The order for the Federal column of attack was to advance and seize Cemetery Hill. In all subsequent orders of General Meade this was the main objective; but upon their attempt to form for that purpose outside of the crater they were swept by such a fire from the batteries and infantry, including Colonel Smith's force, in the ravine in rear, and the 59th Virginia, under Captain Wood, formed in a ditch on the right of the crater and perpendicular to the main trench, that they rushed back and clung to the protec tion of the crater, continuing the contest for the possession of the trenches.

About 7.30 o'clock Ferrero's negro division was ordered to push through the breach and carry Cemetery Hill. They moved across the open space between the Federal and Confederate lines into, out of, and beyond the crater; but at this point they broke under the fierce artillery and musketry fire there concentrated upon them; and, after having been partially reorganized, broke again, now fleeing in wild disorder into and out of the crater, back to General Burnside's rearmost lines, within the Federal intrench-ments. They carried back, on their way, Bell's brigade,* of Turner's division, which, having been pushed across from Burn-

* General Orel's report, dated August 3d, 1864, in "Conduct of the War" (18G5), p. 102.

side's lines by Ord to support their assault, was then attempting to press forward from the right of the crater. Such was the con centration of fire upon their front and flanks that the Federals were unable to develop and form their column of attack, arid this was their last attempt to charge.

Meanwhile the struggle had continued for the possession of the trenches. On the Confederate right of the crater these were held by the remainder of the 22d and the 23d South Carolina, aided by the 26th and part of the 46th Virginia. Barricades were con structed, and the Federals did not succeed in advancing more than thirty yards. On the left they gradually occupied the trenches for less than two hundred yards, turning the barricades by advan cing along and under cover of the glacis, and springing thence into the trench, until Colonel McMaster erected a last barricade"- at the bend, in advance of the covered way leading to General El liott's quarters. From this point the glacis took a direction which exposed the Federals attempting to use it to a flank fire from the exterior parapet, held by the right of Ransom's brigade; and here the enemy's advance was effectually checked, both in the trench and outside of it.

The entire Federal offensive had now been reduced to an impo tent and fractional conflict in the trenches, when, at 9.45, General Meade gave General Burnside a peremptory order to withdraw his troops.f It even appears, from what General Badeau says of this order to withdraw,} that it originated with, and was first sug gested by, General Grant himself, and not by General Meade. Says General Badeau:

" Burn side's despatches to Meade, reporting the fight, were meagre and unsatisfactory in the extreme; and Grant at last rode out to the National line, and there dismounting, walked across the front, under a heavy fire, to a point where Burnside was watching the battle. He took in tlie situation at a glance, and, perceiving that every chance of success was lost, at once exclaimed, ' These troops must be immediately withdrawn. It is slaughter to leave them there.'' § He then returned to Mcade's headquarters, and a written order to this effect was sent to Buruside."

It follows from this that, before Meade's order to withdraw was

* Colonel McMaster's statement. See Appendix.

t See " Conduct of the War" (1865), Appendix, vol. i., pp. 229, 230.

I "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 482.

§ The italics are ours.

issued—that is to say, before 9.30 A. M. —General Grant, after com ing personally to the front, saw " that every chance of success was lost." General Burnside, however, considering that a retreat across the open space between the lines could only be effected with great slaughter, asked for and obtained a suspension of the order, to await a more favorable opportunity. It is evident that his object was riot to go on with the attack—still less to renew it—but to retire the men with the least possible sacrifice of life. General Meade at first refused, but finally gave him discretion as to the time for withdrawal.* The remaining Federal supports (Warren and Hancock) took no part in the attack; and they also—General Warren at 9.45, General Hancock at 9.25—received orders "to suspend all offensive operations" and resume their original posi tion. So did General Ord.f

Such was the situation — the Federals unable to advance, and fearing to retreat—when, at ten o'clock, General Mahone arrived with a part of his men, who lay down in the shallow ravine, to the rear of Elliott's salient, held by the force under Colonel Smith, there to await the remainder of the division.;); But a movement having occurred among the Federals which seemed to menace an advance, General Mahone threw forward his bri gade with the 61st North Carolina, of Hoke's division,, which had now also come up. The 25th and 49th North Carolina, and the 26th and part of the ITth South Carolina, all under Smith, which were formed on Mahone's left, likewise joined in the counter-movement, and three-fourths of the gorge-line were carried with that part of the trench, on the left of the crater, occupied by the Federals. Many of the latter, white and black, abandoned the breach and fled to their lines, under a scourging flank fire of artillery and musketry from Wise's brigade.§

At about 11.30 Wright's brigade, which had then reached the ground, was detached and pushed forward, separately, by General Mahone, to drive the Federals out of the crater, but it suffered a repulse.] General Beauregard now ordered a concentration of all available batteries to be made upon the crater and adjacent

* "Conduct of the War" (1865), Appendix, vol. i., p. 230.

t Ibid., pp. 234, 238, 240.

I Colonel McMaster's statement. See Appendix.

§ General Johnson's statement. See Appendix. |] Ibid.

trendies, and, under cover of this fire, a combined movement of the forces of Mali one and Johnson was prepared, ordered by Generals Lee and Beauregard. Satmders's brigade of Mahone's division, with the 61st North Carolina, of Hoke's division, and the 17th South Carolina, of Johnson's division, moved on the left and rear of the crater, under General Mahone; and the 23d and part of the 22d South Carolina on the right, under General Johnson/- But before this last charge the Federals, thoroughly demoralized under the cross-fires of our artillery and musketry, were running the dread gauntlet back to their intrenchments, so that this last attack met with but little resistance. The fact is that the crater and lines were so rapidly emptied of Federals, at the last moment of the charge, that the Confederate batteries slackened their fire, and only thirty men, with three stands of colors, were captured, f

The total Confederate loss was 1172. Johnson's division (of which 2500 were engaged about the crater), including Cokjuitt's brigade, temporarily attached to it, bore of this loss 922 — 66 officers, 856 men—the share of Elliott's brigade therein amount ing to 672 in killed, wounded, and missing. A few of these were prisoners, captured during the fight in the trenches, and, of the others, about 256 figured among the victims of the ex plosion, inclusive of 22 men belonging to Pegram's battery. Mahone's division lost 250 men—killed, wounded, and missing— out of about 1500.

The Federal loss is reported, by Mr. Swinton, at about 4000 men; by General Meade, at 4400 killed, wounded, and missing, 246 prisoners, 2 colors, and 2 guns; and by General Badeau, at 4400. In our opinion the enemy must have lost more than 5000 men.

Thus came to an end this transcendent scheme for the capture of Petersburg, "planned with consummate skill"—says General Badeau—"and every contingency cared for in advance. With the enemy drawn up in force to the north bank ; the National troops brought rapidly back, the Army of the Potomac and the Eighteenth corps massed in rear of the mine; artillery prepared to cover the approach; the mine itself a success — there was every reason to anticipate a brilliant conclusion to the operation."

* General Johnson's statement. See Appendix. t Ibid.

Whereupon General Grant is credited with having said in regard to this masterly stroke, in which the highest expectations were centred, " Sucli an opportunity of carrying fortifications I have never seen, and do not expect again to have." And yet, writes General Badeau, with a frankness that does him no little honor, this affair proved to be "one of the most discreditable to the National arms that occurred during the war." This we will not contradict; but when he states that "it was" more than thirty minutes after the explosion before the rebels recovered from their panic and returned to their lines," he is in error. He no less errs when he asserts that <: the [Federal] advance was not checked; the troops were not discouraged; the ground was clear before them; there was yet no serious resistance; they halted simply because they were not commanded to do other wise." The Confederate officers there present—and foremost of all Colonel McMaster — testify that they rallied their men, re stored order, and opened fire not more than five minutes after the mine had exploded. What stopped the Federal troops in their advance and prevented them from reaching the crest of Cemetery Hill — as they had been ordered to do — was the tre mendous and raking cross-fire of artillery, prepared by General Beauregard for that very purpose, and the unflinching stand and prompt and accurate infantry fire of our troops, in front, as well as to the left and riidit of the crater.

o

Upon this very point General Bushrod Johnson, in his earnest and straightforward manner, says :

" The 23d and part of the 22d South Carolina regiments on the right, and the 17th and 18th on the left of the crater, opened a destructive fire from our parapets on the advancing column and on the enemy in the breach. The flanking arrangements of our works, on both sides of the breach, afforded peculiar advantages, and soon the fire along the line of my division extended far out on each flank, wherever the enemy's column could be reached, and swept the ground in front of the crater.

" To the men on the left of Wise's brigade, occupying the eminence, south of Baxter road, about two hundred yards from the crater, the enemy's masses presented a most inviting target.

" Wright's battery of four guns, admirably located and intrenched on the left of Elliott's brigade, and in rear of our front line, poured its whole column of fire on the enemy's masses and right flank. The position of this excellent battery was perhaps unknown to the enemy, and the superior manner in which it was served, the rapidity of its fire, and the terrible effect on the enemy's forces, no doubt greatly astonished and demoralized them.

" Major Haskell's mortar-battery, in charge of Captain Lamkin, consisting of four Coehorns, on the Jerusalem plank road, and one Coehorn and two 12-pound mortars in the ravine, some two hundred yards to the left and rear of the breach, and two mortars to the left of Wright's battery, were all opened promptly on the assaulting columns. The practice of the four mortars on the plank road was admirable. Their shells dropped with precision upon the enemy's masses, huddled in disorder in front of and in the crater. Some three mortars on the right of the Baxter road, commanded by Lieutenant Langhorne, opened and continued, at intervals, with good effect until the close of the engagement."

This sufficiently explains why the Federals, notwithstanding their thorough state of preparation—"every contingency being cared for in advance"—did not accomplish what was expected of them. Nor is their failure at all attributable to the absence of their corps and division commanders ; for every colonel and every subordinate officer knew — if not every man of the assaulting column—what orders had been issued, and that the work to bo done was to carry the Confederate lines and take possession of the hill beyond. The truth is, that, losing sight of the invincible spirit of the veteran troops confronting them, they had counted upon inextricable confusion on the part of the Confederates, and had not anticipated the reception in store for them from the skilfully located batteries of General Beauregard.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Divers Operations of Federal Columns.—General Hancock's Expedition.— General "Warren's.—The Charge made by General Hagood's Brigade.— Defeat of General Hancock's Corps by Generals Hill and Hampton.—In significant Command Given to General Beauregard.—His Dissatisfaction. —General Whiting Requests him to Inspect the Works at Wilmington. —General Lee Thinks General Beauregard will be Given Command of Northwest Georgia. — He is Ordered to Charleston, to Examine into a Difficulty between Generals Jones and Itipley.— Finds the Department •much Disorganized. — His Interview with President Davis at Augusta. —The Latter Details to him General Hood's Plan of Campaign.—Gen eral Beauregard Approves it.—President Davis Decides to Give General Beauregard the Military Division of the West.—General Beauregard Ac cepts.—He Leaves for General Hood's Headquarters.—His Communica tion to General Cooper.—General Hood Demands, but docs not Secure, the Surrender of Resaca.

SOME two weeks after the explosion of the Federal mine and the attempted capture of Petersburg, the enemy, with a view, no doubt, to divert public attention from the inglorious results of "that miserable affair," as General Grant is reported to have called it, resorted again to divers operations, within and outside of the limits of his lines of intrenchment.

General Hancock, with his own corps, to which were added the 10th and all of Gregg's cavalry, was charged with the first ex pedition. This movement was intended to create a diversion on the north bank of the James River, but it proved to be another sore disappointment to the enemy, and General Hancock, on the 20th of August, about eight or ten days after his departure, was ordered back to his former position at Petersburg, having sus tained a loss of more than 1500 men.*

Meanwhile, and before General Hancock's return, an expedi tion, aimed at the Weldon Kail road, was undertaken by General Warren. It led to several sharp actions between the contend-

* Swinton, " Army of the Potomac," p. 532.'

ing forces, where much vigor and stubbornness were exhibited on both sides, resulting, however, in the final retention of the road by the Federals. Their loss amounted to not less than •M55 killed, wounded, and missing. 1 * This shows what a strong effort General Lee had made to dislodge the enemy from the Weldon road. Unfortunately, and owing to the impossibility of sending additional reinforcements, he failed in his purpose. He would not and could not afford to sacrifice more lives for the possession of a line of communication which, though of great advantage to us, was not indispensable, for we still held the Dan ville route, by which Richmond as well as the army could be provisioned, f

* Swinton, " Army of the Potomac," p. 535.

t It was during this attempt to regain the use of the Weldon road that, on the 21st of August, General Hagood, of South Carolina, distinguished him self in a personal encounter with a Federal officer.

Owing to inaccurate reports of his scouts General A. P. Hill, who com manded the Confederate forces against Warren's expedition, mistook the exact position of the enemy's line on the left, and, through General Malione, who labored under the same error, Hagood's brigade was ordered to press the rear and flank of the Federals. He was to be supported by five brigades of Mahone's division, supposed to be already in front. The brigade drove the skirmishers from their rifle-pits, but found itself iii presence of " a strongly intrenched line, crowded with men and artillery, extending right and left as far as could be seen."* The five brigades of General Mahone were not there. General Hagood saw at once how perilous a strait he was in, and used his utmost endeavors to halt his command; but the men, " intent on carrying the position before them, neither heard nor heeded his voice,"t and had actually reached the parapets of the works before they understood what overwhelming disaster threatened them. The situation was nearly desperate, all the more that a flanking column had now been sent behind the brigade, with the evident purpose of cutting off its retreat. At this moment a Fed eral officer, Captain Daly, of General Cutler's staff, boldly rode forward and seized a regimental flag of the brigade. Seeing this, General Hagood, then on foot, came up as fast as he could, and, calling upon his men to fall back, demanded the immediate return of the colors. Upon the officer's refusal to comply-—there being no time for parley — General Hagood shot him through the body, and " as he reeled from the saddle upon one side sprang into it from the other, Orderly Stoncy seizing the flag from his foiling hands." J Instantly iticing about, the South Carolina brigade, under the lead of its intrepid commander, charged and easily dispersed the Federal line in its rear, and, regardless of the severe fire poured upon it from the enemy's

* General Hagood's Mcjaoirs. See Appendix. t Ibid. J Ibid.

