And here it is but fair to assert that, on the 17th of June, the War Department, and Mr. Davis likewise, had already received General Beauregard's telegram of June 14th; for if the Pres ident's telegram, forwarded from Richmond, at that date, to Gen eral Bragg, had taken but one day to traverse the wires—and the proof is there, none can deny it—it is certain that no greater time was required for General Beauregard's despatch to travel the same distance over the same line. And it should be stated further, that, on the 20th of June, when the President sent his order, as signing General Bragg to the permanent command of the West ern Department and of the Army at Tupelo, he had not only full cognizance of General Beauregard's telegram of the 14th, but also of his explanatory letter of the 15th. The true motive actuat ing General Beauregard in temporarily leaving his command, was, therefore, perfectly brought home to the President, before he penned the peremptory order, so uncalled for and so arbitrary, by which—judging from appearances—he sought to humiliate and cast aside one of the most prominent generals of the South, who en joyed then, as always during the war, the full confidence and af fection of the people—if not of the President—and whose influence with the army was undoubted. If Mr. Davis had been animated, at that time, by other feelings than those of personal dislike tow ards General Beauregard, he would, with a view to the public weal and to the eminent services of the latter, have simply sent General Van Dorn—as he actually did—to relieve General Lovell at Vicksburg, and would have ordered General Bragg to remain with the forces at Tupelo until General Beauregard's return. It is claimed, on behalf of Mr. Davis, that had such a course been adopted, General Beauregard, though absent, would still have re tained command of the department, and orders to General Bragg would have had to pass through General Beauregard's hands be fore finally reaching the actual commander of the forces; which w r ould have entailed much delay, if nothing worse. This objection is utterly futile, inasmuch as General Beauregard had transferred to General Bragg the temporary command of the department as well as of the army proper."" But even admitting that such a

*Sec his letter of June 15th to General Cooper.

transfer had not been effected, is it not a fact — well known to Mr. Davis—that, while in command of a mere military district,* under General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Department of Northern Virginia, General Beauregard corresponded directly with the Secretary of War, with the Adjutant-General, and with the President himself, without incurring the displeasure, or in any way interfering with the red-tape routine, of the War Depart ment? General Beauregard did the same thing again when he commanded an army in Western Tennessee, under General A. S. Johnston. The President and the War Department had never been known to be so punctilious as to the observance of military etiquette in matters of this kind, and Mr. Davis had clearly vio lated it before General Beaurcgard's departure from Tupelo. The order removing General Beauregard read as follows:

" RICHMOND, June £0//<, 18C2. u General BRAXTOX BRAGG, Tupelo, Mississippi:

"Your despatch, informing me that General Beauregard had turned over the command to you and left for Mobile, on surgeons 1 certificate, \vas duly re ceived. You arc assigned permanently to the command of the department, as will be more formally notified to you by the Secretary of War. You will correspond directly, and receive orders and instructions from the government in relation to your future operations.


The opportunity was seized upon, and, under the transparent pretense of affronted dignity, President Davis worked his will. Thus was consummated an act of grossest injustice, one of the most inexcusable abuses of power perpetrated by him during the war. This was not all. Jlis irritation at an assumed slight to his authority induced him to go still further. He prepared the list of interrogatories contained in a letter of instructions to Colonel W. P. Johnston, A. D. C., dated Richmond, June 14th, the day General Beauregard's first despatch was received. This reached General Beauregard in Mobile, on the 20th, and shows the searching ingenuity used to find him at fault, not only with re gard to the evacuation of Corinth, but also as to all orders and instructions issued or given by him, for the defence of the Missis sippi Ilivcr. These interrogatories and General Beauregard's

* The "Potomac District," created in October, 18G1. See General Orders No. 15, Adjutant and Inspector General's office, in Appendix to Chapter XIII.

answers to them were given at the end of the preceding chapter. Nothing more, therefore, need be said about them here.

General Bragg informed General Beauregard of the President's last order to him. lie telegraphed as follows:

" TUPELO, June 21s*, 18G2. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"I have a despatch,from the President direct, to relieve you permanently in command of this department. I envy you, and am almost in despair.


This was the first intimation General Beanregard received of


the arbitrary decree throwing him out of service. He felt it keenly, as it was natural that lie should. lie knew he had done nothing to merit such treatment, but understood the implied dis grace intended by the President. The consciousness of his worth, however, and his devotion to the cause, lent him a dignity and forbearance deserving of high praise. His answer to General Bragg exhibited no irritation whatever. It was a quiet, uncom plaining acquiescence in the government's action, and read thus:

" MOBILE, June 22d, 1802, " General B. BRAGG, Tupelo, Mississippi:

" I cannot congratulate you, but am happy for the change. It will take me some time to recuperate. I will leave my Staff with you until required by me. You will find it very useful."

On the next day, the lion. George "W. Randolph, Secretary of War, confirmed General Bragg's despatch, as follows :

" RICHMOND, Jum 23d, 18G2. " General G. T. BEATJREGARD, Mobile, Alabama:

"General, —I enclose copies of a telegram from the President to General Bragg, and a letter which I have addressed to him.*

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE W. RANDOLPH, Sec. of War."

Not a word of explanation, not an expression of regret at the abrupt change, are to be found in the few lines given above. An act of greater official discourtesy could hardly have been com mitted. A delinquent second lieutenant could riot have been more summarily dealt with.

General Beauregard made no direct answer to the Secretary of

* The telegram has already been given in our text. The letter referred to is in the Appendix to this chapter.

War; but, on the 25th, from Mobile, where he still was, advising General Forney, as he had said he would do, he wrote this letter to General Cooper:

"General, —Enclosed please find the certificate* of ruy physicians, members of my general staff as inspectors, recommending that I should withdraw for a while from the command of Department Xo. 2. This is the third certificate to the same effect I have received from them since my arrival at Jackson, Ten nessee; but finding, or believing, that my presence until now was absolutely necessary, with the forces under my command, I persistently refused to avail myself of their recommendation until the present moment, when I feel that in justice to myself and to the cause I am endeavoring to defend I must take a little rest, and retire for a while from the active scenes of life to which I have been accustomed for the last sixteen months. I will, for the present, repair to Bladon Springs, Alabama, where I will be always ready to obey any orders of the department (regardless of my health) to resume the active duties of the field, whenever circumstances will require that I should be so ordered. " Kespectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BF..UKKGAKD, General C. S. A/'

AVe have now to refer to what Mr. Davis says in his book upon this unfortunate incident of his administration, and to disclose the errors he commits while relating it.


After giving his own version of what occurred at the time of General Beauregard's departure from Tupelo, and producing such evidence as might best support the conclusions he intended to draw, Mr. Davis says:

"From this statement it appears: First, that General Beaurcgarcl iras not, as has been alleged, harshly deprived of his command, but that he voluntarily sur rendered if, after being furnished with medical certificates of his physical inca pacity for its arduous duties. Second, that he did not even notify his gov ernment, still less ask permission to retire. Third, that the order, assigning another to the command he had abandoned, could not l>c sent through Jiim,icJtcn he had departed and none to a place ichcre there icas no telegraph, and rarely a mail. Fourth, that it is neither customary nor proper to send orders to the com mander of an army through a general on sick-leave ; and in this case it would have been very objectionable, as a similar order had just Itccn sent and dis obeyed. " t

The mere recital of the facts, as already given, clearly disproves the foregoing statement:

* It has already been given to the reader.

f'Risc and Fall of the Confederate Government,'' vol. ii. p. 73. The italics arc ours.

I. It would be as true to allege that General Beau regard was never relieved of his command at all, as to state that he was not "harshly deprived" of it. Mr. Davis, who had before him, or at his disposal, every telegram and letter inserted in this text, could not have believed that General Beauregard had " voluntarily aban doned" his command — in other words, permanently withdrawn from it, of his own free W 7 ill—when it was so evident that the ab sence spoken of would only be for a short time, and that, "mean while," the command of the army would be intrusted to General Bragg. No better proof could be offered to show that both Gen eral Beauregard's intention and desire were to resume his com mand as soon as he could.

II. If Mr. Davis is correct in his second point, what becomes of General Beauregard's telegram of June 14th, where he says: "I am leaving for a while, on surgeon's certificate. I must have a short rest " ? lie had certainly not left Tupelo when that despatch was forwarded. He had therefore " notified his government," in the telegram and in the letter. His "government," therefore, knew, before his departure, that his intention was to leave. True, no "permission"—in the strict sense of the term—was askel of the War Department. But it was clearly with no thought of ignor ing—still less of overriding—the authority of the War Depart ment or of the Commander-in-Chief. No formal permission was asked, because General Beauregard believed that, under the cir cumstances, he could freely transport himself to any place in the Confederacy, even outside of his territorial command, without special leave from Richmond—all the more so, that he clearly in dicated the precise localities to which he was going, the reasons for which he was leaving, and the length of time he proposed be ing absent.

III. Mr. Davis's assertion that " the order assigning another to the command he had abandoned could not be sent through him (General Beauregard), when he had departed and gone to a place where there was no telegraph and rarely a mail," is, indeed, extraordinary, to say the least of it. " Mobile " was not an inac cessible place, nor was " Bladon Springs" an unknown locality. General Bragg found no difficulty in notifying General Beaure gard of the order superseding him ; and the curt, unceremonious, official note of Mr. Randolph, dated Richmond, June 23d, also reached General Beauregard without difficulty or delay.

IV. If, as Mr. Davis lias it, General Beauregard Lad abandoned his command without "permission"—that is to say, in violation of army regulations—he was not absent on " sick-leave,'' or any other " leave;" he had simply deserted his post. If, on the other hand, as Mr. Davis plainly states, he was "on sick-leave," the temporary arrangement made at and before his departure should have been acquiesced in ; fur he was clearly not at fault, if on " sick-leave."

But it is an undeniable fact that, when the government's de spatch of June 1-ith was sent directly to General Bragg, General Beauregard was still in full command at Tupelo, and had not, then, even intimated his intention of going to the inaccessible place Mr. Davis objects to. He only disclosed that intention af ter the President's order had reached General Bragg; and this is the "similar order," which, Mr. Davis states, was sent through General Beauregard and disobeyed. Scarcely over three weeks after he left Tupelo, General Beauregard—had he not been, at that time, tacitly "shelved"—could have resumed his active du ties in the iield or elsewhere. His health was sufficiently restored by the rest, quiet, and salubrious air he had enjoyed at Bladon Springs. But, as is now apparent, the current of succeeding events did not require his presence with the army, even a fortnight after his sufficient restoration to health. And this had been clearly fore seen by him before he left Tupelo. Xor was the hurried depart ure of General Bragg, so much insisted upon by President Davis, at all indispensable. General Van Dorn, when sent to relieve General Lovell, did just as well; and we have yet to learn that he took even a company with him to reinforce a place which, Mr. Davis said, was so imminently threatened.

Days, and even weeks, passed by. General Beauregard was still in retirement at Bladon Springs. Letters of sympathy and regret reached him from all points of the Confederacy, and proved what a high place he occupied in the public esteem. Yet some injudi cious friends, or "mischief-makers"—as the lion. John Forsyth, who had been one of our three Peace Commissioners to Washing ton, so aptly called them—strove hard to create feelings of suspicion and animosity between our leading men, and, what was worse, be tween Generals Beauregard and Bragg. The former did his utmost, incessantly, not only to screen his successor from all imputation of blame concerning the action of the Executive in placing him in

command of Department ~No. 2, but made it a point (except when speaking to a limited circle of tried friends) to approve of all that had been done in that respect. We give here a few passages from a letter from General Bragg to the Hon. John Forsyth, dated Tupelo, July 17th, written in acknowledgment of a very remark able article printed by the latter in the Mobile Evening News. In the Appendix will also be found a letter of General Beaure-gard on the same subject.

After speaking of his determination ever to avoid discussions in the public press, and thanking Mr. Forsyth for the sentiments he had expressed concerning the positions, " personal and official," of General Beauregard and himself, General Bragg said :

" No two men living ever served together more harmoniously, or parted with more regret. None of us are free from our faults and weaknesses, but among mine will never be found a jealousy which would detract from so pure a man and eminent a general as Beauregard.

" No one could have been more surprised at the order assigning me to his command than myself; and certainly the idea of my being a ' pet' with any part of the administration is laughable. . . . Upon the urgent appeal of his physicians, after arriving here, where it was supposed we should not be as sailed by the enemy for a few weeks, he retired to seek some relief from the toils which have made him an old man in the short space of one year. If it be his friends who have started this discussion, they are doing him great in justice, and so far as I am concerned I can only say to them, the records here will show with what regret I parted with their chief, and how ardently I hoped for his restoration, that he might resume the position lie had filled so honorably."*

On the 22d of July, from Tupelo, where no incident of note had thus far happened, General Bragg addressed an interesting communication to General Beauregard, setting forth a plan of active operations which he had prepared, and asking his opinion and advice thereon.f General Beauregard answered as follows:

" CULLUM SPRINGS, BLADON, ALA., July 2Sth, 1862. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Commanding Department No. 2, Mobile, Ala.:

"Jfy dear General, — Your letter of the 22d instant was received only last night. I give you with pleasure the following views on your proposed operations from Tupelo, for I wish you the amplest success, both on your own and the country's account.

" You have evidently but one of four things to do. First, to attack Hallcck

* The entire letter is in the Appendix to this Chapter. t This communication is to be found in Appendix.

at Corinth; second, to attack Buell at or about Chattanooga; third, to at tack Grant at or about Memphis ; fourth, to remain idle at Tupelo.

"From what you state the first is evidently inadmissible, and the last can not be entertained for one moment, for action, action, is what we require.

