" At 10 A. M. I withheld an order for Ransom to move until further arrange ments should be made, for the following reasons :
"The right was heavily engaged; all of the reserve had been detached, right and left, at different times; the silence of Whiting's guns, which had been heard a short time about 8 A.M., gave reasonable hope that he had met no resistance and would soon be on; a despatch had been sent to Whiting at 9 A.M., which was repeated at 9.30 A.M., to 'press on and press over every thing in your front, and the day will be complete;' and Ransom not only reported the enemy in strong force in his front, but expressed the opinion that the safety of his command would be compromised by an advance.
" On the right Hoke had early advanced his skirmishers and opened with his artillery. The fog and other causes temporarily delayed the advance of his line of battle. When he finally moved forward he soon became hotly engaged, and handled his command with judgment and energy.
" Hagood and Johnson were thrown forward, with a section of Eschelman's Washington Artillery, and found a heavy force of the enemy, with six or eight pieces of artillery, occupying the salient of the outer line of works on the turnpike and his own defensive lines.
" Our artillery engaged at very short range, disabling some of the enemy's guns and blowing up two limbers. Another section of the same command opened from the right of the turnpike. They both held their positions, though with heavy loss, until their ammunition was spent, when they were relieved by an equal number of pieces from the reserve artillery under Major Owen.
" Hagood, with great vigor and dash, drove the enemy from the outer lines in his front, capturing a number of prisoners, and, in conjunction with Johnson, five pieces of artillery—three 20-pouuder Parrotts and two tine Na poleons. He then took position in the works, his left regiment being thrown forward by Hoke to connect with Ransom's right. In advancing this regi ment encountered the enemy behind a second line of works in the woods, with abatis interlaced with wire. Attack at that point not being contem plated, it was ordered back to the line of battle, but not before its intrepid advance had brought on it considerable loss. This circumstance has been referred to before, as the occasion of a mistake by Ransom.
" Johnson, meanwhile, had been heavily engaged. The line of the enemy bent around his right flank, subjecting his brigade, for a time, to fire in flank and front. With admirable firmness he repulsed frequent assaults of the enemy, moving in masses against his right and rear. Leader, officers, and men alike displayed their fitness for the trial to which they were subjected. I cannot forbear to mention that Lieutenant Waggoner, of the 17th Tennessee Regiment, went, alone, through a storm of fire and pulled down a white flag w r hich a small, isolated body of our men had raised, receiving a wound in the act. The brigade, holding its ground nobly, lost more than a fourth of its entire number.
" Two regiments of the reserve were sent up to its support, but were less effective than they should have been, through a mistake of the officer posting them. Hoke also sent two regiments from Clingman, to protect Johnson's flank. These partially partook of the same mistake, being posted in the woods, where the moral and material effect of their presence was lost.
" I now ordered Hoke to press forward his right for the relief of his right-centre, and he advanced Clingman with his remaining regiments, and Corse with his brigade.
" He drove the enemy with spirit, suffering some loss; but the gap between Cliugman and the troops on his left induced him to retire his command, to prevent being flanked, and re-form it in the intermediate lines. Thus Corse became isolated; and, learning from his officers that masses were forming against his right flank, he withdrew some distance back, but not quite so far as his original position.
" These two brigades were not afterwards engaged, though they went to the front; Corse, about one hour after he fell back, and Clingman at about 2.15 p. M. The enemy did not re-occupy the ground from which they drove him before they retired.
"In front of Hagood and Johnson the fighting was stubborn and prolonged. The enemy, slowly retiring from Johnson's right, took strong position on the ridge in front of Proctor's Creek, massing near the turnpike, and occupying advantageous ground at the house and grove of Charles Friend.
" At length Johnson, having brushed the enemy from his right flank in the woods, with some assistance from the Washington Artillery, cleared his front, and rested his troops in the shelter of the outer works.
" One of the captured pieces having opened on the enemy's masses, he finally full back behind the woods and ridge at Proctor's Creek, though his skirmish line continued the engagement some hours longer.
" Further movements were here suspended, to wait communication from Whiting, or the sound of his approach, and to reorganize the troops, which had become more or less disorganized. Brief firing at about 1.45 p. M. gave some hope of his proximity.
" I waited in vain. The firing heard was probably an encounter between Bearing and the enemy's rear-guard. Dealing had been ordered by Whiting to communicate with me; but, unsupported as he was by infantry or artillery, he was unable to do so, except by sending a detachment by a circuitous route, which reached me after the work of the day was closed.
" At 4 P. M. all hope of Whiting's approach was gone, and I reluctantly abandoned so much of my plan as contemplated more than a vigorous pur suit of Butler and driving him to his fortified base.
" To effect this, I resumed my original formation, and directed General Iloke to send two brigades forward along the Court-house Road, to take the enemy in flank and establish enfilading batteries in front of the heights west of the railroad.
" The formation of our line was checked by a heavy and prolonged storm of rain. Meanwhile, the enemy opened a severe fire, which was soon silenced by our artillery.
" Before we were ready to advance darkness approached, and, upon consul tation with several of my subordinate commanders, it was deemed imprudent to attack, considering the probability of serious obstacles and the proximity of Butler's intrenched camp. I therefore put the army in position for the night, and sent instructions to Whiting to join our right at the railroad in the morning.
"During the night the enemy retired to the fortified line of his present camp, leaving in our hands some fourteen hundred prisoners, five pieces of artillery, and five stand of colors.
" He now rests there, hemmed by our lines, which have since, from time to time, been advanced with every skirmish, and now completely cover the southern communication of the capital, thus securing one of the principal objects of the attack.
" The more glorious results anticipated were lost b*y the hesitation of the left wing and the premature halt of the Petersburg column before obstacles in neither case sufficient to have deterred from the execution of the move ments prescribed.
14 Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the officers and men who fought
the battle of Drury's Bluff, for the ardor and intrepidity displayed by them whenever called upon to meet the foe, regardless of his advantage in num bers and position. I shall take pleasure in presenting the names of those who most distinguished themselves as soon as the detailed reports of subor dinate commanders shall have been received at these headquarters.
" The same opportunity will be taken to mention the names and services of those members of my personal and general staff who were present during that battle, and of those officers who, belonging to other commands, kindly volun teered their services on that occasion. The intelligent zeal and activity of all these officers, in transmitting orders and conveying information from one por tion of the field to the other, contributed largely to the success of the day."
The day was ours. Butler's army was driven back, hemmed in, and reduced to comparative impotency, though not captured. The danger threatening Richmond was, for the time being:, avert-
O O J OJ
ed. Our success, however, was incomplete in this, that General Beauregard's entire plan, one of the ablest he had conceived dur ing the war, was not carried out. The blame rests, not only upon " the hesitation of the left wing," but chiefly upon General Whit ing, whose failure to execute the order which had been distinctly and repeatedly given him prevented the decisive result so nearly accomplished.