Very shortly after this affair, whereby the enemy had gained the possession of a road but lost many lives, General Hancock was met and defeated, at or near Eeams's Station, by a Confeder ate force under Generals A. P. Hill and Hampton. Their hard-won success was conceded by the enemy, though since that time it has been a matter of surprise that General Hancock was not immediately reinforced from General Warren's position, or that the troops sent to relieve him w T ere marched by the longer of the two roads leading to him. The Federal loss was reckoned at 2400, killed, wounded, and missing, out of about 8000 men.*" Our own loss was severe also, though we have no means now at hand, of ascertaining the exact figures.

Since the battle of Drury's Bluff (May 16th) General Beaure-gard, the first general commissioned by the Confederate Govern ment, had been in command of only two divisions, numbering together less than 10,000 men of all arms; and from and after the arrival of General Lee at Petersburg (June 18th) he had held a subordinate position, very similar but really inferior to that of a corps commander, whose force generally consisted of three di visions of about 5000 men each. His army (so-called) occupied nearly all the new lines he had established on the night of the 17th of June, from the Appomattox to the old lines where these crossed the Jerusalem plank road. They measured a length of over two miles, and, although commanded by some of the ene my's works in front, had been made quite secure by artificial means.

It is not to be wondered at that such a position had become irksome to General Beauregard. It was all the more so because a very important movement against Washington, through the Shenandoah Valley, had been set on foot and confided to an officer who was gallant and meritorious, but whose rank in the Confederate army was lower than that held by General Beaure gard, and whose merit and experience as a strategist had not been tested.

works, made good its retreat, though with heavy loss, to the shelter of the valley.

General Beauregard spoke in high terms of the coolness and daring of General Hagood upon this occasion, and strongly recommended him for promotion—which he most assuredly deserved.

* Swinton's " Army of the Potomac,'' p. 538.

II.—17

General Beauregard, though not openly cast aside, had been placed in an unworthy position, and was wasting his powers upon work that, under the guidance of General Lee, almost any subordinate general could have performed. The fact that Early, a lieutenant-general, and not General Beauregard, was selected for the campaign referred to above, proves how deeply rooted was the prejudice prevailing against Beauregard at Rich mond.

That General Early did his utmost to carry out the operation intrusted to him no one \vill for a moment doubt, and those who know him well, and appreciate his devotion to the cause he was serving, would certainly be the last to cast even a shadow of cen sure upon him; but it is none the less true that to retrieve the failing fortunes of the South at that juncture something more than devotion, earnestness, and gallantry was required on the part of the leader of this all-important expedition. He should have had experience in handling separate, independent commands; ra-pidit}^ of conception and execution; the power to shape and con trol events; the unwavering confidence in success which ever forces a like confidence upon an army; the capacity and habit, as it were, of assuming responsibilities; the prestige of acknowl edged ability. These traits were pre-eminent in General Beau-regard, who was available at that time, and whose presence at Petersburg could certainly have been dispensed with after Gen eral Lee's arrival.

Early in the month of September General Beauregard had de termined to ask for a change of command, when General Whiting expressed a desire that he should reinspect his defensive works at Wilmington and the mouth of Cape Fear River. With General Lee's consent he complied with this request, returning to Peters burg about the middle of the month. A few days later he was in formed by General Lee that there was a probability of his being ordered to the command of the Army of Northwestern Georgia, then under General Hood. Though somewhat surprised at such an announcement—for he remembered what answer the President, two years before, had given to the Congressional delegation asking for his return to the Army of Tennessee *—he nevertheless pre pared and forwarded to General Lee the following memorandum :

* See volume i., p. 418.

PETERSBURG, YA., September 19^, 1864. "Being strongly impressed with the responsibility of that position (the command of the Army of Northwestern Georgia), I am fearful of not being equal to the present emergency ; but, being anxious to do all in my power to serve the cause, I will obey with alacrity any order of the War Department which may put me in command of that army. With a view, however, to in crease my usefulness as far as practicable, I hope I will be authorized to take with me such members of my general staff as I may consider indispensable to success, to wit: 1. Chief of Staff and First Assistant. 2. Quartermaster. 3. Medical Director. 4. Inspector. 5. Chief -Engineer. 6. Commissary, if re quired, as well as such other members of my general staff as I may find necessary when I shall have assumed command.

"G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

This was readily assented to by General Lee, who assured him that his request would undoubtedly be granted by the "War De partment.

Shortly afterwards (on or about the 23d of September) General Beauregard was ordered by the President to repair to Charleston, and, while awaiting further orders there, to inquire into the dif ficulty existing between General Sam. Jones, commanding the Department, and General R. S. Ripley, commanding the First Military District, of South Carolina.* Before leaving Peters burg he took an affectionate farewell of General Lee and of his staff, and also of such officers of his own military family as were not to accompany him to his new field of action.

General Beauregard reached Charleston on the 25th of Septem ber, and immediately informed the President of the fact. The latter was then at Macon, Ga., the headquarters of General Howell Cobb, and on his way to confer with General Hood, at Palmetto, Ga. He instructed General Beauregard to meet him at Augusta, where he expected to be, on the 2d of October, before returning to Richmond.

Meanwhile, General Beauregard entered on the duties assigned to him at Charleston. He discovered a change for the worse, in the condition of the defences, since his departure for Weldon, "N. C., about seven months before. The system of signals and tel egraphs that he had established along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, by which to gather news of the movements of the enemy- and his fleets, had fallen into complete neglect. The

* See General Beauregard's letter, in Appendix.

parapets of Fort Snmter, formed partly of the debris and ruins of its former magnificent walls and casemates, had crumbled down, and were being gradually washed away by the rains and the waves of the sea, thus rendering parts of the parade visible to the sentries in the rigging of the enemy's blockaders. The want of harmony existing between the Commander of the Department and the Chief of the First Military District was evident; and General Beaure-gard soon perceived that the former could not control the restless and insubordinate spirit of the latter, who required a firm hand to keep him within bounds. The investigation of the difficulties be tween these two officers revealed facts which confirmed General Beauregard in this opinion. He therefore came to the conclusion that the sooner General Hi pie y was sent to the field the better it would be for the service. Hence, on the 27th, he forwarded the following telegram to President Davis, who was then at General Hood's headquarters:

" CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 21th, 1864. " To President JEFF. DAVIS, General Hood's Headquarters, Ga.:

" Matters here are very unsatisfactory, requiring prompt action on the part of Government. This State should be one district, under a Major-General, and the whole Department under a Lieutenant-General or General. I will telegraph changes required soon. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

" Operator \vill repeat same message to General R. E. Lee, at Petersburg, Va., and to Hon. J. xV. Seddon, Secretary of War, at Richmond. "Official.

" II. W. FlELDEN, A. A. G."

On the 2d of October, in accordance with his instructions, General Beauregard repaired to Augusta, and the next day had a long conference with the President, who had also arrived there during the night. The General gave him a long and de tailed account of his investigation at Charleston, repeating and minutely explaining the important suggestions contained in the foregoing telegram. lie thereupon earnestly recommended that Colonel D. B. Harris, who had been so efficient an aid to him, during his long defence of Charleston, should be made a major-general, and assigned to the command of the new District of South Carolina. Mr. Davis would only promote him to a briga dier-generalship, giving him the command of the First Subdis-trict of South Carolina—in other words, of the City of Charles ton and its Harbor. General Beauregard was desirous that the President should make the promotion at once; but he preferred

delaying it until his return to Eichmond. Meanwhile, Colonel Harris was attacked by the yellow fever, then prevailing at Charles ton, and died of it on the 10th of October, before hearing of his well-deserved promotion. In him the Confederacy lost a brave and efficient officer. As a division or even a corps commander he would have had few superiors. General Beauregard had repeat edly recommended him for promotion ; but it was with some dif ficulty that he had obtained for him the rank of major after the Shiloh campaign, and of colonel after nearly two years of distin guished services at Charleston. General Harris was a graduate of West Point, before General Beauregard entered that institution. lie had resigned shortly after joining the army, and, at the open ing of the war took service in the Confederacy. He was cap tain of engineers at the battle of Manassas, and, after serving for some time with General Cocke, joined General Beauregard, and re mained with him until his untimely death. All who knew Colonel Harris admired and respected him. Not only was he an able and experienced Engineer, but his coolness under fire, and the deter mined though simple and modest manner in which he performed his duties, no matter under what circumstances, had endeared him to the scarred veterans—officers and men—among whom he had served. His favorite and characteristic motto—one he constantly used, and to which he was faithful to the last—was: " The path of duty, the safest of all."

The President, without directly assenting to General Beaure-gard's suggestions as to the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, adopted most of them; and Lieutenant-General "W. J. Hardee was accordingly assigned to that command, vice Major-General Sam. Jones, who took charge of the Military District of South Carolina; while Major-General Howell Cobb was placed over the Military District of Georgia. Florida had also been put under the command of a major-general (J. Patton An derson), immediately after the battle of Olustee, or Ocean Pond.

Having gone over and concluded these different matters with General Beauregard, the President entered into an interesting and minute account of his recent visit to General Hood's head quarters, at Palmetto, Ga. He praised highly the new Command er of the Army of Tennessee, predicting that he would carry out a different policy from that of General Joseph E. Johnston, who would have retreated ere long—said Mr. Davis—to the very

Gulf of Mexico, should Sherman have followed him that far south. He spoke with high praise of the plan of operations of General Hood, who was on his inarch to flank General Sherman, then at Atlanta, and cut his line of communication with Middle Tennessee. He was also to destroy the railroad and bridges, from Atlanta to Chattanooga, in as many places as possible, giving bat tle only when the chances should be favorable to him. General Beauregard readily approved of this movement, which was per fectly feasible, was according to the principles of war, and would, if carried out, compel Sherman to turn back, to protect his line of communication and force a battle with Hood, who, having the choice of position, in a mountainous country, might inflict on his adversary such heavy losses as would prevent his farther advance into Georgia, or make his retreat to Dalton— or even to the vicinity of Chattanooga—a military necessity. A change of base in war, when practicable—which is not often the case—is always attended with great results;* for one of the cardinal principles of tactics is, " to operate on the communications of your enemy, without exposing your own," which General Hood could well do on this occasion, as he could readily establish his new lines of communication via the Selma, Jacksonville, and Rome Railroad, then built to Blue Mountain, ten or twelve miles from Jackson ville, where could soon be established his new depot of.immediate supplies.

The President, having ascertained that General Beauregard favored this expected movement, determined to place him in com mand of what was to be the Military Division of the "West, em bracing the two Departments under Generals Hood and Taylor, and lie informed General Beauregard of his decision to that effect. General Hood's Department consisted of Tennessee and such part of Western and Northern Georgia as was not included in General Hardee's command; General Taylor's consisted of Alabama, Mis sissippi, and Eastern Louisiana. A command composed of nearly five States—that is to say, covering more than one-third of the ter ritorial extent of the Confederacy—was now offered to General

* " Although it is a maxim never to abandon your line of communication, yet to change that line is one of the most skilful manoeuvres of the art of war, where circumstances authorize it. It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike great blows, and manoeuvre on his enemy's flank. Victory is then in his hand."— NAPOLEON, at St. Helena.

Beauregard. Had lie consulted his own interests, or taken thought of his personal fame, he would have declined the heavy responsi bility about to be imposed upon him ; for he knew that, important as his command was in territorial extent, he would be without troops directly under him, with very scanty resources to count upon, and—far worse than all—with a marked feeling of discour agement and distrust growing among the people. He knew, fur thermore, that he was not superseding General Hood, or in any way depriving him of his command, but that he was merely sent to him as an adviser. In proof of this we quote from President Davis's letter to General Hood, dated September 28th, from Opelika, Ala.:

k ' * * * It seeins to me best that I should confer with General Beauregard, and, if quite acceptable to him, place him in command of the Department embracing your army and that of General R. Taylor, so as to secure the fullest co-operation of the troops, without relieving cither of you of the responsibilities and powers of your special commands,- except in so far as would be due to the supe rior rank and the above assignment of General Beauregard. He will necessa rily, if present with either army, command in person. Before final action there will be time for you to communicate with me, and I shall be glad to have your views.*

" Very respectfully and truly yours,

" JEFFERSON DAVIS."

General Beauregard accepted, nevertheless, the trust reposed in him, under the condition, however, that he should be able to rely on the support of the War Department. The President promised him its cordial co-operation, and desired that he should go at once to confer with Generals Hood and Taylor. He left that night.

Another topic was discussed during the Augusta conference. The President spoke of his troubles with Governor Brown, of Georgia, who, he said, did not give the Government a cordial sup port, and was ever disposed to throw petty obstacles in the way of procuring recruits, conscripts, and even supplies of provisions and manufactured goods. General Cobb, he also asserted, was very much embarrassed in his work, as commander of his military district, by the want of harmony, so perceptible in his official rela tions with Governor Brown. While in command of the Depart ment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, General Beauregard had always been on very friendly terms with Governor Brown.

* " Advance and Retreat," p. 255.

He offered to call on the latter while on his way to General Hood's headquarters, and to do all in his power towards accom plishing what the President desired. It was so agreed. Mr. Davis left that evening for Richmond, and the next morning (October 4th) General Beauregard began his prearranged journey, arriving the same day at Milledgeville, where he was most kindly received by Governor Brown. The latter granted all that was asked of him, and offered General Beauregard his most cordial support. A few days afterwards, the following telegram was for warded from Opelika, Ala., to Mr. Davis:

"OPELIKA, ALA., Oct. 7M, 18G4. " To President DAVIS, Richmond :

" I have arranged, satisfactorily, matters between Governor Brown and Gen eral Cobb relating to exempts and State militia. Am now en route for Hood's front. t G. T. BEAUHEGAHD.''