" Now, with regard to the other two propositions, it is evident that unless you reinforce General E. K. Smith, at Chattanooga, he will be overpowered by Buell, and that our communication with the East, and our supplies at At lanta, Augusta, etc., will be cut off; also that a partial reinforcement would so weaken you at Tupelo as to paralyze you for any other movements from there ; hence you have adopted the wisest course in sending to Smith all your available forces, except just enough to guard your depots, etc., to the rear of your present position at Tupelo.

u The third proposition would have afforded you some success, but not as brilliant and important in its results as the second one, if the newspapers will permit you to carry it successfully into effect; for Ilallcck and Buell, occupy ing the base of a long isosceles triangle, of which Mobile is the apex, could get to Chattanooga before you if they should become aware of your move ments, and then you would have to contend again with superior forces, as usu al to us. The moment you get to Chattanooga you ought to take the offen sive, keeping in mind the following grand principles of the art of war: First, always bring the masses of your army in contact with the fractions of the en emy ; second, operate as much as possible on his communications without ex posing your own; third,operate always on interior or shorter lines. I have no doubt that with anything like equal numbers you will always meet with success.

" I am happy to see that my two lieutenants, Morgan and Forrest, are doing such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee. When I appointed them I thought they would leave their mark wherever they passed.


" Sincerely your friend,


General Bragg, fur reasons we cannot explain, did not follow the advice given ; and his campaign into middle Tennessee and Kentucky ended almost in disaster.

General Beaurcgard, it seems, had not given up all hope of again assuming command of his army, lie followed its every movement with the greatest interest and anxiety; and during the leisure now afforded him, drew up an extensive plan for its further success, which he finally forwarded to the AVar Depart ment. In the meantime—namely, on the 25th of August—he had officially reported " for duty in the field.'' The plan we here re fer to was addressed to General Cooper, whose relations with Gen eral Beauregard had not ceased to be of an agreeable character. It was marked " Confidential," and read thus:

" MOBILE, ALA., September 5th, 18G2.

" General, —Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I would be returned to the command of Department No. 2,1 had prepared while at Bladon, Alabama, a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based on my knowledge of that part of the theatre of war; but hearing that my just ex pectations are to be disappointed, I have the honor to communicate it to the War Department, in the hope that it may be of service to our arms and to our cause. It was submitted by me to General Bragg on the 3d instant. By look ing at the map it will be seen that the forces operating in that section of country will be separated at first by one river (the Tennessee), and afterwards by two (the Tennessee and Cumberland), hence they will be unable to support each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains; but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will first refer to those in East Tennessee and then to those west of it.

" In the first case, our objective points must be, first, Louisville, and then Cin cinnati. How best to reach them from Chattanooga, with Buell at Iluntsville and Stevenson, is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations, the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that if we ad vance towards our objective points without getting rid of him, we would ex pose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must, then, give him battle first, or compel him to retire before us.

" Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say lie is now doing), we will be advancing towards Louisville; but should he venture on Florence or Savannah, to unite his forces with Rosecraus and Grant, we will have to con centrate enough of our forces from Mobile and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a grand battle, when we would be able to resume our march as before indicated. We must, however, as soon as practicable, con struct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for otherwise our communication would be cut off by the enemy as soon as those two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats and transports.

" The best positions for said works are about forty miles below forts Donel-son and Henry, not far from Eddysville, where those two rivers come within one and a half miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation where a strong field-work could be constructed for a garrison of about twenty-five hundred or three thousand men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) against a large army. Under the guns of this work, and along the bank of each river, a series of batteries, armed with the heaviest guns (eight, nine, ten inch, and rifled guns), could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers.

" When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession, I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible, so completely that future travellers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankee vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of our army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main body would be marching to Cincinnati; but if we could get boats enough it would

be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati, I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.

"Now, for the operation of Western Tennessee. The object should be to drive the enemy from there and resume the command of the Mississippi River. For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army, and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dora's. From there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident that the forces at Memphis and Yazoo River would then have their line of communication by the river with the North cut off, and they would have cither to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tennessee, to fall back precipitately to Ilumboldt and Columbus, or their lines of commu nication would be cut off also. We would then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or the Ohio at Paducah. We would thus compel the enemy to evacuate the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss on our part of only a few hundred men. General Price could then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy.

k ' The armament and ammunition of the works referred to should be collected, as soon as possible, at Meridian and Chattanooga. Such are the operations which I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the President had judged proper to order me back to the command of that army which I had, with General Brngg's assistance, collected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my shattered health, while my presence could be spared from it, and until he informed me that it was ready to take the offensive.

" Hoping for its entire success, I remain, yen* respectfully,

" Your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUHEGAKD, General C. S. A."

Hardly a week had elapsed after the foregoing communication was forwarded to Richmond, when the Hon. Thomas J. Semmes and the Hon. Edward Sparrow, Members of Congress from Louisi ana, called by agreement, with their colleagues, on President Davis, to present to him a petition, signed by nearly sixty Sena tors and Representatives from different States of the Confederacy. It is a paper of great interest, giving additional information upon the subject which occupies our attention :

"To the PRESIDENT of the Confederate States:

u Sir, —The undersigned Senators and Representatives in Congress from the Western and Southwestern States have learned with pleasure that General Bcauregard, restored in health, has reported for duty, and that he has been as signed to the command of South Carolina and Georgia. They have also been reliably informed that the General is anxious and eager to return to the com-


mand of the Army of the West. Without in any manner desiring to interfere with the military dispositions of the government, or with the prerogatives of the President as Commandcr-in-Chief of all the forces, they would respectfully submit that a due regard, consistent with the best interests of the country, should be paid to the wishes of one who has given such proofs of disinterested devotion to our cause, and who has contributed so much by his generalship to insure the success of our arms. Compelled by the exigencies of the country to separate himself from his Army of the Potomac to go West in a new field, at a most gloomy period of our revolution ; then, with scanty resources, to form a new army, under every possible disadvantage, consequent upon the unex pected fall of forts Henry and Done]son, he was found equal to every emer gency ; and then at the battle of Shiloh, and in the masterly retreat from Cor inth, saved that army. We know the enthusiasm with which his return would inspire our noble army, who long to see him, and that the worthy general commanding would be rejoiced and gladdened by his presence. As represen tatives aforesaid, knowing well the sentiments and wishes of the people we represent, we unhesitatingly say that the restoration of General Beauregard to the Army of the West would be hailed with great joy by them ; and without detracting from the acknowledged merit and well-earned reputation of the present commander, we respectfully submit that a new guarantee for the suc cess of our arms would be given. For these reasons we earnestly ask the President to duly consider the expressed desire of General Beauregard, ere lie be definitely assigned to any position. Understanding that the assignment of General Beauregard to Charleston has been pressed upon the government by the Governor and Council of South Carolina, we tender herewith the names of the representatives of that State, as expressive of their assent to our petition.

" It is but justice to General Beauregard to say that this step is taken with out his knowledge or consent.

"Ed. Sparrow, T. J. Semmes, W. L. Yanccy, L. C. Ilaynes, II. C. Burnet, J. B. Clark,

- Peyton, G. A. Henry, L.T.Wigfall,

— Menccs, C. W. Bell, C. J. Villere, G. D. Royston, J. M. Elliott, David Clopton, G. W. Ewing, W. N. Cooke, F. S. Lyon,

La. it

Ala. Tenn. Ky. Mo.


Tenn. Texas.


Mo. La.







J. Perkins, Jr.,

C. M. Conrad, J. Wilcox,

P. W. Gray,

T. B. Ccxton,

J. C. Atkins,

W. G. Swan,

II. S. Footc,

T. B. Haudley,

H. W. Bruce,

II. J. Breckinridge,

W. R. Smith,

E. L. Gardeushire,

J. W. Moore,

D. F. Kenncr, L. C. Dupre,

E. S. Dargan,

F. J. Batson,




u it

Ark. Ky.


Ala. Tenn. Ky. La.


Ala. Ark.









u A true copy.

G. B. Hodge, II. E. Reid, Win. II. Tibbs, J. L. M. Curry, A. W. Con row, F. W. Freeman, Wm. Porcher Miles, M. L. Bonhani, W. AY. Boyce, F. Farrow, J. McQueen,

CHARLES J. VILLKKE, Representative in Congress.

President Davis' s answer to this earnest appeal, supported by such an imposing array of representative names, was truly characteristic. The reader will judge of it after reading the following paper:

Notes of an Interview icith the President relative to Transferring General Bcaure-gard to the Command of Department No. 2.

"RICHMOND, frjitcmter \3tli, 18G2.

" General Sparrow and myself this day called on the President, and deliv ered to him a petition, signed by about fifty members and senators from the Western and Southwestern States, in which the restoration of Beaurcgard to the command of the army now under Bragg was solicited, it being stated in the petition that it was known that Bragg would welcome the restoration of Beauregard. The President received it politely, and immediately read it aloud in our presence, making, en passant, some running comments on tho correctness of some of the facts stated in the petition. lie then calmly and dispassionately read aloud all the signatures attached to the petition. Hav ing sent to an adjoining office for five or six despatches, he read them aloud in the order they were sent or received, according to date, and accompanied them in a calm manner with the following explanation, prefacing it with the remark that he supposed we had not a correct and faithful apprehension of the facts. lie stated that on the day preceding his first despatch command ing Bragg to proceed to Vicksburg (14th June, I think), he received a de spatch from Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, informing him that Beaure gard (to whom Pickens had previously sent a despatch requesting him to come to Charleston and take command there) had replied that his presence was ulMotutfli/ necessary to the army at Tupelo, and that he could not leave it. lie (the President) further stated the following condition of things existed at that time : Columbus and Island No. 10 had surrendered ; Fort Pillow was evacuated, Memphis was abandoned, the enemy were taking possession of the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and threatening a descent through Mississippi ; that Xew Orleans had fallen, and the disposition seemed

to be to give up everything; that he had just received a despatch from Lov-ell, stating, unless reinforced, he would abandon Yicksburg; besides all this, he knew the people had no confidence in Lovell, and would not serve under him. lie at once determined to send Bragg to Vicksburg, and on the loth June, I think, telegraphed to Bragg to proceed at once to Vicksburg, as the danger was pressing and imminent, and that the assignment of him to Vicks burg was but temporary. Bragg immediately replied by telegraph (16th or 17th, I do not remember) that Beaurcgard, being in bad health, desired tem porary repose, and intended to leave the army for a short period, and con cluded by saying he would await further orders. When this despatch arrived in Richmond, the President was at Raleigh ; as soon as he received it from the Adjutant-General, he telegraphed Bragg to go at once to Vicksburg, the danger was pressing and imminent, and he was sorry he had permitted anything to interfere with his orders. Bragg replied on the 18th or 19th, that Beauregard Jiad left on a surgeon's certificate of four months, stating, however, that Beau-regard would return in a short time, and as soon as the army was reorgan ized. I forget the exact terms of the despatch. It conveyed the idea of Beau-regard's absence being temporary, and of no very long duration ; but how long was uncertain, and where he had gone was not stated* Bragg informed the President his presence had now become absolutely necessary to the army, and that he awaited further orders. The President replied, giving Bragg the com mand of the department, and ordered Van Dora to Vicksburg through Bragg. The President stated that under these circumstances every military man will say that Beaurcgard should have remained at Tupelo, even if lie had to ~be carried aliout •in a Utter.* He knew that Bragg's assignment to Vicksburg was but tempo rary, and he ought to have waited at least two or three weeks ; that he left the army under these circumstances without permission, and that he had no right to leave on a surgeon's certificate without permission, and he had not stated where he had gone; that so long as Beauregard remained invested with the command of the department, Bragg was only the commander of that army at Tupelo ; that Bragg could not correspond with the War Department except through Beauregard, and no orders could be issued to other forces in the de partment at Vicksburg or elsewhere, except through Beauregard as head of the department, and therefore, under the circumstances, a change of the head of the department was absolutely necessary for the public interest. The President, though stating the irregularities of Beanregard's conduct in leaving the army, said he had overlooked all that, and disavowed its influence on his conduct, and based his action exclusively on the public interests at that time.

" That so far as giving Beauregard command of Brngg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the department, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall, and to put a new commander* at the head of the army, would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the peti tion* He further stated that Charleston was no unimportant command, that

* The italics are ours.

Charleston and Savannah were of vast consequence to the Confederacy, and as he believed General Bcauregard's qualifications peculiarly fitted him for its defence, he had selected him on that account as the best man in the army for the South Carolina and Georgia Department. The President read aloud to us all the despatches spoken of above. I may not therefore give their tenor ac curately; he promised us copies, and, moreover, authorized us to repeat what passed in conversation. The above, however, is substantially what passed, as far as I can recollect; it is not all that passed, nor do I pretend to give the exact language.


A few words more, and we have done with this subject. We have furnished the whole of the evidence relating to it; and, in order to make the chain more complete, we now refer the reader to the despatch of Governor Pickens, and General Beauregard's answer to it, to be found in the Appendix to this chapter. Let the read er carefully compare the facts composing that evidence with what Mr. Davis writes in his book, and with what he said to the com mittee of Congressmen who called on him to petition for General Beauregard's restoration to his army. lie will need no further enlightenment in order to draw a just conclusion. We do not in-

r^ J

tend to scrutinize the motives which actuated Mr. Davis in his conduct at that time towards General Beauregard ; but, that he was not moved by a spirit of patriotism, or influenced only by a pure desire to advance the interests of the cause, is shown by the expressions used by him on that occasion : " lie would not do it, if the whole world united in the petition" Here was the Presi dent of the Confederacy, the first and most prominent servant of its people, ready to oppose his will, his rule, not only to the desire of the majority of that people, but—if need be—to the declared opinion of ** the whole world:" the plain meaning of which was that should he and the rest of mankind, including the whole pop ulation of the South, differ as to the wisdom of any measure of public interest, he would be right, and the li -whole world" wrong. What monarch, in this or in any former age, could have regarded his power as more absolute?

Taken as a whole, the military operations in Department No. 2, from Bowling Green to the evacuation of Corinth, including the stand made at Tupelo, presented some of the most difficult problems of war. Without the wish to claim undue credit for the manner in which these were solved, in view of the desperate begin ning, the wretched want of preparation, the deficiency of men and


arms, the raw and incomplete materials, collected by such strenu ous efforts, the friends of General A. S. Johnston and of General Beauregard may be proud of the results; of the skill with which they met every emergency, and, with heavy odds against them, balked the plans of the enemy.



ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, Jan. 24th, 18G1. Bvt. Miijor P. G. T. BEAUREGAUD, Corps of Engineers, West Point, X. Y.:

Major, —The Secretary of War directs that Special Orders No. 238, of Xov. 8th, 18(>0, appointing you to the post of Superintendent of the Military Acad emy, be revoked, and that you return to your former station at Xe\v Orleans. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Jos. G. TOTTEN, Bvt. Brig.-Genl., Chief Eng.


WASHINGTON, Jan. 25th, 18G1. SjKcial Order Xo. 19.

Special Order Xo. 238, Adjutant-General's Oflice, of Xovember, 1800, appoint ing Bvt. Major Peter G. T. Beauregard, Captain Corps of Engineers, to be the Superintendent of the Military Academy, is hereby revoked, and Major Beau-regard will return to his former station at Xew Orleans, La.

By order of the Secretary of War. S. COOPER, Adj.-Genl.

Major BEAUREGARD, through Engineers.

XEW ORLEANS, Feb. 12th, 18G1. Hon. Rd. TAYLOR, Xew Orleans, La.:

Dear Sir, —Upon rellcction and consultation with my friends, I have come to the conclusion that I ought not and cannot accept that Colonelcy of Engi neers and Artillery in the State army—but my professional knowledge, expe rience, and services, without military rank, are at the command of the State, even unto death. Respectfully, your obedient servant,


XEW ORLEANS, Feb. 12th, 18G1. Major G. T. BEAUREGAKD :

Dear Sir, —I regret most sincerely that anything should have occurred to induce you to change the determination in which I left you on yesterday. A great deal of apprehension has been felt for the safety of our forts commanding the river, and the attention of the whole community has been directed to you as the one upon whom the State must rely in the hour of danger.

I cannot presume to intrude ray advice and opinions upon you. again, and will only repeat that your decision will be a source of great regret and disap pointment to the whole country, as well as to your friends, among whom, my dear sir, I hope yon will permit me to include myself.

With high respect, your obedient servant, R. TAYLOR.

NEW ORLEANS, Feb. 13 tf, 1861.

Gentlemen, —As time presses, and it may soon become urgent to be prepared for the worst, permit me to make a few suggestions which may lead to our successful preparation.

In the iirst place, we must look to our most vulnerable point, the Mississippi River; for one single steamer, with only two or three guns, coming into the port of New Orleans, would in a few hours destroy millions' worth of property, or lay the city under a forced contribution of millions of dollars.

It is an undeniable fact that, in the present condition of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, any steamer can pass them in broad daylight; and that even when in. a proper condition for defence, they could not prevent the passage of one or more steamers during a dark or stormy night, without the assistance of a properly constructed raft or strong wire rope across the river between the two forts, so as to arrest the course of said steamers, even only for half an hour, under the severe cross-fire of said forts.

The first thing to be done, then, is to commence the construction of (or pre pare at least the materials for) said obstacles; then the guns of the land fronts of Fort Jackson ought to be mounted at once on the river fronts ; the guns, chassis, and carriages at Baton Rouge, Forts Pike, Wood, Battery Bienvcnu, etc., where they are not required at present, ought to be sent at once to these two forts on the river, to be put in position as advantageously as possible on their river fronts—not overlooking, however, the flank guns of the other fronts; all said chassis and carriages ought to be tried forthwith by double charges of powder and shot; ample supplies of ammunition ought to be sent there forthwith. The trees along the river, masking the fires of those two forts, up and down the river, ought to be cut down at once, particularly those on the Fort Jackson side. In a few words, no expenses ought to be spared to put those two works in a most efficient state of defence ; for $50,000 or $100,000 spent thus, might, a few weeks hence, save millions of dollars to the State and city of New Orleans.

A rough calculation shows me that the raft spoken of would cost about $40,000, and three wire cables probably $60,000. I prefer the first. Mr. John Roy, my former assistant architect on the New Orleans custom-house, would be of great assistance in the construction of either of said obstacles.

In haste, I remain, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUUEGARD. To the Military Board of the State of Louisiana, New Orleans, La.


Dear Sir,—A. copy of yours of the 13th instant, to the "Military Board/'

relative to the condition of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, was received two days since. For the information I thank yon, also for the valuable suggestions offered. I have written the members of the Board on the subject, and urged their immediate attention to the whole matter. I am aware of its importance, but am compelled to leave all such matters (military) to those who have a knowledge of them. I only regret, with all of our friends, that you could not accept the post tendered you, Colonel of Artillery and Chief of Engineers.

With the highest regards, your obedient servant, In haste. TIIOS. O. MOOIIE.

NEW ORLEANS, Feb. Wth, 1861.

Dear Sir, —Your favor of the 17th instant has just been received. I thank you for regretting that I could not accept the military position tendered me. Although not in service, I wish it distinctly understood that my professional knowledge and experience are at the command of my native State, even unto death, whenever required—but without military rank; not, however, through any jealousy of General Bragg's appointment, for I am happy to state that it is a most excellent choice; and I should have been very happy to serve with him or under his orders, in the defence of our rights and firesides, if I could have accepted the Colonel and Chief of Engineers and Artillery position tendered me. I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAT/REGARD. To his Excellency, Gov. T. O. MOORE, Baton Rouge, La.


Sir, —Your resignation has been accepted by the President of the United States, to take effect the 20th instant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. TOWNSEND, Asst. Adj.-Geul. To Bvt. Major P. G. T. Bi: ACRI-GAIID,

Captain Corps of Engineers, Xe\v Orleans, La.

Telegram of L. 1\ Waller, Secretary of War, to Governor Pickcns, of South Carolina.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A., MONTGOMERY, March 1st, 1801. Gov. F. W. PICK HNS, Charleston, 8. C.:

Your letter to President received. This government assumes control of military operations at Charleston, and will make demand of the fort when fully advised. An officer goes to-night to take charge.

L. P. WALKER. See. of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, MONTGOMERY, March 1st, 1861. His Excellency F. W r . PICKENS, Governor, etc.:

Sir, —Your letter of the '27th ultimo, addressed to the President, has been referred by him to this department. In controlling the military operations


in the Larbor of Charleston, the President directs me to say that everything will be done that may be due to the honor and rights of South Carolina.

The President shares the feeling expressed by you, that Fort Sumter should be in our possession at the earliest moment possible. But this feeling, natural and just as it is admitted to be, must yield to the necessity of the case. Thorough preparation must be made before an attack is attempted, for tbe first blow must be successful, both for its moral and physical consequences, or otherwise the result might be disastrous to your State in the loss of many of those whom we can least afford to spare. A failure would demoralize our people, and injuriously affect us in the opinion of the world, as reckless and precipitate. . . . Under the fourth section of an Act of Congress to raise Pro visional Forces for the Confederate States of America, and for other purposes, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose in another communication of this date, the President has appointed Peter G. T. Beauregard Brigadier-General, to command the Provisional Forces of this government in tbe harbor of Charles ton. General Beauregard will be accompanied by an Adjutant, whose duty it will be to receive into the Provisional army, with their officers, under the provisions of the act aforesaid, the forces of your State now in Charleston.

General Beauregard has the entire confidence of the President and of this department, and I beg to commend him as possessing every soldierly quality. I have the honor to be, with high regard, your obedient servant,

L. P. WALKER, Sec. of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A., MONTGOMERY, March 1st, 1861. Brig.-Genl. P. G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Sir, —You will proceed without delay to Charleston, and report to Governor Pickens for military duty in that State.

You are authorized, by your appointment as Brigadier-General, under the provisions of the third section of an Act of the Congress to raise Provisional Forces for the Confederate States, to receive into the service of this govern ment such forces as may be tendered or may volunteer, not to exceed five thou sand men, as you may require, or for whom you can make suitable provision. A copy of the Act referred to has been this day transmitted to Governor Pick-ens.

You will report to this department your arrival at Charleston, and give such information, with respect to the defences of that harbor, as you may consider important. You will also secure, if possible, the services of a competent Adju tant, and report your action, in that behalf, to this department. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. P. WALKER, Sec. of War.


Captain Fox to Lieutenant-General Scott.

Feb. 8th, 1861. Lieut.-Genl. WINFIELD SCOTT, U. S. A.:

Sir, —Tho proposition which I have had the honor to submit to you fully, in person, is herewith presented in writing. Lieutenant Hall and myself have had several free conferences ; and if he is permitted by the South Carolina authori ties to re-enter Fort Suinter, Major Anderson will comprehend the plan for his relief. I consider myself very fortunate in having proposed a project which meets the approval of the general-in-chief; and I ask no reward but the entire conduct of the post, exclusive of the armed vessels. The commander of these should be ordered to co-operate with me, by affording me protection and destroy ing their naval preparations near the bar, leaving to mo, as the author of the plan, the actual operations of relief. I suggest that the Pawnee be immediately sent to the Delaware Breakwater to await orders, the Harriet Lane to be ready for sea, and some arrangement entered into by which the requisite steamer and tugs should be engaged— at leant, so far as not to excite suspicion. I should prefer one of the Collins steamers. They are now being prepared for sea, and arc of such a size and power as to be able, fearlessly, to run down any vessel which might attempt to capture us outside by coup dc main. I could quietly engage one, and have her ready to start on twenty-four hours' notice, without exciting suspicion. I shall leave for New York at \\ r. M., and any communication will find mo at Judge Blair's. If the Pawnees pivot-gun is landed, it should cer tainly be remounted. Very respectfully, etc., G. V. Fox.

General Scott to Captain Fox.


March 19//I, IbCl.

Dear Sir, —In accordance with the request contained in a note of the Secre tary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I request that you will have the goodness to proceed to Charleston, S. C., and obtain permission, if necessary, to visit Fort Sumter, in order to enable you to comply with the wish expressed in the secretary's note. Very respectfully, etc., WINFIELD SCOTT.

Secretary Cameron's Instructions to Captain Fox.


Sir, —It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter, you have been selected for this important duty. Accordingly, you will take charge of the transports in New York, having the troops and supplies on board, to the port of Charles ton harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance, to deliver the subsistence. If you are opposed in this, you are directed to report the fact to the senior naval officer of the harbor, who will be instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an eu-trance, and place both the troops and supplies in Fort Sumter.

I am, sir, etc., SIMON CAMEHOX, Sec. of War.

President Lincoln io Captain Fox.

WASHINGTON, May 1st, 1861. Capt. G. V. Fox:

My Dear Sir, —I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt to pro vision Fort Sumter should be the source of any annoyance to you. The prac ticability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test. By reason of a gale, well known in advance to be possible, and not improbable, the tugs, an essen tial part of the plan, never reached the ground ; while, by an accident, for which you were in nowise responsible, and possibly I, to some extent, was, you were de prived of a war-vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great importance to the enterprise.

I most cheerfully and truthfully declare that the failure of the undertaking has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you developed in the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation. For a daring and dangerous enterprise of a similar character, you would, to-day, be the man of all my ac quaintances whom I would select. You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our anticipation is justified by the result.

Very truly your friend, A. LINCOLN.


MONTGOMERY, April 2d, 1861. Brig.-Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Charleston Harbor, Charleston, S. C.:

Sir, —This government has at no time placed any reliance on assurances by the government at Washington, in respect to the evacuation of Fort Sumter, or entertained any confidence in the disposition of the latter to make any conces sion, or yield any point to which it is not driven by an absolute necessity. And I desire that you will govern yourself generally with reference to this, as the-key to the policy of the government of the Confederate States.

You are specially instructed to remit, in no degree, your efforts to prevent tho reinforcement of Fort Sumter; and to keep yourself in a state of the amplest preparation and most perfect readiness to repel invasion ; acting in all respects —save only in commencing an assault or attack (except to repel an invading or reinforcing force)—precisely as if you were in the presence of an enemy con templating to surprise you.

The delays and apparent vacillations of the Washington government make it imperative that the further concession of courtesies such as have been ac corded to Mnjor Anderson and his command, in supplies from the city, must cease. And, in general terms, the status which you must at once re-establish and rigidly enforce is that of hostile forces in the presence of each other, and who may at any moment be in actual conflict.

But as past conditions have allowed this government to continue thus far courtesies of personal convenience to Major Anderson and his officers, it is proper now, as those courtesies are required to be determined by the necessities

of your position, that you signify in respectful terras to Major Anderson that all communication with the city from the fort, and with the fort from the city, for any purpose of supply, is absolutely inhibited. And after Laving so notified that gentleman, at the very earliest moment practicable, you will make your surveillance of the harbor, and the enforcement of the rule of instruction indi cated in the notice to the commander of Fort Sumter, as rigid as all the means at your command, in the most watchful vigilance, can secure.

Until the withdrawal of the commissioners of this government from Wash ington—an event which may occur at any moment—no operations, beyond what is indicated in the foregoing, would be admissible. Promptly, however, on the receipt, by this government, of the intelligence of such withdrawal, the depart ment will transmit to you specific instructions for your guidance. Kespectfully, your obedient servant,

L. P. WALKER, Sec. of War.



CHARLESTON, S. C., April 27th, 1SGI. Hon. L. P. WALKER, Sec. of War, Montgomery, Ala.:

Sir, —I have the honor to transmit to the department my detailed report of the operations during the bombardment of Fort Sumter, accompanied by copies of the reports sent in to this oflice by the commanders of the batteries, together with a series of photographs, twenty-two in number, showing the condition of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and of the floating battery, after the surrender of the former fort.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. HEAUREGARD, Ikig.-Genl. Comdg.