We are loath to comment upon the lamentable remissness of an officer, possessing undoubted capacity, whose subsequent death, in the hands of the enemy, from wounds received in his gallant defence of Fort Fisher, pleads for indulgence on the part of the historian. General Wise—who, with General Martin, was under his command at the time of the Drury's Bluff affair—wrote (be sides his official report) a full and clear narrative of what then took place. He was severe upon General Whiting's course and the cause that produced it, but his criticism is not the less true and well-deserved. He used the following language:
" My report fully detailed all these particulars to General Beauregard, who referred it back to General Whiting. And here I take heartfelt pleasure in stating my judgment upon the latter. * * * He was an able and brave officer, and foiled only from his too long indulged habit of inebriety. Had he been sober that day General Beauregard would have achieved the most decisive victory of the war. His success w T as signal and brilliant as it was; but what would have been the effect upon the war if Whiting had obeyed his orders, and he had crushed, as he undoubtedly would, the army of Butler, and had then rapidly crossed to Chaffin's Bluff, and thence to Bottom's Bridge, with his victorious 20,000 ? Lee would have had his 45,000 in Grant's front, with Beauregard's 20,000 on his left flank and rear, and Grant would never have II.—13
reached Harrison's Landing—if, indeed, his army too had not been conquered. Yet Beauregard received for his victory at Drury's Bluff rather more of cen sure than of commendation."
The last telegram sent by General Beatiregard to General Whiting on the day of the battle read as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT, May IQth, 1864: 11.30 P.M. " Major-General WHITING :
"Your despatch of 7.30 P.M. (sent by the guide Archer), replying to mine of 4.15 P. M., is received. / rely and insist that you shall effect a junction with my right to-morrow morning, as indicated in my despatch of G.45 p. M., here with repeated in duplicate. G. T. BEAUHEGAKD."
The foregoing despatch had been sent to General Whiting upon receipt of the following telegram:
" General BEAUREGARD, Drury's Bluff:
"I am here for the night near Walthall's Junction. Didn't get your de spatch until near night. Had driven the enemy all the way from Swift Creek, his pickets and outposts being very stubborn and provided with ar tillery. Enemy retired slowly before me all day. Could inflict no great loss on him owing to country. Owing to lateness of hour of receiving despatches and enemy's position could not press him further to-da3 r . Concluded to try again in the morning, if you do. Could hear but very little firing. His line faces me and rests on his works across the Neck and beyond the railroad. Send reply. Two regiments of cavalry are moving from City Point. Makes me uneasy, as I have to detach cavalry.
"7£p.M., May 16^,'64.
" "VV. H. C. WHITING, Major-General.
" Don't let him press me to-night; position very bad." " Received 10.15 p. M.
"G. W. LAY, Lieut-Colonel."
The grief expressed by General Whiting when he met General Beauregard on the following day, was most sincere. He accepted the blame laid upon him, admitted his irremediable error, and asked to be relieved from his command. This was immediately done, as is shown by the telegram we here append, forwarded by General Beauregard to President Davis:
O
" HANCOCK'S HOUSE, 2£ MILES N. WALTIIALL JUNCTION,
May lWi, 18G4.
"Whiting's forces joined me at mid-day. He expressed a desire to be relieved from command of his temporary division, and has accordingly re turned to the temporary command of the Department, In accordance with your permission I have assigned General Hill to command this division tern-
porarily, -with the understanding that he will apply for orders in the field. I trust this will fully meet your approval.
"The enemy has retired to his lines across the Neck. I have telegraphed General Bragg as to my position and intentions.
" G. T. BEAUREGAKD."
Following this recital, we are again compelled to refer to the errors contained in Mr. Davis's book. The passages to be found in Yol. II., pp. 511-515, wherein is described his interview with General Beau regard, at Drury's Bluff, and its results, are here alluded to:
" In the afternoon of the 14th I rode down to visit General Bcauregarcl at his headquarters in the field. Supposing his troops to be on the line of intrenchment, I passed Major Drury's house to go thither, when some one by the roadside called to me and told me that the troops "were not on the line of intrenchment, and that General Beauregard was at the house behind me.
"My first question on meeting him was to learn why the intrenchments were abandoned. He answered that he thought it better to concentrate his troops. Upon my stating to him that there was nothing then to prevent Butler from turning his position, he said lie would desire nothing more, as he would then fall upon him, cut him off from his base, etc."
What else General Beauregard is supposed to have then said is not given by Mr. Davis, whose memory, no doubt, failed him at this point. Or was it that General Beauregard only began, and never ended, his explanation ? Be this as it may, Mr. Davis affords the reader neither satisfaction nor enlightenment.
The impossibility of any such occurrence, or of any such con versation, will now be demonstrated.
It was between the hours of eight and nine in the morning of the 14th, and not in the afternoon of that day, that Mr. Davis first saw General Beauregard at the Drury house; the object of his coming thither being to confer concerning the plan laid before him, through General Bragg, the tenor of which is already known. General Beauregard had no " headquarters," at that time, " in the field," or elsewhere. The Drury house was the first he had en tered on his arrival at Drury's Bluff that morning, and he had not yet left it when the President was ushered in. The "line of intrenchments" spoken of by Mr. Davis, and for the abandonment of which he called General Beauregard to account, had been taken by the enemy on the evening before ; that is to say, before General Beauregard's arrival at Drury's Bluff. And it must be borne in mind that, at the time of Mr. Da vis's visit there, General Beaurc-
gard had not yet seen the commanding officer of the post—Gen eral Hoke—who, expecting a renewed attack, was then near his lines; nor had he even assumed command of our forces. The fact is that, as late as 8 o'clock A. M., on the 14th, Drury's Bluff had not been made a part of General Beauregard's De partment, as appears from the following telegram forwarded ; to him on that day:
"RICHMOND, VA., May Uth, 1864. " To General BEAUREGARD :
"Your command is extended so as to include all that portion of Virginia lying south of the James River, including Drury's Blulf and its defences.
Order will be sent by courier.
" S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Gcnl." /
The order was sent, and with it a communication from Gen eral Bragg, of the same date, confirming the despatch.*- Pres ident Davis, therefore, might, with equal logic, have taken Gen eral Beauregard to task for not having prevented Butler's landing at City Point and Bermuda Hundreds.
Mr. Davis goes on as follows:
" We then passed to the consideration of the operations to be undertaken against Butler, who had already advanced from his base at Bermuda Hun dreds. I offered, for the purpose of attacking Butler, to send Major-General Ransom with the field force lie had for the protection of Richmond."