From Milledgeville, General Beauregard had to travel via Ma-

CD o

con, Columbus, Opelika, and Newnan, to,get to General Hood's headquarters, as the latter had already left Palmetto to operate against the railroad from Atlanta to Marietta. The Opelika and Atlanta Railroad, from Fairburn to the latter place, was in the possession of the Federals, and Newnan was as near as General Beauregard could get with safety, as he had no escort with which to repel any hostile force he might meet on his way. lie had stopped at Macon for a day to confer with General Cobb, whom he found, as ever, zealous and energetic, and who heard with joy how "oil had been poured on the troubled waters" surrounding Governor Brown.

From Macon, fearing that Colonel Harris, whose illness had been reported to him, might not recover, General Beauregard telegraphed General Ilardee, recommending General Custis Lee, Colonel William Butler, or Colonel Alfred Rhett, as Commander of the First Subdistrict of South Carolina, in case of Colonel Harris's death. But, in the end, neither General Ilardee nor Gen eral Jones removed the commander of that subdistrict. General Ilardee was one of the finest corps commanders in the Confederate service; but, determined and intrepid as he was on the battle field, he, like General Sam. Jones, was given to hesitation and procrastination when dealing with matters of importance in ad ministration.

General Beauregard reached E"ewnan on the 7th of October, and left immediately, on horseback, for Cave Spring, about sev enty miles distant, where he arrived on the evening of the 9th. There at last he had a conference with General Hood, who con firmed what President Davis had already said of his plan of op erations. General Beanregard now came to the conclusion that the movement had been rather hastily undertaken, and without proper provisions being first made for the change of base. It was evident to him that the matter had not been sufficiently con sidered in its details, and that a great deal had been left to future determination, and even to lack. It was easy to discover in the details of the plan evidences of the fact that General Hood and Mr. Davis were not accustomed to command armies in the field, especially armies like ours, for the management of which much had to be foreseen, and much prepared or created.

Sadly impressed with what he had seen and heard, during his conference with General Hood, General Beauregard resolved to repair at once to Jacksonville, about thirty miles southwest of Cave Spring, and about twelve miles from the terminus of the Selma and Rome road. He was there on the llth, and imme diately telegraphed General Taylor to come to him without delay. General Beauregard had not yet assumed command, and had de termined not to do so until he had seen and freely conferred with both of his Department Commanders.

Meanwhile, he directed supplies of all kinds to be sent to Jacksonville, as a new depot of distribution, and made a personal examination of the approaches to the place, with a view to erect there all necessary works for its protection. He ordered, in Gen eral Hood's name, that the Selma Railroad should be rapidly completed, from its terminus, Blue Mountain, to Jacksonville; and local officers found there, and still on sick leave, were appointed to fill, temporarily, all indispensable positions, not only at Jacksonville, but also along the new line of opera tions, so as to expedite the transfer of supplies for General Hood's army.*

On the 12th of October, three days after his conference with General Hood, he addressed a communication to General Cooper, giving a minute account of his interview at Cave Spring, stating

* See letters to General Hood, and to others, in Appendix.

what General Hood had done and what he proposed doing. The following passage of this document is submitted : *

" Not being sufficiently well acquainted with the nature of the country referred to, and not having yet assumed command of my new Department, I advised General Hood not to carry out his first project" (crossing to the north side of the Coosa Eiver, twelve miles below Rome, which was occupied by one division of the enemy, and then crossing the Oostanawla), "unless confi dent of being able to rccross the Oostanawla above Rome, before General Sherman could concentrate superior forces against him, or could endanger his communications. He readily consented to this suggestion.

" It was also determined that, as a success was necessary to keep up the present buoyant spirit of the Army of Tennessee, a battle should not be fought unless with positive advantage on our side of numbers and position, or unless the safety of the army required it.

" Under these circumstances, being still unprovided with a staff, baggage, and horses (which were left in Virginia when I was ordered to Charleston), and wishing to confer, before assuming command, with Lieutenant-Geueral R. Taylor, relative to the condition of his Department and his ability to co operate with General Hood in the present campaign; being desirous, more over, of arranging matters necessarily connected with the change of base from Jonesboro 1 , Georgia, to Jacksonville, Alabama, I repaired to this place (Jacksonville) for the object stated, hoping to be able to return to the front in time for a battle, should one occur; but, to be certain of doing so, I in structed General Hood to keep me advised of the movements of the enemy. I expect, nevertheless, to rejoin him in a few days. * * *

" I remain, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGAKD, General."

On the same day, October 12th, General Hood demanded the unconditional surrender of llesaca, which was refused; and, not wishing to lose time or sacrifice his men, he passed on, to con tinue breaking up the railroad. This he did successfully, as ap pears by the following message:

"NINE MILES SOUTH OF LAFAYETTE, GA., Oct. 15^,1864. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

" The army struck the communication of the enemy, about a mile above Resaca, on the 12th instant, completely destroying the railroad, including the block-houses from that point to within a short distance of Tunnel Hill, and about four miles of the Cleveland Railroad, capturing Dalton and all in termediate garrisons, with their stores and equipments, and about one thou sand prisoners.

" The main body of Sherman's army seems to be moving towards Dalton.

" JOHN B. HOOD."

* The whole of the letter will be found in Appendix.

CHAPTER XL.

General Beauregard Assumes Command of the Military Division of the West. —The Departments Comprised in this Division.—Circular Addressed to that Section of the Confederacy.—Telegrams from Generals Roddy and Forrest.—General Beauregard Establishes a Base of Operations at Jack sonville.— Anecdote of a Young Soldier. — General Hood Resolves to Continue the Destruction of General Sherman's Communications, and to Cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville.—General Beauregard Approves the Plan, but Fears it will not be Successfully Executed.—General Hood Persists.—Reluctant Assent of- General Beauregard.—Similarity between General Hood's Plan of Campaign and President Davis's.—General Beau-regard's Communication to the War Department, October 24th.—Tele gram to General Cooper.—General Hood Moves on October 22d.—Diffi culties of Making Change of Base to Tuscumbia.—General Beauregard Leaves on October 24th, to Rejoin General Hood.—General Hood Changes his Line of March.—Failure to Seize Decatur.—General Hood again Alters his Plan.—His Army too Destitute of Provisions to Cross into Tennessee.—General Beauregard's Chagrin.—He Proposes Crossing the River with the Troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole Com mand.

ON the 17th of October General Beauregard assumed command of his new Department, and published the following order:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. nth, 1864. " General Orders, No. 1:

"In obedience to the orders of the President of the Confederate States I assume command, this clay, of the Military Division of the West, east of the Mississippi River, comprising the Department of Tennessee and Georgia, com manded by General J. B. Hood, and the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, commanded by Lieutenant - General Richard Taylor. These officers will retain command of their respective Departments, issuing orders necessary for the proper discharge of their duties.

"In assuming command of this important Military Division I enjoin on all officers and soldiers harmony, zeal, implicit and prompt obedience to orders, and confidence in themselves and their commanders; and success will then surely crown their efforts to drive the enemy from our soil, and establish the independence of our country.

" The following are the officers of my personal and general Staff:

1st Lieutenant A. R. Cliisolm A. D. C.

1st Lieutenant A. N. Toutant A. D. C.

Colonel George TV. Brent A. A. G.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Otcy A. A. G.

Major Henry Bryan A. I. G.

Major J. B. Eustis A. I. G.

Major-General M. L. Smith Chief of Engineers.

Major Edward Willis Chief Quartermaster.

Major F. Molloy , Chief Commissary.

Surgeon R. L. Brodie Medieal Director.

Surgeon Samuel Chopnin Medical Inspector.

"The Medical Director, Chief Quartermaster, and Chief Commissary will act only as inspectors of their respective Departments until further orders.

"All communications to the Headquarters of this Military Division will be addressed to this place until further notice.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General. "Official.

" GEO. TV. BRENT, A. A. G."

The general outlines of the Military Division of the West were given in the preceding chapter, but it is necessary here to specify more minutely its precise limits. These are indicated and ex plained in the following orders forwarded from the War Depart ment to General Beauregard:

" RICHMOND, VA., Oct. 3d, 18G4. " General G. T. BEAUREGAUD :

"The Department of Tennessee and Georgia, under General Hood, includes all of the State of Georgia north and west of the following line: commen cing at Augusta and running along the line of the Augusta and Savannah Railroad to Milton; thence along the western boundary-lines of the counties of Bullock and Tatnall; thence along the south bank of the Ocmulgee River to the northeast corner of Invin County; thence south to the Florida line and to the Appalachicola River. All the territory west of this Department and the Appalachicola River, and east of the Mississippi River, forms the Depart ment of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, under Lieutenant-Gencral Taylor. Special order has been this day issued placing you in command of both these Departments.

" S. COOPER, A. and I. G."

On the day on which General Beauregard assumed command (October 17th) he caused the following proclamation to be is sued :

Circular. " HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

JACKSONVILLE, ALA., Oct. !?£/*, 1864.

" In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the Military Division of the West I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes and sections, for their generous support and confidence.

"In assigning me to this responsible position the President of the Con-

federate States lias extended to ine the assurance of his earnest support; the executives of your States meet me with similar expressions of their devotion to our cause; the noble army in the field, composed of brave men and gallant officers, are no strangers to me, and I know that they will do all that patriots can achieve.

" The history of the past, written in the blood of their comrades, but fore shadows the glorious future which lies before them. Inspired with these bright promises of success, I make this appeal to the men and women of my country to lend me the aid of their earnest and cordial co-operation. Un able to join in the bloody conflicts of the field, they can do much to strength en our cause, fill up our ranks, encourage our soldiers, inspire confidence, dispel gloom, and hasten on the day of our final success and deliverance.

"The army of Sherman still defiantly holds the City of Atlanta: he can and must be driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia and surrounding States to speak the word, and the work is done.

" We have abundance of provisions, and there are men enough in the country liable and able for service to accomplish the result. To all such I earnestly appeal to report promptly to their respective commands, and let those who cannot go see to it that none remain at home who are able to strike a blow in this critical and decisive hour.

"To those soldiers of the army who are absent from their commands with out leave I appeal, in the name of their brave comrades, with whom they have in the past so often shared the privations of the camp and the dangers of the battle-field, to report to their respective commands within the next thirty days; and an amnesty is hereby granted.

" My appeal is to every one, of all classes and conditions, to come forward freely, cheerfully, and with a good heart, to the work that lies before us. My countrymen! respond to this call as you have done in days that have passed, and, with the blessing of a kind and over-ruling Providence, the ene my shall be driven from your soil, the security of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established, soon to be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriot ism, summon us to the field; we cannot, dare not, will not fail to respond.

" Full of hope and confidence, I come to join in your struggle, sharing your privations, and, with your brave and true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to our arms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.

"Official.

"GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

The following despatch was received on the 18th of October from General P. D. Roddy, who was then at Courtland. It was dated on the 17th:

"No cavalry [enemy's] have passed Decatur. Scouts report but a small garrison at Decatur yesterday, and no force on the north side of the river,

from Florence up to Decatur. All other force is believed to be going to wards Bridgeport."

Two days later the following telegram was received from General K B. Forrest, dated Corinth, October 19th:

" I am moving to meet General Washburn, who is reported crossing five thousand troops at Clifton. If he crosses I will attack. If I can defeat him

I can then cross and destroy N.W. Railroad to Nashville, and be in position as desired" [by General Taylor].

These two telegrams are important, as showing the reasons for General Hood's proposed future campaign into Middle Tennessee.

After completing all necessary arrangements for the establish ment, at Jacksonville, of a good base for General Hood to operate from, General Beauregard, on the 19th of October, started to join the Army of Tennessee at Blue Pond, in a northeasterly direc tion, six miles beyond Centre, which is itself about thirty miles from Jacksonville. On his arrival there he ascertained from General Wheeler that General Hood and his army had retired to Gadsden, on the Coosa River, some twenty-seven miles to the westward. Wheeler reported Sherman's army not far from his front, and that he had been skirmishing that day with the Fed eral cavalry, supported by some infantry. General Beauregard was surprised that no intelligence of this retrograde movement had been sent to him. He began to fear that General Hood was disposed to be oblivious of those details which play an important part in the operations of a campaign, and upon which the ques tion of success or failure often hinges. Leaving immediately for Gadsden, General Beauregard arrived there on the 21st, at

II o'clock A. M.

On his way an incident occurred which was of no importance in itself, but which illustrates the tone and spirit animating the Confederate soldier, even at that late hour of our struggle. Dur ing the evening of the 20th, while General Beauregard was await ing, at a cross-road store, the arrival of his staff-wagon, a young lad, wearing the Confederate uniform and carrying a light rifie-musket, stepped up to the fireplace to warm himself. General Beauregard was sitting close by, and, observing that the lad's shoes were very much worn, kindly said to him, "My young friend, you seem to be badly shod."

" Yes," was the reply, " we are, many of us, in that condition;

but let another fight come on with the Yankees, and we will all have new shoes."

Smiling at this curiously spirited answer, the General asked him how old he was.

" Seventeen, sir," he answered, " and I was at the battle of Manassas." Saying which he raised his cap and, showing a scar on the side of his head, added, " That's what I got there."

"What regiment do you belong to?" said the General; "and how is it you are so far behind it ?"

"I belong now to the gallant 30th Louisiana/'said the young veteran. " I had a chill this afternoon, and I lay down under a tree. I fell asleep there, and when I woke up the army had passed on."

Feeling now quite an interest in the young soldier, General Beauregard remarked, "I suppose you must be tired and hun gry. I shall have something given you to eat, and take you in my wagon when it gets here."