CHARLESTON, S. C., April 27th, IbGl. Brig.-Genl. COOPER, Adj.-Genl. C. S. A.:

jX'iV,—I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of the bom bardment and surrender of Fort Sumter, and the incidents connected therewith. Having completed my channel-defences and batteries in the harbor, necessary for the reduction of Fort Sumter, I despatched two of my aids at 2.20 P. M., on Thursday, the llth of April, with a communication to Major Anderson, in com mand of the fort, demanding its evacuation. I offered to transport himself and command to any port in the United States he might select; to allow him to move out of the fort with company-anus and property, and all private property, and to salute his flag on lowering it. lie refused to accede to this demand. As my aids were about leaving, Major Anderson remarked, "that if \vo did not batter him to pieces he would be starved out in a fe\v days," or words to that effect.

This being reported to me by my aids, on their return with his refusal, at 5.10 P.M., I deemed it proper to telegraph the purport of his remark to the Sec retary of War. I received by telegraph the following instruction at 9.10 P.M. : "Do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter; if Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that in the meantime he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be em ployed against Fort Sumter, you are authorized thus to avoid effusion of blood. If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable." At 11 P. M. I sent my aids •with, a communication to Major Anderson, based upon these instructions. It was placed in his hands at 12.45 A. M. , on the 12th instant. He expressed his willingness to evacuate the fort on Monday afternoon, "if furnished with the necessary means of transpor tation, and he should not receive contradictory instructions from his govern ment, or additional supplies." But he declined to agree "not to open his guns upon us in the event of any hostile demonstration, on our part, against his flag." This reply, which was open, and shown to my aids, plainly indicated that, if in structions should be received contrary to his purpose to evacuate, or he should receive his supplies, or the Confederate troops should fire on hostile troops of the United States, or upon transports bearing the United States flag, containing men, munitions, and supplies designed for hostile operations against us, he would feel bound to fire upon us, and to hold possession of the fort. As, in consequence of a communication from the President of the United States to the Governor of South Carolina, we were in momentary expectation of an attempt to reinforce Fort Sumter, or of a descent upon our coast to that end from the United States fleet lying oif the entrance of the harbor, it was manifestly an apparent necessity to reduce the fort as speedily as possible, and not to await until the ships and the fort should unite in a combined attack upon us. Accordingly, my aids, car rying out my instructions, promptly refused to accede to the terms proposed by Major Anderson, and notified him, in writing, that our batteries would open upon Fort Sumter in one hour. This notification was given at 3.20 A. M., on Fri day the 12th instant. The signal-shell was fired from Fort Johnson at 4.30 A. M., and, at about 5 o'clock, the fire from our batteries became general. Fort Sumter did not open until 7 o'clock, when it commenced with a vigorous fire upon the Cumrnings's Point Iron Battery. The enemy next directed his fire upon the enfilade battery on Sullivan's Island, constructed to sweep the parapet of Fort Sumter, to prevent the working of the barbette guns, and to dismount them. This was also the aim of the floating battery, the Dahlgreu battery, and the gun-batteries at Cummings's Point. The enemy next opened fire on Fort Moultrie, between which and Fort Sumter a steady and almost constant fire was kept up throughout the day. These three points, Fort Moultrie, Cummings's Point, and the end of Sullivan's Island, where the floating battery, Dahlgreu Battery, and the enfilade battery were placed, were the points to which the enemy seemed almost to confine his attention, although a number of shots were directed at Captain Butler's mortar battery, situated eastward of Fort Moultrie, and a few at Captain James's mortar batteries at Fort Johnson. During the day (12th instant) the fire of our batteries was kept up most spiritedly, the

guns and mortars being worked in the coolest manner, preserving the prescribed intervals of firing. Towards evening it became evident that our fire was very effective, as the enemy was driven from his barbette guns, which he had at tempted to work in the morning, and his fire was confined to his casemated guns, but in a less active manner than in the morning, and it was observed that several of his guns a larbcttc were disabled.

During the whole of Friday night our mortar batteries continued to throw shells, but, in obedience to orders, at longer intervals. The night was rainy and dark, and as it was confidently expected that the United States fleet would attempt to land troops upon the islands, or throw men into Fort Sumter by means of boats, the greatest vigilance was observed at all our channel batteries, and by our troops on both Morris and Sullivan's islands. Early on Saturday morning all our batteries reopened on Fort Sumter, which responded vigorously for a while, directing its fire specially against Fort Moultrie. About 8 A. M. smoke was seen issuing from the quarters of Fort Sumter; the fire of our bat teries was then increased, for the purpose of bringing the enemy to terms as speedily as possible, inasmuch as his flag was still floating defiantly. Fort Sumter continued to lire from time to time, but at long and irregular intervals, amid the dense smoke. Our brave troops, carried away by their enthusiasm, mounted the different batteries, and, at every discharge from the fort, cheered the garrison for its pluck and gallantry, and hooted at the fleet lying inactive just outside the bar. About OO P. M., it being reported to me that the Federal ling was down (it was afterwards ascertained that the flagstaff had been shot away), and the conflagration from the large volume of smoke appearing to in crease, I sent three of my aids with a message to Major Anderson to the effect that, " seeing his flag no longer flying, his quarters in flames, and supposing him to be in distress, I desired to offer him any assistance he might stand in need of." lie fore my aids reached the fort the United States flag was displayed on the parapets, but remained there only a short time when it was hauled down and a white flag substituted in its place. When the United States flag first disappeared the firing from our batteries almost entirely ceased, but reopened with increased vigor when it reappeared on the parapet, and was continued until the white flag was raised, when the firing ceased entirely. Upon the ar rival of my aids at Fort Sumter they delivered their message to Major Ander son, who replied " that he thanked General Beauregard for his offer, but desired no assistance." Just previous to their arrival at the fort, Colonel Wigfall, one of my volunteer aids, who had been detached for special duty on Morris Island, had, by order of Brigadier-General Simons, crossed over to Fort Sumter from Cummings's Point in an open boat, with private William Gourdin Young, amid a heavy fire of shots and shells, for the purpose of ascertaining from Major Ander son whether his intention was to surrender, his flag being down and his quarters in flames. On reaching the fort the colonel had an interview' with Major An derson, the result of which was that Major Anderson understood him as offering the same conditions on the part of General Beauregard as had been tendered to him on the llth instant, while Colonel "Wigfall's impression was that Major Anderson unconditionally surrendered, trusting to the generosity of General

Beauregard to offer sucli terms as •would bo honorable and acceptable to both parties; meanwhile, before these circumstances had been reported to me, and, in fact, soon after the aids I had despatched with the offer of assistance had set out on their mission, hearing that a white flag was flying over the fort, I sent Major Jones, chief of iny staff, and some other aids, with substantially the same proposition I had made to Major Anderson on the llth instant, excepting the privilege of saluting his flag. Major Anderson replied that "it would be ex ceedingly gratifying to him, as well as to his command, to be permitted to salute their flag, having so gallantly defended the fort under such trying circum stances, and hoped that General Beauregard would not refuse it, as such a priv ilege was not unusual." He furthermore said, " he would not urge the point, but would prefer to refer the matter again to General Beauregard."

The point was, therefore, left open until the matter was submitted to me. Previous to the return of Major Jones I had sent a fire-engine, under Mr. M. II. Nathan, Chief of the Fire Department, and Surgeon-General Gibbs, of South Carolina, with several of my aids, to offer further assistance to the garrison of Fort Sumter, w^hich was declined. I very cheerfully agreed to allow the salute, as an honorable testimony to the gallantry and fortitude with which Major Anderson and his command had defended their post, and I informed Major Ander son of my decision about half-past seven o'clock, through Major Jones, rny chief of staff. The arrangements being completed, Major Anderson embarked, with his command, on the transport prepared to convey them to the United States fleet still lying outside of the bar, and our troops immediately garrisoned the fort; before sunset the flag of the Confederate States floated over the ramparts of Sumter.

I commend in the highest terms the gallantly of the troops under my com mand, and where all have done their duty well it is difficult to discriminate. Although the troops outside of the batteries bearing on Fort Sumter were not so fortunate as their comrades working the guns and mortars, still their ser vices were equally valuable and commendable; for they were on their arms at the channel batteries, and at their posts and bivouacs, exposed to severe weath er and constant watchfulness, expecting every moment to have to repel rein forcements from the powerful fleet off the bar. To all these troops I award much praise for the cheerfulness with which they met the duties required of them. I feel much indebted to Generals R. G. M. Dunovant and James Simons (commanding on Sullivan's and Morris islands), and their staffs, especially Ma jors Evans and Do Saussurc, S. C. A., for their valuable and gallant services, and the discretion they displayed in executing the duties devolving on their respon sible positions. Of Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Ripley, 1st Artillery Battalion, commandant of batteries on Sullivan's Island, I cannot speak too highly, and join with General Duuovant, his immediate commander since January last, in commending in the highest terms his sagacity, experience, and unflagging zeal. I would also mention in the highest terms of praise Captains Calhoun and Hallouquist, assistant commandants of batteries to Colonel Ripley, and the fol lowing commanders of batteries on Sullivan's Island: Captain J. R. Hamilton, commanding the floating battery and Dahlgren gun; Captains Butler, S. C. A.,

and Bruns, aide-de-camp to General Dunovant; and Lieutenants Wagner, Rbett, Yates, Valentine, and Parker.

To Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. De Saussure, 2d Artillery Battalion, comman dant of batteries on Morris Island, too much praise cannot bo given. He displayed the most untiring energy; and his judicious arrangements, in the good management of his batteries, contributed much to the reduction of Fort Slimier.

To Major Stevens, of the Citadel Academy, in charge of the Curnmings's Point batteries, I feel much indebted for his valuable and scientific assistance and the efficient working of the batteries under his immediate charge. The Cumuiings's Point batteries (iron 42-pounders and mortars) were manned by the Palmetto Guards, Captain Cuthbert; and I take pleasure- in expressing iny admiration of the service of the gallant captain and his distinguished company during tin; action. I would also mention in terms of praise the following commanders of batteries at the Point, viz.: Lieutenants Armstrong, of the Citadel Academy, and Brownfield, of the Palmetto Guards; also Captain Thomas, of the Citadel Academy, who had charge of the rilled cannon and had the honor of using this valuable weapon—a gift of one of South Carolina's sons to his native State— with peculiar effect. Captain J. G. King, with his company, the Marion Artil lery, commanded the mortar battery in rear of the Cnnmiings's Point batteries; and the accuracy of his shell practice was the theme of general admiration. Captain George S. James, commanding at Fort Johnson, had the honor of firing the first shell at Fort Siunter; his conduct and that of those under him was commendable during the action. Captain Martin, S. C. A., commanded the Mount Pleasant mortar battery, and, with assistants, did good service. For a more detailed account of the gallantly of the attack on Sumtcr, I would re spectfully invite your attention to the copies of the- reports of the different officers under my command, herewith enclosed. I cannot close this report with out referring to the following gentlemen : To his Excellency,Governor Pickens, and staff'—especially Colonels Lamar and Dearing, who were so active and effi cient in the construction of the channel batteries; Colonels Lucas and Moore, for assistance on various occasions; and Colonel Duryea and Mr. Nathan, Chief of the Fire Department, for their gallant assistance in putting out the fire at Fort Snmter when the magazine- of the latter was in imminent danger of explo sion ; General Jamieson, Secretary of War, and General S. K. Gist, Adjutant-Gen eral, for their valuable assistance in obtaining and despatching the troops for the attack on Snmter and defence of the batteries; Quartermaster's and Com missary-General's Departments, Colonels Hatch and Walker; and the Ord nance Board, especially Colonel Manigault, Chief of Ordnance, whose zeal and activity were untiring; the Medical Department, whose preparations had been judiciously and amply made, but which a kind Providence rendered unnecessa ry ; the Engineers, Majors Whiting and Gwynn, Captains Trapiers and Lee, and Lieutenants McCrady, Earle, and Gregorie—on whom too much praise cannot bo bestowed for their untiring zeal, energy, and gallantry, and to whoso labors is greatly due the unprecedented example of taking such an important work, after thirty-three hours firing, without having to report the loss of a single life,

and but four persons slightly wounded ; from Major W.H. C. Whiting I derived also much assistance, not only as au engineer, in selecting the sites and laying out the channel Latteries on Morris Island, hut as Acting Assistant-Adjutant and Inspector-General, in arranging and stationing the troops on said island; the Naval Department, especially Captain Hartstein, one of my volunteer aids, who was indefatigable in guarding the entrance into the harbor and in trans mitting my orders.

Lieutenant T. B. linger was also of much service, first as ordnance-inspecting officer of batteries, then in charge of the batteries on the south end of Morris Island. Lieutenant Warley, w T ho commanded the Dahlgren channel battery and the school-ship, which was kindly offered by the Board of Directors, was of much service. Lieutenant Rutledge was Acting Inspector-General of Ordnance of the batteries, in which capacity, assisted by Lieutenant Williams, C. S. A., on Morris Island, he was very useful in organizing and distributing ammunition. Captains Childs and Jones, assistant commandants of batteries to Lieutenant-Colonel De Saussure, Captains Winder and Allston, Acting Assistant-Adjutant and Inspector-Generals to General Simons's brigade; Captain Manigault of my staff, attached to General Simons's staff, did efficient and gallant services on Morris Island during the fight. Professor Lewis R. Gibbes, of the Charleston College, and his aids, deserve much praise for their valuable services in operat ing the Drurnmond lights, established at the extremities of Sullivan's and Mor ris Islands. The venerable and gallant Edmund Baffin, of Virginia, was at the Iron Battery and fired many guns, undergoing every fatigue and sharing the hardships at the battery with the youngest of the Palmettos. To my regular staff—Major D. R. Jones, C. S. A., Captains Lee and Ferguson, C. S. A., and Lieu tenant Legai-d, S. C. A.; and my volunteer staff, Messrs. Chisolm, Wigfall, Chest nut, Manning, Miles, Gonzales, and Pryor—I am much indebted for their inde fatigable and valuable assistance, night and day, during the attack, transmit ting my orders in open boats with alacrity and cheerfulness to the different bat teries, amid falling balls and bursting shells. Captain Wigfall was the first in Fort Sumter to receive its surrender.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brig.-Geul. Comdg.