This is an indirect acknowledgment that the object of his visit on the 14th was to listen to General Beauregard's plan of opera tions : first, against Butler, and afterwards, in conjunction with General Lee, against Grant; for that was the only plan then sub mitted and under consideration, and it included the sending of Ransom's force from Richmond to Drury's Bluff. Mr. Davis, therefore, is in error when he says that he "offered" Ransom's division. He made no such offer, but merely consented — appar ently with reluctance — to the removal of that force, which he ordered down twenty-four hours later than General Beauregard had wished him to do, and after positively refusing the 10,000 men from Lee's army, which General Beauregard, in his plan and orally during that interview, had entreated him to send, in order that he might carry out his plans.
Mr. Davis, who fails to give the details of the plan, says that
* See Appendix.
such a proposition was made to him several days later—namely, after the battle of the 16th. He says:
" Soon after the affair at Drury's Bluff, General Beauregard addressed to me a communication proposing that he should be heavily reinforced from General Lee's army, so as to enable him to crush Butler in his intrenchments, and then, with the main body of his force, together with a detachment from Gen eral Lee's army, that he should join General Lee, overwhelm Grant, and march to Washington. I knew that General Lee was then confronting an army vastly superior to his in numbers, * * * but, as a matter of courteous consid eration, his letter [General Beauregard's letter] was forwarded, with the usual formal indorsement. General Lee's opinion on the case was shown by the instructions he gave directing General Beauregard to straighten his line, so as to reduce the requisite number of men to hold it, and send the balance to join the army north of the James."
The confusion in Mr. Davis's mind concerning these events is wholly incomprehensible. Two communications had been pre sented by General Beauregard to the War Department during that period. The first — in other words, the very one about which Mr. Davis's conference was held, on the morning of the 14th — had been addressed, not to Mr. Davis directly, as he as serts, but to General Bragg, and bore date May 14th, 1864. It read as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND So. VA.,
DRURY'S BLUFF, May \ttli, 1864. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg.:
" General, —Considering the vital importance of the question involved, and resting upon the success of the plan I suggested to you this morning, I have deemed it desirable and appropriate that their substance should be briefly communicated in writing. General Lee's army, at Guinea Station, and my command, at this place, arc on nearly a right line passing through Richmond. Grant's army is on the left flank, and Butler on the right. Our lines are thus interior. Butler's aim is unquestionably to invest and turn Drury's Bluff, threatening and holding the Petersburg and Danville Railroads, opening the obstructions in the river at Fort Drury for the passage of war vessels, neces sitating then the return of General Lee to the lines about Richmond. With the railroad held by the enemy, Grant in front, and Butler in rear of the works around Richmond, the capital would be practically invested, and the issue may well be dreaded. The plan suggested is, that General Lee should fall back to the defensive lines of the Chickahominy, even to the intermediate lines of Richmond, sending temporarily to this place 15,000 men* of his troops. Immediately upon the accession of my present force I would take
* Inclusive of Ransom's forces, at Richmond.
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
the offensive and attack Butler vigorously. Such a move would throw me directly upon Butler's communications; and as he now stands, with his right flank well towards the rear, General Whiting should also move simultane ously. Butler must necessarily be crushed or captured, and all the stores of that army would then fall in our hands—an amount, probably, that would make an interruption in our communications, for a period of a few days, a matter of no serious inconvenience. The proposed attack should be accom plished in two days, at furthest, after receiving my reinforcements. This done, I would move with 10,000 more men to the assistance of General Lee than I drew from him, and then Grant's fate would not long remain doubtful. The destruction of Grant's forces would open the way for the recovery of most of our lost territory, as already submitted to you in general terms.
" Respectfully, G. T. BEAUREGARD."
The other communication referred to is dated May 18th, and was sent to Richmond in the form of a memorandum. It was intended to meet the entirely changed circumstances existing after the rout of Drury's Bluff, and had very little —if anything — to do with the plan submitted to General Bragg and to Mr. Davis on the morning of the 14th, and re-affirmed, in writing, on the same day. This second communication ran thus :
"HEADQUARTERS, K C. AND So. VA., May 18th, 1864: 9 p. M.,
HANCOCK'S HOUSE, VA., 2£ miles of Walthall Station.
"Memorandum. —The crisis demands prompt and decisive action. The two armies are now too far apart to secure success, unless we consent to give up Petersburg and place the capital in jeopardy. If General Lee will fall back behind the Chickahominy, engaging the enemy so as to draw him on, General Beauregard can bring up 15,000 men to unite with Breckinridge and fall upon the enemy's flank with over 20,000 men effective, thus rendering Grant's de feat certain and decisive, and in time to enable General Beauregard to return with a reinforcement from General Lee to drive Butler from Petersburg and from his present position. For three days, perhaps four at most, Petersburg and Richmond would be held by the forces left there for that purpose. With out such concentration nothing decisive can be effected, and the picture pre sented is one of starvation. Without concentration General Lee must eventu ally fall back before Grant's heavy reinforcements, and the view presented merely anticipates this movement for offensive purposes. Meantime, it is im possible to effectually protect our lines of communication with North Carolina, and impossible to hold our present line in front of Butler, with a much more reduced force. At present 3000 men can be spared from these with safety, day after to-morrow 2000 more, perhaps; for our lines will probably be stronger, if, as we expect, the forward line can be occupied to-morrow.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
An attentive consideration of the features of these two plans of operations, and of the respective times and situations to which
they refer, will cause the reader to wonder at the incorrectness of Mr. Davis's narrative. The military situations before and after the victory of Drnry's Bluff were very different, and the respec tive plans of operations proposed were in essential features the reverse of each other. The first proposed that Beauregard should be reinforced from Lee, so as to crush Butler, and then move to Lee's support, to take the offensive against Grant; the second proposed that Beauregard should move first to Lee's support, to attack and defeat Grant, and thence return, reinforced by Lee, to finish Butler. Yet Mr. Davis applies to the latter phase of events the plan proposed by General Beauregard to meet the former.
We must assume that Mr. Davis comprehended these proposed plans of action when they were submitted, and we are forced to the conclusion, therefore, that his present sources of historical information are not sufficiently accurate and trustworthy to en title his work to recognition as one of authority.
It will suffice, then, to add that General Lee sent no order to General Beauregard to straighten his line! Apart from the fact that he did not, he could have had no authority for so doing, since General Beauregard's Department was entirely separate and distinct from his, and General Lee was not in the habit of openly violating the rules of military courtesy and etiquette. Moreover, there could have been no occasion for such an order from any quarter, inasmuch as General Beauregard had already informed the War Department that he intended to occupy a shorter line on the next day (May 19th).
As to " the balance" (to use Mr. Davis's expression) of Gen eral Beauregard's forces being sent " to join the army north of the James," the telegrams inserted in the Appendix to the next chapter of this work, wherein this subject is exhaustively treated, conclusively show that General Lee did not make such a request (it was not an order) until May 30th and June 1st; at the same time he expressed the desire that General Beauregard himself should, if possible, cross with his troops and take com mand of the right wing of the Army of Virginia.