"No, sir, thank you," was the sturdy answer. "I have al ready had something to eat, and will get more when I join my regiment. Good-night, sir." And away he went.

General Beauregard requested one of his aids to get the lad's name and tell him with whom he had been talking. His name was obtained, and inscribed in the officer's memorandum-book, but the book was lost during the course of the war.

At Gadsden, General Beauregard found General Hood more than ever resolved upon continuing the destruction of Sherman's railroad communication beyond the Tennessee River. His rea sons for doing so were, that, as he had already caused Sherman, in so short a time to retrograde from Atlanta to Dalton, he be lieved that by crossing his army at Guntersville north of Gads-den, and continuing to tear up the railroad from Stevenson to Nashville — his cavalry, meanwhile, being sent to destroy the long bridge at Bridgeport — he would compel his adversary to follow him into Middle Tennessee, in order to protect his line of communication and his large supplies at Nashville.

The plan was no doubt bold, and likely to lead to great results, if carried out fearlessly and, above all, judiciously. But General Beauregard was apprehensive that General Hood might not be able to execute it as designed. According to his observation General Hood had already evinced want of experience as a com-

mander, though lie had ever been a gallant and resolute subor dinate officer. General Beauregard, therefore, expressed his solic itude as to the execution of the operation. Among other ob jections he urged the lack of time in which to prepare a new base of operations, either at Tuscumbia—near which the Mem phis and Charleston Railroad was said to be in good condition— or at some point on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of Corinth, should our army be forced to cross the Tennessee, at Clifton or Savannah, to escape pursuit by Sherman with greatly superior forces.

General Hood argued that the two roads were in fair condi tion, and, if necessary, could be materially improved before he was likely to have need of them; that he would find ample supplies in Middle Tennessee, and, besides, would get those of the enemy. lie said he would take his pontoon-train with him, and thus be enabled to cross the Tennessee at any point he thought advantageous, should he be compelled to retire his forces; and that, by means of the Beauregard torpedoes, protected by rifle guns behind strong parapets, he could always hold at bay the enemy's few "tinclad" gunboats long enough to allow him to recross the river, in case of emergency.

These details were minutely and earnestly discussed by the two generals during their long conference, which lasted far into the night. General Beauregard was not thoroughly convinced; but knowing that President Davis did not intend that he should supersede General Hood in the command of the Army of Ten nessee, and that he would neither approve nor support his course if he should do so, he thought it wiser to yield and let General Hood have his own way. The plan w r as a good one in itself, but success depended upon the manner in which it should be carried out.

Another reason—which was not without weight with General Beauregard — for not opposing General Hood's idea was the assertion by the latter that his proposed movement, as now amended, had the sanction of General Bragg, at that time the President's military adviser.

In reality—and though different in many minor details—the movement now about to be made closely resembled, and almost formed part of, the system of operations and general plan of campaign devised by President Davis himself, when lie visited

General Hood in the latter part of September. On page 565, vol. ii., of Mr. Davis's work we read as follows :

"With a view to judge better the situation, and then determine, after personal inspection, the course which should seem best to pursue, I visited General Hood's headquarters at Palmetto. The crisis was grave. It was not to be expected that General Sherman would remain long inactive. * * * To rescue Georgia, save the Gulf States, and retain possession of the lines of communication upon w T hich we depended for the supplies of our armies in the field, an effort to arrest the further progress of the enemy was neces sary ; and to this end the railroads in his rear must be effectually torn up, the great railroad bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport destroyed, and the communication between Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Nashville com pletely cut off. Could this be accomplished, all the fruits of Sherman's suc cessful campaign in Georgia would be blighted, his capture of Atlanta would become a barren victory, and he would probably be compelled to make a retreat towards Tennessee, at every mile of which he might be harassed by

Mr. Davis had, of course, said all this to General Hood, and had, in substance, repeated every word of it to General Beaure-gard. In thus insisting upon carrying out his new movement General Hood knew that he was putting into execution part of Mr. Davis's own plan ; and, in not opposing that plan, General Beauregard knew that he was in nowise disregarding Mr. Davis's views, still less disobeying his general instructions.

Three days after this second modification of General Hood's movement General Beauregard made it a point to send a commu nication on the subject to the War Department. He had followed the same course, about twelve days before, with reference to the alteration General Hood had made in his plan, on the Oth of Octo ber, previous to General Beauregard's meeting him at Cave Spring. Thus apprised in season, the War Department could have objected, or proposed any change it deemed advisable; and General Beau-regard's main object was to afford this opportunity to the Admin istration at Kichmond.

Following is the communication alluded to :

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST.

IN THE FIELD, GADSDEN, ALA., Oct. 2±th, 1864. " General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

" General,—I shall leave to-day, about 12 M., to join General Hood, who is en route to the vicinity of Guntersville, on the Tennessee River. At what II.—18

time and place the army will cross future events will determine.* The army of General Sherman is on the road between Dalton and Gadsden, and his advance forces are about fifteen miles distant from Gadsden.

"In view of the present movement, a change of base has become necessary, and orders have accordingly been issued, transferring it from Jacksonville to Tuscumbia, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. To secure out lines of communication and an uninterrupted source of supplies, Lieutenant-General Taylor has been directed to place in complete running order the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads, from Corinth to Tuscumbia, and that all supplies and troops for the army be sent by that route. He has been directed to garrison Corinth and Bear Creek bridge, and protect the important points along these lines by block-houses and field-works, with one or more companies of infantry at each. Post officers have been assigned at Tuscumbia, and it has been suggested to General Taylor to assign Brigadier-General Adams, now at Talladega, to command at Corinth. M:\jor-General Forrest, as soon as he has executed his instructions in the destruction of the Northwestern Railroad, from Nashville to the Tennessee, has been ordered to report immediately to General Hood, in Middle Tennessee.

" General Taylor has likewise been instructed to confer with their Excel lencies Governors Clark (of Mississippi) and Watts (of Alabama), in order to obtain such State troops and militia as may be necessary to secure and pro tect the important points along our railroad communications. The railroad from Memphis to Corinth will be destroyed, and the iron removed, for the purpose of supplying our wants elsewhere. The road to Jacksonville will also be completed, but the rolling-stock will be gradually reduced to the amount used thereon prior to the present movement from Jonesboro', and transferred to such roads as may require it for the exigencies of the army.

"Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, has been instructed to confer with General Taylor, for the purpose of securing our railroad lines, by the proper field-works on the Tennessee River, between Eastport and Florence, as will guard it against navigation by the enemy. To make this the more effectual torpedoes will be placed at proper points. These batteries, armed with 20 and 30 pounder Parrott and rifled guns, will protect the torpedoes and effectually obstruct the passage of gunboats. The guns will be protected by strong and heavy traverses.

"Every precaution possible has been taken to cover our lines of communi cations and render successful the great object of this campaign.

"The chiefs of the quartermaster and commissary departments have been instructed to take all necessary and proper measures to send stores and sup plies to the points above indicated, and co-operate in the movement.

"I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to General Hood, suggesting the propriety of General Chcatham issuing an address to the citi zens of Tennessee, 011 entering that State, setting forth that he comes to that State with his corps and that of Major-General Forrest to aid in their redemp tion, and calling upon them to co-operate with him in the destruction of the

* Guntersville had been the point designated.

enemy's lines of communication, -while the main body of the army is engaged in destroying his lines between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The object of sucli an address will be to arouse the people of that State and distract the enemy as to our intent and aims.*

"My headquarters for the reception and appropriate distribution of papers has been transferred to Oxford, Ala., near Blue Mountain, from which point a line of couriers will connect with the army.

" Our movements after crossing the Tennessee will be determined by those of the enemy.

" I trust, General, that we will shortly be able to communicate to you and the country such tidings as will redound to the honor of our arms and the success of our cause.

" I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Before this was written and forwarded the following telegram

was sent to Richmond :

" GADSDEN, ALA., Oct. 22(7,1864 : 5 P. M. " General S. COOPER, A. and I. G., Richmond, Ya.:

"Army of Tennessee arrived here yesterday, and left to-day for vicinity of Guntersville. Circumstances will determine when and where it will cross Tennessee River. The position of Sherman's army is not definitely known. His advance forces are eighteen miles from here, on road to Daltou.

u G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

It must be borne in mind that, when General Hood left General Beanregard at Gadsden, it was understood that he would cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, or its immediate vicinity, to con tinue the destruction of Sherman's railroad communications; and that Hood's cavalry was also to destroy the bridge on the Chatta nooga road, at Bridgeport.

Ko sooner had General Beauregard yielded his assent to the plan, so exhaustively explained in the foregoing document, than General Hood completed his arrangements to move his army. It began inarching on the morning of the 22d. General Beauregard, who had instructed Lieut.-General Taylor and the chiefs of the quartermaster's arid commissary's departments to meet him at Gadsden, remained there to confer about the necessary prepara tions to carry out the new change of base to Tuscumbia. The pontoon-bridge across the Coosa, forgotten in the hurry of de parture, was, by order of General Beauregard, removed, and sent at once to General Hood.

* See Appendix.

General Beauregard was not long in discovering that this change of base was more difficult to make than the change from Jones-boro' to Jacksonville had been; for the Mobile and Ohio road, from Okalona to Corinth, contrary to General Hood's statement, was in a very dilapidated condition. So was the road from Corinth to Cherokee, near Tuscumbia. For a long period it had been but little used, and meantime it had been greatly injured by both armies.

On the 22d General Beauregard instructed Lieut-General Tay lor to order General Forrest's division and Roddy's brigade of cavalry to report to General Hood, between Guntersville and De catur.* Forrest was then about Jackson, Tenn., and Roddy at or about Tuscaloosa, guarding the Tennessee River from Eastport, on the left, to the eastward beyond Guntersville. On the 23d he ad dressed a communication to Lieut-General Taylor, relative to the new change of base to Tuscumbia, and what he desired him to do in that connection.f

Having now completed all his orders and instructions, General Beauregard, on the 24th, started to rejoin General Hood's army, which he supposed to be then crossing the Tennessee River, at or near Guntersville. On his way thither he stopped at the home of the young heroine Miss Emma Sanson, who within that year had intrepidly piloted General Forrest during his pursuit of Gen eral Grierson's raiding expedition through North Alabama. This young woman had received a unanimous vote of thanks and a grant of public lands from the General Assembly of the State of Alabama. She was absent at the time of General Beauregard's visit, and he missed seeing her.

When he had gone nearly two-thirds of the distance to Gun tersville, to his surprise and disappointment, he was informed that General Hood had turned off to the left, on the road to Decatur, some fifty miles westward, again neglecting to report the impor tant change in his programme, despite General Beauregard's im pressive remarks to him at Gadsden, on the occasion of his former omission of a like nature. When he finally joined General Hood, on the 27th, at Decatur, which was then being invested by the Army of Tennessee, General Beauregard cautioned him anew, in a more pointed manner, against the irregularity of his official

* See letter to General Taylor, in Appendix. t Ibid.

proceedings, and openly expressed his regret that Hood had gone so far down the river to effect a crossing—a movement which would increase the distance to Stevenson by nearly one hundred miles, and give Sherman more time to oppose the march in force.

General Hood said that he had understood, when half-way to Guntersville, that the crossing at that point was strongly guarded by the Federals, and that there was no crossing-point below nearer than Decatur, which he thought he could take without serious loss. General Beauregard was of opinion that the capture of Decatur should have been accomplished by a coup de main at daybreak, for the enemy, now aware of General Hood's presence and intention, would be prepared to meet and resist him.

The reconnoissances that day showed that the place was too strong and too well garrisoned to be assaulted; and, again chang ing his plan, General Hood now resolved to attempt a crossing below Decatur, half-way to Courtland, where, he had been in formed, he would find a favorable point of passage.

On the afternoon of the 28th the Engineers reported no favor able point nearer than Courtland, some twenty miles to the west. The army, therefore, left, on the 29th, for that town, which was about seventy miles distant from Guntersville. Already four or five days had been lost. Upon arriving there the Engineers, who had been sent on ahead of the troops, reported that a cross ing could be effected, but not without difficulty.

At this moment, when General Beauregard hoped that the long-expected movement would at last be begun, General Hood in formed him that he feared he had not, provisions enough left to go into Middle Tennessee with; that many of his men were again shoeless, or nearly so, and that it would be very imprudent to commence a new campaign in that lame condition. He said he would, therefore, prefer going on to Tuscumbia, twenty miles far ther west, where, from all reports, there was a good crossing-place, only ten or twelve miles from Cherokee, the terminus of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Over that railroad he could get all necessary supplies in a few days. It would be impossible to express General Beauregard's chagrin at such an outlook. He began to fear that the army would never reach Middle Tennessee, and so informed General Hood, who could no longer conceal the fact that he also looked at his enterprise rather despondingly. At Tuscumbia the army would be about ninety miles from Gun-

tersville, a distance which it would be necessary to double in order to get back to that point, making it, in all, one hundred and eighty miles.

It was now too late to change General Hood's plan, and the wisest policy was to make the best of it. General Beau regard, therefore, offered no opposition, but strongly advised that every thing should be hurried forward with the greatest expedition ; and that, instead of marching to the eastward after crossing the river, the army should begin a campaign in Middle Tennessee, there to capture or destroy the scattered detached forces of the enemy, while most of our cavalry should be sent to tear up the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, commencing at Bridgeport, or as near that place as practicable; that meanwhile General Hood with his army should endeavor to reach Nashville with the least possible delay, and capture its garrison, under General Thom as, with the large supplies there collected for his forces and those of General Sherman. Such an active campaign, if commenced at once, would compel the latter to return immediately into Mid dle Tennessee to defend his line of communication. General Hood readily concurred in those views, and expressed his convic tion that he could carry them out successfully.*

Fortunately, before leaving Gadsden, on the 24th, General Beau-regard had given all necessary orders for the repairing of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads, and had directed that all available railroad stock should be transferred to them. General Taylor had promised to give the matter his special attention, and to turn in that direction all the supplies then moving towards Jacksonville, Ala. Thus, General Beaure-gard hoped to see the Army of Tennessee resupplied and in a fair way to carry out the campaign planned for it. He proposed crossing the river with the troops, and then leaving General Hood in sole command, for he remembered the words of Napo leon when the Directory, in 1796, offered to send him a general of greater experience, to assist him in the campaign of Ital} r : u One bad head in command of an army in the field is always better than two good ones."