MANASSAS JUNCTION, June 16th, 1861. Sir,— * * * * * *

Can I be informed why it is that none of my communications to the War Department through the Adjutant-General's Department are answered? They are not even acknowledged. I refer more particularly to my letters of the 5th, 9th, and 12th instant.

Ought my communications (reports, etc.) to be sent through General Lee or

not? lie is the only one from whom I receive any official orders of any im portance.

I beg to call your attention particularly to my letter of the 5th instant, re ferring to the immediate necessity of furnishing my command with belts (of any material) three (3) inches wide, red on one side and yellow on the other, to be worn with either color on the outside, and from over the right shoulder buttoned under the left arm, or from left to right, as the officer in command shall direct, for the time being. Many of my regiments are not furnished with the Confederate colors; how are they to be distinguished in battle from the enemy? especially it'we attack them in flank or rear, as we ought to do when ever practicable. I feel very much concerned about these two matters. I have no doubt that, if the ladies of Richmond were called upon, belts and colors could be made in a few days.

Many <>f my companies are entirely unprovided with cartridge and cap boxes; what are they to do, especially in wet weather? We have no ammunition to waste. I have thought it advisable to call these facts to your Excellency's attention, as they arc going to play a very important part in our battles with the enemy. I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G.T. HKAUREdAitn, Brig.-Gcnl. Coindg. To his Excellency President JKFF. DAVIS, Kiehmond, Va.


('AMI- PICKK.NS, June "2(1, 1H(51.

Colonel, —I enclose a brief note just received from Lieutenant-Colonel Ewell, commanding our advanced forces at Fairfax Court-House, as affording the latest information of the movements of the enemy.

I must urge the importance of giving all possible strength to this command at the earliest possible moment, as this section of country is difficult to defend with a small force ; and I trust that any South Carolina, or other good and well-armed, troops that may reach Virginia will be sent hi;her with despatch.

I tind that many of the troops here are badly armed and unprovided with means of transportation and camp equipage.

Respectfully, Colonel, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREUARD, Brig.-Genl. Comdg. To Col. U. S. GA::\::TT, Adj.-Onl.


CAMP PICKENS, June (ith, 18G1. Special Order*, No. 9.

I. Colonel J. L. Kemper is assigned to temporary special service, being charged with the duty of procuring the necessary means of transportation for this com mand, lie is authorized to employ the necessary agents, and will be further assisted by such officers and men from this department as he may select, not to exceed four officers and twenty men. He is further authorized to require of all officers or agents, acting in the Quartermaster's Department, at any post in the department, efficient assistance in the prompt execution and accom plishment of the purposes of these orders.



II. It is desirable that, in all cases AY lien practicable, teams should be hired by the month; hired with wagon, four horses, or five mules to the team, harness complete, and the driver, when practicable. Two hundred such hired teams are required; but if they cannot be procured, Colonel Kemper, in the exercise of a sound discretion, is authorized to purchase horses or mules for one hundred teams, with the necessary wagons and harness.

III. Colonel Kemper is further authorized to purchase a full supply of forage for the teams he may secure.

IV. Colonel Kemper is authorized to transport himself and his agents, or any individual of them, at the expense of the State, over any railroad in the State, or by other public means of conveyance.

V. Colonel Kemper will, if necessary, communicate by telegraph with these headquarters, and with his agents, Avhen reliance in the usual mail facilities will be to the public prejudice.

VI. The general commanding confidently relies on the patriotism and public spirit of the people of Virginia, and cannot doubt they will cheerfully come for ward with their supplies, teams, and means of transportation, at this juncture, for the service of the State, the general weal, and their own safety and liberties.

By order of Brig.-Genl. Beauregard,

THOMAS JORDAN, Act. Asst. Adj.-Genl.


CAMP PICKENS, June Gth, 1861.

In consequence of the urgent necessity of completing the works already commenced for the defence of this important point as rapidly as possible, and of the fact that the troops here stationed cannot be employed continuously on said works without serious interruption to the drills and military instruction so essential to the young soldier, I am compelled to request the patriotic citi zens of this and the neighboring counties to send hero such of their negro men as they can spare, with or without rations, and with spades and pickaxes, con fident that they will cheerfully contribute this labor to assist in the defence of our country and cause. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.


S. \V. FERGUSON, Lt. and A. D. C.


Sir, —On assuming the command here, I found Dr. Gastin, South Carolina Volunteers, acting as medical director, and I have continued him in that posi tion, as I believe him to be fully competent to fulfil its duties; but as ho has no Confederate States commission, the assistant surgeons of this command might object to receiving orders from him ; I have, then, to request, either that he •should bo confirmed in his present position, or that another surgeon should be ordered here in his place.

Brigadier-General Bonham has applied for an officer of the Confederate Army (who has seen some service) as Acting Adjutant-General of his command, and I fully approve of that application. He suggests the namo of Captain J. L. Corley.

I applied a few days ago for a certain number of colored belts (red oa one side and yellow on Ilie other) for the purpose of distinguishing the soldiers of my command from those of the enemy. I earnestly call the attention of the War Department to my letter on that subject.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brig.-Genl. Comdg. JIou. L. P. WALKER, Sec. of War, Richmond, Va.

RICHMOND, June I~th, 1861.

J/// dear General, —I have yours of 15th instant; all you ask for has been at tended to so far as in my power. The Zouaves have gone some days to York-town. The 5th Regiment Alabama Volunteers, a fine regiment, has been or dered to you. I shall try for Colonel Jenkins's South Carolina regiment to bo sent also. No bunting here. Have sent to Norfolk for some. Hope it can bo had. Nothing here for llags. Cartridge-boxes Gorgas will see to, and Major Smith will send you pay-rolls.

In reference to the badges, immense numbers arc being made—but I under stand the President thinks them too conspicuous—so do I. A small rosette of the same stuff pinned or attached on the arm or breast will be less notable, and quite enough distinguishable, I think. I wish I were with you in the conflict. May God give you his protection: your battle is righteous, and your victory undoubted. Yours truly, A. C. MYERS.




Fi<Ei>ERicKsm:R(;, VA., June 15//<, ldo'1.

dcncral, —Since my arrival here I have made careful rcconnoissance of tho coast, and sought in every way possible to possess myself of the enemy's move ments and intentions; there is no evidence of a disposition on his part to land in this vicinity, and I am obliged to think the force here is unnecessarily large. To all appearances the Federal forces will bo directed against Manassas and Harper's Terry ; if those places fall, this position will bo unnecessary, as he will have opened for himself a more direct road to Richmond. I beg, therefore, re spectfully to suggest that, after leaving a sufficient guard for tho batteries, say five hundred men, it will be better for me to march with tho great body of my command to Manassas, or some other point, where they can be made available to resist the first great onslaught of the enemy. It may be tho time for this move has not yet arrived, but my only object now is to inform you that if you agree with my opinion as to the enemy's intentions, I can, at very short notice, march from here with three regiments of volunteers and two batteries of artil lery. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. H. HOLMES, Brig-Gcnl. Provisional Army. To Genl. S. COOPER, Adj.-Genl. C. S. A., Richmond.


BROOKS STATION, June 18th, 1861.

General, —Herewith enclosed you will please find a copy of a letter addressed to the Adjutant-General by me, and which was answered by General Lee, stating that the enemy's plans were not yet sufficiently developed to justify the adop tion of my suggestions, and recommending, if my force could be divided, that I should erect a battery at Mathias Point, some thirty miles below here; from this you will see how utterly out of the question it is for me to send a regiment to your neighborhood, as all the force I have would scarcely be sufficient to resist an effort by the enemy to land, with a view to invade.

I need not say it will give me the greatest satisfaction to co-operate with you, and, if you will keep me advised of your wishes, they shall receive the most respectful consideration, and, as far as I can, consistently with my other obliga-tions, be complied with.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. II. HOLMES, Brig-Genl. Comdg. Dept. Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Mauassas.

A true copy. S. "VV. FERGUSON, Aide-de-Camp.

CAMP JACKSON, June 22d, 1861. General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

Sir, —I received, and read, your communication to me with a great deal of pleasure. I presented it to General Holmes, as you requested, and forwarded ifc to the "War Department. General Holmes, in his endorsement on the back of tho communication, evidently admits the force of your suggestions, hut objects to having any portion of his command taken from him. I desire to take tho " Walter Legion " to the column which is to advance on Alexandria, if such ad vance is made ; anyhow, I desire to co-operate with the main body of the armj r . We are getting very well drilled, and could be of efficient service, if in tlte right place. It is no disposition in me to get my regiment from under General Holmes which prompts these suggestions, for we are well pleased with him, but aro satisfied there is no necessity for us here. There could be twenty-five hun dred efficient men and two batteries of artillery (four rifled cannon) transferred to Manassas, or within supporting distance, and have sufficient forces here to guard this place. It is certainly manifest injury to the service, that so efficient a force should be kept inactive at this place. I think, by the proper represen tation to the War Department, this force can be united with yours. Suppose you make application immediately. I will co-operate with you in the matter.

I send this by Mr. Mhoon, of Mississippi, my relative, and my brother, Lieu tenant Bate. I will be obliged if you will extend to them the privilege of pass ing through your camps during their stay, which will be but a day or two.

Yours, W. B. BATE, Col. Comdg.


My dear General, —Your two letters of the 23d instant have just been delivered to me. I regret much the change you have been compelled to make in your

arrangements, but I can well appreciate them, although I do not believe in tho hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede in Washington—thinking we are going to unite our forces for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Poto mac at or about Edwards's Ferry to attack it in rear, while I attack it in front —hence, probably, the proposed movement of Patterson to keep you at bay. . . . Not being able to obtain a full supply of cartridges for my increased forces, I am going to establish a manufactory of them here. Whenever you can spare a few guns for Leesburg, pray send them. Yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD. To Geul. J. E. JOHNSTON, Winchester, Va.


General Sam. Jones's statement concerning strategic portion of General Beauregarffs report of (he battle of Manassa*.

CAMP AT C'ENTKEVILLE, Xov. 9//<, 18C1.

General,—! have examined the extract which you handed to me, from your report giving tho strategy of the battle of Manassas, and find it, so far as my memory serves me, substantially the same as that dictated by you to me on the night of the lltth July last as a memorandum for the use of Colonel James Chest nut, who was the next morning to repair to Richmond to urge upon the govern ment tho importance of adopting its recommendations; not much importance being attached to the joint action of General Holmes, who was supposed to have but few troops to dispose of, he, I think, was not mentioned in the memoran dum, but only referred to incidentally in your verbal instructions to Colonel Chestnut.

I have a very clear recollection of your instructions to Colonel Chestnut, as I wrote the memorandum myself under your dictation, and after a long and freo conversation with you on the general plan of campaign, and especially of the then impending battle. Very faithfully yours,

SAM. JONES, Brig.-Genl. Genl. 0. T. BF.AURKC.AHD, C. S. A.

CENTKEVILLE, VA., Xov. 9/ft, 18C1.

Tho above statement of General Sam. Jones agrees perfectly well with my recollections of the matter referred to. G. T. BEAUHEGAKD, Genl. C. S. A.

1. Telegram from Colonel John S. Preston to General ficaurcgarci, about concentra tion of Generals Johnston a)id Holmcx's forces u'ilh army at Manassas.


Matter under deliberation. Have had two interviews. Await an answer. Troops will be sent and some equipment for militia.


2. Telegram from Colonel James Chestnut to General Beauregard, as to concentration of Generals Johnston and Iloltncs's forces with our army at Manassas.


Matter seriously debuted. Will await tliis morning for conclusion.



MANASSAS, July 17th, 1861. To Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON, Winchester, Ya.:

War Department lias ordered you to join me ; do so immediately, if possible, and we will crush the enemy. G. T. BEAUREGARD.


WINCHESTER. Va., July 17th, 1861. Genl. BEAUREGARD, Manassas:

Is the enemy upon you in force ? JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.


RICHMOND, July 18th, 1861. Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Manassas, Va.:

McRae's regiment, N. C., goes to you this evening. Barksdale's Mississippi regiment goes to you from Lynchburg. Further reinforcements have promise of transportation in the morning. Hampton's Legion arid others will go as soon as possible. God be praised for your successful beginning. I have tried to join you, but remain to serve you here as most useful to the times.



RICHMOND, July 19th, 1861. Genl. BEAUREGARD, Manassas, Va.:

We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved, you had better withdraw the call upon him so that he may be left to his full discretion. All the troops arriving at Lynchburg are ordered to join you. From this place we will send as fast as transportation permits. The enemy is advised at Washington of the projected movement of Generals Johnston and Holmes, and may vary his plans in conformity thereto.

S. COOPER, Adj.-Genl.


MANASSAS JUNCTION, July 17th, 1861. General Orders, No. 41.

I. The general commanding the army of the Potomac announces to his com mand that, at length, the enemy have advanced to subjugate a sovereign State, and to impose upon a free people an odious government.

Notwithstanding their numerical superiority, they can be repelled; and the general commanding relies confidently on his command to do it, and to drive the invader back beyond his intrenched lines. But, to do this, the highest order of coolness, individual intelligence, and obedience on the part of each officer and man are essential. Great reliance -will be placed on the bayonet at the proper juncture ; but, above all, it is enjoined on officers and men to with hold their fire until directed.

The superior intelligence of the individual members of this command should, in this respect, compensate for the want of a veteran, long-trained soldiery.

In firing each man should take aim and never discharge his piece without a distinct object in full view.

II. The following are announced as the general and personal staff of the gen eral commanding; and any written or verbal orders conveyed through them, or either of them, will be obeyed :

Col. THOMAS JORDAN, Provisional Army of the Confederate States, A. A. Adj.-Genl.

Capt. CLIFTON II. SMITH, Provisional Army of Virginia, A. Adj.-Geul.

Capt. S. W. Fr.K(;rsox, C. S. A., Aide-de-Camp.

Lieut.-Col. THOMAS II. WILLIAMSON, Virginia Army, Chief-Engineer.

Capt. E. P. ALEXANDER, Engineer Corps C. S. A.