Another error on the part of Mr. Davis is noticeable in the second volume of his work, page 512, where he says:
" General Whiting, with some force, was holding a defensive position at Petersburg. General Beauregard proposed that the main part of it should
advance, and unite with him in an attack upon Butler, wherever he should be found between Drury's and Petersburg. To this I offered distinct objec tion, because of the hazard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops moving from opposite sides of the enemy; and proposed that Whiting's command should move at night by the Chesterfield road, where they would not probably be observed by Butler's advance."
This, in the main, is correct. Mr. Davis, as he says, did stren uously oppose the junction spoken of by General Beau regard, though " his universal practice" as lie asserts, " was never to do more than to make a suggestion to a general commanding in the field;"* and General Beauregard, as was his duty to do, yielded to the will of the Commander-in-chief. Mr. Davis continues:
" General Beauregard, thereupon, spoke of some difficulty in getting a cou rier who knew the route and could certainly deliver the order to General Whiting. Opportunely, a courier arrived from General Whiting, who had come up the Chesterfield road. He then said the order would have to be drawn with a good deal of care, and that he would prepare it as soon as pos sible. I arose to take leave, when General Beauregard courteously walked down the stairs with me, remarking as we went that he was embarrassed for the want of a good cavalry commander. I saw in the yard Colonel Chilton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, and said,'There is an old cavalry officer, who was trained in my old regiment, the First Dragoons, and who, I think, will answer your requirements.' Upon his expressing the pleasure it would give him to have Colonel Chilton, I told him of General Beauregard's want, and asked him if the service would be agreeable to him. He readily accepted it, and I left, supposing all the preliminaries settled. In the next forenoon Colonel Samuel Melton, of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Department, called at my residence, and delivered a message from General Beauregard to the effect that he had decided to order Whiting to move by the direct road from Petersburg, instead of by the Chesterfield route; and when I replied that I had stated my objections to General Beauregard to a movement which gave the enemy the advantage of being between our forces, lie said General Beauregard had directed him to explain to me that, upon a further examination, he found his force sufficient; that his operations, there fore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting."
For the elucidation of the facts of the case it has been nec essary to quote thus extensively from Mr. Davis's book. He drifts away so completely from the true version of the incidents he describes that, in re-establishing the facts, our statement be comes directly contradictory to his. The fault is not ours.
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 511. The italics are ours.
Mr. Davis is mistaken in saying that General Beauregard was compelled to employ General Whiting's messenger to carry the first order sent him on that day, after the modification of the plan so much insisted upon by the President. Messengers famil iar with the road just gone over by General Beauregard and his escort were not wanting for the purpose. The proof of this is, that three of them — not one only, as Mr. Davis supposes — were sent, on the 14th of May, to Petersburg, each bearing a copy of the triplicate message to General Whiting. It may be that the courier referred to by Mr. Davis was one of these; but it is not true that General Beauregard could have found no other. The following is the message in question:
"DRURY'S BLUFF, May 14^, 18G4. " To Major-General W. II. C. WHITING, Petersburg, Ya.:
"Proceed to this place Monday morning at daybreak, with Wise's and Mar tin's brigades and two regiments of Colquitt's, with five days' provisions and sixty rounds of ammunition per man, and all available baggage, wagons, and ambulances, and as large a supply-train as possible, via Newby's Bridge, on Swift Creek (20 miles), thence to Cogshill's, Punkett's, Tabcr's, Watkins's (14 miles), and ~be here Tuesday afternoon at latest. Order Walker and his brigade from Kinston to Petersburg; also regiments of Hoke's and Kemper's brigade now at Hicksford and Weldon. If they cannot come with yon, order Dear-ing's cavalry to guard Petersburg until arrival of Walker. Baker's regiment will be sent to meet you at Newby's Bridge. Butler has his whole force in front of this place.
"(Sent in triplicate.) G. T. BEAUREGARD."
The next day, early in the morning, the following additional telegram was sent to General Whiting:
O O
" DRURY'S BLUFF, Nay 15^, 1864 : 7 A. M.
" To be more expeditious, leave as soon as practicable on Sunday. Guides will be at crossing of creek. Communicate only in cipher.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
But, knowing now that General Ransom could not join him until the afternoon of the 15th, and for other important reasons, fully explained to President Davis in a letter which is about to be submitted, General Beauregard concluded to order General Whiting to march directly on the road to Drury's Bluff, accord ing to his original idea before leaving Petersburg. Hence, on the 15th, at 10.45 A. M., Colonel (afterwards General) Logan, formerly of the Hampton Legion, was sent to General Whiting
with a telegram of that date,* together with a copy of General Beauregard's order of battle, both of which had been committed to memory by the messenger, so that no accident might pre vent their safe delivery. A few hours later a duplicate of this telegram was also forwarded to, and duly received by, General Whiting.
The following is the letter referred to:
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT 1ST. C. AND So. VA.,
DRURY'S BLUFF, May 15th, 18G4. " His Excellency President JEFFERSON DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:
" /S7r,—Upon further inquiry as to the shortest and safest route (via Newby's Bridge) by which Major-General Whiting could travel, with his small force, to this point, it was found he would require two days to reach here, the dis tance being at least thirty-four miles, with roads in a bad condition, owing to the prevailing rains. In a telegram of this morning he expresses his fears of an immediate attack upon him by the enemy. At the same time Captain Davidson, of the navy, informs me that a large fleet of gunboats and trans ports of the enemy are about four miles below Chafrin's Bluff, probably to reinforce Butler and make a combined attack by land and water.
"Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the enemy is diligently employed in erecting batteries and rifle-pits around this place, further delay might be fatal to success ; and I have determined to attack him to-morrow morning with the forces at present available here, increased by Barton's brigade, as authorized by you.
"I have ordered Major-General Whiting to co-operate with all his forces by attacking the enemy in rear from Swift Creek. A copy of my instructions to him and of my order of battle will be forwarded as soon as practicable to the Department.
"I have availed myself of the services of Major-General Ransom to com mand one of the two divisions of this army.
" I hope, under the protection of a kind Providence, that our efforts to morrow will be successful.
" I remain, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl."