* See General Bcauregard's letter to General Cooper, November Cth, 1804, to be found in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLI.

Arrival of General Hood's Army at Tuscurnbia, October 30th.—General Beau-regard Requests a Summary of his Plans of Future Operations.—Request not Complied with.—General Beauregard Inspects the Banks of Tennes see River.—Advises an Address to the People of Tennessee. — Heavy Rains Begin on the 2d of November.—General Hood takes up his Head quarters at Florence on the 10th.—Telegrams to the War Department.— Telegram of General Forrest.—Letter of General Beauregard to General Cooper.—Advice to General Hood Concerning the Disorderly Conduct of Scouts.—Despatch from General Taylor.—Further Advance of the Enemy.—Procrastination of General Hood.—He Declines to send Cavalry to Support General Wheeler.—General Beauregard Urges him to Greater Activity.—General Beauregard Leaves Tuscumbia for Corinth.—Again Urges an Immediate Advance.—Leaves Corinth for Macon. — General Hood Moves on the 21st of November.—The Enemy Falls Back.—Attack of his Works in Front of Franklin.—Our Loss Severe.—Letter to General Beauregard from President Davis.—Comments upon it.—General Beaure gard Leaves for Augusta.—His Letter of December Gth to the President. —Inadmissibility of the Plea that Mr. Davis Lacked Timely Notice of General Hood's Proposed Movements.

The army reached Tuscumbia on the afternoon of the 30th of October, and on that day General Hood received the following communication:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

TUSCUMBIA, October 30^, 18G4.

" General, —General Beauregard desires that you will forward him, for the information of the War Department, a brief summary of the operations of your army from the date of its departure from Jonesboro', Ga., to the present time; also a concise statement of your plans of future operations, intended for the same office.

" I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G. " General J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc."

For reasons which cannot be explained this request was not readily complied with.

On the 31st of the same month General Beauregard inspected the banks of the Tennessee, to select suitable positions for the erection of field-works for the protection of the troops while crossing at that point, intending also to fortify the opposite bank,

to facilitate a recrossing, should one become necessary; and, with a view to stimulate the enthusiasm of the people of that part of Tennessee which was about to be occupied by the army, he made the following suggestion to General Hood:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

TUSCUMBIA, October 31s*, 1864.

"General, —General Beauregard directs me to ask your attention to the pro priety of your publishing an address to the people of Tennessee on entering that State.

" One coming from you, as commander of the army, and one from Governor Harris, he regards as highly important.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G. "General J. B. HOOD, Couadg., etc., etc."

Meanwhile the pontoon-bridge was commenced; it was com pleted on the 2d of November. General Steven D. Lee's corps was then thrown across the river, and immediately started some defensive lines around Florence. These were inspected, on the 5th, by General Beauregard, who materially modified all that part of them which was commanded by a height in front. Two di visions of General S. D. Lee's corps were now advanced on Shoal Creek, about seven or eight miles north of Florence.

Unfortunately, heavy rains began on the 2d, and lasted for many days. The river rose rapidly, and the roads became impas sable. Part of the bridge being submerged, Cheatham's corps, which was to have crossed shortly after Lee's, was unavoidably delayed.

General Hood moved his headquarters to Florence on the 10th of November, preparatory to taking the offensive. On the 31st of the preceding month (October) he had sent this despatch to the Secretary of War:

" Florence is in our possession, and the pontoon-bridge is being laid down. I hope to be able to advance across the river so soon as supplies can be ob tained."

On the same day General Beauregard had sent General Cooper a corresponding telegram, in the following words :

" TUSCUMBIA, ALA., November 3d, 1864: 9 A. M. " General S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Ya.:

" Part of the army occupied Florence, but want of supplies and bad weather have delayed forward movement, which will be resumed as soon as practicable.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day General Forrest, telegraphing via Paris, West Tennessee, and Corinth, Miss., forwarded to General Beauregard a despatch, thus describing the result of his encounter with the enemy:

"My batteries, on the Tennessee River, have engaged the enemy all day with great success. Two gunboats and two transports were destroyed in at tempting to pass. One gunboat and two transports are now in my possession, ready for use; but the other gunboat and transport floated down the river in a disabled condition, and both will be either destroyed or captured, as my troops are still in pursuit. There is one gunboat and three transports still above my batteries, all of which will be destroyed or captured."

To this General Beauregard immediately replied, as follows:

" TUSCUMBIA, November 3d, 1864: 2 p. M. " General N. B. FORREST :

" I congratulate you on your brilliant success. We hold Florence as a base to operate, in three or four days,* towards Lawrenceburg or Waynesboro 1 . Meet the army soon as possible in direction of either place, making first a demonstration towards Columbia, if practicable, to distract the enemy, now supposed marching from Nashville and Chattanooga. Send up river to Flor ence, if possible, all surplus captured supplies."

This was addressed to General Forrest at Johnsonville, Tenn., via Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., by couriers, and shows what were General Beauregard's expectations on the 3d of November.

His letter to General Cooper, dated November 6th, is more ex plicit, and gives a full and correct statement of the amended plan of operations adopted on the 3d, after thorough discussion of the subject by Generals Beauregard and Hood. The reader will, no doubt, peruse it with interest:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

TUSCUMBIA, November 6th, 1804.

" General, —I have the honor to enclose for the information of the War Office copy of a communication addressed to General J. B. Hood, on the 30th ultimo, asking a summary of the operations of his army from Jonesboro', Ga., to that date, and for a statement of his plan of future operations for the authorities at Richmond, accompanied by his reply, on the 3d instant, enclosing copies of his telegrams to the Government during the period re ferred to. I renewed my request on the 4th instant for his plan, and on the same day received a reply, stating that' it was not possible for him to furnish

* General Beauregard thought the movement would begin on the 7th at latest.

any plan of future operations, as so much depended on the movements of the enemy; the matter having been fully discussed between General Beauregard and himself.' 1 forward copies of three letters and their several enclosures.

"The plan referred to, which was discussed and approved on the 3d, sub ject to such modifications as the movements of the enemy might determine, was to move as soon as possible from Florence into Middle Tennessee, towards Lawrenceburg, thence to Pulaski or Columbia, as circumstances might indi cate. General Forrest, with his command, was ordered to form a junction with the Army of Tennessee, in the direction of Lawrenceburg or Waynes-boro', first, however, making a demonstration towards Columbia, to distract the enemy, then reported to be advancing towards Pulaski and Rogersville from Nashville and Chattanooga.

"Brigadier-General Jackson, with two brigades of his cavalry and one of Wheeler's, was to cover and support the right flank of the army, while Briga dier-General Roddy, with his command, was to cover the line of communica tion from Tuscumbia to Corinth, and thence towards Meridian.

"Major-General Wheeler, with his command, was to guard the country from Jackson's right to Atlanta.

" The portable pontoon-bridge which has been thrown across the Tennessee at Florence will move with the army, and will be replaced as soon as prac ticable by a permanent pontoon-bridge at the most suitable point for that object.

"Proper defensive works are now being constructed at Florence, by Lee's corps, for the protection of the bridge, and to secure the recrossing of the army, in the event of disaster.

" Various points along the river, from Florence down, arc being examined for the purpose of selecting proper sites for batteries, and strengthened by torpedoes in the river, to prevent the passage of the enemy's gunboats and transports.

" Points below Eastport, where the army may recross in case of necessity, have been ordered to be examined and chosen, the roads to be repaired, and the necessary defensive works constructed. The attention of Major-General Smith, Chief-Engineer, has been specially directed to Savannah, Clifton, and Decatur, Tenn., as points well suited for the purposes indicated.

" In the mean time minute and careful investigations have been made as to the condition of the roads in Middle Tennessee, and also of those districts best able to furnish supplies of provisions and forage for the army.

" It is now contemplated that the army will cross the river and take up its line of march on the 9th instant, with fifteen days' rations. Lee's corps is now on the north side of the river, in front of Florence, two divisions being en camped on Shoal Creek, six or seven miles from that town.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.

" General S. COOPER, A. and L-Geiil., Richmond, Va."

Careful instructions were given, on the 9th, to Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, by General Beauregard as to the

proper mode of protecting the Tennessee River against any at tempted passage of the enemy's gunboats.*

The day following he addressed a letter to General Hood, ad vising him to regulate, by specific orders, the system of scouting then in practice by the commands of Generals Wheeler, Roddy, and Forrest, in rear of the front line of the army, and suggested that cavalry scouts should be furnished with all necessary sup plies, thus preventing the depredations on private property much complained of at the time, and so ruinous to discipline and order.f

These instructions, and others verbally given, appeared to pro duce an unfortunate effect upon General Hood, who began to chafe under the supervision exercised over him by General Beau-regard, and to fear his superior influence with the army. That supervision would have been much greater and more direct had General Beauregard not perceived this growing sensitiveness, and had he not also been thoroughly aware that any open interference on his part would bring upon him the censure of the War De partment.^;

His letters of November 12th, through his Chief of Staff, and of November 15th, written by himself, show what caution and considerateness he used towards the Commander of the army, and how far from his thought it was to overshadow him in any way.§ But, in his opinion, General Hood's preparations for the offensive were so slow and hesitating as to jeopardize the object of the cam paign ; and he therefore, in all his interviews with General Hood, urged the necessity of an immediate advance and greater rapidity in the movements of the troops. His intention, as he distinctly stated, was not to remain with or accompany the army, but merely to see it safely across the Tennessee and on the move forward. For it must be remembered that other important matters claimed his attention, in General Taylor's Department, along the Missis sippi River, where the enemy appeared to be moving his forces towards Memphis and Paducah. An early attack on Corinth was

* See General Beaurcgard's letter, in Appendix.

t See letter to General Hood by Colonel G. W. Brent, A. A. G., in Appendix.

I President Davis had authorized General Hood, should he deem it nec essary, to communicate directly with the War Department. See Chapter XXXIX.

§ See Appendix. See also, in Appendix, General Hood's letter of November 12th, complaining of interference on the part of General Beauregard.

also to be feared, as was a concentration in Middle Tennessee against General Hood's offensive advance.

From Selma, on the 15th, General Taylor forwarded him the following telegram :

"Following just received, dated Jonesboro', Ga., November 14th: ' Scouts and prisoners report enemy destroying railroad between Atlanta and Mari etta. Prisoners report Sherman in Atlanta, and that camp rumor says he will move towards Mobile or Savannah. Prisoners also report 15th and 20th Corps at Atlanta. Large lires observed in Atlanta for last three days.'"

On the 16th General Wheeler, through General Taylor, for warded the following telegram:

O O

" SELMA, 16th, via MERIDIAN. " To General BEAUREGAED :

" Will send Major-General Gardner to Corinth soon as possible. Following just received, dated Jouesboro', 15th : 'Enemy advanced early this morning, with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and wagon-train. Have driven our cavalry back upon this place. Strength not yet ascertained.' Enemy have burned many houses in Rome, Marietta, and Atlanta; also burned railroad and rail road bridges over Chattahoochee."

It now became evident that the inactivity of the Commander of the Army of Tennessee, after his arrival at Tuscumbia, on October 30th, had given Sherman ample time to repair the damage done to the railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga. lie had been able to send back to that fortified place all his sick and wounded, as well as his surplus guns; and to draw from Nashville and elsewhere the supplies of provisions, ammunition, wagons, and horses re quired by him for his movement to the Atlantic coast.

Jackson's division of cavalry being urgently needed to co operate witli and support General Wheeler's forces, General Beauregard now requested General Hood to send it without de lay.* By telegraph, on the 17th, Hood replied as follows:

u To General BEAUREGARD :

"To send Jackson's division at this time would materially endanger the success of the operation of this army. J. B. HOOD, General.''

This refusal General Beauregard thought ill-timed, for the army was still motionless at Florence, and its immediate safety could hardly depend upon the presence of Jackson's cavalry. Sherman had left Atlanta on the 15th, and news of his march,

* See telegram and letter of Colonel Brent, A. A. G., in Appendix.

in two columns, one on the Jonesboro' road, the other on the McDonough road, was being received from various quarters — through General Cobb as well as through General Wheeler. General Hood was aware of it, but could not be persuaded to comply, just then, with General Beauregard's request, nor did he appear anxious to make a forward movement, as is shown by his telegram of that date:

"FLORENCE, Nov. 11th, 1864. " To General BEAUREGARD :

" I have now seven clays' rations on hand, and need thirteen days' additional. Please use every effort to have these supplies pressed forward.

" J. B. HOOD, General."

Realizing the fact that nothing could be gained—while much might be lost—by further procrastination, and wishing to spur on General Hood to definitive action, General Beauregard, on the same day, sent him the following letter:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST, TUSCUMBIA, November \!th, 1864.

" General, —General Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal the enemy rapid and vigorous blows, striking him while thus dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance in Georgia.

" To relieve you from any embarrassment, while operating in North Ala bama and Middle Tennessee, he authorizes you to issue all such orders, in General Taylor's Department, you may dccrn necessary to secure the effi cient and successful administration and operation of your army, sending to Lieutenant-General Taylor, or whoever may be in command, copies of all such orders.

" He wishes you to send forthwith to Major-General Wheeler one brigade of cavalry of Jackson's division and the balance of that division as soon as it can be spared, should Sherman advance into Georgia; and also to advise General Wheeler that, in such a case, Clanton's brigade is subject to his orders.