Col. R. B. LEE, C. S. A., Chief Commissary of Subsistence.

Maj. WILLIAM L. CARELL, C. S. A., Chief Quartermaster.

Surgeon T. II. WILLIAMS, Medical Director.

Col. SAMUEL JONES, C. S. A., Chief of Artillery and Ordnance.

Vuhtntccj' Aid*.

Colonel JAMES CHESTNUT, Jr., South.Carolina. " J. L. MANNING, " W. PORCHEU MILES, " JOHN S. PRESTON, " A. R. CHISOLM, " JOSEPH HEYWARD, By command of Brig.-Genl. BEAUREGARD.



MANASSAS, Aug. 25M, 1861.

(I. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg., to Genl. S. COOPER, Adj. and Insp. Geul., Rich mond, Va.:

General, —With the general results of the engagement between several bri gades of my command, and a considerable force of the enemy, in the vicinity of Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords of Bull Run, on the 18th ultimo, you were made duly acquainted at the time by telegraph ; but it is my place now to submit, in detail, the operations of that day.

Opportunely informed of the determination of the enemy to advance on Ma-

nassas, my advanced brigades, on the night of the IGth of July, were made aware, from these headquarters, of the impending movement; and in exact accordance with my instructions, a copy of which is appended, marked "A," their with drawal within the lines of Bull Run was effected with complete success during the day and night of the 17th ultimo, in face of, and in immediate proximity to, a largely superior force, despite a well-planned, well-executed effort to cut off the retreat of Bouham's brigade, first at Germantown, and subsequently at Cen-treville, whence he withdrew by my direction, after midnight, without collision, although enveloped on three sides by their lines. This movement had the in tended effect of deceiving the enemy as to my ulterior designs, and led him to anticipate an unresisted passage of Bull Run.

As prescribed in the first and second sections of the paper herewith, marked "A," 011 the morning of the 18th of July, my troops, resting on Bull Run from Union Mills Ford to the stone bridge, a distance of about eight (8) miles, were posted as follows:

E\vell's brigade occupied a position in vicinity of Union Mills Ford. It con sisted of Rodes's 5th and Seibel's 6th regiments of Alabama, and Seymour's 6th regiment Louisiana Volunteers, with four 12-pounder howitzers, of Wal ton's battery; and Harrison's, Cabell's, and Green's companies of Virginia cav-airy.

D. R. Jones's brigade was in position in rear of McLean's Ford, and consisted of Jenkins's 5th South Carolina and Burt's 17th and Featherstone's 18th regi ments of Mississippi Volunteers, with two brass 6-pounder guns of Walton's battery, and one company of cavalry.

Longstreet's brigade covered Blackburn's Ford, and consisted of Moore's 1st. Garland's llth, and Corse's 17th regiments Virginia Volunteers, with two 6-ponnder brass guns of Walton's battery.

Bouham's brigade held the approaches to Mitchell's Ford. It was composed of Kershaw's 2d, Williams's 3d, Bacon's 7th, and Cash's 8th regiments South Caro lina Volunteers; of Shields's and Del. Kemper's batteries, and of Flood's, Rad-ford's, Payne's, Ball's, Wickham's, and Powell's companies of Virginia Cavalry, under Colonel Radford.

Cocke's brigade held the fords below and in vicinity of the stone bridge, and consisted of Withers's 18th, Lieutenant-Colonel Strange's 19th, and R. T. Preston's 28th regiments, with Latham's battery, and one company of cavalry, Virginia Volunteers.

Evans held my left flank and protected the stone bridge crossing, with Sloan's 4th regiment South Carolina Volunteers, Wheat's special battalion Louisiana Volunteers, four 6-pounder guns, and two companies of Virginia cavalry.

Early's brigade, consisting of Kemper's 7th, six companies of Early's 24th reg iments of Virginia Volunteers, Hays's 7th regiment Louisiana Volunteers, and three rifled pieces of Walton's battery, Lieutenant Squires, at first were held in position in the rear of, and as a support to, Ewcll's brigade, until after the de velopment of the enemy, in heavy offensive force, in front of Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords, when it was placed in rear of, and nearly equidistant be tween, McLean's, Blackburn's, and Mitchell's fords.


Pending the development of the enemy's purpose, about ten (10) o'clock A.M. I established my headquarters at a central point, McLean's farm-house, near to McLean's and Blackburn's fords, where two G-ponnders of Walton's battery were in reserve; but subsequently, during the engagement, I took post to the left of my reserve.

Of the topographical features of the coilntry thus occupied it must suffice to say, that Bull Rnn is a small stream running in this locality, nearly from west to east, to its confluence with the Occoqnan River, about twelve miles from the Potomac, and draining a considerable scope of country, from its source in Bull Run Mountain, to a short distance of the Potomac, at Occoquan. At this sea son habitually low and sluggish, it is, however, rapidly and frequently swollen by the summer rains until unfordable. The banks, for the most part, are rocky and steep, but abound in long-used fords. The country on either side, much broken and thickly wooded, becomes gently rolling and open as it recedes from the stream. On the northern side the ground is much the highest, and com mands the other bank completely. Roads traverse and intersect the sur rounding country in almost every direction. Finally, at Mitchell's Ford, the stream is about equidistant from Centreville and Manassas, some six miles apart.

On the morning of the I'-'th, finding that the enemy was assuming a threat ening attitude, in addition to the regiments whose positions have been already stated, I ordered up from Camp Pit-kens, as a reserve, in rear of Bonham's bri gade, the effective men of six companies of Kelly's 8th regiment Louisiana Vol unteers, and Kirkland's llth regiment North Carolina Volunteers, which, hav ing arrived the night before en route for Winchester, I had halted, in view of the existing necessities of the service. Subsequently the latter was placed in position to the left of Bonham's brigade.

Appearing in heavy force in front of Bonham's position, the enemy, about meridian, opened fire with several 20-pounder rilled guns from a hill, over one and a half miles from Bull Run. At the same time Kemper, supported by two companies of light infantry, occupied a ridge on the left of the Centreville road, about six hundred yards in advance of the ford, with two G-pounder (smooth) guns. At first the firing of the enemy was at random; but by half-past 12 P. M. he had obtained the range of our position, and poured into the brigade a shower of shot, but without injury to us in men, horses, or gnus. From the distance, however, our guns could not reply with effect, and we did not attempt it, patiently awaiting an opportune movement.

Meanwhile, a light battery was pushed forward by the enemy, whereupon Kemper threw only six solid shot, with the effect of driving back both the bat tery and its supporting force. This is understood to have been Ayres's battery, and the damage must have been considerable, to have obliged such a retrograde movement on the part of that officer.

The purposes of Kemper's position having now been fully served, his pieces and support were withdrawn across Mitchell's Ford, to a point previously des ignated, and which commanded the direct approaches to the ford.

About half-past 11 o'clock A. M. the enemy was also discovered by the pick-

ets of Longstreet's brigade, advancing in strong columns of infantry, with ar tillery and cavalry, on Blackburn's Ford.

At meridian these pickets fell back silently before the advancing foe, across the ford, which, as well as the entire southern bank of the stream for the whole front of Longstreet's brigade, was covered at the water's edge by an extended lino of skirmishers, while two 6-pounders of Walton's battery, under Lieuten ant Garnett, were advantageously placed to command the direct approach to the ford, but with orders to retire to the rear as soon as commanded by the enemy.

The northern bank of the stream, in front of Longstreet's position, rises, with a steep slope, at least fifty feet above the level of the water, leaving a narrow berme in front of the ford, of some twenty yards. This ridge formed for them an admirable natural parapet, behind which they could and did approach, un der shelter, in heavy force, within less than one hundred yards of our skirmish ers. The southern shore was almost a plain, raised but a few feet above the water, for several hundred yards ; then rising with a very gradual, gentle slope, and undulating back to Manassas. On the immediate bank there was a fringe of trees, but with little, if any, undergrowth or shelter; while on the other shore there was timber and much thick brush and covering. The ground in rear of our skirmishers, and occupied by our artillery, was an old field, extending along the stream about one mile, and immediately back for about half a mile, to a bor der or skirting of dense, second-growth pines. The whole of this ground was commanded at all points by the ridge occupied by the enemy's musketry, as was also the country to the rear, for a distance much beyond the range of 20-pouud-er rifled guns, by the range of hills on which their batteries were planted; and which, it may be further noted, commanded also all our approaches from this direction to the three threatened fords.

Before advancing his infantry, the enemy maintained a fire of rifle artillery from the batteries just mentioned, for half an hour; then he pushed forward a column of over three thousand infantry to the assault, with such weight of num bers as to be repelled with difficulty by the comparatively small force of not more than twelve hundred bayonets, with which Brigadier-General Longstreet met him with characteristic vigor and intrepidity. Our troops engaged at this time were the 1st and 17th and four companies of the llth regiments Virginia Volunteers. Their resistance was resolute, and maintained with a steadiness worthy of all praise; it was successful, and the enemy was repulsed. In a short time, however, he returned to the contest with increased force and determina tion, but was again foiled and driven back by our skirmishers and Longstrcet's reserve companies, which were brought up and employed at the most vigorous ly assailed points at the critical moment.

It was now that Brigadier-General Longstreet sent for reinforcements from Early's brigade, which I had anticipated, by directing the advance of General Early, with two regiments of infantry and two pieces of artillery. As these came upon the field the enemy had advanced a third time, Avith heavy num bers, to force Longstrcet's position. Hays's regiment, 7th Louisiana Volunteers, which was in advance, was placed on the bank of the stream, under some cover, to the immediate right and left of the ford, relieving Corse's regiment, 17th

Virginia Volunteers ; this was done under a heavy fire of musketry, with prom ising steadiness. The 7th Virginia, under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, was then formed to tho right, also under heavy fire, and pushed forward to the stream, relieving the 1st regiment Virginia Volunteers. At the same time two rilled guns, brought up with Early's brigade, were moved down in the field to the right of tho road, so as to be concealed from the enemy's artillery by tho girth of timber on the immediate bank of the stream, and then opened fire, directed only by the sound of the enemy's musketry. Unable to effect a pass age, the enemy kept up a scattering fire for some time. Some of our troops had pushed across tho stream, and several small parties of Corse's regiment, under command of Captain Marye, met and drove the enemy with the bayonet, but as the roadway from the ford was too narrow for a combined movement in force, General Longstreet recalled them to the south bank. Meanwhile, tho remainder of Early's infantry and artillery had been called up; that is, six companies of the 24th regiment Virginia Volunteers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hairston, and five pieces of artillery, one rilled gun, and four 6-pounder brass guns, under Lieutenant Garnett, which had been previously sent to the rear of General Longstreet. This infantry was at once placed in position to the left of the ford, in a space unoccupied by Hays, and the artillery was unlimbered in battery to the right of the road, in a lino with the two rifled guns already in action. A scattering lire of musketry was still kept up by tho enemy for a short time, but that was soon silenced.

It was at this stage of the affair that a remarkable artillery duel was com menced and maintained on our side, with a long-trained, professional opponent, superior in the character as well as in the number of his weapons, provided with improved munitions and every artillery appliance, and at the same time occupying the commanding position. Tho results were marvellous, and fitting precursors to the artillery achievements of the 21st of July.

In the outset our fire was directed against tho enemy's infantry, whose bay onets, gleaming above tho tree-tops, alono indicated their presence and force. This drew the attention of a battery placed on a high, commanding ridge, and tho duel b;-gan in earnest. For a time tho aim of tho adversary was inaccu rate; but this was quickly corrected, and shot fell and shells burst thick and fast in tho very midst of our battery, wounding, in tho course of the combat, Captain Eschelman, five privates, and tho horse of Lieutenant Kichardson. From the position of our pieces and the nature of the ground, their aim could only bo directed at tho smoke of the enemy's artillery; how skilfully and with what execution this was done can only be fully realized by an eye-witness. For a few moments their guns were silenced, but were soon reopened. By direction of General Longstreet, his battery was then advanced by hand out of the range, now ascertained by the enemy, and a shower of shell, case, and round shot flew over the heads of our gunners, but one of our pieces had become hors de combat from an enlarged vent. From tho now position, our guns, fired as before, with no other aim than the smoke and flash of their adversaries' pieces, renewed and urged tho conflict with such signal vigor and effect, that gradually the firo of the enemy slackened, the intervals between their discharges grew longer and

longer, finally to cease; and we fired a last gun at a flying, baffled foe, whose heavy masses, in the distance, were plainly seen to break and scatter in wild confusion and utter rout, strewing the ground with cast-away guns, hats, blankets, and knapsacks, as our parting shell was thrown among them. In their retreat one of their pieces was abandoned, but, from the nature of the ground, it was not sent for that night, and, under cover of darkness, the enemy recovered it.

The guns engaged in this singular conflict on our side were three G-pouuder rifled pieces, and four ordinary C-pounders, all of Walton's battery, the Wash ington Artillery of New Orleans; the officers immediately attached were Cap tain Eschelman, Lieutenants C. W. Squires, Richardson, Garnett, and Whitting-tou. At the same time our infantry held the bank of the stream, in advance of our guns, and the missiles of the combatants flew to and fro above them, as, cool and veteran-like, for more than an hour they steadily awaited the moment and signal for the advance.

While the conflict was at its height, before Blackburn's Ford, about four o'clock P.M., the enemy again displayed himself in force before Bonham's posi tion. At this Colonel Kershaw, with four companies of his regiment, 2d South Carolina, and one piece of Kemper's battery, were thrown across Mitchell's Ford to the ridge which Kemper Lad occupied that morning. Two solid shot and three spherical case thrown among them, with a precision inaugurated by that artillerist at Vienna, effected their discomfiture and disappearance, and our troops in that quarter were again withdrawn within our lines, having dis charged the duty assigned.

At the close of the engagement before Blackburn's Ford I directed General Longstreet to withdraw the 1st and 17th regiments, which had borne the brunt; of the action, to a position in reserve, leaving Colonel Early to occupy the field with his brigade and Garland's regiment.