This is the only official communication made by General Beau-regard to President Davis on the forenoon of the 15th of May (the date mentioned by Mr. Davis) relative to the order for the advance of General Whiting and his force, to co-operate with our army at Drury's Bluff. The " message," as Mr. Davis calls the preceding letter, may have been borne by Colonel Samuel Melton,
* The telegram alluded to is given at page 203 of the present chapter. See, also, General Logan's letter, in Appendix.
though General Beauregard has no recollection of the fact; but, by whomsoever delivered to the President, it certainly is the only trustworthy evidence bearing upon the subject. What Colonel Melton is alleged to have verbally added to General Beauregard's letter — namely, "that upon further examination he found his forces sufficient, and that his operations, therefore, did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting"—is in such direct contra diction to all of General Beauregard's views and efforts at the time, to his report of the battle, and to the whole contents of the letter itself, as to be unworthy of serious attention. General Beau-regard's reasons for modifying his order to General Whiting were given in that letter to the President; and therein alone—not in any outside gossip—should General Beauregard's views, opinions, and intentions be looked for, and there only does their expression really exist. In corroboration of the foregoing statement are the telegrams, ten or twelve in number, sent by General Beauregard to General Whiting, between the 14th and 17th of May, showing conclusively that the former never wavered in his desire to secure the latter's co-operation before the expected attack upon Butler. But we have additional proof in the telegram from General Beau-regard to General. Bragg, dated May 15th, 1864 (the day referred to by Mr. Davis), which reads as follows:
" I have already sent General Whiting his instructions to co-operate with me. Please telegraph him to follow them as delivered by Colonel Logan. Yours may conflict with mine."
The fact of General Beauregard's insisting so much upon the co-operation of General Whiting's forces, and the fear that orders from. Richmond might clash with his own, leave no doubt as to his opinion that Whiting's presence was necessary to the success of his plan.
As General (then Colonel) Logan's name has been mentioned in connection with this incident, we quote a passage from a letter written by him to General Beauregard, dated Richmond, Ya., January, 2d, 1882:*
"During the day of May 15th Colonel Samuel Melton, acting A. A. G., notified me that you desired me to take your written and verbal instructions to General Whiting, at his headquarters, near Petersburg, as you intended
* The whole of General Logan's letter 13 given in the Appendix. '
attacking the enemy on the morning of the 16th, and felt anxious that there should, by no possibility, be any miscarriage of your instructions, or any mis understanding as to their import. * * * Just before starting on my mission I was sent for by you, and in the presence of Colonel Melton the written de spatches were given to me, and their contents carefully explained to me by you."
The written despatches to General Whiting were intrusted to Colonel Logan, "in the presence" of Colonel Melton, and care fully explained by General Beauregard. It is evident, therefore, that Colonel Melton knew the object of Colonel Logan's mission to General Whiting. How, then, on that very day, and while hand ing to Mr. Davis a letter from General Beauregard, explaining the reasons for his last orders to General Whiting, could Colonel Melton have said, " Upon further examination General Beaure gard found his forces sufficient, and thought his operations did not depend upon making a junction with Whiting?"
It should be added, that the co-operation so persistently en joined upon General Whiting would have been judicious and of material importance, even had the President granted, and not denied, the reinforcements sought from the Army of Northern Virginia. But, without such assistance from General Lee, the junction of General Whiting's forces from Petersburg became absolutely necessary, in order to insure success over the Federal army threatening Richmond from the south of the James.
Reference will now be made to Mr. Davis's account of his offer of Colonel Chilton to General Beauregard, as a cavalry commander.
What General Beauregard needed at that time, and what he asked for was, not a cavalry commander, but cavalry and infantry, with which to crush Butler, and afterward cross the James, so as to co-operate with General Lee against General Grant. This was the essential feature of General Beauregard's plan. Having never desired the services of Colonel Chilton—who, from the opening of the war, had been a staff officer only — General Beauregard neither asked for nor accepted him—granting that he was offered by Mr. Davis. He had with him cavalry officers of undeniable merit, namely, Colonel Dunnovarit and Colonel Baker (already at Drury's Bluff), and General Dearing, who was to come up with Whiting's forces, and of whose ability and dash General Beaure gard had the highest opinion. There was, therefore, no vacancy
which Colonel Chilton could have filled, unless he were made to supersede one of these three cavalry commanders — a thought which never occurred to General Beaureirard's mind.
O
It is noticeable, also, that Mr. Davis, when writing of these events, lays great stress upon General Ransom's " unpublished " report of the battle of Drury's Bluff, while, on the other hand, he makes not even a passing allusion to the report of General Beau-regard, the chief and unquestionably the most trustworthy source of information concerning that battle. That report has been given in this chapter, and the reader should examine it with at tention. Every material statement it contains is corroborated and supported by the reports of Generals Iloke, Johnson, Colquitt, and Hagood. As to General Ransom's report, which Mr. Davis quotes as authority in contradiction to General Beauregard's, it is incorrect in many important particulars; so much so that it re ceived General Beauregard's censure at the time, not only because of its inaccuracy with regard to some of the events of the battle, but also because of General Ransom's shortcomings on that oc casion, and because of the unauthorized and -unofficial manner in which the paper was published in Richmond, before General Beauregard's own report had been forwarded to the War De partment.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
Withdrawal of Troops from General Beauregard. — Repulse of the Enemy on May 17th.—Construction of Hewlett Line Fortifications. — Military Situa tion. — The War Department withdraws more Troops from General Beau-regard to Reinforce General Lee. — Attack of Gillmore's Corps.—General Wise's Account of it. — General Beauregard's Telegram to General Bragg (June 7th). — His Letter to the Same (June Oth). — Predicts General Grant's Movements, and Proposes a Plan of Attack and Defence to the War De partment. — His Proposals not Heeded.—General Grant's Army Crossing the James. — General Beauregard Telegraphs Generals Lee and Bragg to that Effect. — His Force at Petersburg. — Attack by Smith's Corps on the 15th.— Arrival of Hagood's Brigade, of Iloke's Division. —General Beaure gard Notifies the War Department and General Lee of the Necessity of Calling Bushrod Johnson from the Bermuda Hundred Lines. — War De partment Declines the Responsibility, but Blames General Beauregard.— Johnson's Arrival.—Three Federal Corps Assault Petersburg on the ICth. — Repulse of the Enemy. — How General Gracie Arrived and Saved the Line from Destruction. — General Beauregard's Telegrams and Messages to General Lee. — A New Defensive Line. — How General Beauregard Fell Back upon it, at 12.30 A.M., on the 18th. — The Enemy's Surprise thereat. — Mr. Swinton, Mr. McCabe, and Mr. J. E. Cookc. — Their Errors as to the Time of the Arrival of General Lee's Army at Petersburg. — General Lee's Telegrams. — Kershaw's Division of the Army of Northern Virginia Reaches Petersburg on the Morning of the 18th. — The Enemy's Assault on that Day. — His Repulse. — General Lee's Arrival.—General Beauregard Proposes an Attack on General Grant's Left and Rear.—General Lee Ob jects.— The War Department's Disregard of General Beauregard's Re quisitions and Warnings.
AT 1 o'clock p. M., on May 17th, while General Beauregard was still pursuing Butler's army, Hansom's division was with drawn from him to Richmond, notwithstanding his request that the order should be suspended. General Whiting's forces had just come up, and were not yet assigned to position.
