade was inactive in that quarter, and, apparently, without a commander, General Eeauregard sent Colonel Ferguson, of his staff, to lead it into action, under the di rection of General Hardee. This was part of the brigade of Colonel Pond, who, far from being inactive, was, in fact, recon noitring so as to ascertain his position more accurately and act un-derstandingly against the battery in his front. By orders, said to have been from General Hardee, a brilliant but ineffective charge was then and there made by the 18th Louisiana,f under Colonel Mouton, and immediately afterwards by the Orleans Guard battal ion, under Major Querouze; the 16th Louisiana followed in the rear of the column, but was only partially engaged. Alone and unsupported the 18th Louisiana charged gallantly up the hill, closely upon the battery, which had already begun to abandon its ground, when a murderous fire from three regiments of McCler-nand's force compelled the regiment to retire, after a loss of two hundred and seven officers and men, killed and wounded, who could not be removed from the field.;}: The Orleans Guard bat talion lost about eighty men while making a similar charge, im mediately afterwards.

The enemy at this point, however, was now falling back, in ac cordance wkh the retrograde movement of the other Federal forces, when General Wallace fell, mortally wounded, after having, by his skill and tenacity, contributed much towards the salvation of the Federal army. But General Prentiss, unaware of the move ment executed by Wallace's division, still clung to his position, to gether with the 8th, 12th, and 14th Iowa and the 58th Illinois, of Wallace's division, who were endeavoring to save their artillery. After they were cut off they made several ineffectual charges in an effort to break through to the Landing, and at about half-past five o'clock r. M., surrounded and hemmed in by our troops, they finally abandoned the struggle, and surrendered, amid the loud cheers of the victors. The prisoners there captured numbered some twenty-five hundred men, and among them was General

* Colonel Ferguson's Report, see Appendix.

t Colonel Pond's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 329.

I Colonel Moutou's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 333.

Prentiss himself.* They were sent to the rear under escort of cavalry and a detachment from Wood's brigade.f

This closing in of the Confederate lines had brought the ex treme right and the left centre of the line of battle unexpectedly face to face, as the last wooded ridge was crossed which had sepa-ated them as they pressed on both flanks of the Federal divisions. Much confusion ensued, as well as delay for the replenishment of ammunition, before the commands were extricated and directed

anew against the enemy.

o «

Meanwhile, since four o'clock, Colonel J. D. Webster, an able offi cer of General Grant's staff, had been collecting the reserve artillery and other batteries, till he had massed about sixty guns (some of them 24-pounder siege guns) along a ridge covering Pittsburg Landing, and reaching out to the camps of Wallace, a portion of which was still held by the remainder of that division, with some of MeClernand's regiments, and fragments of Sherman's, on their right. In rear of Webster's guns was also Ilurlbut's division, J with Veatcli's brigade now reattached, and two of Stuart's regi ments, all of these reinforced by numbers rallied from the broken commands. General Grant having arrived on the field at one o'clock p. M.,§or about that time, had been busy at this work since three o'clock. The line of bluffs masked all view of the river; but, in fact, General Buell's Army of the Ohio was also now arriving from Savannah, on the opposite bank, below Pittsburg Landing, and Ammen's brigade, of .Nelson's advance division, had been thrown across and placed in support of Webster's battery, at five o'clock. Generals Buell and Xelson were both present on the field, jj Behind these forces and below the bluff was the remainder

* General Preritiss, in his report of the battle, written after his return from captivity, thus alludes to this memorable incident :"...! determined to as sail the enemy, which had passed between me and the river, charging upon him with my entire force. I found him advancing in mass, completely encir cling my command, and nothing was left but to harass him and retard his progress so long as might be possible. This I did until 5.30 r. M., when find ing that further resistance must result in the slaughter of every man in the command, I had to yield the fight. The enemy succeeded in capturing my self and twenty-two hundred rank and file, many of them wounded."

t General Eunice's Report.

I General Ilurlbut's Report, "Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 401.

§ General Badcau says, eight o'clock A. M.

1 General Nelson's Report, " Record of the Rebellion,'' vol. iv. p. 413.

of Grant's army, its flight arrested by the river, and its masses tossing in uncontrollable panic and disorder.*

But in rear of the victorious Confederate line was a scene of straggling and pillage which, for a time, defied all remon strance and all efforts at coercion. The disorder and plunder that had followed the capture of Prcntiss's, Sherman's, and Mc-Clernand's camps were now all the greater, as the troops, fasting since dawn—and some of them since the previous evening—were exhausted from incessant fighting and marching. The commands were broken and mixed ; and among many the idea prevailed that the battle had been won and was virtually ended. One cheering feature, however, in the scene of spoil, \vas the strewing of old flint-locks and double-barrelled shot-guns, exchanged for the En-field and Minie rifles abandoned by the enemy. In view of this change of armament and the general scarcity of ammunition, General Beauregard ordered the collection of the enemy's ordnance stores, as well as all available provisions, to be sent to the rear for greater security.

The forces were deployed again into line from the point around which they had centred in the capture of Prentiss's and Wallace's advanced regiments. Those under General Bragg's direction moved to the right, Chalmers's brigade leading, after a halt for re-distribution of ammunition ;f and, extending to the Tennessee bottom, Jackson's brigade followed, without ammunition, the bayonet being their only weapon.^: The remainder of the line was continued from right to left, with the same brigades that had been previously engaged. Those on the right of the Bidge road were practically under the direction of General Bragg, and those on the left of it, under Generals Polk and Hardee. This road, as well as all approaches to the Landing, was swept by the enemy's artillery. The Federal position, on the bluffs, was fronted by a deep ravine and creek, running into the Tennessee, with branches falling into it from the line of the Confederate advance, all filled with back water from the river, on account of the late heavy rains; and the main ravine, w r hicli protected the Federal front, was enfi-

* " Agate," " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. p. 393. Sec also General BuelVs Report, vol. iv. p. 410.

t See Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 258. J General Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 2GG.

laded by the fire of the gunboats lying in its mouth. Over this ground, divided and thickly wooded, a continuous line of battle was impracticable. General Beauregard, seeing that nothing but a concerted and well-supported attack, in heavy mass, could, that evening, strike the finishing blow by which the enemy would be crushed, ordered the corps commanders, on the right and left, to make a hasty reorganization of the troops under their control, for a combined onslaught, while he, at the centre, should organize re inforcements for the line of attack in his immediate .front. He caused all fragmentary bodies and stragglers, in his vicinity, to be brought up from the rear, and formed into such organizations as the emergency allowed, and they were thus carried forward to swell the line of battle.

The troops, however, were not pressed to the front in combined attack, as ordered, but in a series of disjointed assaults, with but little support from the batteries, many of which were allowed to remain inactive in the rear.* These assaults were easily broken, and with slaughter, by the formidable weight of metal which girded the Federal position, supported by a still heavy force of in fantry, reinforced by some of General Buell's troops, while the shells of the gunboats swept the long ravine which our different commands had to cross in assailing the bluff, and which formed their only rallying cover from the lire in front. The troops, more over, were greatly disorganized; the commands were cut up and intermingled, and regimental organization was greatly confused. The corps commanders, then as throughout the day, continued to give examples of personal courage, but exhaustion and hunger nul-

* In his Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 324, Captain Hodgson, writing of the charge made by the 18th Louisiana, and, subsequently, by the Orleans Guard battalion, at four o'clock r. M., or about that time, says: "This was about the last firing of my battery, on the Gth instant/'

Captain Ketchum, in his Report (ibid. pp. 340, 341), says : " Colonel Pond's fine brigade was badly cut up in a charge on a battery, in one of these camps, which, I have always thought, might have been avoided, had my lattery not ~bccn withdrawn from the advance I was making on this camp.' 1 ' 1

General Chalmers, in his Report, p. 2GO, says : " During this engagement, Gage's battery was brought up to our assistance, but suffered so severely that it was soon compelled to retire."

Sec also Pond's and Mouton's Reports, as to the separate and isolated action of their commands.

lified all attempts to create enthusiasm on the part of the men. General Hardee, in command on the left, to whom General Beau-regard had sent Lieutenant Chisolm, of his staff, to ascertain how he was faring, answered: "We are getting along very well, but tell the General they (meaning the enemy) are putting it to us very severely." Chisolm, though ordered to return, and report before dark, remained as aide-de-camp to General Hardee, who had none of his staff with him, and was bringing up two regiments into position, from the rear, when one of them broke in disorder, under the artillery fire from the field-pieces and gunboats, and fell back out of the fight.* Here, also, part of Pond's brigade, when about to make a last forward movement, received a fatal volley from the 27th Tennessee, of Cleburne's brigade, which compelled it to face about, and their artillery support to take a new position against a supposed hostile attack from the rear—an untoward event, which ended the share of this brigade in the conflict of that day. f The remaining troops, under General Ilardee—that is to say, Wood's brigade, greatly diminished by detachment and casual ties, and a small portion of Cleburne's—did not succeed in making any impression on the force of artillery and infantry defending the position of Wallace's camps, still held by fragments of Wal lace's, McClernand's, and Sherman's divisions. The forces on the right of General Hardee, under General Folk's direction, were en gaged in the same desultory and indecisive contest, Gibson's and Anderson's brigades not being actively employed by him.J So was it with General Breckinridge's division. Colonel Trabue, commanding the first Kentucky brigade of that division, in his re port of the battle, speaking of the events of the day, following the surrender and capture of General Prentiss's command, says:

" Finding the troops who had come in from my right halting one or two hundred yards in my front, I allowed the 6th and 9th Kentucky regiments hastily to change their guns for Enfield rifles, which the enemy had surren dered, and I then moved up and rejoined General Breckinridge, who, with Statham's and Bowen's brigades, was occupying the front line, being on the crest of the hill (or highland) overlooking the narrow valley of the Tennes see River, on which, and near by, was Pittsburg Landing. Having been halted here for more than an hour, we endured a most terrific cannonading

* Colonel Chisolm's Report, in Appendix.

t Colonel Pond's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 329.

J General Anderson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 305.

and shelling from the enemy's gunboats. My command, however, had seen too much hard fighting to be alarmed, and the 4th Kentucky stood firm, while some of our troops to the front fell back through their lines in confu sion. . . . From this position, when it was nearly dark, we were ordered to the rear to encamp, which movement was effected in good order. I followed, in the darkness of the night, the Purdy road, after having re-united to my command Byrne's battery and the others of my troops who had been de tached to the right, not including, however, Cobb's battery/'

Among the forces of General Bragg, on the right, where that officer was directing movements, Gladdeifs brigade had become dissevered* in the confusion following the capture of General Prentiss, and took no part in the assaults upon the last Federal position, though the portion remaining under its commanding of ficer, Colonel Deas, was formed on the left of Jackson's brigade. This latter brigade was led, under a heavy lire from the light bat teries, siege-pieces, and gunboats,f across the ravine, and with its only weapon, the bayonet, ascended the ridge nearly to the crest, bristling with guns ; but, without support, it could be urged no farther. It remained for some time sheltering itself against the precipitous sides of the ravine, till Jackson, seeing his men use lessly under a raking fire, and that a farther advance was imprac ticable, without support and a simultaneous movement along the whole line, sought for orders from his division commander, Gen eral Withers ; but darkness closed the conflict before he could reach him. Of tin's eventful part of the day, after which hostili ties entirely ceased on both sides, Colonel Joseph "Wheeler, com manding the 19th Alabama regiment, in his report says: " But af ter passing through the deep ravine below the lowest camps, we were halted within about four hundred yards of the river, and re mained ready to move forward for about half an hour, when night came on, and we were ordered to the rear, and were assigned to bivouac, by General "Withers.''^ Chalmers's brigade, the extreme right, vainly attempted to mount the ridge against the fire from the line of batteries and infantry, assisted by the flank fire of the gunboats, though it made repeated charges, till night closed in.g ^

* Colonel Deas's Report, u Confederate Reports of Battles/' p. 245. t General Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 2GG. I " Confederate Reports of Battles/' p. 270. § General Chalmers's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 2GO.