" These Headquarters will be removed in the morning from this place to Montgomery, Alabama.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant.,

" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.

"General J. B. HOOD, Comdg., etc., etc."

Unable to await any longer the tardy preparations of General Hood for the offensive, General Beauregard left Tuscumbia on the 17th for Corinth, and reached the latter place on the next day. On his arrival there he forwarded various telegrams to the War Department, to Generals Hood, Taylor, Cobb, and

Wheeler, and lost no time in giving all necessary orders for proper defensive works and the collection there of as strong a garrison as could be had. He also gave most minute instructions

tr» "

for the prosecution of the road to Tuscumbia, and repairs of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, as far as needed, towards Meridian.

While at Corinth alarming telegrams from Generals Hardee, Taylor, Cobb, and Wheeler were received by him relative to Sherman's advance on Macon. He determined to leave at once for that locality, and telegraphed General Hood to take the offensive at once, in order to destroy or capture the Federal forces in Middle Tennessee, and compel Sherman to return to Kentucky, even should he have already reached the coast.

General Beauregard arrived at Macon on the 2rtth, after many annoying delays at Meridian, Demopolis, Selma, and Montgom ery, and had a long and important conference with Generals Cobb and Taylor. The latter had been ordered to Macon, to assist Generals Cobb and Hardee in the defence of Georgia. He was an officer of acknowledged merit, though not educated as a soldier, and could be relied upon whenever judgment and firm ness were requisite. General Hardee, who appreciated these qualities in General Taylor, had urgently solicited his presence at Savannah, to aid in preparing for Sherman's threatened ap proach. General Beauregard decided upon sending him at once, and soon afterwards forwarded some important communications to General Hardee concerning Sherman's movements, and what could best be done to anticipate them.*

At last, on the 21st of November, General Hood, being ready to march, started on his offensive campaign into Eastern Tennes see, which was destined not to be of long duration.

On his approach the enemy retired from Columbia, where an abundance of supplies was found ; and on the 30th our forces, having arrived in front of Franklin, made a vigorous attack, at 4 p. M. on that day, and drove the enemy from his outer line of temporary works to his inner works, which he abandoned dur ing the night, leaving his killed and wounded in our possession. He retreated rapidly towards Nashville, our cavalry still pursuing. It was then that General Chcatham failed to attack the enemy

* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's order to Licutenant-Gcncral R Taylor, aud letters of November 27th and 29th to General Hardee.

hi flank, while lie was filing away on his front, thus disregard ing the orders given him by General Hood and frustrating his plan. Our loss was severe, many of our best officers being among the killed and wounded. There fell Major-General Cle-burne and Brigadier-Generals John Adams, Gist, Strahl, and Grandberry. Among the wounded were Major-General John Brown and Brigadier-Generals Canty, Manigault, Quarles, Cock-erell, and Scott. Our aggregate loss amounted to 4-500.* It was a hard-fought battle, but, withal, a barren Confederate vic tory.

On the 30th of November, in response to his telegram of the 24th, General Beauregard received the following letter from President Davis:

" RICHMOND, Nov. 30?A, 1864. " General BEAUREGARD, care of Colonel Win. Brown :

" Yours of the 24th received. It is probable that the enemy, if short of supplies, may move directly for the coast. "When that is made manifest you will be able to concentrate your forces upon the one object, and I hope, if you cannot defeat his attempt, that you may reduce his army to such condition as to be ineffective for further operations. Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy he can scarcely change the plans for Sherman's or Grant's campaigns. They would, I think, regard the occupation of Tennes see and Kentucky as of minor importance. JEFFERSON DAVIS."

This letter reached General Beauregard on or about the 4th of December, on liis way from Macon to Augusta, where he arrived on the 6th of December, at 6 p. M., after an uninterrupted and fa tiguing journey, from Montgomery, Macon, Milledgeville, Sparta, and Mayfield. He had thus retraced his steps and abandoned his intention of visiting Mobile, then seriously threatened, because of the reception, on December 2d, of a despatch from Richmond extending his Department to the Atlantic coast.

It will be seen by the foregoing communication from the Pres ident that, far from disapproving General Hood's tardy and per sistent effort to march into Tennessee and Kentucky, he was of opinion that nothing effective could be accomplished "until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy." Does this indicate opposition to the plan adopted? On the contrary: Let Hood go on, let him reach, as soon as he can, "the country proper of the

* See General Hood's telegram to General Beauregard, in Appendix. See also his report.

enemy;" then will he compel Sherman to retrace his steps and abandon his march into Georgia. Such is the only interpretation to be given to Mr. Davis's letter.

The President's despatch of November 7th to General Hood, quoted by the latter in his book,* as showing opposition to the campaign into Tennessee, is not more explicit and defined. In neither does Mr. Davis do more than set forth surmises and sup positions. In neither does he state any positive objection, or advise any positive course of action. Had he shown open oppo sition to the campaign, it is needless to say that General Hood could not and would not have undertaken it, nor, under such cir cumstances, would General Beauregard have given it his assent.

From all points of the vast Department over which General Beanregard now had command came despatches and communi cations and urgent calls for advice and assistance. Despondency and confusion were gradually taking possession of the public mind and gaining upon the commanders of the various menaced points in that part of the Confederacy. All that personal energy and unremitting attention could accomplish was done by General Beauregard to respond to the unceasing calls upon him. He neglected none, and, in all his answers and counsels, endeavored to instil that hope and confidence in our success which he him self, perhaps, no longer entertained. During his short stay at Augusta he met General Bragg, who had just arrived, and held with him a long conference in relation to the condition of affairs in General Hardee's Department. General Bragg promised heart ily to co-operate with him, but failed to do so when the occasion arose.

Before leaving Augusta to repair to Charleston, on his way to Savannah, General Beauregard wrote the following letter to

President Davis:

"AUGUSTA, GA., Dec. Qth, 18G4.

" To his Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederate States : "Sir, —Your letter of the 30th, acknowledging the receipt of my telegram

of the 24th of November, was received by me on the road from Macon to this

place.

"With the limited reliable means at our command I believe that all that

could be has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance

of Sherman's forces towards the Atlantic coast. That we have not, thus far,

* " Advance and Retreat, 1 ' p. 273. The telegram referred to will be found in the Appendix.

been more successful, none can regret more than myself, but he will doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, Charleston, and Savannah, and he may yet be made to experience serious loss before reaching the coast. On the 16th of November, when about leaving Tuscumbia, Ala., on a tour of inspection to Corinth, Miss., I was informed by General Hood of the report just received by him, that Sherman would probably move from Atlanta into Georgia. I instructed him at once to repeat his orders to General Wheeler to watcli closely Sherman's movements, and, sliould he move, as reported, to attack and harass him at all favorable points.

"I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Taylor, at Selma, Ala., to call on Governor Watts, of Alabama, and Governor Clarke, of Mississippi, for all the State troops that they could furnish, and, witli all the available movable forces of his Department, to keep himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice to the assistance of Mnjor-General Howell Cobb and Major-General G. W. Smith, who were then at or about Griffin, Ga., threatening Atlanta.

" I also telegraphed to General Cobb to call upon Governor Brown, of Georgia, and Governor Bonham, of South Carolina, for all the State troops that could be collected.

;t I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to Georgia, in the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement.

" On my arrival at Corinth, on the 18th of November, having been informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all necessary orders to meet the emergency, including an order to General Hood to send one division of cavalry (Jackson's) to reinforce Wheeler; but this order was suspended by him, his objection being that his cavalry could not be reduced without endan gering the success of his campaign in Tennessee, and that General Wheeler already had thirteen brigades under his command. I finally instructed him to send only one brigade, if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as already had been decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I ar rived on the 24th of November.

"'I did not countermand the campaign into Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:

" 1st. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa rivers, across Sand and Lookout mountains, had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, ren dered almost impassable to artillery and wagon-trains.

•' 2d. General Sherman, w r ith an army better appointed, had already the start of about two hundred and seventy-five miles, on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.

" 3d. To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage, and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.

"4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman would have opened to Thomas's forces the richest II.—19

portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capt ure of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

"5th. In October last, when passing through Georgia to assume command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by Governor Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about six thousand men. which, I supposed, might be doubled in a levy en masse.

"General Cobb informed me at the same time that at Augusta, Macon. and Columbus he had about six thousand five hundred local troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his reserve and convalescent camps, near Macon, two thousand five hundred more. Of these nine thou sand men he supposed about one-half, or five thousand, could be made avail able as movable troops for an emergency.

" To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta the State of Georgia would thus have probably seventeen thousand men, to which number must be added the thirteen brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, amounting to about seven thousand men. The troops which could have been collected from Sa vannah, South Carolina, and North Carolina, before Sherman's forces could reach the Atlantic coast, would have amounted, it was supposed, to about five thousand men.

" Thus, it was a reasonable supposition that about twenty-nine or thirty thousand men could be collected in time to defend the State of Georgia, and insure the destruction of Sherman's army, estimated by me at about thirty-six thousand effectives of all arms, their cavalry, about four thousand strong, being included in this estimate.

" Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I con cluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the de fence of Kentucky, and perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and. East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources. I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGAKD, General."

Thus was the President kept well advised, not only of the main movements of our forces, but of the reasons for them. General Beauregard thought it incumbent upon himself to do so, and. from the moment he assumed command of the almost boundless Department placed under him to the day he was relieved of it, never did he, in a single instance, fail to inform Mr. Davis, or the War Department, of every new phase of the military situation in that part of the country. Mr. Davis therefore gives an erroneous impression in his book, when he leads the reader to believe that he was unaware of General Hood's "change of plan" and did not oppose it, because when notified of the same "it was too late to

regain the space and time which had ~been lost."* It may have been "too late" on the 30th of November; but was it "too late" on the 12th of October, on the 22d and 24th of the same month, on the 3d and the 6th of November—dates at which both the President and the War Department, as we have seen, had been officially apprised of the successive alterations, deemed necessary by General Hood for the success of his campaign ? That General Beauregard had originated none of these alterations, and that he, more than once, deplored their adoption, has already been shown ; and that the President, though made conversant in season with General Hood's amended views and intentions, said nothing to indicate his disapproval of them, is no less a patent and well-established fact. His disapprobation, if not officially expressed and communicated to General Hood, could be of no import, was altogether futile, and might as well have been acquiescence. Mr. Davis never hesitated to reject the plans of any of the generals commanding in the field when, in his opinion, there was sufficient reason for so doing. He had gone farther, and, on former occa sions, had openly prohibited the execution of many a proposed military movement. We refer to the plan of aggressive campaign prepared by General Beauregard and submitted to the President, through Colonel Chestnut, on the 14th of July, 1861; to the ad vance urged at the Fairfax Court-house conference, in October of the same year, by Generals J. E. Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith; to the plan of campaign suggested, instead of the invasion of Pennsylvania, in 1863; to the proposed concerted attack upon Butler's forces, near Bermuda Hundreds, in May, 1864, by the whole of General Beauregard's army, reinforced by 10,000 men from the Army of Northern Virginia. On those occasions the President's purpose was clear, his opposition un mistakable. No doubt could exist as to his meaning. Here, on the contrary, so vague and equivocal, so liable to misconstruction, was the language made use of in Mr. Davis's despatch of Novem ber 7th to General Hood, and in his letter of November 30th to General Beauregard, that, had the campaign into Tennessee re sulted in success instead of disaster, this same despatch and this identical letter could have been interpreted to show Mr. Davis's unqualified approbation of the movement.

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 569. The italics are ours.

CHAPTER XLIL

General Beauregard's Effort to Reinforce General Hood by Drawing Troops from the Trans-Mississippi Department. — His Communication to General E. Kirby Smith. — lie Urges that Two or more Divisions be Sent to the Army of Tennessee, or that a Diversion be Made towards Missouri.—His Advice as to Best Method of Crossing. — War Department Authorizes Call upon General E. K. Smith.—General Beauregard Leaves for Charleston. — He again Presses General E. K. Smith to Forward his Troops. — The Latter Considers the Attempt Impracticable.—No Steps taken to Carry out the Movement.—General Beauregard Arrives in Charleston. — He visits Sa vannah on the 9th of December, and Consults with General Hardee as to the Defence of the City. — Returns to Charleston. — Letter to President Davis.— Detailed Orders to General Hardee. — Second Visit to Savannah. —General Sherman Demands the Surrender of the City on the 17th of December.—His Demand Refused.—Preparations for Evacuation.—Gen eral Beauregard's Confidential Circular. — He Goes to Pocotaligo. — Sends Memorandum of Orders to General Hardee. — Successful Evacuation of Savannah.—Want of Transportation for Troops.—General Beauregard in Charleston on the22d of December. — Prepares new Defensive Lines. — His Presence Required by General Hood.—He Applies to be Relieved of the Command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. — Request Granted. — His Last Letter to General Hardee.—He Leaves for Montgomery.

BEFORE following General Beauregard on his way to Savannah, ria Charleston, where he arrived on the evening of December 7th, it may be of interest to mention what he had endeavored to do immediately after the battle of Franklin, with a view to reinforce General Hood's army upon its entrance into Tennessee. He had cast his eyes towards the Trans-Mississippi Department, then under General E. Kirby Smith, and, with that rapidity of strategic conception so remarkable in him, had formed a plan of concentration which, if carried out in season, might have materi ally changed the aspect of our military affairs. We submit his communication to that effect:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 2d, 18G4. • ; To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept.:

"General, — You are probably aware that the Army of Tennessee, under Gen eral J. B. Hood, has penetrated into Middle Tennessee as far as Columbia, and

that the enemy is concentrating all his available forces, under General Thom as, to oppose him. It is even reliably reported that the forces, under General A. J. Smith, in Missouri, and Steele, in Arkansas, have been sent to reinforce Thomas. It becomes, then, absolutely necessary, to insure the success of Hood, either that you should send him two or more divisions, or that you should at once threaten Missouri, in order to compel the enemy to recall the reinforcements he is sending to General Thomas.