Thus left with about 12,000 men to operate against an enemy not less than 25,000 strong, General Beauregard, after another severe engagement on that day, drove the Federals back behind their intrenchments at Bermuda Hundreds Neck. A number of gunboats and transports, lying near the bend above Dutch Gap,
were repelled by a battery of two 20-pounder Parrotts, just capt ured from the defeated foe. Across this Neck, from the James to the Apporaattox, General Beauregard now constructed a strong line of works (known thereafter as the "Hewlett line"). Its left, at the Hewlett House Bluff, commanded the part of the Dutch Gap facing that position. Thus it was that Butler and his army—in words attributed to General Grant — were so effect ually " bottled up."
It remains to be said that all the circumstances of the moment singularly favored the proposed plan of General Beauregard. General Grant, having lost fully 40,000 men from the outset of his campaign down to the battle of May 12th, near Spottsylvania Court-house, was, from that date to the 21st, awaiting reinforce ments, without attempting any serious offensive movement. At this favorable period General Beauregard was denied a temporary reinforcement of 10,000 men from the Army of Northern Vir ginia, which he would have made stronger within forty-eight hours by 23,000 men,* yet, scarcely three weeks afterwards, on the 13th of June, after General Grant had been reinforced by 90,000 men, and General Lee by only 18,000, General Early was detached from the Army of Northern Virginia to the Shenandoah Valley with 12,000 men. As an unfortunate consequence of the failure of the Confederate authorities to comply with General Beauregard's plan of operations, Butler, though badly beaten, was able to effect his retreat upon his strong base at Bermuda Hundreds, and could safely (as he did) detach from that point Smith's corps of 16,000 men, to aid General Grant in the effort made, on June 3d, at Cold Harbor, to break through General Lee's defensive lines, on that side of the James. Meanwhile, Butler, still 13,000 strong, continued to be a threat to the safety of Richmond, on the south side of the James. This rendered it unwise to detach any material part of General Beauregard's force to aid General Lee. So urgent, however, did the Confederate au thorities regard the necessity, that they gradually withdrew from General Beauregard most of the troops that had been directly engaged under him in the battle of Drury's Bluff.
It is to be remembered that Butler's base at Bermuda Hundreds
* Including the 10,000 to be taken from General Lee's army, and leaving about 4000 to hold the Bermuda Hundreds line.
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
was also a constant menace to General Lee's communications, via Richmond and Petersburg, with his main sources of supply— namely, the States and open ports south of Virginia. Wilmington was the only Atlantic harbor through which we could then re ceive ammunition and clothing from Europe. Communication with South Carolina and Georgia, by way of the Weldon and Danville Railroads, was also endangered by Butler's presence. This produced almost daily conflicts, and severe ones at times, showing that Butler's object was to seize or destroy the Rich mond and Petersburg Railroad, at the point nearest to Bermuda Hundreds. In consequence of this fully one-third of the Confed erate force had to be used on picket service. This force now con sisted only of part of Bushrod Johnson's division, about 3200 strong, holding the Bermuda Hundreds lines, and Wise's brigade, together with the local militia of Petersburg,'* in all about 2200 men, guarding that city.
On the 9th of June, Gillmore's corps was thrown across the Appomattox, by a pontoon-bridge at Point of Rocks, in a move ment against Petersburg. The attack itself was made by a body about 5000 strong, chiefly of Kautz's mounted infantry, and w r as successfully repulsed. Had Gillmore's large force been handled with more vigor, Petersburg, with the handful of men then avail able for its defence (so completely had General Beauregard been deprived of troops for the support of General Lee), would have inevitably fallen into the hands of the enemy.
General Wise, in his narrative, gives a correct and graphic de scription of this affair. The following passage is copied from it:
"They pressed hard upon the left for three or four hours, and then sud denly attacked the militia on my extreme right with a detachment numbering 1000, which were handsomely received by Archer; but they broke through his line, one-half of them taking the road into Petersburg, and the other the road leading to Blandford. Graham's battery, accidentally at the City Water Works, met the first, and a curious force drove back the latter. I had de tailed all who could possibly do momentary duty out of the hospitals, calling them the 'Patients; 1 and from the jail and guard-houses all the prisoners, calling them the 'Penitents ;' and the two companies of 'Patients' and 'Pen itents' moved out on the Blandford road, while I advanced with three com-
* That militia, composed of old men and boys, had brought forth the re mark from the Northern Press, that it was made up of men snatched from the grave, and youths taken from the cradle.
panics of the 46th from our left; and the enemy on that road, seeing the head of the column of ' P. P.'s' advancing in their front, and my three com panies bearing on their right flank, they wheeled to the right-about at once and retired; and Graham's battery repulsed the other party advancing on the city. This was done with the loss of thirteen killed and a few wounded of the militia. Petersburg was thus barely saved on the 9th; and the defence was so critical, that I demanded additional forces, and General Beauregard at once reinforced my command with my 26th Virginia, and nine companies of the 34th."
It is proper to add here that, before these reinforcements were forwarded, General Beanregard had sent General Bearing and most of his cavalry, from the right of the Bermuda lines—where he had yet no works—to General Wise's assistance. He arrived in time to aid in the repulse of the enemy.
Previous to this, forecasting the strategy of General Lee's ad versary, and believing that, persevering in his movement left ward around Richmond, he would pass to the south side of the James, General Beauregard, as early as the 7th of June, forward ed the following telegram to General Bragg:
"DUNLAP'S FARM, June 1th, 1864: 3.30 P.M. " General B. BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:
" Should Grant have left Lee's front, he doubtless intends operating against Richmond along James River, probably on south side. Petersburg being nearly defenceless, would be captured before it could be reinforced. Ran som's brigade and Hoke's division should, then, be returned at once.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
The following was General Bragg's answer:
" RICHMOND, June 8th, 1864. " To General BEAUREGARD :
"My acquaintance with the state of affairs in General Lee's front is not sufficient to enable me to form an accurate opinion on your suggestions of yesterday, as to return of Hoke and Ransom. Have therefore forwarded your despatch to General Lee. BRAXTON BRAGG."
Two days later, with that strategic discernment which charac terized both himself and Jackson, General Beauregard forwarded the following written communication to Richmond:
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT N. C. AND So. VA.,
SWIFT CREEK, VA., June 9th, 1864, 7 A. M. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Comdg. C. S. Armies, Richmond, Va.:
"General, — The present movements of Grant's army have a significancy which cannot have escaped your observation. He clearly seeks to move II.—14
around Lee's forces by an advance upon his left flank, in the direction of the James River, with a view to operate between that river and the Chicka-hominy, and, in case of his meeting with no adequate resistance, to plant himself on both sides of the former, throwing across it a pontoon-bridge, as close to Chaffin's Bluff as circumstances may permit; and, failing in this scheme, lie may continue his rotary motion around Richmond, and attack it by concentrating the whole of his army on the south side of the James, using the fortified position at Bermuda Hundreds Neck as a base for his operations.