Meanwhile, General Beauregard had been weighing attentive!}', and no doubt anxiously, the premonitory signs visible during the kiter hours of the battle. The strength of the Federal batteries was apparent, by their extent and sound, and by the effect pro duced on the Confederate lines ; while the steady and heavy rolls of musketry, proceeding from the same quarter, indicated the presence either of fresh troops, the arrival of which General Beau-regard had feared and predicted the evening before, or of forces reorganized from the stragglers on the field, as had been done with our own stragglers several times that day. As General Beauregard rode in rear of the disjointed lines, the futility of these fitful, detailed attacks became more and more evident to him. Most of the commands were disorganized and fragmentary, sun dered by the deep, wooded ravines, and numbers of stragglers could be seen in all directions. lie felt not only that it was im practicable to gather up all his forces for a general and simultane ous onslaught, which alone might have been effective, but also that the brief space of time now remaining to him before night fall must be used to collect the troops into position, or the morn ing, and its threatened possibilities, would find him with but a nominal army. He knew that Lew. Wallace's division, of some eight thousand men, was near by, observing the road from Furdy; that it had not, as yet, been engaged in the conflict, and might, at any mo ment, fall upon us in flank, left, or rear. He therefore resolved, without further delay, to withdraw the troops gradually from the front, and reorganize them, as w r ell as possible, to resume the offen sive on the 7th, and complete his victory over Grant. According ly, at dusk, he sent to the different corps commanders the order, k * to arrest the conflict, and fall back to the enemy's abandoned camps for the night."*

General Bragg had also concluded that the troops were incapable of any further offensive efforts in his quarter of the field, and had already resolved to withdraw, f He gave orders to that effect, which were anticipated, as to some of the commands, by the or ders sent by General Beauregard.:): Chalmers had fought, as al-

* Colonel Augustin's and Captain C. H. Smith's Reports, in Appendix.

t Dr. Nott's letter, in Appendix.

| The order to General Bragg was borne by Captain Clifton Smith, acting aide-de-camp. In a few cases it was communicated directly to brigade com manders by Colonel Augustin. another aide-de-camp to General Beauregard.

ready stated, till night had closed in upon him ; and as he and Jack-eon fell back in the darkness, the hitter's regiments became sepa rated from each other,* and he from them, and so remained during the night and the following day. The withdrawal of the troops, as a general thing, was attended with disorder, by reason of the dark woods and broken character of the country. u It was eight o'clock at night," says General Anderson, in his report, " before we had reached a bivouac, near General Bragg's headquarters, and in the darkness of the night the 20th Louisiana, and portions of the 17th Louisiana, and Confederate Guards, got separated from that por tion of the command in which I was, and encamped on other


Colonel Forrest's cavalry was picketed along Wallace's and Ilurlbut's camps, while another regiment of cavalry was posted to protect the left flunk, and guard the approaches from the Snake Creek bridge, exposed to Lew. Wallace's fresh force of eight thou sand men. General Ilardee's corps and General B reck in ridge's di vision withdrew to McClernand's camps, and General Bragg's corps, with one (Clark's) division of General Polk's corps, rested in those of Sherman. Through a misunderstanding of order.-, on the part of General Polk, his other (Cheatham's) division was sent back about three miles and a half, to its bivouac of the previous night.£

General Bragg and, later in the evening, the other corps com manders visited General Bcaurcgard's headquarters, in General Sherman's camps, and reported orally their operations of the day. All were elated and congratulatory over the success of the day, and the expectations of the morrow.£ The results, indeed, were great

* Jackson's Report, " Confederate Reports of Battles,'' p. 2GG.

t " Confederate Reports of Battle?,' 1 p. 30o.

I General Cheatliam says, in his Report: " At the close of the day, a part of my command remained on the field, and a portion returned to our encamp ment of the night previous/' In a letter to General Bcauregard, dated Nash ville, Tenn., November 27th, 1870, General Cheatliam uses the following lan guage: " At dusk, on the evening of the Gth, I was on the extreme left of our army, near the river. I recollect that General Cleburnc's division was on my right. The second brigade of my division (Stcphens's), with a portion of Johnson's (my first), retired to our camp of the night previous — Saturday night. This camp was near General Folk's headquarters, where the enemy's cavalry horses were killed by our artillery, on Friday, and several miles—at least three—in front of Mickey's."

§ Colonel Jacob Thompson's letter, in Appendix. I.—20

and encouraging. A half-disciplined army, poorly equipped and ap pointed, had assailed an opposing array larger in numbers, nearly half of which was composed of seasoned troops, provided with the best and most abundant armament and supplies, arrayed, besides, on familiar ground, chosen by its own leaders. That army had steadily been driven back to its last stronghold, a great part of it routed and demoralized; its tents, baggage, subsistence, and hos pital stores captured, together with thirty stands of colors, fully sixty field-pieces, many thousand small arms and accoutrements, and ammunition enough for another day's battle. General Beau-regard's promise, that the Confederate army should sleep in the enemy's camps, was fulfilled; and, reorganized for the next day, it would undoubtedly have given the finishing stroke to the entire Federal forces, had Buell marched towards Florence,f as it had just been reported that he had done, instead of effecting his junc tion with Grant, on the evening and night of the 6th, as w T as actually the case.

A despatch wits sent to Richmond, announcing the day's victory and the hope of its completion on the morrow, and the corps com manders were dismissed with instructions to reorganize their re spective forces as thoroughly as possible, and hold them in readi ness to take the offensive at break of da} r .

The night had closed with heavy clouds, and, about midnight, a cold, drenching rain set in, which made it the more difficult to col lect and re-form the broken commands and numerous stragglers, who were moving about for pillage, through the alluring camps of the enemy. The storm also interfered with the care of the wounded, who were unavoidedly neglected, but the little that could be done for them was done alike for friend and foe.

The gunboats, all through the night, at the suggestion, it was said, of General Nelson, threw shells into the Confederate bivouacs, the dim light of the camp-fires guiding them in their aim. Thus were slumber and rest chased away from our exhausted men.

Indefatigable and daring as usual, Colonel Forrest, under cover of the storm and darkness, sent scouts, clothed in Federal over coats, within the enemy's lines. They reported that large bodies of troops were crossing the river to Pittsburg Landing and that

t Colonel Helm had telegraphed to General Beanrcgard that Buell's army was marching on Florence; it proved to be Mitchell's division, and not Buell's army.

much confusion existed among them. Colonel Forrest so advised Generals Ilardee and Breckinridge, suggesting that an attack should be made at once, or that the army should withdraw next morning. He was referred to General Beauregard, but, un fortunately, was unable to find his headquarters.* At a later hour he again sent in his scouts, who returned at two o'clock in the morning, stating that Federal troops were still arriving. Gen eral Ilardee, being informed of the fact for the second time, in structed Colonel Forrest to go back to his regiment, and, keeping a vigilant picket line, to notify him of all hostile movements, should any be attempted. But General Ilardee failed to com municate this important information to General Beauregard.

* See "Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," by General Thomas Jordan.


Difficulty of Collecting and Organizing Commands during Night of the Gth.— Firing Resumed Early next Morning.—Nelson's Brigades Cross the Ten nessee.—Positions Taken by the Federals. — Chalmers's Brigade and a Mixed Command Force Back Nelson's Advance.—At 8 A. M. the Confed erates are Driven Back with the Loss of a Battery.—They Regain the Position and Battery at 9. — Critical Situation of Ammcn's Brigade.— New Position Assumed by the Confederates.—Crittenden's Division En gaged.—Absence of General Polk from the Field.—His Timely Arrival at 10.30.—His Charge with Cheatham's Brigade.—Organization of Federal Army during the Night of the Gth.—Inaction of General Sherman on the Morning of the 7th.—General Breckinridge Ordered Forward.—Enemy Driven Back on our Whole Line.—Advance of Federal Right AVing.— Its Repulse.—At 1 p. M. Enemy on our Left Reinforced.—General Bragg Calls for Assistance. — General Beauregard in Person Leads the 18th Louisiana and Other Troops to his Aid.—Predetermination of General Beauregard to Withdraw from the Battle-field.—Couriers sent to Corinth to Inquire about General Van Dorn.—Preparations for Retreat.—Guns and Colors Captured by Confederates on the Gth.—Slow and Orderly With drawal of Confederate Forces.—Inability of the Enemy to Follow.— Reconnoissance of General Sherman on the Morning of the 8th.—Con federates not Disorganized.—Their Loss During the Battle.—Computa tion of Numbers Engaged on Both Sides.—Federal Loss.

THE night of the 6th of April, as has been already stated, was so dark and stormy that it was found impossible properly to col lect and organize all the commands. The fighting, moreover, had been protracted even after dusk, on certain parts of the field, be fore General Beauregard's orders to arrest the conflict could be communicated and carried out.

At about half-past five o'clock, on the morning of the 7th, the skirmish-firing on our right, in an easterly direction, towards the Tennessee River, indicated that the enemy was about to as sume the offensive. Generals Ilardee, Breckinridge, and Bragg repaired at once to their respective commands, and availed them selves of such forces as they had immediately at hand, with which to oppose this onset. Geneial Ilardee had, under his orders, on

his extreme right, two of General Bragg's brigades, namely— Chalmers's and Jackson's, of Withers's division. General Bragg had, on the left of our line, the remainder of his corps, increased by one division (Clark's) of General Folk's corps, which was sub sequently reinforced by Trabuc's brigade. On the left of Gen eral Ilardee came General Breckinridge; and between him and General Bragg was the position which had been assigned to Gen eral Polk.

General Jordan, in his "Campaigns of Lieutenant-General For rest," page 137, thus correctly gives the positions and forces of the enemy:

•' By seven o'clock r. M., on the Gth, Nelson's (two) brigades had crossed the Tennessee, and, with the one that so materially helped—with "Webster's op portunely posted battery—to save the Federal army from utter overthrow, were at once thrown forward by General Bucll, as a shield between General Grant's army and the Confederates. Crittendcn's division likewise came up from Savannah by water not long after, and was promptly established in the same manner, on Nelson's right. Moreover, Lew. Wallace, strangely unable to find the road battleward, amid the thunder peals of more than a hundred cannon within six miles of him, as soon as the dusky shadows ami the quiet of night had supervened, found a way to the south bank of Snake Creek and to a position then commanding the bridge, and by chance, too, in the neigh borhood of Sherman, with the shreds, or odds and ends, of his own and other divisions that had rallied around him. One of McCook's brigades (Rousseau's) also reached the scene about sunrise, and the other two were near at hand.

'' Thus were marshalled there, or near at hand, ready to take the offensive against the victors of the day before, twenty-five thousand fresh Federal troops,* three battalions of which were Regulars. On the Confederate side, to meet such an onset, there was not a man who had not fought steadfastly for the greater part of Sunday. In addition to the many stragglers incident to all battles, the casualties did not fall short of six thousand five hundred offi cers and men, so that not more than twenty thousand Confederate infantry (and artillery) could have been found to answer to their names that morning. Scattered widely, the regiments of the brigades of Bragg's and Ilardec's corps had slept here and there, among the captured encampments, wheresoever they could find subsistence. Folk's corps had been embodied, to some degree, and led during the night by their general, rearward, at least a mile and a half be yond Shiloh, towards Corinth."f

* General Sherman estimates at eighteen thousand men those that had fought the day before. Sec his "Memoirs," p. 245.

t Only one of his divisions (Chcatham's) had been collected together and taken back, through a misunderstanding of orders, to its bivouac of the night of the 5th, about three and a half miles from the Shiloh meeting-house.