"I beg to urge upon you prompt and decisive action; the fate of the country may depend upon the result of Hood's campaign in Tennessee.

" Sherman's army has lately abandoned Atlanta, on a venturesome march across Georgia to the Atlantic coast about Savannah. His object is, besides the destruction of public and private property, probably to reinforce Grant, and compel Lee to abandon Richmond. It is hoped that Sherman may be prevented from effecting his object; but should it be otherwise, the success of Hood in Tennessee and Kentucky would counterbalance the moral effect of the loss of Richmond. Hence the urgent necessity of either reinforcing Hood, or making a diversion in Missouri in his favor.

" Hoping that you may give us the desired assistance,

"I remain, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

A copy of the foregoing letter was immediately forwarded to Richmond for the information of the War Department, and this telegram preceded it:

"MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 2rf, 1864: 9 P.M. " His Ex. President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va., via Tallahassee, Fla.:

" Generals Steele and A. J. Smith are reported to be reinforcing General Thomas at Nashville. Cannot General E. Kirby Smith reinforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee, or take offensive in Missouri ? His assistance is abso lutely necessary at this time. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The next day, and while General Beauregard was already on his way to Georgia, there to gather tip, from every quarter, all available forces to check Sherman's advance, he caused the fol lowing letter to be sent to General E. IL Smith, in order to give him all possible facilities for successfully executing the transfer of his troops to the eastern side of the Mississippi:

"HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

MONTGOMERY, Dec. 3d, 18G4. u To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Coindg. Trans-Miss. Dept.:

"General, —I am this day in receipt of telegram from General Beauregard (who is now en route to the Atlantic coast), dated Opelika, Ala., Dec. 3d, in which he directs that I recommend for your favorable consideration that de tached floating booms, armed with torpedoes, in addition to light batteries on shore, be placed in the Mississippi River, to prevent the enemy's gunboats from

passing or offering annoyance at the point that you may select for the transfer of troops to this side, should you deem it expedient to make such transfer.

" These booms should be triangular in shape, about 40 feet in length by about 20 feet base; should be made of five longitudinal pieces and five or six cross ones, strongly halved into and on top of the former. The booms should be anchored across the river, about forty feet apart from centre to centre, and tor pedoes should be anchored in the open space between them.

"A second row of booms, breaking openings with the first, should be anchored about one hundred feet below the first row, being in the same manner as the former armed with torpedoes.

" The torpedoes should be about six feet below the surface of the water. The booms should be firmly anchored, with the apex of the triangle up stream. " I have the honor to be, General, respectfully, your obt. scrvt.,

" GEORGE WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.''

The Secretary of War, the Hon. James A. Seddon, had answered General Beauregard's telegram to the President, and, though lie doubted General E. Kirby Smith's willingness to respond to the emergency, had, however, authorized the call upon him.* But his reply reached Headquarters after General Beauregard's de parture from Montgomery. When the War Department was apprised of the fact the following telegram was forwarded to

Lieutenant-General Taylor :

" MERIDIAN, Dec. Ut7i, 1864.

"By Telegraph from Richmond, 7^, via Mobile, 13th.

"To Lieut.-Genl. TAYLOR:

" Transmit by most rapid means the following despatch to General E. Kirby Smith, Shreveport, La.: 'If practicable, cross troops. Aid General Hood, or divert forces from operating against him in Tennessee. If crossing be im possible, cannot you make demonstrations to withdraw troops of the enemy?

" ' We have intelligence that Steele, with 15,000 men, had reached Memphis, and was proceeding to aid Thomas, commanding the enemy in operations against Hood. The campaign in the Trans-Mississippi has ceased or been abandoned, while the enemy concentrates east of the Mississippi.

'"The co-operation of your troops should, in some force, avail us.'

" JAS. A. SEDDON, Secy. War."

To avoid all possible misunderstanding and present the case in a stronger light, Colonel G. W. Brent, A. A. G., transmitted to

* Mr. Seddon's telegram to General Beauregard read: " Your telegram of the 2d inst. is referred to me for answer. If General E. K. Smith can now act as you suggest, it would be well he should do so. You are authorized so to inform him, and to request his prompt attention. He has, however, failed heretofore to respond to like emergencies, and no plans should be based on his compliance." The telegram was dated Ilichmond, December 4th, 18G4.

General E. K. Smith, through Dr. Macken, special courier of the War Department, a duplicate copy of General Beauregard's first letter, with this additional communication:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 13th, 1864. •' To General E. KIRBY SMITH, Comclg. Trans-Miss. Dept.:

u General, —On the 2d inst. General Beauregard transmitted to you, by his aide-de-camp, Captain Toutant, a letter requesting that you would, without delay, send to the support of General Hood two or more divisions, or threaten Missouri, to distract the enemy, so as to induce him to recall his reinforcements to Thomas. Since that date General Beauregard has been ordered to the East, and is now absent, and I am in receipt of a telegram from the Hon. Secretary of War directing General Beauregard to order the movement indicated in the letter of the 3d instant.

"In the absence of the General I transmit you a copy of the said letter, and request a speedy compliance with it. Your prompt attention and action are not only required by the order of the Secretary of War, but by the exigencies of the public service.

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obt. scrvt,

" GEORGE W. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."

Thus, it is made apparent that General Beauregard's earnest appeal to General E. Iv. Smith was approved, and promptly acted upon, by the War Department. General Hood in his book also discloses the fact of his great anxiety to receive reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Department. He writes:

" The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transfer-once of troops to the Army of Tennessee from Texas—[why from Texas, which would have caused additional delay?]—and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi River." *

But no "glad tidings" came. General E. Iv. Smith could not be moved to action. He allowed exaggerated rumors and obsta cles, trifling in their nature, to prevent him from adopting the step which had been so earnestly urged upon him. And here we may appropriately remind the reader that, scarcely one month before, General Forrest, with his light batteries alone, had capt ured and destroyed several of the enemy's gunboats and trans ports on the Tennessee River—thus proving that they were by no means so formidable as reported. It is to be regretted that General E. Kirby Smith, although, in many respects, an officer

* " Advance and Retreat," p. 299.

of merit, did not exhibit the energy, daring, and determination that so eminently distinguished General Forrest. Had the latter, and not the former, been then in command of the Trans-Missis sippi Department, what a difference might have been made in the result of the war! *

General Beauregard remained only one day in Charleston ; and, as General Ilardee was at that time in Savannah, he left on the Sth for the latter place, stopping on his way at Pocotaligo, to confer with Major-General Sam. Jones. lie strongly advised the driving back of the enemy from his too close proximity to the Charleston Railroad. At 7 A.M., on the 9th, he reached Sa vannah. After a careful study of the situation and a full con sultation with General Ilardee, relative to the defence and pos sible evacuation of that city, he wrote out the following order and gave it to General Ilardee that evening before taking leave

of him:

" SAVANNAH, Dec, Qth, 18G4. " Lieut.-General >V. J. HARDEE, Comdg., etc., etc.:

"General,— It is my desire, after the consultation that has taken place, that YOU shall hold this city as in your judgment it may be advisable to do, bearing in mind that, should you have to decide between a sacrifice of the garrison and city, you will preserve the garrison for operations elsewhere.

"Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

The enemy was now so near the railroad, between Savannah and the river, that General Beauregard was compelled to ascend the stream as far as the bridge — a distance of some fifteen miles— before he could safely take the train, which he did on the 10th, at 1 A.M., being accompanied by Colonels Otey and Roman and Major James B. Eustis. At 5 r. M. on that day he was again in Charleston, and the next morning caused the following order to be published:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

CHARLESTON, Dec. llth, 18G4. " General Orders, No. —:

"1. This Military Division having been extended by his Excellency the President to embrace the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Flor ida, it is announced, for the information of all concerned.

"2. In urgent cases district and subdistrict commanders are authorized to

* See, in Appendix, General E. Kirby Smith's reasons for not acceding to General Beauregard's call upon him.

communicate directly with these Headquarters, transmitting immediately copies of said correspondence to their proper Commanders.

" By command of General Beauregard.

" JNO. M. OTEY, A. A. G."

The outlook for the immediate future of the Confederacy had become very alarming. Hood's army, near Nashville, was seriously threatened by Thomas, who was hourly awaiting his coming re inforcements. Sherman, almost unimpeded in his inarch through Georgia, had all but reached his destination. News had also been received that two corps of Grant's army, reinforced by cav alry, were advancing in North Carolina, via "Weldon, with a large train of wagons; and General Beauregard was asked for troops with which to oppose the reported movement.*

In a long and explicit letter to President Davis, General Beaure gard thus explained the situation in General Ilardee's Department:

" CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. IWi, 18C4.

" To his Excellency President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.: " (Confidential.)

11 Sir, —I arrived here, on my way to Savannah, on the evening of the 7th, and remained until the following afternoon, to obtain information relative to the present condition of this Department.

"The Second and Third Subdistricts, embracing Charleston and its defences, were reported to me short of provisions and ammunition for a siege. I arrived at Pocotaligo during the night of the 8th, and after spending several hours in conference with General Jones as to the state of affairs in that vicinity, I pro ceeded to Savannah, arriving there on the morning of the 9th.

" General Jones informed me that, after collecting all that could be safely spared from the other points in the District of South Carolina, his forces consisted of about five thousand five hundred effectives of all arms, of which about three thousand were militia and reserves.

" Immediately upon my arrival at Savannah I called upon General Hardee, who communicated to me the following information:

" 1st. That the enemy, supposed to be from thirty-five thousand to forty thousand men of all arms, were advancing on the River road, Middle Ground road, Central Railroad, and Louisville road, and were then reported to be about ten miles from the city, or about six miles from General Ilardee's inter mediate line of works, known as the Overflow Line; and that a portion of the enemy's troops was reported about three miles from Monteith Station, on the Charleston Railroad.

" 2d. That his forces in and around Savannah, south of the Savannah River, consisted of about ten thousand effectives of all arms, about one-half of which were reserves and militia; that the main body occupied the works and lines

* See General Whiting's telegram, in Appendix.

guarding the city and its approaches, while the rest was then engaged in delay ing the advancing columns of the enemy, which he supposed, however, would reach the front of his lines that day or the next; hence he had given orders for all extra trains on the Gulf Railroad and Charleston Railroad to be sent in the direction of Charleston as soon as practicable.

"3d. That on the north side of the Savannah River, and along New River, the number of troops was small, and only just sufficient to guard the works there constructed.

"4th. That Wheeler's cavalry was mostly operating in rear of the enemy, south of the Savannah River.

"5th. That in Savannah there were about thirty days' provisions for the forces in and around the city.

"I advised General Hardee, in accordance with previous instructions, to defend the city so long as consistent with the safety of his command, and sug gested that he should make such preparations and arrangements—which I regretted to discover had not been made—as might be necessary for the evacu ation of the city at the proper time, should that necessity arise. With these views General Hardee coincided. I particularly called his attention to the ne cessity of keeping open his communications with Charleston, via the Screven's Ferry Causeway and the Charleston Railroad, the latter being already partially interrupted by a battery of the enemy, near Coosawhatchic. I informed Gen eral Hardee that I would return at once to Pocotaligo, to advise with General Jones relative to re-opening, without delay, the communications at Coosaw-hatchie, and preventing their further interruption.

"When leaving Savannah, at 9 P.M., I received intelligence that the enemy had approached the railroad, between the city and the river, so as to render the running of my train dangerous. I therefore took the cars at the bridge, which I reached by steamboat. On arriving at Pocotaligo, early the next morning, I conferred with General Jones as intended, and came on to Charleston, to furnish him with all available means required by him.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGAKD, General/'

On the 13th, 14th, and 15th important telegrams* were ex changed between Generals Beanregard and Hardee — the latter alluding to the critical duties now pressing upon him, and asking for additional orders, the former referring to his despatches of the Stli and his letter of instructions of the 9th. He advised anew the immediate repair of the Screven's Ferry Causeway, and the establishment of a pontoon-bridge across the Savannah River, with flat-boats, which, he thought, could be impressed from neigh boring rice-plantations. lie directed General Ilardee's special at tention to the necessity, under all circumstances, of maintaining

* See Appendix.

his communications with General Jones at Pocotaligo; explained his views as to the best method of obstructing, by means of trees and torpedoes, the creeks east of Screven's Ferry; and recom mended, at places which he designated, the construction of rifle-pits and batteries for field-pieces. He also made it clear that, in case it became necessary to abandon Savannah, the river should be obstructed as far down as possible, in order to protect the country and railroad from Charleston to Augusta, and place either or both beyond the reach of a flank attack. On the 16th, at 8 A. M., in answer to General Hardee's telegram of 3.30 r. M. of the previous day, he stated that he must be where most urgently called; that each officer should now bear his own responsibility and do for the best. He promised, however, to leave that day for General Jones's headquarters, and immediately afterwards for Savannah — which he did, reaching the latter place at eleven o'clock at night.

The next day (the 17th) was an eventful day for Savannah. General Sherman, elated by the success of his march through Georgia, addressed the following communication to General liar-dee:

" IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, Dec. 17th, 1864.

" General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, Comdg. Confederate Forces in Savannah, Ga.: "General, —You have doubtless observed from your status at Roseden that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up Ogcechec to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance, necessary to the reduction of Savannah. I have already re ceived guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as for as the heart of the city. Also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by \vhicli the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied.

" I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of Savannah, and its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time your answer before opening with heavy ordnance.

" Should you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison. But should I be forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army, burning to avenge a great national wrong they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war. I enclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the surrender of the town of Resaca, Ga., to be used by you for what it is worth.* ;i I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

" W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, U. S. A."