As part of the history of this engagement, I desire to place on record that, on the 18th of July, not one yard of intreuchments nor one rifle-pit sheltered the men at Blackburn's Ford, who, officers and men, with rare exceptions, wero on that day for the first time under fire, and w r ho, taking and maintaining every position ordered, cannot be too much commended for their soldierly be havior.

Our artillery was manned and officered by those who but yesterday wero called from the civil avocations of a busy city. They were matched with the picked light artillery of the Federal Regular army—Company E, 3d Artillery, under Captain Ayres—with an armament, as their own Chief of Artillery admits, of two 10-pounder Parrott rifled guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and two 6-ponnder pieces, aided by two 20-pounder Parrott rifled guns, of Company G, 5th Artillery, under Lieutenant Benjamin ; thus matched, they drove their vet eran adversaries from the field, giving confidence in and promise of the coming efficiency of that brilliant arm of our service.

Having thus related the main or general results and events of the action of Bull Run, in conclusion, it is proper to signalize some of those who contributed the most to the satisfactory results of that day.

Thanks arc due to Brigadier-Generals Bonliam and Ewell, and to Colonel Cocke, and the officers under them, for the ability shown in conducting and ex ecuting the retrograde movements on Bull Run, directed in my orders of the 8th July—movements on which hung the fortunes of this army.

Brigadier-General Longstreet, who commanded immediately the troops en gaged at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th, equalled my confident expectations, and I may fitly say that, by his presence at the right place, at the right moment, among his men, by the exhibition of characteristic coolness, and by his words of encouragement to the men of his command, he infused a confidence and a spirit that contributed largely to the success of our arms on that day.

Colonel Early brought his brigade into position, and subsequently into action, with judgment, and at the proper moment he displayed capacity for command and personal gallantry.

Colonel Moore, commanding the 1st Virginia Volunteers, was severely wounded at the head of his regiment, the command of which, subsequently, devolved upon Major Skinner—Lieutenant-Colonel Fry having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of a sunstroke.

An accomplished, promising officer, Major Carter II. Harrison, llth regiment Virginia Volunteers, was lost to the service ; while leading two companies of his regiment against the enemy, he fell, twice shot, mortally wounded.

Brigadier-General Longstreet, while finding on all sides alacrity, order, and intelligence, mentions his special obligations to Colonels Moore, Garland, and Corse, commanding severally regiments of his brigade, and to their field officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Fry, Funsten, and Mini ford; and Majors Brent and Skin ner, of whom he says, " they displayed more coolness and energy than is usual among veterans of the old service." General Longstreet also mentions the con duct of Captain Marye of the 17th regiment Virginia Volunteers, as especially gallant on one occasion in advance of the ford.

The regiments of Early's brigade were commanded by Colonel Harry Hays and Lieutenant-Colonels Williams and Hairston, who handled their commands in action with satisfactory coolness and skill, supported by their field-officers, Lieutenant-Colonel de Choiseul and Major Penn of the 7th Louisiana, and Major Pattou of the 7th Virginia Volunteers.

The skill, the conduct, and the soldierly qualities of the Washington Artillery engaged were all that could be desired. The officers and men attached to the seven pieces already specified won for their battalion a distinction which, I feel assured, will never bo tarnished, and which will ever serve to urge them and their corps to high endeavor. Lieutenant Squires worthily commanded tho pieces in action. The commander of the battalion was necessarily absent from tho immediate field, under orders ill the sphere of his duties, but tho fruits of his discipline, zeal, and instruction, and capacity as an artillery commander, were present, and must redound to his reputation.

On tho left, at Mitchell's Ford, while no serious engagement occurred, tho conduct of all was eminently satisfactory to the general officer in command.

It is due, however, to Colonel J. L. Kemper, Virginia forces, to express my sense of the value of his services in the preparation for, and execution of, tho

retreat from Fairfax Court-House, on Bull Run. Called from the Lead of his regiment, by what appeared to me an imperative need of the service, to take charge of the superior duties of the Quartermaster's Department, with the ad vance at that critical juncture, lie accepted the responsibilities involved, and was eminently efficient. For further information touching officers and individ uals of the 1st Brigade, and the details of the retrograde movement, I have to refer particularly to the report of Brigadier-General Bonham herewith.

It is proper here to state, that while, from the outset, it had been determined, on the approach of the enemy in force, to fall back and fight him on the line of Bull Run, yet the position occupied by General Ewell's brigade, if necessary, could have been maintained against a largely superior force. This was espe cially the case with the position of the 5th Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Eodes, which that excellent officer had made capable of a resolute, protracted defence against heavy odds. Accordingly, on the morning of the 17th ultimo, when the enemy appeared before that position, they were checked and held at bay, with some confessed loss, in a skirmish in advance of the works, in which Major Morgan and Captain Shelly, 5th regiment Alabama Volunteers, acted with intel ligent gallantry, and the post was only abandoned under general, but specific, imperative orders, in conformity with a long-conceived, established plan of ac tion and battle.

Captain E. P. Alexander, Confederate States Engineers, fortunately joined my headquarters in time to introduce the system of new field-signals, which, under his skilful management, rendered me the most important service preceding and during the engagement.

The medical officers serving with the regiments engaged were at their proper posts, and discharged their duties with satisfactory skill and zeal; and, on one occasion, at least, under an annoying fire—when Surgeon Cnlleu, 1st Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Avas obliged to remove our wounded from the hospital, which had become the special target of the enemy's rifled guns, notwithstanding it was surmounted by the usual yellow hospital flag j but which, however, I hope, for the sake of past associations, was ignorantly mistaken for a Confeder ate flag. The name of each individual medical officer I cannot mention.

On the day of the engagement I was attended by my personal staff, Lieuten ant S. W. Ferguson, A. D. C., and my volunteer aides-de-camp, Colonels Preston, Manning, Chestnut, Miles, Chisolm, and Hey ward, of South Carolina, to all of whom I am greatly indebted for manifold essential services in the transmission of orders on the field, and in the preliminary arrangements for the occupation and maintenance of the line of Bull Run.

Colonel Thomas Jordan, Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain C. H. Smith, Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel S. Jones, Chief of Artillery and Ordnance, Major Cabell, Chief Quartermaster, Captain \V. H. Fowle, Chief of Subsistence Department, Surgeon Thomas II. Williams, Medical Director, and Assistant-Surgeon Brodie, Medical Purveyor, of the general staff attached to the Army of the Potomac, were necessarily engaged severally with their responsible duties, at my headquarters at Camp Pickens, which they discharged with an energy and intelligence for which I have to tender my sincere thanks.

Messrs. McLean, Wilcoxen, Kinchcloe, and Brainier, citizens of this immediate vicinity, it is their due to say, have placed me and the country under great obli gations for the information relative to this region, which has enabled me to avail myself of its defensive features and resources. They were found ever ready to give me their time, without stint or reward.

Our casualties, in all sixty-eight killed and wounded, were — - killed, and — — wounded, several of whom have since died. The loss of the enemy can only be conjectured; it was unquestionably heavy. In the cursory exam ination, which was made by details from Long.street's and Early's brigades oil the 18th of July, of that part of the iield immediately contested, and near Blackburn's Ford, some sixty-four corpses were found and buried, some few wounded, and at least twenty prisoners were also picked up, besides one hundred and seventy-live stands of arms, a large quantity of accoutrements and blankets, and quite one hundred and fifty hats.

The effect of this day's conflict was to satisfy the enemy he could not force a passage across Bull Run iu face of our troops, and led him into the Hank move ment of the 21st July, and the battle of Manassas, the details of which will be related in another paper.

Herewith I have the honor to transmit the reports of the several brigade com manders engaged, and of the artillery ; also a map of the field of battle.

The rendition of this report, it is proper to say, in conclusion, has been un avoidably delayed by the constantly engrossing administrative duties of the commander of an army corps composed wholly of volunteers—duties virtually essential to its well-being and future elhciency, and which I could not set aside or postpone on any account.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAURKGARD, Genl. Comelg.


CAMP PICKF.NS, July 2lst, 1661.

General, —General Jones's Adjutant comes in to report that the Federal troops are between us and General Jones, and approaching.

Tnos. G. RIIKTT, A. Adj.-Genl. (Received at about f>^ o'clock P. M.)


Sent atoih. A. M.

General, —You will hold yourself in readiness to take the offensive on Centrc-villo at a moment's notice, to make a diversion against the enemy's intended attack on Mitchell's Ford and, probably, Stone Bridge. You will protect well your right tlank against any attack from the eastward. General Holmes's brigade will support your movement. If the enemy be prepared to attack in front of your left, leave it (said brigade)

in proper position, with orders to take the offensive when it hears your engage ment on the other side of the Run. I intend to take the offensive throughout my front as soon as possible.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brig.-Genl. Comdg. Genl. R. S. EWELL, Union Mills, Ya.

Report of the Battle of Manassas.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. 1st Corps Army of the Potomac, to Geul. S. COOPER, Adj. and Insp. Genl., Richmond, Ya.:

General, —Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy, on the 21st of July, I propose—I hope not unsea sonably—first, to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the cam paign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle.

Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy, with a decidedly su perior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or turn my posi tion in this quarter, was immediately impending, I despatched, on 13th July, one of my staff, Colonel James Chestnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the consideration of the President a plan of operations, substantially as follows:

I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as possible, the bulk of the "Army of the Shenandoah" with that of the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient forces to garrison his strong works at Winches ter, and to guard the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold Patterson in check.

At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither, with all of his command not essential for the defense of the position of Aquia Creek. These junctions having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as soon as he approached my advanced positions at and around Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat, and the de struction or capture of his army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenan-doah, under General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces, and rejoined, as he returned, by the detachment left to hold the mountain passes, was to march back rapidly into the valley, fall upon and crush Patterson, with a supe rior force, wheresoever he might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from Win chester for Manassas. Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to enable mo to enter them with him ; or, if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force. Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston would reinforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him su perior to his opponent, General McClellan, and able to defeat that officer.

This done, General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people, as he advanced, to the recovery of their political rights

and the defence of their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then march to the investment of Washington in the rear, while I resumed the offen sive in front.

This plan of operations, yon are aware, was not accepted at the time, from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its proposed advantages.

Informed of these views, and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defence of the line of Bull Kun, the enemy having now developed his purposes by the advance on, and oc cupation of, Fairfax Court-House, from which my advanced brigade had been withdrawn.*

The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph, on the 17th July, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston was immedi ately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should the move ment, in his judgment, be deemed advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry.

In view of these propitious approaching reinforcements, modifying my plan of operations so far as to determine on attacking the enemy at Centreville, as soon as I should hear of the near approach of the two reinforcing columns, I sent one of my aids, Colonel Chisolm, of South Carolina, to meet and communi cate my plans to General Johnston, and my wish that one portion of his forces should march by the way of Aldie and take the enemy on his right flank, and in reverse at Centreville. Dilliculties, however, of an insuperable character, in connection with means of transportation and the- marching condition of his troops, made this impracticable; and it was determined our forces should be united within the lines of Bull Run, and thence advance to the attack of the enemy.

General Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confed erate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operation and disposition to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire ap proval, and generously directed their execution under my command, t

In consequence- of the untoward detention, however, of some five thousand of General Johnston's army corps, resulting from the inadequate- and imperfect means of transportation for so many troops, at the disposition of the Manassas Gap Railroad, it became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before daylight, to modify the plan accepted, to suit the contingency of an immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, then plainly at hand.

The enemy's forces, reported by their best-informed journals to be fifty-five thousand strong, I had learned from reliable sources, on the night of the 20th, were being concentrated in and around Centreville, and along the Warrcnton turnpike road to Bull Run, near which our respective pickets were in immedi ate proximity. Tins fact, with the conviction that, after his signal discomfiture

* See papers herewith marked " A" and " B." t See papers herewith marked " C " and " D."


on the 18th of July before Blackburn's Ford, the centre of my lines, he would not renew the attack in that quarter, induced ine at once to look for an attempt on my left flank resting on the stone bridge, which was but weakly guarded by men, as well as but slightly provided with artificial defensive appliances and artillery.

In view of these palpably military conditions, by half-past four A. M. on the 21st of July I had prepared and despatched orders directing the whole of the Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, including the brigades and reg iments of General Johnston which had arrived at that time, to bo held in readi ness to march at a moment's notice.

At that time the following was the disposition of our forces:

Ewell's brigade, constituted as on the 18th of July, remained in position at Union Mills Ford, its left extending along Bull Run, in the direction of McLean's Ford, and supported by Holmes's brigade, 2d Tennessee, and 1st Arkansas regi ments, a short distance to the rear—that is, at and near Camp Wigfall.

D. R. Jones's brigade, from Ewell's left in front of McLean's Ford, and along the stream to Longstreet's position. It was unchanged in organization, and was supported by Early's brigade, also unchanged, placed behind a thicket of young pines, a short distance in rear of McLean's Ford.

Longstreet's brigade held its former ground at Blackburn's Ford, from Jones's left to Bonham's right at Mitchell's ford, and was supported by Jackson's bri gade, consisting of Colonel James F. Preston's 4th, Harper's 5th, Allen's 2d, the 27th, Lieutenant-Colonel Echolls, and the 33d, Cummings's Virginia regiments, twenty-six hundred and eleven strong, which were posted behind the skirting of pines, to the rear of Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords j and in rear of this sup port was also Barksdale's 13th regiment Mississippi Volunteers, which had lately arrived from Lynchburg.

Along the edge of a pine thicket in rear of and equidistant from McLean's and Blackburn's fords, ready to support either position, I had also placed all of Bee's and Bartow's brigades that had arrived, namely: two companies of the llth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, the 2d Mississippi, Colonel Falkuer, and the 4th Alabama, with 7th and 8th Georgia regiments, Colonel Gartrell and Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, in all twenty-seven hundred and thirty-two bayonets.

Bonham's brigade, as before, held Mitchell's Ford, its right near Longstreet's left, its left extending in the direction of Cocke's right. It was organized, as at the end of the 18th of July, with Jackson's brigade, as before said, as a support.