The positions occupied by the Federal forces on the morning of the 7th are still more definitely given in Yan Home's "His tory of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. pp. 109, 111, as follows:

"General Buell first formed General Nelson's division next to the river as the left of the battle front, and General Grant assigned Wallace's division to the right flank, near Snake Creek, below the mouth of Owl Creek. Between these extremes the remaining forces were formed—Crittenden's division on the right of Nelson's, with a space for McCook's on his right, when it should arrive, and on the right of the position of this division the troops engaged the day previous, somewhat refreshed, extended the line to Wallace's left. *********

"At the time that the recession of Nelson's line was arrested, McCook's fore most brigade, Rousseau's, moved into position on the right of Crittenden. This brigade extended the line, but Rousseau's flank was for a time as much exposed as Crittenden's had been, as there was still a wide space between the two armies. Before, however, the enemy could take advantage of this expos ure Kirk's brigade reached the field, and was placed in reserve on the right flank. Each brigade of Buell's army was now required to furnish its reserves, while Boyle's brigade of Crittenden's division was designated as a general reserve, and was so placed as to be facile of movement whenever there should be need of support. General Buell also availed himself of the fragmentary forces of the Army of the Tennessee, found in his rear.

"The Army of the Ohio (Cumbe?'lanc£) now offered a battle front one mile and a half long, about half the distance between Nelson's left and Wallace's right. The left flank was covered with skirmishers, and was in some degree protected by the roughness of the ground near the river. The right had no assured connection with the Army of the Tennessee, but rested in a wood. To strengthen the right, thus exposed to an enfilading or reverse fire, Gibson's brigade of McCook's division, on coming to the field, was placed in reserve in proximity. In front of Nelson was an open field, partially screened by woods, which extended beyond the enemy's line. Crittenden's left brigade and McCook's right were covered by a dense undergrowth, while in front of their right and left brigades, respectively, the ground was open. The ground, mainly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow before Crittenden, which fell into a small creek, passing in front of McCook. The Hamburg road penetrated the line near Nelson's left.* The enemy was in heavy force beyond the open ground in Buell's front, in a line slightly oblique to his line, having one battery so posted as to command Nelson's left, another to sweep his front and the woods before Crittenden's left, a third bearing upon the junction of Crittcndeu's right and McCook's left, and a fourth in the immedi-

* When Van Home states that the Hamburg road passed perpendicularly through the Federal line near Nelson's left, he means the Hamburg and Purdy road, not the Hamburg and Pittsburg road.

ate front of the latter. Beauregard had massed his forces on his right the evening previous, under General Bragg, to grasp the Lauding, and in conse quence this flank was strong for defense in the morning."

The Confederate pickets and skirmishers encountered by the advanced line of Nelson's division were those of Forrest's cavalry regiment. They gradually fell back in the direction of Hardee's line, then being formed near and beyond McClernand's old en campments, to the rear of which they retired soon afterwards, to take position on Hartleys right flank. Xelson's advancing line soon encountered Chalmers's brigade and Moore's regiment, added > to which was an extemporized command, consisting of the 19th Alabama, of Jackson's brigade; the 21st Alabama, of Gladden's brigade; and, says General Chalmers, in his report,* the Crescent (Louisiana) regiment; also a Tennessee regiment, under Lieuten ant-Colonel Yenable; and another Alabama regiment (the 20th), under Lieutenant-Colonel Chadwick, supported by batteries. They not only checked Xelson's force, but compelled it to fall back some distance, when, being supported by the advance of Crittcn-den's division, it again resumed the offensive, at about eight o'clock A.M. ; and Ilazen's brigade, on Nelson's right, being now pushed forward with great gallantry, forced the Confederates back, with the temporary loss of a battery. They soon rallied, and, aided by their batteries and other small reinforcements which General Beauregard very opportunely sent them, resumed the offensive at nine o'clock A.M., recovering their former position and their lost bat tery, inflicting a severe loss on Ilazen's brigade, and compelling that officer to call earnestly for aid. Meanwhile, Nelson's left bri gade, under Ammen, was sorely pressed, and was in serious danger of beinc: turned on its left.

" This brigade [says Van Home] fought gallantly to maintain a position second to none on the field, but at length began to give ground, and a decided advantage to the enemy seemed inevitable, as Nelson had neither artillery nor infantry to direct to his support, Ilazen's brigade having been shattered, and Bnell's being needed in its own position. But the impending disaster was averted by Terrell's regular battery of McCook's division, which, having just arrived from Savannah, dashed into position, and, by its rapid and accurate firing, silenced the enemy's first battery, which was aiding the infantry force pressing Ammen. Subsequently, the enemy repeated the attack, and endan-

* " Confederate Reports of Battles," p. 261.

gered both the brigade and Terrell's battery, the latter having lost very many gunners, and being without adequate support. . . . Then, by a flank attack by Nelson, and a direct one by Crittenden, aided by a concentric fire from the batteries of Mendenhall, Terrell, and Bartlett, he was driven beyond the posi tion of his second and third batteries." *

The Confederates soon assumed a new position. It was main tained, despite all the efforts of the Federals, until General Beau-regard determined to retire his troops, at about 2.30 P.M., when some guns had to be abandoned for want of horses to carry them off the field.

Crittenden's division had also been hotly engaged, shortly after Kelson's, with the rest of Hardee's and part of Breckinridge's commands, and, after a severe contest of several hours, in which it had to be supported on the right, at about ten o'clock A.M., by several thousands of General Grant's troops, under McClernand and Hurlbut, it was held at bay until two brigades, Gibson's and Kirk's, of McCook's division, joined in the struggle. His other brigade, Rousseau's, containing three battalions of Regulars, had reached the field early in the morning and taken a position near General Sherman's left. Yan Home says:

" Thus, McCook followed Crittenden in attacking the enemy. This divis ion met the same stubborn resistance, and made frequent charges. Rousseau's brigade, having taken an advanced position early in the day, repulsed a charge as its introduction to battle. It then gave a counter-blow, drove the oppos ing force some distance, and captured a battery. The direction of Rousseau's advance left an opening between McCook and Crittenden, which the enemy perceived, and began to mass troops to occupy. To prevent this, General McCook ordered Colonel Willich, commanding the 32d Indiana, to drive back the enemy, and, by the bayonet and bullet, this was gallantly accomplished. The remainder of Gibson's brigade followed "Willich, and soon both brigades, Rousseau's and Gibson's, were in hottest conflict. "VVillich's regiment at one time became wedged between other forces, and, receiving their fire, was com pelled to withdraw. This led to confusion, but order was soon restored. Kirk's brigade reached the field just as Rousseau had exhausted his ammu nition, and took his position, that he might replenish. While Rousseau was absent Gibson was severely pressed, as the enemy continued his movements to separate Crittenden and McCook. His left regiment, the 49th Ohio, was involved in imminent danger, and was compelled to change front twice under fire to prevent the turning of the position. Upon the return of Rousseau, his brigade, and two regiments of Hurlbut's division hitherto in reserve, went

* " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. pp. 112,113.

into line, when General McCook's whole division, thus supported, advanced and drove the enemy beyond General Sherman's camps." *

This was not done, however, until General Beauregard had de termined to withdraw from the field, in order not to prolong a then useless contest.

Just about the time (10.30 A.M.) when General McCook was as suming the offensive with his whole division, and was near push ing through the gap between General Breckinridge's left and Gen eral Bragg's right, caused by the absence of General Polk with one of his divisions, the latter arrived on the iield. It was relief, indeed, to General Beauregard, whose anxiety concerning Polk had been intense. Unable, since morning, to hear anything of General Poik's whereabouts, the thought had even crossed his mind that the commander of his First Corps had been captured. But, at half-past nine o'clock, he at last ascertained that, through, a misunderstanding of the orders given the previous evening, Gen eral Polk had retired, with Cheatham's division, to his bivouac of the 5th, for the purpose of recruiting and re-supplying that com mand with provision and ammunition. A message—and rather an imperative one—was instantly sent him, to hurry back to the front—and hurry back he did. Dashing forward, with drawn sword, at the head of Cheatham's fine division, he soon formed his line of battle at the point where his presence was so much need ed, and, with unsurpassed vigor, moved on, against a force at least double his own, making one of the most brilliant charges of in fantry made on either day of the battle. lie drove back the op posing column in confusion, and thus compensated for the tardi ness of his appearance on the iield. Shortly before this, General Beauregard had placed a battery in position, on a slight elevation some distance in advance of the Shiloh meeting-house, thereby holding the enemy in check through the gap referred to, and ma terially assisting the gallant charge of Cheatham's division.

During the night of the 6th and early morning of the 7th, Gen eral Grant's shattered forces, of a mixed character, had been par tially collected and formed into three divisions, under Generals Sherman, McClernand, and Ilurlbut, in advance of the bivouacs of the first two commands, not far from the bridge across Snake Creek. General Lew. Wallace's fresh division, with two batteries

* " History of the Army of the Cumberland, 11 vol. i. pp. 113,114.

of six pieces each, from near Crump's landing, was formed on Sherman's right, and constituted the extreme right of General Grant's extensive line.

General Sherman, in his report of the battle, says of the opera tions on this part of the field:

" At daylight, on Monday, I received General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps. I despatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before; and at the appointed time the division, or, rather, what remained of it, with the 13th Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here I remained, patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About ten o'clock A.M., the heavy firing in that di rection, and its steady approach, satisfied me; and General Wallace being on our right flank, with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my col umn to General McClernand's right, formed line of battle facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's brigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily and slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery."

Thus General Sherman remained several hours " patiently wait ing for the sound of General Buell's advance upon the main Cor inth road." But the attack of General Nelson had fairly com menced at eight o'clock A.M., and that of Crittenden and McCook about an hour later. This inaction, on the part of General Sher man, enabled General Beauregard to reinforce his centre from his left. Had General Sherman boldly advanced, before Cheatham's division so gallantly took its position in line, he would have been able to penetrate our line between General Bragg's right and Gen eral Breckinridge's left, as we have already intimated, and would have cut the Confederate line in two, for General Beauregard had then no reserves, and could not have opposed General Sherman's advance.

When General Breckinridge, in the centre, was ordered to take the offensive and relieve the right of our line, his left flank was still unprotected, and the fear of its being turned prevented him from executing the movement; seeing this, General Beauregard sent back to him one of his brigades—Trabue's—then on General


Bragg's left; and, shortly afterwards, also gave orders that Rus sell's brigade, of Clark's (now Stewart's) division, of General

Polk's corps—which, for the time being, was on General Bragg's right—should be at once extended towards General Breckinridge's left, so as to afford some protection to his threatened flank, and enable him to engage the enemy in his front. This he did with no less vigor than success, having Hodgson's (Slocomb's) Louis iana battery, and two sections of other batteries, to support him. But, at about eleven o'clock A.M., McCook's fresh division, with a part of Crittenden's and some of General Grant's reorganized forces, pressed him so hard that he was driven back some distance and compelled to abandon one of his batteries. Then there was sent to his assistance a small brigade, under Colonel Iceichart, of New Orleans—a most efficient Bavarian officer, commanding the 20th Louisiana regiment. This brigade was temporarily composed of Colonel Reichart's own regiment, Colonel Hill's Tennessee reg iment, and a battalion of stragglers, which General Beauregard had very opportunely placed under command of Captain Lockctt, of the C. S. Engineers.* These troops, who had just been brought to General Beauregard from the woods on our right rear, marched forward with great alacrity and spirit, and by twelve o'clock Gen eral Breckinridge had retaken both his position and his battery, and the enemy was being driven back on our whole front.