"In that hypothesis our first object would seem to be to throw him off, as far as practicable, from his objective point (Richmond), unless the Govern ment were to adopt the bold and, perhaps, safer policy of giving him battle, and decide at once the fate of that city, while we remain with a compara tively compact, well-disciplined, and enthusiastic army in the field.
" To accomplish this object the river battery at Howlctt's should be com pleted without delay, and thoroughly armed; the river should be obstructed by rope works and torpedoes, so distributed as to leave passage for only one ironclad at a time, which, in the meanwhile, should prevent the crossing of the river between that battery and Chaffin's Bluff. My defensive line, now nearly completed, and extending from the river battery at Howlett's to Mrs. Dunn's house, would be held by Johnson's division.
"The comparatively level and open country between these two points might be defended by a line of redoubts from Dunn's house to Swift Creek. The short line west of Fort Clifton, between Swift Creek and the Appomat-tox, would be a barrier against any approach from the intersection of those two streams.
" The defensive line from Mrs. Dunn's to the Appomattox could be defended by a part of Hokc's division, while the rest, taking position in Petersburg, might hold it until reinforcements from Lee's army were obtained.
"Two divisions of about 15,000 men in all would thus prevent any force of the enemy from penetrating between Drury's Bluff and Petersburg, and compel him to take the latter before he could venture a real advance on Richmond.
"With these views hastily thrown on paper I send you a statement of the strength and organization of the forces at the lines around Petersburg, at Drury's Bluff", and in front of Bermuda Hundreds Neck, that you may judge of my resources and ability to face the impending contingencies for which I may from moment to moment have to provide.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. BEAUIIEGARD, General."
It is apparent, upon a careful examination of the foregoing-letter, and of the reasons there given in explanation of General Grant's predicted movement, that, had the latter looked over the whole field with the same clearness as did General Beatiregard, and effected his passage at Bermuda Hundreds, instead of south of the Appomattox, while he might still have attacked Peters-
burg — as lie did, on the 15th, with Smith's corps, now increased to 22,000 men—the main body of the Federal army must have irresistibly planted itself upon the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. It would have been able, immediately thereafter, to stretch its left across the Richmond and Danville Railroad, cut ting off General Beauregard from General Lee; cutting off Gen eral Lee and Richmond from the South; insuring the fall of Richmond; leaving no route of retreat for the army of Northern Virginia; and virtually ending the war by the 1st of July, 1864.
Anticipating this extreme danger, General Beauregard recom mended the bold and — in his opinion — "safer" plan of concen tration of all our available forces, to give General Grant battle, and thus decide, at once, the fate of the Confederate capital, while we still had in the field "a compact, well-disciplined, and enthusiastic army." As an alternative he proposed '" to throw General Grant off as far as practicable from Richmond," by the proper defence and obstruction of the James and of the line from Drury's Bluff to Petersburg, so that he should be compelled, " under the greatest disadvantages, to attempt the capture of the latter place before venturing a real and serious advance on Rich mond."
Neither proposition met with consideration at Richmond, nor, it seems, from General Lee; for, when General Grant, instead of crossing at Bermuda Hundreds at a time when he could have
£5
done so almost without impediment, preferred the point of pas sage that made Petersburg his immediate objective, General Beauregard was left, with about 5400 men, gradually increased to about 11,000, to bear the pressure of a hostile force increasing, by successive reinforcements, from 22,000 to at least 90,000 men (exclusive of two divisions of Wright's corps)—substantially the mass of General Grant's army.
With such fearful and almost incredible odds against him, Gen eral Beauregard, from the 15th to the 18th of June, maintained a successful barrier to the Federal advance—a feat of war almost without a precedent in which the courage and the endurance of the troops, no less than the skill with which the commander used his small resources, were fully as conspicuous as the good-fortune that lent itself to such a result. During these few but, apparently, never-ending days of unremitting anxiety, General Beauregard, by repeated telegrams and messages, informed the
War Department and General Lee of the movement of the Fed eral army to the south side of the James, and against his lines in front of Petersburg. In support of this assertion we offer the following telegrams:
1. " SWIFT CREEK, YA., June Uth, 1864 : 7.15 A. M. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:
" Movement of Grant's across Chickahominy and increase of Butler's force render my position here critical. With my present forces I cannot answer for consequences. Cannot my troops sent to General Lee be returned at once ? Please submit my letter of 9th instant to President.
" G. T. BEAUREGAKD, General."
2. " SWIFT CREEK, YA., June 14$, 1884 : 8.10 p. M. t: General R. E. LEE, Army N. Va.:
"A deserter from the enemy reports that Butler has been reinforced by the 18th and a part of the 10th Army Corps.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
Apart from the increasing strenuousness and weight with which the attack at Petersburg was made, and the unusual bold ness with which Butler ventured out of his intrenchments, in aggressive demonstrations upon the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the noticeable activity in the movement of the Federal transports on the James, the capture, south of the river, of pris oners from General Grant's several army corps, and the result of their carefully - sifted testimony, were pressingly urged as cor roborative of General Beauregard's opinion.*
Had one of General Lee's corps reached the scene in time to enable General Beauregard to take the offensive, General Grant's forces, sent up in detail, as they were, might have been beaten in detail; and this was the object desired and urged by General Beauregard as soon as he saw that General Grant was passing to the south side of the James, which he had anticipated and pre dicted as the probable projected movement of the enemy. In deed, it afterwards appeared that General Grant's purpose, in fighting the battle of Cold Harbor (June 3d) was that, if unsuc cessful in breaking through General Lee's lines, he might thus prepare the way for such a movement.
General Grant's arrangements having been made for this last change of base, his several corps were put in motion for James
* See Appendix.
River in the afternoon and night of the 12th of June.* Smith's corps (the 18th) was transported by way of the White House back to Bermuda Landing; Burnside's corps (the 9th) and Wright's (the 6th), by way of Jones's Bridge (Chickahominy) and Charles City Court-house Road ; Hancock's (the 2d) and Warren's (the 5th) corps, by way of Long Bridge (Chickahominy) to Wilcox Landing, on the James, f where General Grant's headquarters had been established on the 13th, and whence he telegraphed to Washing ton that the passage of the river would begin the next day. At 3 o'clock p. M., on the 14th, General Grant was at Bermuda Hundreds.
Smith's corps, brought around from the White House, was landed at Bermuda Hundreds in the afternoon of the 14th, and marched to Point of Rocks, on the Appomattox, where there was a pontoon-bridge already established, by which he crossed during that night and moved at once upon Petersburg,^ having been reinforced with Kantz's cavalry and Hink's division of colored troops, making his force, as already said, 22,000 strong.