* This demand of General Hood for the surrender of Resaca (October 12th,

Without loss of time, and after full consultation \vith General Beauregard, an answer was forwarded by General Hardee. Be fore submitting it to the reader it is proper to say that General Sherman's threats, should an unconditional surrender be refused, were striking indications of what must have been his premedi tated design with regard to the "large cities" of the South—and villages and hamlets—whose misfortune it might be to fall into his power. This letter of General Sherman is a stumbling-block in the way of his later assertions, and conflicts with the statements he has seen fit to make since the war about the burning of Colum bia. But we shall have occasion to discuss this subject hereafter.

General Hardee's answer was clear, firm, to the point. It was written with moderation and dignity, and in that respect was in contrast with the communication of the Federal commander.

It read as follows :

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

SAVANNAH, GA., Dec. ltth, 1864. " Major-Genl. "W. T. SHERMAN, Comdg. Federal Forces near Savannah, Ga.:

"General, — I have to acknowledge receipt of a communication from you of this date, in which you demand ' the surrender of Savannah and its de pendent forts,' on the ground that you ' have received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the city,' and for the further reason that you ' have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by •which the people and garrison can be supplied.' You add, that should you be 'forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starva tion, you will then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will make little effort to restrain your army,' etc., etc.

"The position of your forces, a half-mile beyond the outer line for the land defence of Savannah, is, at the nearest point, at least four miles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line are both intact.

" Your statement that you have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied is incorrect. I am in free and in constant communication with my Department.

18G4,) contained the following words: "If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken." We do not intend to discuss the propriety of such demands of surrender, or to approve of the tone characterizing them; but it should be remembered that General Hood was addressing an invading enemy, whose passage through the South had already been marked by acts of cruelty, pillage, and devastation. Whereas General Sherman was the commander of that invading army, whose conduct at Atlanta, after its surrender, had aroused and justified a feeling of resentment on the part of the commander of the Confederate forces.

" Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts is refused.

" With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of your letter of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with, I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from them in future.

" I have the honor to be. very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

" W. J. HARDEE, Lieut-General."

The War Department had approved General Beauregard's views as to the stand to be made at Savannah. It had even in dicated that the same programme might be adopted with regard to Charleston. The following telegram* is given in support of this averment:

"RICHMOND, Dec. 17th, 18G4. " To General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

" The spirit of your instructions to General Hardec, relative to the defences of Savannah, is approved. It is hoped Savannah may be successfully de fended. But the defence should not be too protracted, to the sacrifice of the garrison. The same remarks are applicable to Charleston. We must rely upon your judgment to make the fullest possible defence consistently with

the safety of the garrisons.

" S. COOPER, A. and Insp.-Genl."

This approbation was a cause of no small relief to General Beauregard, and allowed him more latitude than he would other wise have had.

Active, urgent preparations for the evacuation were instantly begun. It was now r but a question of a few days. So little had yet been done that General Beauregard feared there would be insufficient time to save most of the public property, and destroy what must otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy. Most of the orders then issued were not only suggested by him, but, in many instances, written under his dictation.f His memoran dum for the location of troops, dated December 18th, and left with General Hardee, shows the amount of work accomplished during his last visit to the invested city. On the 19th he com pleted the order relative to the final evacuation, which was forwarded to the different commands, headed " Confidential

* It was a ciphered telegram.

t See Colonel John. G. Clarke's letter to General Beauregard, in Appendix.

Circular," and signed by General Hardee, as Commander of the Department. We refer the reader to this memorandum and to this circular, which will both be found in the Appendix to the present chapter.

General Hardee remained at Savannah, to carry out the dis positions taken by General Beauregard; and the latter, on the same day, left that city to confer with his District and Subdis-trict Commanders, and advise with them as to the best methods of putting his plans into execution.

The next day he caused the following letter to be sent to Gen eral Hardee:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 20ZA, 1864. " Lieut.-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg., etc., etc.:

"General, —I am directed by the General Commanding to forward to you the accompanying memorandum* of orders, which he wishes you to issue immediately after the evacuation of Savannah. They are designed to carry out his views as to the best disposition of troops under your command for the defence of Charleston and the State of South Carolina generally—Savan nah being in the possession of the enemy.

" Major-General G. W. Smith's command (about two thousand men) being sent to Augusta, will leave, of the troops coming from Savannah, about six thousand live hundred, which, added to those under the immediate command of Major-General Sam. Jones, on the line of the Savannah and Charleston "Railroad—say about five thousand five hundred, exclusive of those in and around Charleston—make about twelve thousand troops. Of these he thinks there should be about two thousand five hundred to guard the left bank of the Combahce, with about one thousand in reserve at a central point between the Combahee and the Ashcpoo.

" About three thousand five hundred in the Fourth Subdistrict, with about one thousand of them in reserve at or near Adams's Run and Green Pond, and about five thousand in the Second and Third Subdistricts, in addition to those already there. The cavalry guarding the left (or coast) flank, and the front and right flanks, should, of course, be used to support the troops to which they are nearest.

" The orders indicated in the accompanying memorandum will make a distribution approximating as nearly to these numbers as circumstances will permit. In carrying them out it will be necessary that you should send promptly the troops carried to Hardecville by Brigadier-General Taliaferro to rejoin their respective brigades, and the detached companies or battalions of South Carolina reserves and militia to report to Brigadier-General Chest nut, at Grahamville; and the companies of the 3d South Carolina Cavalry,

* We invite the reader's special attention to the memorandum above re ferred to. See Appendix.

under Colonel Colcock, to unite with those now in front of Grahamville and near Coosawhatchie and Pocotaligo and Kirk's squadron, together with the section of horse artillery attached to the 3d South Carolina Cavalry.

"Endeavor to bring and keep together, as far as practicable, the troops of the same organization.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" A. R. CHISOLM, A. D. C."

While the foregoing communication was being penned this telegram was forwarded to Richmond:

" POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 20th, 1864. " President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:

" General Hardee reports that about fifteen hundred of the enemy's infan try crossed yesterday Savannah River, from Argyle Island to Izard's planta tion. Wheeler holds them in check. General Hardee will probably evacuate Savannah to-night. His first defensive line will be in rear of the Combahee. Wheeler's cavalry will guard country thence to the Savannah River. All quiet here. No report from General Hood since 28th of November.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

He now ordered that the Savannah River Railroad bridge and trestle-work on the Carolina side should be immediately and thoroughly destroyed, and that Generals Wheeler and Taliaferro should be instructed to that effect. Through Captain Courtney, at Hardeevillc, he also communicated with Commodore Hunter, and pointed out the necessity of commanding the Savannah River by his gunboat, as long as possible, from the enemy's battery to a point as far up the stream as navigation would permit.

During the night of the 20th, and in strict obedience to Gen eral Beauregard's instructions, Savannah was successfully evac uated. President Davis was informed of the fact as follows:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec., 21st, 18G4.

" General Hardee reports to-day from Hardecville that evacuation of Sa vannah, as instructed by me,* was successfully accomplished last night. All the light artillery and most of the stores and munitions were brought off. The heavy guns were spiked and otherwise disabled. Line of defence behind

Combahee River will be taken as soon as possible.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day he sent this telegram to General Hardee:

"POCOTALIGO, S. C.,Dec. 21st, 1864. "I congratulate you on the success of the evacuation. You can delay

* See, in Appendix, Colonel Clarke's letters to General Bcaurcgard.

movement on Coinbahee line long enough to secure your supplies, provided you send your surplus artillery here and reinforce Fourth District and Charles ton, as per my memorandum of yesterday, forwarded to you to-day by staif-officer. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

" Lieut.-General HARDEE,

"Hardceville, S. C."

Sufficient transportation had not been prepared for the troops at Pocotaligo and Hardeeville, and for those whose movements were now so important for the defence of Charleston and other threatened points in South Carolina. General Beauregarcl, who was much disappointed at this want of forethought on the part of the district and subdistrict commanders, at once issued ener getic orders designed to remedy the evil, and among them the following:

"POCOTALIGO, S. G., Dec. 21st, 18G4. •' Lieut.-Colonel JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G.:

" Forces here and at Savannah are almost unprovided with transportation. Have impressed forthwith sufficient for three thousand men here, same in Fourth Subdistrict, and six thousand about Charleston. I leave about 2 p. M.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the same day the following telegram was also forwarded:

" POCOTALIGO, S. C., Dec. 21st, 18G4. " Lieut.-Colonel JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G. :

" Until further orders there must be three full trains on road from Coosaw-hatchie to Hardeeville, and three or four near here, awaiting troops for Fourth District and Charleston. See that it be done at once.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 22d General Beanregard was again in Charleston, his mind engrossed with the preparations to be made for the safety of that city and the establishment of new defensive lines for the State. It would uselessly encumber the narrative, to insert here the various orders he issued at that time. Most of them, as also part of his correspondence in that connection, will appear in the Appendix to the present chapter. His activity was quickened by the unofficial news of General Hood's disaster at or near Nash ville, and the desire, more than once expressed, since General Beauregard's arrival in Charleston, that he should visit, as soon as possible, the Army of Tennessee.

The three following letters show what minute attention Gen eral Beauregard was giving to the impending dangers of the moment:

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OP THE WEST,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 25th, 1864. " Lieut-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"General, —If the pontoons now at Pocotaligo are not required there, Gen eral Beauregard deems it best that the officer in charge of them be ordered by telegraph to send them to this city at once.

" He also deems it best, and directs, that the wagons lately sent from this city to Pocotaligo be furnished with covers, as most of them are without them.

" I am further directed to inquire of you what torpedoes have been put down lately in the channel and harbor. If none, the Commanding General directs that they be laid at once where originally contemplated, especially in front of the rope obstructions. Mr. Fraser Mathews is suggested as one who could be charged with this duty, if no one else can accomplish the work.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OP THE WEST,

CHARLESTON, S. C.,Dec. 21th, 1864. " Lieut-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dcpt. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

" General, —I am instructed by the Commanding General to direct as fol lows :

" 1st. That you make, silently and cautiously, all necessary preparations for the evacuation of Charleston—should it become necessary—taking at the same time the proper steps to save the garrisons of the different works.

" Detailed and confidential instructions should be given as to the spiking, by means of rat-tail files, all heavy guns and such others as cannot be moved; for disabling carriages, chassis, and batteries.

2d. That the infantry and cavalry of your command be organized forth with into brigades and divisions, under good commanders. That all the troops be supplied with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, blankets, and shoes; and that ample transportation be supplied, as also ammunition for small-arms and light batteries.

" 3d. That all light batteries be organized into battalions of three batteries each; one battalion being attached to each division, the others in reserve, under the Chief of Artillery.

"The battalions attached to divisions, although under the orders of the division commanders, in battle and on the march, will, nevertheless, make ail their returns and reports to the Chief of Artillery, and all correspondence relative to the organization, equipment, and interior management of batteries will pass through the same channel. Such batteries will only be under the orders of the Chief of Artillery when in permanent camp or winter-quarters.

" The Commanding General also directs that, should field-officers be needed for the battalions, you will apply by telegraph to the War Department, and request immediate attention.

" I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"JOHN M. OTEY, A. A. G." II.—20

" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,

CHARLESTON, S. C.,Dec. 29«7t, 1864. "Lieut.-Gcneral J. W. HARDEE, Comclg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

"•1st. The lines in Christ Church require the special attention of your En gineer and the Commander of the Second Subdistrict. The woods in front of the lines should be cut into abatis at once, and positions for field-guns in embrasure should be established immediately along them.

" 2. The batteries commanding approaches through the creeks should be put in perfect order and garrisoned.

" 3d. A pontoon-bridge should be thrown across Cooper River at the most favorable point, if practicable.

"4th. I think you ought to apply for the promotion of Majors Lucas and Manigault, to give them more authority over their battalions.

" Respectfully yours,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."

Two days before, General Beauregard had forwarded the fol lowing telegrams to tire War Department:

1. " CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 27tft, 1864. "General S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

"In event of having to abandon the coast, and enemy's movements will permit a choice of base of operations, shall it be towards North Carolina or Georgia ? Latter is true base for forces of this Department; but views of

War Department may require otherwise.*

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

2. " CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 27*A, 1864. " General S. COOPER, Adjt.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

" General Hood desires me to visit Army of Tennessee. Colonel Brent, my Chief of Staff at Montgomery, says my presence is required West, owing to some confusion in various matters, and want of supplies and ammunition. Unless otherwise instructed, I will leave here as soon as I can make definite

arrangements for future operations in this State.

" G. T. BEAUHEGARD."

On the 30th General Beauregard, having completed all possible arrangements for the pending emergency, asked to be relieved of the command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, in order that he might devote all his time and attention to his Depart ment proper — the Military Division of the West. His request was granted by President Davis, in the following despatch:

"RICHMOND, Dec. SQth, 1864. " To General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"Your despatch of this day received, also copy of that to General Cooper,

* This telegram, and that which immediately follows it, were in cipher.

in relation to assignment of General Bragg. You -will leave with General Hardee orders and instructions in regard to the Department east of Augusta, and will resume the command of the District west of Augusta, as heretofore defined. The change will be more formally announced from the Adjutant-General's office. JEFFERSON DAVIS/'

Before taking leave of General Hardee, and of Charleston, where he had ever met with so much sympathy and encourage ment, General Beauregard, in a last letter, thus expressed his views as to what should be done after his departure:

CHARLESTON, S. C.. Dec. 3lst, 1864. " Lieut-General W. J. HARDEE, Comdg. Dept. S. C., Ga., and Fla.:

" General, —I enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received to-day from the President relieving me, at my request, of the general command of the De partment of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. My presence is absolutely required at this moment at Montgomery and with the Army of Tennessee, and I cannot inform you when I will be able to return in this direction. The interruption of railroad communication might render it impracticable to get back in time to be of assistance to you, should you require my aid suddenly.