This renewal of hostilities, first originating on our extreme left, then gradually extending towards General Bnigg's right, brought out, most conspicuously, that soldierly valor and surprising spirit of endurance which signalized the Confederate troops on many a battle-field, but never more so than upon these two days of un paralleled hard fighting. The battle now raged fiercely on our whole front, except over the interval between Generals Bragg

* These stragglers, from every arm of the service, were brought to General Beauregard, with no one to take command of them. As he was looking around in search of a temporary leader to march them off to the front, his eye fell on a young officer just then passing near him, whose soldierly bearing at once attracted his attention. The young officer was halted, and found himself in the presence of General Beauregard. " Could you command a bat talion?" said the General to him. "If ordered to do so, I think I can," was the modest and, at the same time, firm reply. General Beauregard, having now ascertained his name, took him to the battalion of stragglers near by, and, introducing him to the men, said, u Here is Colonel Lockett, whom I now place in charge of you. lie will lead you to victory, if you only follow him." In a loud and earnest cheer they each and all promised to do it, and gallantly redeemed their promise half an hour later.

and Breckinridge, where skirmishing only appeared to be go ing on.*

The Federal right wing advanced steadily at first, under a light fire from the Confederates, but when it had come within fair range of Bragg's line (consisting of the remnant of Ruggles's division, his own corps, part of Folk's second division—Clark's, now com manded by Stewart—and one brigade of Breckinridge's command), it was greeted with such a terrible fire of musketry and artillery, that—

"The Federals reeled and rushed rearward, followed nearly a mile by the Confederates; but here, reinforced by McCook, Sherman attempted to resume the advance. Now the fight waxed obstinate, and the firing, says Sherman, was the severest musketry fire he had ever heard. Rousseau's Federal brigade here was pitted against Trabue's Kentuckians. Both fought with uncommon determination to win, but the Federals were repulsed, and Wallace was so pressed that his situation became extremely critical.! McCook's other brigade had joined in the action meanwhile; and in that part of the field, including Grant's forces under Sherman and McClernand, there were fully twenty thou sand Federals opposed by not half that number of battle-battered Confederates. The impetus of the Confederate attack was, therefore, slackened in the face of such odds. Yet several brilliant charges were made, one of which, to the left of Shiloh, General Beauregard himself led in person, carrying the battle-flag of a Louisiana regiment."!

* During the fierce struggle in front, General Beauregard noticed, through the woods, some troops apparently uniformed in white. He at first took them to be Federals, but observing that they w ? ere fighting on our side, he sent an aid to ascertain where they came from, hoping they might be part of Van Dora's army. They proved to be the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard battalion, temporarily merged into one command. Their coats being blue, they had been fired into, on the day before, by some of our own troops; and, in order to avoid a repetition of the mistake, had turned their coats "inside out."

When General Beauregard had resigned his commission in the United States army, in February, 1861, he had joined, as a private, the Orleans Guard bat talion, then just organized in the city of New Orleans. When he was made brigadier-general in the Confederate service and sent to Charleston, his name was preserved on the rolls of that battalion, and, whenever called, the color-sergeant, stepping forward, would answer: "Absent on duty." Tins custom was kept up as long as the battalion remained in service, and even on the bat tle-field of Shiloh. Their flagstaff was made of a piece of the Sumter flagstaff, which General Beauregard had sent to their commander, after the surrender of that celebrated fort, in April, 18G1.

fThis is General Wallace's own statement. See " Rebellion Record," vol. iv. p. 359. J " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," p. 142.

At about one o'clock p. M., the enemy, on our left, being reinforced, had resumed the offensive. General Bragg—whose forces had been weakened by the withdrawal of three brigades (Anderson's, Trabue's, and Russell's), which, in the course of the morning, had been sent to strengthen our centre and right—was gradually driven back, towards the Shiloh meeting-house. lie then sent to General Beauregard for assistance. Fortunately, in the small ravine passing immediately south of the meeting-honse were the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard battalion, together with two Tennessee regiments, which had been collected there in obedience to orders. General Beauregard rode down to them, ad dressed a few words of encouragement to the lirst two, and ordered them to move promptly to the support of General Bragg. A? they passed by, with a tired, heavy gait, they endeavored to cheer their own favorite commander, but were so hoarse from fatigue and over-exertion that they could only utter a husky sound, which grated painfully on General Beaurcgard's car. They had not pro ceeded far, when another staff officer came to him, in great haste, and informed him, on the part of General Bragg, that unless the latter was reinforced at once, he would certainly be overpowered. Looking in his direction, General Beauregard saw the commander of the Second Corps gallantly rallying his troops under a heavy fire from a much superior force of the enemy. He rode, with his staff, to the leading regiment of Pond's brigade, the ISth Louisi ana (Lieutenant-Colonel Roman commanding, Colonel Mouton having been wounded), and, seizing its colors, ordered ''his Louisi-anians " to follow him. They started with an elasticity of step sur prising in troops that, a moment before, appeared so jaded and broken down. They were soon at the side of General Bragg.* Leaving them in his charge, General Beauregard returned to one of the rear regiments of Tennesseeans, which lie led in a similar manner, but being too weak, from illness, to carry its flag, a large and heavy one, he transferred it to one of his volunteer aids, Colo nel II. E. Pevton, of Virginia, who carried it until the regiment

*Tlicn it was that General Beauregard, being almost reproved by Colonel Augustin, one of his aids, for thus exposing himself, said: " The order must now be 'follow,' not' go /' " Colonel Augustin had taken the flag, however, and for a few moments led the 18th Louisiana and the Orleans Guard battalion, the latter of which he himself had organized, some eight months before, in New Orleans.

got into position. General Bragg resumed the offensive, and, de spite the broken and disjointed condition of the forces under him, drove the enemy back, out of sight from the Shiloli meeting house, and kept him at that distance until about 2.30 P. M., when General Beauregard gave him orders to retire slowly arid join the retreat.

At an early hour in the morning General Beauregard had es tablished his headquarters on a small knoll, to the right (eastward) of the Shiloli meeting-house, which appeared to be the most eligi ble and central point, and one from which he could, with greatest facility, communicate with his corps'commanders and they with him.

Long before the charge we have just described, the enemy's boldness, his active and steady movements, and the heavy roll of musketry on our right, and, shortly afterwards, in our front, had confirmed General Beauregard in his belief that General Buell had, at last, formed a junction of the remainder of his forces with those of General Grant. He knew that his depleted and exhausted forces were now facing at least twenty thousand fresh troops, in addition to Lew. Wallace's command, in addition also to Ammen's brigade of Kelson's division, whose timely crossing, the day be fore, had saved the Federals from annihilation. To indulge a hope of success with these fearful odds against him would have been to show a lack of judgment impossible to such a soldier as Beauregard. The die, however, was cast. There was no means of avoiding the issue. The only plan left, General Beauregard thought, was, in appearance, to fight a outrance, so as to deceive the enemy as to his real intentions, and, so deceiving him, to effect, at the proper time, an orderly, safe, and honorable retreat. The victorious army of the day before could leave the battle-field in no other way. He carefully kept his own counsel, and, from about noon, issued all his orders accordingly. To show a bold front all alon£r his line; to offer as strong a resistance as the nature of the


ground and the condition of his forces would permit; and,if pos sible, to cross to the south side of the ravines, in front of the Shiloli meeting-house, which had so effectually protected Sher man's and Prentiss's commands, on the preceding morning—such were the objects he now strained every nerve to secure. And the task before him was difficult, because the least symptom of weak ness or hesitancy on his part would necessarily increase the bold-

ness of liis opponent, and correspondingly depress his new, hardly organized, and worn-out forces.

Meanwhile, with feelings of anxiety easily understood, he de spatched couriers to Corinth, to hurry forward General Van Doru's army of about twenty thousand men,daily expected there from Van Buren, Arkansas, from which point he had promised to form a junction with General Beauregard, at the earliest practicable moment. But the high waters, and want of means of transporta tion, had greatly delayed Yan Dorii's movement. Had he arrived in time on the field, General Beauregard's intention was to have kept about five or six thousand men of that command with him self, as a reserve, and to have sent Yan Dorn with the rest to at tack Lew. Wallace's extreme right and rear, while he, Beauregard, would have attacked both Lew. Wallace and Sherman in front, with his own left. The light there could not have lusted long. lie would then have attacked successively, in flank, rear, and front, McClernand's and McCook's divisions; and afterwards, the other divisions towards their left. Had it been possible to execute that programme, there can be little doubt that the victory, on this sec ond day of the battle, would have been more complete than on the first; and that it would have been ended before Wood's division, of BuelTs army, could have come to the enemy's relief; for it was nearly dark when that division arrived.

While his couriers were hurrying on their way to Corinth, in search of news from Yan Dorifs army, General Beauregard, still biding his time, and unwilling, yet, to hasten the moment of his predetermined retreat, went on supplying reinforcements to his front, with stragglers and stray commands collected from the woods and ravines in his rear. History, we think, furnishes no other ex ample of a great battle, against such odds, being prolonged over four hours, with reserves thus brought together and organized.*

* During the late war, General Beauregard's experience of Southern volunteers convinced him that they furnish the best material for soldiers. Active, in telligent, brave, self-reliant, and persevering, their powers of endurance are simply wonderful. After being three months under arms, they become as trustworthy on the field of battle as veterans; and no more than six months' drilling is required to make them as proficient as regulars of two and-three years' service. But they soon consider themselves capable of passing jud« > -ment on their commanders; and, should these forfeit their confidence, they grow dissatisfied and intractable, and lose sonic of their best soldierly qualities.

At last, however, the drain made upon his feeble resources had ex hausted them. Stragglers and stray commands could no longer be found. And just then his couriers arrived from Corinth. They reported that Van Dorn was not there, and that his where abouts was unknown. The time had evidently come when it was imperative to put the plan of retreat into execution.'* Gen eral Beauregard's hope of Tan Dorn's junction on that day had been but a fleeting one; he had regarded it as a thing possible, but hardly probable. He ordered Colonel Chisolm, one of his aids, to go immediately to the rear with a company of cavalry, and clear and repair the roads for any emergency. About an hour later, he instructed Colonel Jordan, the Adjutant-General of the army, to select at once a position across the ravine in the rear, for such troops and batteries as were available to protect the retreat. He then ordered the corps commanders to be prepared to retire slow ly and leisurely, but, before doing so, to take the offensive again with vigor, and drive back the enemy as far as possible, while he established batteries and posted troops to protect his retiring forces. After placing a battery in front of the Shiloh meeting house, and another on the Ridge road, towards the right, he went in person across the ravine, to examine the location of the troops intrusted to Colonel Jordan, and he there posted two additional batteries, the better to cover the retrograde movement, which had then fairly begun, and was being executed in a very orderly man ner. General Breckinridge, occupying the centre of the line of battle, retired first (the adjacent divisions closing up the void space) and took up his position in rear of the troops and batteries

*A remarkable instance of bravery was shown by a mere boy, about this time, when matters were looking gloomy, and the stoutest hearts were begin ning to fail. The meeting-house of Shiloh had been turned into a hospital, and many of our wounded were collected there to be operated on. General Beauregard sent one of his aids to have them transferred to the rear, prepara tory to a retrograde movement. Upon his return the aid reported that while there, a private (a boy scarcely over fourteen years of age), had come to have a wound in his hand attended to. While the surgeon was dressing it — the fighting still going on near by —the boy said : "Make haste, please, doctor, I want to go back and take another shot at the Yankees." General Beauregard told his aid to return immediately and ascertain the name of the young hero, so as to have it published in general orders. It was too late. He had, no doubt, gone back " to take another shot at the Yankees."

established across the Shiloli meeting-house ravine, so as to form the rear guard. Then came the commands of Generals Polk, Hardce, and Bragg, which gradually withdrew from the field, be hind General B reck in ridge's position, and continued their retreat in the direction of Corinth, to the points designated to be occupied by them that night.