Cocke's brigade, increased by seven companies of the 8th, Hunton's, three companies of the 49th, Smith's, Virginia regiments, two companies of cavalry, and a battery, under Rogers, of four C-pounders, occupied the line in front and rear of Bull Run, extending from the direction of Bonham's left, and guarding Island, Ball's, and Lewis's fords, to the right of Evans's demi-brigade, near the stone bridge, also under General Cocke's command.

The latter held the stone bridge, and its left covered a farm-ford about one mile above the bridge.


Stuart's cavalry, some three hundred men of the Army of the Shenaudoah, guarded the level ground, extending in rear from Bouham's left to Cocke's right.

Two companies of Radford's cavalry were held in reserve a short distance in rear of Mitchell's Ford, his left extending in the direction of Stuart's right.

Colonel Peudletou's reserve battery of eight pieces was temporarily placed in rear of Bonhani's extreme left.

Major Walton's reserve Lattery of five guns was in position on McLean's farm, in a piece of woods in rear of Bee's right.

Hampton's Legion, of six companies of infantry, six hundred strong, having arrived that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it arrived, ordered forward to a position in immediate vicinity of the Lewis House, as a support for any troops engaged in that quarter.

The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison of Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833 and twenty-nine guns.

The Army of the Shenandoah, ready for action on the field, may be set at COOO men and twenty guns.*

The brigade of General Holmes mustered about twelve hundred and sixty-five bayonets, six guns, and a company of cavalry about ninety strong.

Informed, at 5.30 A.M., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy had deployed some twelve hundred men t with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front, I at once ordered him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain their posi tion to the last extremity.

In my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack, with my right wing and centre, on tho enemy's flank and rear at Centreville, with due precautions against the advance of his reserves from the direction of Washington. By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 meridian.

These new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully ap proved them, and the orders for their immediate execution were at once issued.

Brigadier-General Ewell was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, respectively supported by their several appointed reserves.

The cavalry, under Stuart and Radford, were to be held in hand, subject to future orders, and ready for employment, as might be required by the exigencies of the bat tie.

* That is, when the battle began; Smith's brigade and Fisher's North Carolina came up later and made total of Army of Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, eight thousand three hundred and thirty-four. Hill's Virginia regiment, five hundred and fifty, also arrived, but was posted as reserve to ri«;ht flank.

t These were what Colonel Evans saw of General Schcnck's brigade of General Tyler's division, and two other heavy brigades, in all, over nine thousand men, and thirteen pieces of artillery, Carlisle's and Ayrcs's batteries. That is, nine hundred men and two G-pounders, confronted by nine thousand men and thirteen pieces of artillery, mostly rifled.

About 8.30 A. M. General Johnston and myself transferred our headquarters to a central position, about half a mile in rear of Mitchell's Ford, whence we might watch the course of events.

Previously, as early as 5.30, the Federalists in front of Evans's position, Stone Bridge, had opened with a large 30-pounder Parrott rilled gun, and, thirty min utes later, with a moderate, apparently tentative, fire from a battery of rifled pieces, directed, first in front, at Evans, and then in the direction of Cocke's position, but without drawing a return fire and discovery of our positions; chiefly because, in that quarter, we had nothing but eight 6-pouuder pieces, which could not reach the distant enemy.

As the Federalists had advanced with an extended line of skirmishers in front of Evans, that officer promptly threw forward the two flank companies of the 4th South Carolina regiment, and one company of Wheat's Louisiana battalion, deployed as skirmishers to cover his small front. An occasional scattering fire resulted, and thus stood the two armies in that quarter for more than an hour, while the main body of the enemy was marching his devious way through the "Big Forest" to take our forces in flank and rear.

By 8.30 A. M., Colonel Evans having become satisfied of the counterfeit char acter of the movement on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to turn his left flank, decided to change his position to meet the enemy, and, for this pur pose, immediately put in motion to his left and rear six companies of Sloan's 4th South Carolina regiment, Wheat's Louisiana battalion (live companies), and two 6-pounders of Latham's battery, leaving four companies of Sloan's regiment under cover, as the sole, immediate defence of the stone bridge, but giving in formation to General Cocke of his change of position and the reasons that im pelled it.

Following a road leading to the old Pittsylvauia (Carter) Mansion, Colonel Evans formed in line of battle, some four hundred yards in rear, as he advanced, of that house, his guns to the front and in position, properly supported to its immediate right. Finding, however, that the enemy did not appear on that road, which was a branch of one leading by Sudley's Springs Ford to Brents-yille and Dumfries, ho turned abruptly to the left, and, marching across the fields for three quarters of a mile, about 9.30 A. M. took position in line of battle, his left, Sloan's companies, resting on the main Brcntsville road, in a shallow ravine, the Louisiana battalion to the right, in advance two hundred yards, a rectangular copse of wood separating them — one piece of his artillery planted on an eminence some seven hundred yards to the rear of Wheat's battalion, and the other on a ridge near, and in rear of Sloan's position, commanding a reach of the road just in front of the line of battle. In this order he awaited the coming of the masses of the enemy, now drawing near.

In the meantime, about 7 o'clock A. M., Jackson's brigade, with Imboden's and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up a position along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cocke's right and Bouham's left, with orders to support either in case of need, the character and topographical features of the ground having been shown to General Jackson by Captain D. B. Harris of the Engineers of this army corps.

So much of Bee's and Bartow's brigades, now united, as had arrived, sorao twenty-eight hundred muskets, had also "been sent forward to the support of the position of the stone bridge.

The enemy, beginning his detour from the turnpike at a point nearly half-way between Stone Bridge and Centreville. had pursued a tortuous, narrow trace of a rarely used road, through a dense wood, the greater part of his way, until near the Sudley road. A division, under Colonel Hunter, of the Federal Regular army, of two strong brigades, was in the advance, followed immediately by an other division under Colonel Heintzclman, of three brigades and seven companies of Regular cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery, eighteen of which were rifled guns. This column, as it crossed Bull Run, numbered over sixteen thou sand men of all arms, by their own accounts.

Burnside's brigade, which here, as at Fairfax Court-House, led the advance, at about 9.45 A. M. debouched from a wood in sight of Evans's position, some five hundred yards distant from Wheat's battalion.

Ho immediately threw forward his skirmishers in force, and they became en gaged with Wheat's command, and the G-pounder gun under Lieutenant Left-witch.

The Federalists at once advanced, as they report officially, the 2d regiment Rhode Island Volunteers, with its vaunted battery of six 13-pounder rilled guns. Sloan's companies were then brought into action, having been pushed forward through the woods. The enemy, soon galled, staggered by the fire, and pressed by the determined valor with which Wheat handled his battalion, until he was desperately wounded, hastened up three other regiments of the brigade and two Dahlgren howitzers, making in all quite three thousand live hundred bayonets and eight pieces of artillery, opposed to less than eight hundred men and two G-pounder guns.

Despite this odds, this intrepid command of but eleven weak companies main tained its front to the enemy for quite an hour, and until General Bee came to their aid with his command. The heroic Bee, with a soldier's eye and reco<nii-tion of the situation, had previously disposed his command with skill, Imboden's battery having been admirably placed between the two brigades, under shelter behind the undulations of a hill about one hundred and fifty yards north of the now famous Henry house, and very near where ho subsequently fell, mortally wounded, to the great misfortune of his country, but after deeds of deliberate and ever-memorable courage.

Meanwhile, the enemy pushed forward a battalion of eight companies of Re^ 1 -ular infantry, and one of their best batteries of six pieces (four rilled), supported by four companies of marines, to increase the desperate odds against which Evans and his men had maintained their stand with an almost matchless tenacity.

General Bee, now finding Evans sorely pressed under the crushing weight of the masses of the enemy, at the call of Colonel Evans, threw forward his whole force to his aid, across a small stream, Young's Branch, and valley, and engaged the Federalists with impetuosity, Imboden's battery, at the time, playing from his well-chosen position with brilliant eftcct, with spherical c:ise, the enemy having first opened ou him from a rifled battery, probably Griffin's, with clou-

gated cylindrical shells, which flew a few feet above the Leads of our men, aiid exploded m tlic crest of a hill immediately in rear.

As Bee advanced under a severe fire, lie placed the 7tli and 8tli Georgia regi ments, under the chivalrous Bartow, at about 11 A. M., in a wood of second-growth pines, to the right and front of, and nearly perpendicular to, Evans's line of battle, the 4th Alabama to the left of them, along a fence connecting the position of the Georgia regiments with the rectangular copse in which Sloan's South Carolina companies were engaged, and into which he also threw the 2d Mississippi. A fierce and destructive conflict now ensued; the fire was wither ing on both sides, while the enemy swept our short, thin lines with their numer ous artillery, which, according to their official reports, at this time consisted of at least ten rifled guns and four howitzers. For an hour did these stout-hearted men of the blended commands of Bee, Evans, and Bartow breast an uniutermit-ting battle-storm, animated, surely, by something more than the ordinary courage of even the bravest men under fire; it must have been, indeed, the inspiration of the cause and consciousness of the great stake in issue which thus nerved and animated one and all to stand unawed and unshrinking in such extremity.

The Federal brigades of Heintzelrnan's division were now brought into action, led by Pickett's superb light battery of six 10-pounder rifled guns, which, post ed on an eminence to the right of the Sudley road, opened fire on Imboden's battery, about this time increased by two rifled pieces of the Washington Ar tillery, under Lieutenant Richardson, and already the mark of two batteries which divided their fire with Imboden and two guns, under Lieutenants David-sou and Lef twitch, of Latham's battery, posted as before mentioned.

At this time, confronting the enemy, we had still but Evans's eleven compa nies and two guns, Bee's and Bartow's four regiments, the two companies llth Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, and the six pieces under Imboden and Richardson. The enemy had two divisions of four strong brigades, in cluding seventeen companies of Regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery, four companies of marines, and twenty pieces of artillery.* Against this odds, scarce ly credible, our advance position was still for a while maintained, and the ene my's ranks constantly broken and shattered by the scorching fire of our men ; but fresh regiments of Federalists came upon the field. Sherman's and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division, as is stated in their reports, numbered over six thou sand bayonets, which had found a passage across the Run about eight hundred yards above the stone bridge, threatened our right.

Heavy losses had now been sustained on our side, both in numbers and in the personal worth of the slain. The 8th Georgia regiment had suffered heavily, being exposed, as it took and maintained its position, to a fire from the enemy, already posted within a hundred yards of their front and right, sheltered by fences and other cover. It was at this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner was severely wounded, as also several other valuable officers ; the Adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Branch, was killed, and the horse of the regretted Bar-tow was shot under him. The 4th Alabama also suffered severely from deadly

* See official reports of Colonels Heintzelman, Porter, and Burnside.

fire of the thousands of muskets which they so dauntlessly confronted under the immediate leadership of Bee himself. Its brave colonel, E. J. Jones, was dangerously wounded, and many gallant officers fell, slain or hors dc combat.

Now, however, with the surging mass of over fourteen thousand Federal in fantry pressing on their front, and under the incessant fire of at least twenty pieces of artillery, with the fresh brigades of Sherman and Keyes approaching, the latter already in musket range, our lines gave back, but under orders from General Bee.

The enemy, maintaining their fire, pressed their swelling masses onward as our shattered battalions retired ; the slaughter, for the moment, was deplorable, and has filled many a Southern home with life-long sorrow.

Under this inexorable stress the retreat was continued, until arrested by the energy and resolution of General Bee, supported by Bartow and Evans, just in rear of the Robinson house and Hampton's Legion, which had been already ad vanced, and was in position near it.

Imbodeu's battery, which had been handled with marked skill, but whose men were almost exhausted, and the two pieces of Walton's battery, under Lieuten ant Richardson, being threatened by the enemy's infantry on the left and front, were also obliged to fall back ; Imboden, leaving a disabled piece on the ground, retired until he met Jackson's brigade, while Richardson joined the main body of his battery near the Lewis house.

As our infantry retired from the extreme front, the two fi-pounders of Latham's battery, before mentioned, fell back with excellent judgment to suitable posi tions in the rear, whence an effective fire was maintained upon the still ad vancing lines of the Federalists, with damaging eflect, until their ammunition was nearly exhausted, when they, too, were withdrawn in the near presence of the enemy and rejoined their captain.

From the point previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the artillery, which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left Hank ; and we anxiously, but confidently, awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed attack in that quarter by our right wing.

At half-past ten A.M., however, this expectation was dissipated by a despatch from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried; but that, in consequence of a communication from General D. R. Jones, he had just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union Mills. But, in my judgment, it was now too late for the effective execution of the contemplated movement, which must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for the attack. Therefore it became immediately necessary to depend on new combinations and other dis positions suited to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre, already begun by Jones and Longstrect, was at once countermanded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which ho had chosen to give us battle. Under these circumstances, our reserves not already in movement were immediately ordered up to support

our left flank, namely : Holmes's two regiments, and battery of artillery, under Captain Lindsey Walker, of six guns, and Early's brigade. Two regiments from Bonham's brigade, with Kemper's four 6-pouuders, were also called for; and with the sanction of General Johnston, Generals Ewell, Jones (D. R.), Long-street, and Bouham were directed to make a demonstration to their several fronts, to retain and engross the enemy's reserves, and any forces in their flank, and at and around Centreville. Previously our respective Chiefs of Staff, Major Rhett and Colonel Jordan, had been left at my headquarters to hasten up and give directions to any troops that might arrive at Mauassas.

These orders having been duly despatched by staff officers, at 11.30 A. M., Gen eral Johnston and myself set out for the immediate field of action, which we reached, in rear of Robinson's and Widow Henry's houses, at about 12 meridian, and just as the commands of Bee, Bartow, and Evans had taken shelter in a wooded ravine behind the former, stoutly held, at the time, by Hampton, with his Legion, which had made a stand there after having previously been as far forward as the turnpike, where Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, an officer of brill iant promise, was killed, and other severe losses were sustained.