General Jordan thus correctly speaks of that retreat in the "Campaigns of Lieutenant -General Forrest," pages 143 and

"The battle kindled soon after daylight, and raged furiously from right to left for more than five hours. And, notwithstanding the odds of fresh troops brought up against them, despite their long-continued engagement, the Con federates had not receded from the ground upon which they had been con centrated, as soon as it was apparent that the battle was in their hands. But they were being fearfully depleted meanwhile. Beginning the combat with not more than twenty thousand men, exclusive of cavalry, less than fifteen thousand were now in the Confederate ranks. General Beauregard, seeing the unprofitable nature of the struggle, determined not to prolong it. Direct ing his Adjutant-General to select a position, anil post such troops as were available to cover the retreat, he despatched other staff officers to the corps commanders, with the order to retire simultaneously from their several posi tions, ready, however, to turn and fight should it become necessary. And ac cordingly, about two o'clock (2.30), the retrograde movement of the Confeder ates was inaugurated and carried out with a steadiness never exceeded by veterans of a hundred fields.

"During the various stages of the conflict General Beauregard had tried to use his cavalry, but so dense and broad-spread were the woods that they proved altogether fruitless of results. . . .

" The retreat had now commenced in earnest, but so stunned and crippled was the enemy that no effort or pretence to pursue was made. The line es tablished to cover the movement commanded the ground of Shiloh church, and some open fields in the neighborhood ; thence keeping up a vigorous play of artillery on the woods beyond ; there was no reply, nor did any enemy become visible. That line was then withdrawn about three fourths of a mile, to another favorable position. Meanwhile, the retreat had been effected in admirable order, all stragglers falling in the ranks, and that line was abandoned with no enemy in sight. . . .

" Of trophies the Confederates carried from the field some twenty-six stands of flags and colors, and about thirty of the guns captured on the 6th. The guns which figure in Federal subordinate reports as captured from the Con federates, with few exceptions, were those lost on Sunday by the Federals, which, for want of horses to draw them from the field, had been left by the Confederates where they had been taken."

General Grant says, in his report : L— 21

"Before the close of the action the advance of General T. J. Wood's division (two brigades of Buell's corps) arrived in time to take part in the action.

" My force was too much fatigued from two days' hard fighting and ex posure in the open air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue immediate!} 7 . Night closed in cloudy and with a heavy rain, making the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning.

" General Sherman, however, followed the enemy, finding that the main part of the army had retreated in good order."

But General Sherman, in his report, uses the following lan guage :

"At the time of recovering our camps (about four o'clock P.M.) our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy."

And General Buell says, in his report:

" Two brigades of General Wood's division arrived just at the close of the battle; but only one, that of Colonel Wagner, in time to participate actively in the pursuit, which it continued for about a mile, and until halted by my order."

If any pursuit beyond the Shiloh meeting-house was made by the Federals on the afternoon of the 7th, it must have been made very cautiously, for the Confederates were not at all disturbed in their slow and quiet retreat. General Breckinridge, commanding the reserve, bivouacked for the night near the former headquarters of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, on the night of the 5th, at about one and a half miles from the battle-field. The next morn ing (on the 8th) he fell back to a position only three miles farther to the rear, where he remained undisturbed for several days, with the cavalry thrown out well to the front, in close proximity to the Federal lines.

On the morning of the 8th, General Sherman, with two brigades and some cavalry, advanced to reconnoitre, on the lower Corinth road, while General Wood, with two brigades, reconnoitred on the upper road. On arriving at General Breckinridge's bivouac of the preceding night they found our cavalry pickets in position, arid pursued them for about half a mile with a regiment of cavalry and one of infantry. At that point Colonel Forrest appeared, and charged the enemy with a part of his forces, a company of "Wirt Adams's regiment, a squadron of the 8th Texas, and some Kentuckians, under Captain John Morgan, amounting in all to about three hundred and fifty troopers. The Federals were thrown into great confusion, and routed; "although," says General Slier-

man, in his report, "the ground was admirably adapted for a de fence of infantry against cavalry, being miry, and covered with fallen timber." Their loss amounted to fifteen killed, about twenty-five wounded, and some seventy prisoners. The Confed erates pursuing too vigorously, and coming suddenly on the bri gades of Federal infantry, were repulsed, after the brave and dash ing Forrest had been severely wounded in the side. His command then retired, followed a short distance by some of the enemy's cavalry, towards General Breckinridge's encampment, at Mickey's farm, only about two and a half miles from the point of collision.

General Sherman concludes his report, dated on the day of this encounter, as follows: "The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried ; and our troops being fagged out * by two days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation,! ordered them back to their camps, where they now are."

We discover here two oversights on General Sherman's part. The short conflict referred to occurred early in the morning, and there was certainly ample time in which to bury fifteen dead and remove twenty-five wounded. And the two brigades of Wood's division, of BuelTs army, which accompanied his command, had taken but little part in the battle of the preceding day, having ar rived on the field about the time the battle terminated.

The remainder of the Confederate forces, sorely disappointed, but not without heart, returned from Shiloh to their former posi tions at and about Corinth, to recruit and reorganize, and to await a favorable opportunity of striking another blow at their antago nists.

The loss on the Confederate side was unusually heavy, but this was due to the fact that it had been the assailant all day on the 6th, and very often on the 7th. The army under Generals John ston and Beauregard had gone into the battle with thirty-nine thousand six hundred and thirty men of all arms and condition, and it received no reinforcements during the two days' fight, ex cept Colonel Hill's Tennessee regiment, which reached the front unarmed on the morning of the Oth, and was furnished with arms and equipments picked up on the field. This regiment swelled

*'They could not have been more ''fagged out" than their adversaries were.

the Confederate numbers to about forty thousand men. Our loss was 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, and 959 missing; presenting an aggregate of 10,699, or, in killed and wounded, twenty-four and one third per cent, of those present on the field. This is a very re markable proportion, in view of the rawness of most of the troops, and the nature of the ground upon which the battle was fought. It is about the greatest average ever attained in any single contest between veteran armies,* and in most instances the defeated army is either completely routed or unfit for another campaign until largely reinforced.

The Federals commenced the battle, on the 6th, with over forty thousand men of all arms, and were reinforced that day by the timely arrival of Am men's brigade, of General Buell's army. Dur ing the night of the 6th and the next morning they were rein forced again, by Lew. Wallace's division of General Grant's army; by three divisions (Crittenden's, McCook's, and Kelson's two other brigades) of General Buell's army; and, towards the end of the second day's battle, by two brigades of Wood's division of the same army, f which brought up the number of fresh Federal troops, on the 7th, to over thirty-two thousand men of all arms. Our computation is based on the fact that these divisions contained no less than seven thousand men each, as is established by General Yan Home, in his " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. p. 99, where the following passage is found:

" The 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th divisions, commanded respectively by Briga dier-Generals Thomas, McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, arid Wood, with a contin gent force of cavalry, in all thirty-seven thousand effective men, constituted the main army, which, under the personal command of General Buell, was to join General Halleck in the projected movement against the enemy at Corinth, Mississippi. 1 '

The total force of the Federals on both days amounted, there fore, to about seventy-two thousand men of all arms, and their losses were, according to official reports—in General Grant's army,

* Those losses generally vary from one twentieth, or five per cent., to one fourth, or twenty-five per cent., of the troops engaged. The British, at "Wa terloo, lost not quite one sixth, or only sixteen per cent. The Austrians, at Ma genta, lost only one thirteenth, that is, not quite eight per cent.; and the Prus sian loss at Sadowa was remarkably small, being only one twentieth, or five per cent.

t See Generals Grant's r.nd Bucll's Reports.

1437 killed, 5679 wounded, and 2934 prisoners ; in General Buell's army, 236 killed, 1816 wounded, and 88 prisoners; making 1673 killed, 7495 wounded, and 3022 prisoners, or a grand total of 12,190. Thus the proportion of killed and wounded, on the Fed eral side, as compared to the number of troops present on the Held, was nearly thirteen per cent., which is about the ordinary proportion in modern warfare.


Commentaries on the Battle of Shiloli: I. "Why Generals Johnston and Beau-regard did not Sooner Move the Army from Corinth..—II. Their Reasons for Forming their Lines of Battle as they did. — III. Why the Con federate Attack was Made Chiefly on the Enemy's Right, and not on his Entire Front.—IV. Demonstration of the Fact that the Confederate Attack took the Enemy Completely by Surprise.—V. General Beau-regard's Opinion and Criticism of General Sherman's Tactics during the Battle.—VI. Refutation of the Charge that the Confederate Troops were Withdrawn too soon from the Battle-field on the Evening of the Gth.— Comparison Drawn by Mr. Davis between General A. S. Johnston and Marshal Turenrtc.—VII. General Beaurcgard's Opinion as to the Fight ing of the Confederates during the Battle of the 7th.—VIII. Correction of the Absurd Story that General Beauregard did not Leave his Am bulance during the First Day of the Battle, and, when Informed of Gen eral Johnston's Death, " Quietly Remained where lie was, Waiting the Issue of Events."


GENERALS JOHNSTON and Beauregard have both been censured for not moving sooner and more rapidly from Corinth, to attack the Federals at Pittsburg Landing, so as to anticipate General Buell's junction with General Grant. The causes of this delay, as already given in the preceding chapters, sufficiently absolve the two Confederate commanders from any just blame. The read er will pardon us for briefly reverting to them.

General Beauregard, it will be remembered, only arrived at Jackson, Tennessee, on the 17th of February. General Polk, with about fourteen thousand five hundred men of all arms, was in command in that military district. Four days after General Beau-regard's arrival, and before he had yet formally assumed com mand, he despatched five officers of his staff to the governors of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, to ascertain wheth er they could send him, at Corinth, the State troops they had available at that time; and he also requested General Johnston, who was then at Murfreesboro', retiring, with some fifteen thou-

sand men, from Bowling Green and JSTashville, to Stevenson, to change the direction of his retreat to Dccatur, Alabama, that he might more readily form a junction with the forces at Corinth, at the proper time. To this request, General Johnston willingly ac ceded.

By the 27th of March, with our defective means of transporta tion, and restricted supplies of all kinds, General Beauregard had assembled, at and about Corinth, an army of over forty thousand men, exclusive of some nine thousand occupying the Mississippi llivcr defences, at Xew Madrid, Island 2so. 10, and Fort Pillow. And General Van Dorn, at General Beauregard's request, was mov ing rapidly from Van Buren, Arkansas, with an army of nearly twenty thousand men, to unite also with our forces at Corinth. lie would have arrived in time to take a part in the battle of Shi-loh, had he not been delayed by high waters, which prevented his marching to Memphis, when he could not immediately procure suf ficient river transportation. Even with these obstacles to overcome, General Van Dorn's troops commenced arriving at Memphis on the 10th of April, only three days after the battle of Shiloh. How different might have been the result, had he arrived in time !

Great difficulties were encountered in organizing and supplying so many troops, hastily gathered up from such remote points. These difficulties were increased by the want of experienced officers, to take charge of the brigades and divisions as soon as formed. A delay of one or two days may be attributed to that cause alone. The War Department had promised General Beauregard a certain number of officers, below the rank of brigadier-generals, designa ted by him, from his army of the Potomac, so as to assist in or ganizing the troops of his new command, if needed ; but that promise was only partly complied with, and much too late.

Generals Johnston and Beauregard intended to move from Cor-


inth, on or about the 1st of April, with the hope of beginning their attack against the Federals on the morning of the 3d, at latest; whereas they were not able to leave until the latter da} r , and did not get into position before the afternoon of the 5th, at too advanced an hour to open the attack immediately. With better disciplined troops, the march of less than eighteen miles could have been made in one day; but two of our corps, Generals Folk's and Bragg's, which had been recently organized, were most ly composed of commands not yet used to marching. General

Folk's corps was, besides, rather slow in starting; and we were two days in passing over that short distance.


It lias pleased some hypercritical military writers, also, to criticise severely the order of battle adopted at Shiloh. They think that a great mistake was made, in deploying the different corps, in suc cessive lines,* along the whole front of battle, instead of intrust ing a part of that front to each corps, itself formed on several lines.

The first merit of a commander is, to be able to adapt the means at his disposal to the circumstances in which he is placed, and to apply them, in the simplest manner possible, to the accom plishment of the object in view. Our " corps" were thus designa ted, not only for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the number of our troops, which we wished to exaggerate, but also to inspire our own men with greater confidence. The truth is, that these corps were properly " divisions," at least in size, and were composed only of from four to five brigades, averaging each about two thousand infantry, so that the first line, General Hardee's, consisting of four brigades, contained some eight thousand five hundred bayonets, and the second line — five hundred yards in rear of the first—consisting of five brigades, under General Bragg, had about fifteen hundred more bayonets, or nearly ten thousand in all. General Folk's corps and General Ereckinridge's division composed the first of four brigades, numbering not over eight thousand five hundred men, and the second, of about six thousand, gave a total of less than thirty-five thousand infantry. The forces of Generals Folk and Breckinridge were formed in columns of brigades, at proper intervals, in rear of the second line of battle. Our front was therefore of limited extent for one command, com pared to many other fronts of battle subsequently used during the war, especially in Virginia, with the corps of Generals Jack son and Longstreet.

General Hardee's command, used to marching and moving as an organized body, under that cool and gallant officer, constituted

* Only two corps, Generals Hardee's and Bragg's, were thus deployed j the other two, Generals Folk's and Breckinridge's, were in columns of brigades, supporting each wing.

the front line of battle, to secure unity of action, during what was expected to be a surprise. General Bragg's troops were equally well disciplined as regiments, but were unused to inarch ing by brigades, and many of his regiments had never before been under his orders. It was supposed that, in a broken and wooded country, they might very well follow and support General Ilardec's lines, but might not do so well if deployed to form the immediate front. General Folk's command, recently organized, was even less prepared to occupy such a position. Breckinridge's division was composed of excellent material, and could march well, having lately retreated from Kentucky and middle Tennes see, with General Ilardee's corps; hence, it was thought advisable, at first, to hold it in reserve for any emergency which might hap pen on any distant part of the field.

That the commands got very much broken and mixed up dur ing the battle was not surprising, and was due less to the order of battle than to the rawness of the troops, including officers, the broken and wooded nature of the field, and the severity of the contest. General Beauregard is of opinion that any other order of battle would have resulted similarly, under like circumstances. The Federals were also in the same mixed-up condition, according to their own reports, when the battle had lasted only a few hours. At the close of the first battle of Manassas, the Confederates, who had fought on the defensive, in a single line of battle, owing to the want of troops, were nearly as badly disorganized as the army at Shiloh was. General Beauregard says that he has often seen nc\v troops when attempting to mananivre, even on level ground, get so thoroughly mixed up in a few moments that a long time was required to disentangle them. It may be true that our re serves were engaged somewhat too early in the action; but this was done to save time, as success depended on the rapid execution of the offensive, and to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and concentrating for the defensive.


Another objection raised against the attack at Shiloh is, that it was made to bear too much on the Federal left, which brought the Confederates in too close proximity to the Tennessee River, where their right flank became exposed to the fire of the enemy's two gunboats.

The attack was made oblique on the right, as has been already stated in the narrative of the battle, in order to get on better ground, towards the ridge separating the waters which flow into Lick Creek from those which empty into Owl Creek. This ar rangement enabled us, besides, to take the Federal encampments more in flank than would have been possible by a direct attack. The country was too much broken and too heavily wooded to justify much fear of the gunboats in the river. They could not have distinguished friends from foes, except at a short distance, and they would have had to fire at random. We expected to back the Federals against Owl and Snake Creeks—the two narrow and rickety bridges of which could not have stood heavy pressure— early in the day, without incurring much risk from the gunboats. It was only late on the afternoon of the 6th, when attacking Pitts-burg Landing itself, that our right flank became really exposed to their fire, and our attack was checked, principally, by the water in the creeks and ravines which empty into the Tennessee River.

It must be remembered that the Confederates had no accurate knowledge of the ground occupied by the Federals, and they had no proper staff officers to make the necessary reconnoissances, if practicable. The expedition was intended to be a surprise, and they feared to arouse the suspicions of the enemy by a forced reconnoissance: hence, they preferred to take the risk attending an imperfect knowledge of the ground over which they had to operate, rather than incur the danger of giving timely warning of the attack to the enemy. War is usually a contest of chances, and he who fears to incur any risk seldom accomplishes great re sults.

It is possible that, if we had had an army of veterans and had possessed a thorough knowledge of the Federal positions, we might have attacked in a different manner. At any rate, we would have so extended our left as to engage Sherman's troops 'shortly after we attacked Prentiss's, which would have given the former less time to prepare for the onslaught. There is no doubt that, at early dawn, Sherman was no better prepared than Pren-tiss to receive an attack. But General Beauregard had been as sured, while collecting information at Corinth for the movement, that the distance between Owl and Lick Creeks, near the Shiloh meeting-house, was about two miles, whereas it was more nearly three: hence our front, was not sufficiently extended to attack,

in rapid succession, the whole Federal front, a circumstance which gave Sherman time hastily to form his division to oppose us; and on this fact he bases his denial of having been surprised by the Confederates.


Our narrative of the movement from Corinth to Shiloh has clearly established the surprise of the Federals on that occasion. When an army of nearly forty thousand men advances to within a mile and a half of an enemy's encampments; establishes lines of battle in the woods in his front, during a whole afternoon ; bivouacs all night in that position without being disturbed, and the next morning advances at leisure, in line of battle, to within sight of those encampments, without meeting any serious opposi tion, it is absurd to deny that a surprise is effected; otherwise, there is evidently no attack in war that can be thus designated. If the attack was not a surprise, how can General Sherman ac count for the success achieved against Prentiss, in about one hour, and against himself in about two hours, by a force not well or ganized, badly armed, and worse equipped ? lie says, in his " Me moirs,-' p. 233, of the general position at Tittsburg Landing:

"The ground itself admits of easy defence by a small command, and yet af fords admirable camping ground for a hundred thousand men."

Again, on page 229 :

" We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw men timid. The position was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and Lick Creek, with a similar confluent, on our left; thus narrowing the space over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles."

In his report of the battle, he says of his own position near the Shiloh meeting-house:

" The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of Appier's camp, and flows to the north along my whole front. This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side/'

In his testimony at the trial of Colonel AVorthington, an officer of his command, in August, 1SG2, he said:

"And here I mention, for future history, that our right flank was well

guarded by Owl and Snake Creeks, our left by Lick Creek, leaving us simply to guard our front. No stronger position was ever held by an army. .. . But even as we were on the 6th of April, you might search the world over and not find a more advantageous field of battle—flanks well protected, and never threatened, troops in easy support, timber and broken ground giving good points to rally; and the proof is that forty-three thousand men, of whom at least ten thousand ran away, held their ground against sixty thousand chosen troops* of the South with their best leaders. On Friday the 4th, nor officer, nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can prove."

Now, what forces had lie and General Prentiss with which to hold and defend their impregnable positions? Sherman had three of his brigades of infantry, three batteries of six pieces each, and some cavalry, and was reinforced by one brigade of McCler-nand's division, making in all over nine thousand men ; and General Prentiss had three brigades of infantry and two batteries, or about six thousand men—together they had over fifteen thousand men.

Their positions were carried in from one to two hours by liar-dee's corps of four brigades, numbering nine thousand and twenty-four infantry and artillery, assisted by Bragg's five brigades, ten thousand seven hundred and thirty-one infantry and artillery, and by two brigades of Folk's corps, about four thousand five hundred men, or, in all, less than twenty-five thousand. Folk's other two brigades and Breckinridge's division of three brigades took no part in this first attack. Is it probable that the Federals, who fought so gallantly during the rest of that day, would have been driven so soon from such a stronghold as is described by General Sherman, if they had not been surprised ? But the reports of several of Gen eral Sherman's own brigade commanders show conclusively that the Confederate attack, on the morning of the 6th, came upon them quite unexpectedly. A remarkable circumstance is, that General Sherman had then no cavalry pickets in advance of his encampments, having forgotten, apparently, that cavalry is " the eye of an army." His infantry pickets and guards were so few and close to his first line of sentinels as not to be able to delay our advance, or give timely notice of our approach. General Sherman says also, in his report:

* The Confederates numbered not quite forty thousand men, and about one third of this force was composed of newly formed regiments, very recently armed.

"On Saturday (5th) the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front, yet I did not believe they designed anything but a strong demonstration."

And further on lie adds:

About 8 A. M. (Sunday) I saw the glistening bnyonets of heavy masses ot infantry, to our left front, in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp."

Major Ricker says that, after reporting to General Sherman a reconnoissance he had made on the day preceding the battle:

" I told him I had met and fought the advance of Bcaurcgard's army, and that he was advancing on us. General Sherman remarked,'It could not be possible; Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations to attack us in ours—mere reconnoissance in force.' " *

But Generals Sherman and Prentiss were not the only com manding officers surprised by Beaurcgard's "foolish"' attack. Generals Ilallcck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally unprepared for his sudden onslaught. General Buell, with five divisions of his army, well organized and fully equipped, num bering at least thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, had left Nashville from the 15th to the 20th of March, to form a junction at his leisure with Grant at Savannah, via Columbia, Mount Pleas ant, and Waynesboro. lie was delayed several days at Columbia by high water in Duck River, the bridge having been destroyed by the Confederates. While there he first heard, on or about the 29th of March, that Grant's army had moved to Pittsburg Land ing, on the left bank of the Tennessee River. General Buell re sumed his march on the 31st, intending—having obtained the ap proval of General llalleck—"to stop for cleaning up and rest at Waynesboro;" he had not yet received any intimation that Gen eral Grant was in danger, or that he (Buell) should hurry up with his forces.

But in order that we may not be suspected of a disposition to be unfair towards the distinguished generals referred to, we quote from Van Home's " History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. pp. 102 et seq., as follows :

* See Boynton's " Sherman's Historical Raid," pp. 33, 34, for further extracts from official records.


" General Buell had not yet * received an intimation that General Grant was in any danger, or that there was need of haste in the movement of his army, and, desiring to have his forces in good shape to meet a comrade army, ob tained permission from General Halleck to stop for rest at "VVaynesboro. The army commander had also under consideration the propriety of moving to Hamburg, above Pittsburg Landing, and thence to the place of conjunction. Stronger evidence could not be adduced than this project of stopping at Wayncsboro, that neither General Halleck nor General Buell, at this time, thought that there was anything actual, probable, or possible, in the situa tion at Pittsburg Landing, to demand the hurried advance of the army of the Ohio. But General Nelson [commanding the leading division], ignorant of this proposal to halt at Waynesboro, and alive to the probability of an early attack upon General Grant, hurried through the place for rest and trimming up for a handsome introduction to the Army of the Tennessee, and, by sweep ing impetuously on the road to Savannah, he both defeated the deflection towards Hamburg and the halt at Wayncsboro; for before General Buell thought it necessary to give orders to Nelson, other divisions, to which the speed of the first had been communicated, were also beyond Waynesboro, and could not then be recalled.

"That General Grant felt secure at this time is equally manifest. Tele graphic communications between him and Nelson were established on the 3d of April. The latter telegraphed that he could bo at Savannah with his division on the 5th. On the 4th, General Grant replied that he need not hasten his march, as transports to convey him to Pittsburg Landing would not be ready before the 8th. Nevertheless, Nelson hastened on, and it was well he did, for he gave motion to the whole army behind him, and General John ston was even then on the march from Corinth, with his entire army, to crush General Grant before General Buell could give him assistance. . . .

"A variety of facts support the assumption that neither General Halleck, General Grant, nor the division commanders on the field beyond Pittsburg Landing, had the remotest expectation that the enemy would advance in of fence from Corinth with full strength. General Halleck proposed to com mand the united armies in their advance upon Corinth, and yet he was not to leave his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, until the 7th. Oil the 5th, General Sherman, though not the senior division commander, yet virtually so, from the confidence reposed in him by General Grant, telegraphed to the latter: ' All is quiet along my lines now; the enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments and one battery six miles out.' t Again: «I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our

* On the 31st of March.

t The Confederates were then within that distance with their whole army of nearly forty thousand men, and they formed their lines of battle that after noon about a mile and a half in his front. They had passed the night of the 4th at Monterey, only nine miles from his headquarters.

pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with a certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack upon our position. 1

"General Grant telegraphed the same day as follows: 'The innin force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east. . . . The num ber of men at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from eighty thousand men. Some skirmishing took place between our out-guards and the enemy's yesterday and the day before. ... I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared, should such a thing take place. ... It is my present intention to send them (EiieH's three foremost divisions) to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here.' . . .

" They [the Federal divisions at Pittsburg Landing] were widely separated, and did not sustain such relations to each other that it was possible to form quickly a connected defensive line. . . . They had no defences and no desig nated line for defence in the event of a sudden attack, and there was no gen eral on the field to take, by special authority, the command of the whole force in an emergency.

" While the national army was unprepared for battle and unexpectant of such an event, and was passing the night of the 5th in fancied security, Johnston's army of forty thousand men was in close proximity, and readv for the bloody revelation of its presence and purpose on the following morning. . . . Early on the morning of the Cth of April, a Sabbath day of unusual brightness, cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing was distinctly heard at Savannah. General Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon his most advanced positions, and, not waiting to meet General Buell, as he had appointed, and not leaving any instructions or suggestions for his guid ance in moving his army to the field, or even expressing a desire that he should give him support, he gave an order to General Nelson to march his division up to Pittsburg Landing, and, taking a steamer, hastened towards the noise of battle. Tie did, however, advise General Buell, by note, that an at tack had been made, whose occurrence he had not anticipated before Monday or Tuesday; apologized for not meeting him, as he had contemplated, and mentioned the fact that he had ordered General Nelson to move with his di vision 'to opposite Pittsburg Landing.' The omission to request him to take any other divisions to the field, or even to hasten their march to Savannah, must be accepted as conclusive that General Grant did not at the time antici pate such a battle as would require the assistance of other portions of the Army of the Ohio. ... lie [General Buell] subsequently received a note from General Grant, addressed to the commanding officer, advanced forces, near Pittsburg, Tennessee, advising him that his forces had been engaged since early morning, contending against an army estimated at a hundred thousand men, and that the introduction of fresh troops upon the field would inspire his men and dishearten the enemy/'

General Shermnirs vain effort to show that he was ready for the Confederate attack on the morning of the Gth contradicts his

former statements. It certainly weakens in nothing the prepon derance of evidence offered by us, nor does it, in any way, impair the force of what is said in Van Home's "History of the Array of the Cumberland." The discussion of this point has made it clear that not only Sherman's division, but the entire Federal army, was taken by surprise. That General Sherman should deny it to-day, with such bitterness of feeling towards those who prefer the testimony of facts to his unsubstantiated assertions, seems the result of an after-thought, which involves him in inconsistency.

In Badeau's " Military History of U. S. Grant" we read as fol lows :*

"... On the 4th (April) the enemy felt Sherman's front in force, but noth ing serious came of it, and the opinion of that commander was decided that no probability of an immediate engagement existed. Grant rode out on the day after (the 5th) to Sherman's lines, and concurred with him in this judg ment. They were both mistaken, for the skirmish was the reconnoissance of the enemy, preliminary to the battle of Shiloli. This affair, however, awoke attention, and put both officers and men on the alert."

These are conflicting statements. How could " both officers and men " be " on the alert"—that is to say, ready for an attack on that morning—when the commanding general himself did "not anticipate" any such attack ; and when he and General Sherman believed that no immediate engagement was likely to take place? Were " the officers and men " of the Federal army better informed than their commanding generals ? A few of them were, and even ventured to suggest their fears to some of their commanders, but they were rebuked for their presumption.

The Federal army could not have been "on the alert" and ready, at that time, to meet the onset of the Confederate army, for the simple and additional reason that, when our troops swept into the enemy's encampments, most of the men off duty were found at their morning meal, some loitering about their recri-

O s O O

mental grounds, some lying in their tents, while others were busi ly attending to the nearly cooked bread which then filled their well-lit ovens. This utter absence of preparation, obvious to all the first assaulting Confederate columns, shows how secure the enemy thought himself, and how little generals, officers, and men dreamed of an attack on that day.

* Vol. i. pp. 71, 72.

General Grant was evidently much mistaken as to the number of the Confederates; but, in war, one is very apt to judge of the strength of an adversary by the severity of the blows he inflicts. If General Grant really believed that his enemy was as strong as his despatches of that period state, was he not at fault in having landed his army on the exposed side of a wide and deep river, when that enemy lay at so short a distance—only twenty-two miles? Was he not to blame for leaving his entire front unpro tected by field-works, and for neglecting to throw out all the cav alry at his disposal, as far in his front and on his flanks as possi ble? But in his letter* to General Halleck, sent from Savannah, April 5th, he said :

"General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's eolumn will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four or live miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here. From that point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at almost any point."

lie proposed thus to violate two important maxims of war: first, by dividing his forces and isolating a part of them—with a broad and deep stream behind them, and a small one (Lick Creek) separating the two bodies from each other—at a still shorter distance than that which lay between Pittsburg Landing and the enemy at Corinth, supposed to be eight) 7 ' thousand strong; secondly, by pro posing to form the junction of his forces at a point even nearer to the enemy than Pittsburg Landing. In such a case the tempta tion to seize the opportunity for their separate destruction would have been too great for even a non-aggressive adversary to re sist.

If General Grant had had time to carry out his intention, Gen erals Johnston and Beauregard—guarding well the crossings of Lick Creek, on its south side—would have concentrated all their available forces against General BuclTs first three divisions, which would have been destroyed before they could have been rein forced, either by his other two divisions or by troops from Pitts burg Landing. Then the Confederate commanders would have attacked General Grant himself, with all the chances of success in their favor, especially if, meanwhile, Van Dorn could have joined them (as already instructed) with his forces from Arkansas.

* Sec Boynton, " Sherman's Historical Raid/' p. r,0. j 22


General Beauregard is of opinion that General Sherman com mitted a grave error by protracting, as he did, the defence of the position he held at the Shiloh meeting-house. When, at 8 A.M., he " became satisfied, for the first time, that the enemy designed a determined attack on his whole camp "—knowing his unprepared condition to offer a long resistance—he should have " made a vir tue of necessity," and, instead of calling on McClernand, in his rear, to come to his assistance, he should have ordered or request ed him, Wallace, and Hurlbut, to select at once a strong defensive position near the former's camps (and there were many such), on which Prentiss and himself could retire at the proper moment. And when, at about 9 A.M., he "judged that Prentiss was falling back," which exposed the left flank of his own two remaining bri gades to the concentrated attack of the Confederates, he should have retired, fighting, on the right of the defensive position occu pied by the three divisions of McClernand, Wallace, and Hurl-but, behind which his and Prentiss's shattered troops could have rallied as a reserve, increased by his fourth brigade—Stewart's— which, on his first arrival at the Landing, he had imprudently de tached, over two miles to his left rear, to guard a bridge across Lick Creek. That bridge might very well have been protected by a small force of cavalry and a section of artillery. The Federals would thus have presented a united front, in a strong position, as an effective barrier to the headlong and disjointed attacks of the Confederates, who would necessarily have been in some confusion from their march through the woods and across the ravines, and their assault on the first line of Federal encampments. As it was, in their pursuit of Sherman's and Prentiss's commands, they caught, u on the wing" and in succession, the divisions of McCler nand, Wallace, and Hurlbut, who offered a gallant but ineffectual resistance to the persistent and determined attacks of the elated Confederates.

This error of General Sherman is, however, one that is often committed in an active campaign. Two memorable examples oc curred in the late Franco-Prussian war, which cost France, be sides her high military renown, the provinces of Alsace and Lor raine, and one billion of dollars.

On the 4th of August, 1870, three Prussian divisions, of the

Crown Prince's army, surprised and crushed, at "Wissembourg, on the Sarre River, one division of McMahon's corps (the 1st) of thirty-six thousand men, which formed the right wing of the French army, composed of the elite of the French troops. Two days afterwards the Crown Prince attacked again, suddenly, the remainder of the French corps, at "Woerth, a few miles back from Wissembourg. The other two corps, 5th and 7th of McMahon's army, were not quite within supporting distance, and instead of opposing his overpowering adversary in such a manner only as to give time to those two corps to concentrate on a good defensive position in his rear, he made a determined stand at "Woerth, call ing on them to hurry up to his assistance. Only two divisions of the 5th corps (De FaillyV) reached him in time to take part in the desperate struggle then going on. But his gallant troops were nearly annihilated, and he was compelled to retire to the fortified and distant camp of Chalons, to recruit and reorganize another army, which was lost shortly afterwards at Sedan.

The left wing of the French army met with nearly the same fate. It consisted of five corps, scattered along the frontier in ad vance of Mctz, all under the immediate direction of the French Emperor, Napoleon III., whose headquarters were established in that fortified city. Three Prussian corps, under General Von Steinmetz, suddenly appeared at Sarrebruck, on the Sarre River, which they crossed rapidly, and, on the 6th, surprised the 2d French corps (Frossard's) at Spcichercn, where another desperate engagement ensued while awaiting the support of the other four French corps. These arrived, however, in the vicinity only in time to be caught "on the wing," and had to fall back in great haste towards Metz—in a divergent direction from McMahon's line of retreat—where they were finally surrounded, and compelled to surrender, with Marshal Bazaine, October 29th, 1870, after an he roic but useless defense, so far as regarded the safety of France.

General Beauregard is of opinion that, had the Confederates been in better fighting condition, the corresponding error of Sher man would have ended the battle of Shiloh long before Buell could have come to the assistance of the Federals, and a decisive victory would then have enabled the Confederates to take the of fensive in middle Tennessee and Kentucky, with far greater re sults than those obtained, at first, by General Bragg, a few months later.


The blame for having withdrawn the Confederate troops too soon from the fight, on the evening of the 6th, "just as"—it is alleged—" a last concentrated effort was about to be made by some of the subordinate commanders," has, we think, been conclu sively refuted in the narrative of the battle. That charge is en tirely disproved by the reports of brigade and regimental com manders. The cessation of hostilities was not ordered until " a last concentrated effort" had been made shortly after 4 r. M., under General Beauregard's own eyes, and not until he was satis fied, from the condition of his troops, that no further attack on our part would meet with success, especially after the opening of Webster's reserved Federal batteries, supported by reinforcements, as the rolls of infantry fire clearly indicated. It was not until then, about 6 r. M., shortly before sunset, that the order was given to cease the contest, and collect and reorganize the various com mands, before it should be too dark to carry out the order effec tually. But before these instructions could be generally distrib uted, the fighting had, in reality, ceased on the greater part of the. field. As an additional proof that the order was not given too soon, it is a positive fact that the brigades and divisions of the dif ferent commands, especially Bragg's and Ilardee's, were not col lected and reorganized in time to meet the Federal attack, on the next morning. The true reason, besides the rawness of our officers and men, why we were not able to complete our victory on the 6th, is correctly given, by the Adjutant-General of the Confeder ate army at Shiloh, in his "Campaigns of Lieutenant-General For rest," p. 151, as follows :

" After the combat was at its height, about meridian, those superior officers who should have been occupied with the concentration and continuous pro jection of their troops in heavy masses upon the shattered Federal divisions, were at the very front and 'perilous edge' of the battle, leading forward regi ments, perchance brigades, into action, with great individual intrepidity, and doing a great deal, no doubt, by their personal example, to impel small bodies forward. But, meanwhile, to their rear were left the masses of their respective commands, without direction, and thus precious time was lost. The Confed erates were not kept continuously massed and employed, either in corps or divisions; mere piecemeal onsets were the general method of fighting after 12 o'clock (on the 6th), with this consequence: Sherman was enabled to make several obstinate, powerful stands, by which he protracted the battle

some hours. Had the corps been held well in hand, massed and pressed con tinuously upon the tottering, demoralized foe ; had general officers attended to the swing and direction of the great ' war-engine' at their disposition,rather than, as it were, becoming 'so many heads or battering-ranis of that machine,' the battle assuredly would have closed at latest by mid-day. By that hour, at most, the whole Federal force might have been urged back and penned up, utterly helpless, in the angle formed between the river and Lick (or Snake) Creek, or dispersed along the river bank, between the two creeks; we repeat, that had the Confederate corps been kept in continuity, closely pressed en masse upon the enemy, after the front line had been broken and swept back, the Federal fragments must have been kept in a downward movement, like the loose stones in the bed of a mountain torrent.''

Before leaving this part of our subject it is proper, we think, to direct attention to the comparison, drawn by Mr. Davis, be tween General Albert Sidney Johnston and Marshal Turenne, with reference to the battle of Shiloh. Says Mr. Davis: *

"To take an example far from us, in time and place, when Turenne had, after months of successful manoeuvring, finally forced his enemy into a position which gave assurance of victor}', and had marshalled his forces for a decisive battle, he was, when making a preliminary reconnoissauce, killed by a chance shot; then his successor, instead of attacking, retreated, and all which the one had gained for France the other lost.''

The falsity of the comparison is too flagrant to need more than a passing notice. First, it was at the suggestion of General Beaure-gard that General Johnston had marched his small army to Cor inth, in order to form a junction there, and fight the battle of Shiloh, not " after months of successful manoeuvring,' 1 as was the case with Marshal Turenne, but, on the contrary, after months of irreparable disasters, which had brought the country to the brink of despair, and led General Johnston to believe that he had lost the confidence of both the people and the army. Second, it was General Beauregard—not General Johnston—who "had marshalled our forces for a decisive battle" at Pittsburg Landing, as has been already fully and clearly established. Third, when the commanding general fell, the battle had been in progress fully eight hours. His " successor" continued the attack, with all the vigor and energy possible, as long as daylight and the physical condition of his men allowed him to do so. He renewed the attack the next day; and only began his masterly retreat because the enemy in his front had been reinforced with overwhelming numbers. Fourth, the victory

* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,'' vol. ii. p. G8.

was by no means assured at the hour of GeneralJolmston's death. All that can be said is, that our right was then in the act of driv ing back the enemy's left; but there still remained his right and centre, which, though hard pressed, had not yet been routed, and only began to give way in confusion after General Beauregard had assumed command. " It was after G p. M." he says, " when the enemy's last position was carried, and his force finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering Pitts-burg Landing." *

To a careless or superficial reader, this comparison, coming from such a source, might have a certain weight, but when sifted and closely analyzed, it is seen to be the far-fetched and idle fancy of prejudice.


General Beauregard says that the hardest lighting the Confeder ates encountered on the 7th was with Buell's splendidly organized and well-disciplined divisions, numbering at least twenty thou sand f before the arrival of Wood's two brigades in the afternoon of that day. According to Sherman's " Memoirs," J General Grant's own forces, on the 7th, amounted to nearly twenty-five thousand men (including Lew. "Wallace's division of fresh troops), but they did not fight with the animation and spirit of the pre ceding day. Until about 10.30 A. M., General Beauregard had, in the centre and on the right, as stated in the narrative of the battle, only about ten thousand infantry and artillery, under Gen erals Breckinridge and ITardee, to oppose Buell's three fresh divis ions, supported by a part of General Grant's forces of the preced ing day, under Ilurlbut, while General Bragg had only about seven thousand five hundred infantry and artillery, on the left, with which to oppose General Grant's force of more than twenty thousand men. By 11.30 A.M., General Beauregard had withdrawn from General Bragg two brigades and a regiment, to reinforce the centre and right, and he had made him extend another brigade (Russell's) to his right, to cover the space between him and Breckinridge, left open by the unfortunate absence of Cheatham's division, of General Folk's corps. General Bragg had, therefore, at that time (11.30 A. M.),

* See General BeauregarcTs Report.

t "History of the Army of the Cumberland," vol. i. p. 115.

J Page 245.

only about five thousand men with whom to confront General Grant's forces, and he was reinforced during the day by only two straggling regiments under General J. K. Jackson, and by a small disjointed brigade under Colonel Pond, at about 1 p. M. With those forces General Bragg not only held at bay those opposed to him, but took the offensive several times, and, on the arrival of Cheatham's division in its proper place, compelled Wallace, Sher man, and McClernand to call earnestly on McCook, of BuelFs army, for support. General Beauregard, therefore, felt not much concerned about his left; and he directed all his attention and most of his available troops to holding in check or driving back, at times, BuelPs forces, which showed considerable boldness, and seemed to be well handled.

The result of that day's battle shows conclusively what would have been the consequences had General Grant carried out his intention — according to a statement to that effect in General Sherman's "Memoirs" —of attacking the Confederates on the morning of the 7th, without awaiting the assistance of General BuelTs forces. His disaster would undoubtedly have been irrepa rable.

With regard to the claim of victory raised by both sides, after the battle of Shiloh, it is thus clearly and, we believe, fairly stated by General Jordan :*

'• The Confederates found their pretension upon the facts of the heavy capt ures of men, artillery, and colors which they carried from the field, the com plete rout inflicted on the Federals on Sunday, and their ability, on Monday, to hold the ground upon which they had concentrated and made the battle until 2 r. M.,f when General Beauregard withdrew from an unprofitable combat —withdrew in admitted good order, taking with him all the captured guns for which there was transportation. Moreover, his enemy was left so com pletely battered and stunned as to be unable to pursue. The Federals claimed the victory upon the grounds that, on Monday evening, they had recovered their encampments and possession of the field of battle, from which the Con federates had retired, leaving behind their dead and a number of wounded. In this discussion it should be remembered that after the Confederates concen trated on Monday, or from at least as late as 9 A. M. up to the time of their retreat, they uniformly took the offensive and were the assailants. All sub stantially claimed in reports of Federal subordinate generals is that, after having been worsted between 9 A. M. and 2 r. M., they were then able to hold

* " Campaigns of Lieutenant-General Forrest," p. 150. t It was after two o'clock r. M.

their own and check their antagonists.* After that, manifestly, there was a complete lull in the battle until about 4 p. M., when, and no sooner, do the Federals appear to have advanced.

" General Beauregard has been blamed, unjustly, for withdrawing his troops just as they were being launched, on Sunday evening, against the last Fed eral position, with such numbers and impetus, by generals on the spot, as must have insured complete success. The reports of brigade and regimental com manders entirely disprove this allegation.! His order, really, was not distrib uted before the greater part of the Confederate troops had already given up the attempt, for that day, to carry the ridge at the Landing."

For further particulars as to the hour when General Beaure-gard's order to cease firing was given and received, we refer the reader to the Appendices to the present and the two preceding chapters.


When error and falsehood have taken hold of public credulity, their eradication is an arduous and unpleasant task. The experi ence of life teaches this lesson to most men. And it often hap pens that even the fair-minded are slow to discard a conviction which has grown upon them and is strengthened by the assertions of those who are, or have been, high in authority. There seerns to be.a fatal attraction about the propagation of evil reports, which the preponderance of truth itself but tardily counterbalances and destroys. " Listeners," says Hare, " do seldom refrain from evil hearing."

This applies to the unaccountable and malicious story, to which additional notoriety has recently been given, that General Beau-regard, during the first day of the battle of Shilob, up to the time when he was informed of General Johnston's death, was lying in his ambulance, taking no part whatever in the fight, and, that even after the fall of the commanding general, he " quietly remained where he was, waiting the issue of events."

To listen to such a statement, and see credence given to it, must have been pleasing to those—fortunately few in number—whose object has always been to misrepresent General Beauregard, to ignore his merit as a commander, and rob him of the renown he acquired despite their jealous efforts.

* See Reports of Generals Wallace, Nelson, Crittendcn, etc., and Correspond ence of " Agate," in " Record of the Rebellion," vol. iv. Doc. 114. t Sec Appendix.

On page 67 of the second volume of Mr. Davis's "Rise and Full of the Confederate Government," the following passage will be found:

"General Bcaurcgard had told General Johnston that morning, as he rode off, that if it should be necessary to communicate with him or for him to do anything, he would be found in his ambulance in bed. Governor Harris, knowing this, and how feeble General Beauregard's health w r as, w r cnt first to his headquarters, just in the rear of where the army had deployed into lino the evening before. Beaurcgard and his staff were gone on horseback in the direction of Shiloh church. He found them there. The Governor told Gen eral Beauregard that General Johnston had been killed. Beaurcgard ex pressed regret, and then remarked,' Everything else seems to be going on well on the right.' Governor Harris assented. 'Then,' said Beaurcgard,' the bat tle may as well go on.' The Governor replied that he certainly thought it ought. He offered his services to Beauregard, and they were courteously ac cepted. General Beaurcgard then remained where he was, waiting the issue of events."

It is to be regretted, on Mr. Davis's own account, that he has given to the world as history so baseless a fiction.

A passage similar to this appears in Colonel W. P. Johnston's "Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," but it had been de termined, after due reflection, to pass it by in silence in this work. General Beauregard, it was thought, could afford to over look a charge so palpably absurd. But Mr. Davis having thought proper to reproduce the statement, with the evident purpose of giving it the additional weight of his name and authority, we now feel impelled, though reluctantly, to refute the statement and set the matter finally at rest.

That General Beauregard's health was not good at the time of the battle is an admitted fact; but that, nevertheless, he displayed the most untiring activity and energy, and, within less than two months after his arrival in the West, mastered the minutest details of the military situation, and changed its whole aspect, by inspir ing new hope and confidence in the public mind, then so much de pressed, is no less certain, and has been proved beyond dispute, by the facts and documents already given to the reader in the preceding chapters.

With the clear perception resulting from his remarkable stra tegic powers, his ill-health had not prevented him from advising and effecting the evacuation of Columbus, until then errone ously considered the " Gibraltar of the West;" fortifying and

strengthening Fort Pillow, New Madrid Bend, and Island No. 10; urging General Johnston to abandon his retreat towards Stevenson, and march to Decatur, so as to facilitate a junction of the two armies; and, finally, despatching most of his staff, with special messages, to the governors of four States, and to Gen erals Van Dorn, Bragg, and Lovell, in one earnest and almost desperate effort to obtain and concentrate an army of about forty thousand men at or near Corinth, and thus prepare the way for the great battle which was fought on the 6th and 7th of April.

Nor had his ill-health prevented him from organizing and dis ciplining, as well as could be done, the heterogeneous army he had thus collected, to the concentration of which the government had merely given a silent, not to say unwilling, assent. For the read er must not forget that General Beauregard's letter to General Cooper, dated February 23d," x " detailing his course as to the tem porary enlistment of State troops, had met with no response; and that, to his question addressed to General Johnston as to whether the War Department sanctioned his action in the matter, the an swer, dated February 26th, was : " Government neither sanctioned nor disapproved." f

The War Department had adopted the same irresponsible pol icy with regard to the troops at Pensacola, asked for by General Beauregard of General Bragg; the bald truth of the matter be ing, that General Bragg, having referred General Beauregard's call upon him to the government at Richmond, was left to his own discretion as to his compliance with it. lie was never ordered at all, despite Mr. Davis's assertions to that effect; ^ but came of his own accord, thereby assuming the full responsibility of the move ment. That the government did not prevent the transfer de manded is all that can be claimed for it.

Not only had General Beauregard suggested and brought about the concentration of our forces at Corinth, but, after declin ing the command-in-chief, which was offered him by General Johnston, he had also, at the request of the latter, drawn up the General Orders, the seventh clause of which read as follows: "All general orders touching matters of organization, discipline, and

* See Appendix to Chapter XVI. t Ibid.