At this critical juncture General Beauregard had, for the im mediate defence of Petersburg, north and south of the Appomat tox, Wise's brigade, not more than 1200 strong; some light artil lery, with 22 pieces, besides a few men manning the three or four heavy guns in position; two small regiments of cavalry, under Brigadier - General Dearing, and the local militia already men tioned; in other words, an aggregate not exceeding 2200 men of all arms. These troops occupied, from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank-road, about three miles of the Petersburg lines, which were some seven miles and a half in length, leaving fully four miles undefended. True, on his extreme right, in the woods, outside of the lines of works, General Beauregard had thrown Bearing's command, whose duty was to guard that flank and give timely warning of any heavy body of the enemy approaching in that direction. But these were mere precautionary measures to prevent surprise. ~No hope of serious resistance, by so small a force, could be entertained. At the same time the lines across Bermuda Hundreds ISTeck, the object of which was to hold Butler
* See "Army of the Potomac," by Swinton, p. 498. See, also, General Meacle's report.
t Swinton's " Army of the Potomac," p. 499. J Ibid., p. 500.
in check, were occupied only by Bushrod Johnson's division (less Ransom's and Grade's brigades, still absent with General Lee), about 3200 men. That is to say, the total force under General Beauregard's orders was but 5425 strong. Hoke's division, the return of which he had been urging since the 7th of June, was still retained on the north side of the James. The defensive line of Petersburg, from the lower to the upper Appomattox, con structed by the Engineer Department some time before the arrival of the Federals, was so extensive * as to require a force of not less than 25,000 men, instead of the 2200 then available.
At ten o'clock in the morning of the 15th of June "W. F.
G
Smith, after a hot engagement of several hours with Dearing's cavalry, in advance, moved upon the Confederate works by the Baxter road, in front of Batteries G and 7. lie was met, with unsurpassed stubbornness, by General Wise's forces, and repeat edly repulsed; but he succeeded at last, at 7.30 P.M., in carrying the Confederate batteries, from Ko. 5 to Xo. 9, inclusive. Han cock's corps—which had crossed the James on the morning of the 15th, and, by some neglect or omission, was not immediately ordered to march upon Petersburg—came up to the support of General Smith only in the afternoon, too late to participate in the assault of that clay.f
Hoke's division, of General Beauregard's force, withdrawn from it on the 30th of May to reinforce General Lee,^: had been ordered, at last, to hold itself in waiting at Drury's Bluff, and, in response to General Beauregard's continued urgent calls, had been allowed to march to Petersburg at 11.30 A.M. on the 15th.§ Ila-good's brigade, forming part of that division, and for which rail road transportation had been sent to Chester, reached Petersburg about dusk, just after the batteries had fallen. It was followed by the two other brigades within a few hours. These reinforce ments, as they arrived, were disposed upon a new line, a short distance in rear of the captured works, upon which a small epaule-ment was thrown up during the night.
* It measured seven miles and a half. A portion of it, especially in the quarter of Batteries 5, C, and 7, was bad in location, and very vulnerable. General Beauregard, when first inspecting it, on his arrival at Petersburg (May 10th), had openly condemned its injudicious extension.
t Swinton's "Army of the Potomac,'' p. 505. Sec, also, Hancock's report.
I Sec Appendix. § See Appendix.
General Beauregard, seeing the immense gravity of the attack, and that a heavy mass of the Federal army was now present and pressing against Petersburg, at 9.11 P.M. on the 15th, notified General Bragg of the situation. He informed him that he would order Johnson down from Bermuda Hundreds, and that General Lee must look to the defence both of those lines and of Drury's Bluff.* He also telegraphed General Lee to the same effect.f The War Department had already been advised of the probable necessity of such a movement, and had been asked to elect be tween Petersburg and the Bermuda Hundreds line, as it grew more and more evident that both could not be lield.J For rea sons of its own the War Department would make no decision in the matter. But, as immediate action was imperative, General Beauregard assumed the responsibility, and, knowing that the safety of Richmond depended upon the protection to be given to Petersburg, at 10.20 P.M. ordered the abandonment of the Bermuda Hundreds line. Johnson's division was accordingly transferred to Petersburg, moving at dawn on the 16th, and ar riving at or about 10 o'clock A.M. on the same day. The thin skirmish line and few cavalry pickets which, in obedience to or ders, he had left upon his withdrawal were driven off by Butler early on that morning.
The battery at Ilowlett's house had just been completed and armed with a few heavy guns received from Richmond when General Beauregard determined to evacuate those lines. He ordered Colonel Harris, his Chief-Engineer, to dismount the guns and bury them, with their carriages and chassis, in the most fa vorable locality in the vicinity of the battery, and to carefully cover the spot with sod, leaves, and bushes, so as to conceal them from the enemy. These instructions were carried out to the let ter; and when, on the 18th, Pickett's division drove off the Fed erals from the Hewlett Battery and the Bermuda Hundreds line, these guns and their appurtenances, being unearthed and found uninjured, were placed again in position, and used with telling effect on the Federal ironclads and other vessels lying in the long reach of Dutch Gap, facing the battery.
Thus reinforced, General Beauregard had under him a total effective force of about 10,000 men, of all arms, confronting
* Sec Appendix. t See Appendix. J See Appendix.
Hancock's corps (the 2d) and Smith's (the IStli), with an aggre gate of not less than 44,000 men.
Burnside's corps (the 9th) came up at about noon on the 16th,* and General Hancock, who, by instructions of General Meade, had refrained from attacking until these reinforcements arrived, ordered an assault, with all the available forces, to be made at or about 5.30 r. M.f Three Federal corps (about 66,000 men) now united in an unrelaxing effort of three hours to break the Confederate line, and Birney's division, of Hancock's corps, finally succeeded in effecting a lodgment. The contest continued into the night, then gradually slackened and ceased. Warren's corps (the 5th), which had only reached Petersburg at dusk;}: on that day, took no part in the action of the 16th.
I^o further offensive movement was attempted by the enemy until about noon of the next day (17th). With the addition of Warren's corps, composed of four divisions, the Federal force now assailing Petersburg consisted of not less than 90,000 men, of all arms, while the troops under General Beauregard only numbered 10,000 effectives, most of whom were unprotected by field-works.
With this fearful disparity, the battle opened on the 17th. Three times were the Federals driven back, but they as often resumed the offensive and held their ground. About dusk a portion of the Confederate lines was wholly broken, and the troops in that quarter w T ere about to be thrown into a panic, which might have ended in irreparable disaster, when, happily, as General Beauregard, with his staff, was endeavoring to rally and re-form the troops, Grade's brigade, of Johnson's division, consisting of about 1200 men—the return of which to his com mand General Beauregard had been urgently asking—came up from Chaffin's Bluff, whence, at last, the War Department had ordered it to move. It was promptly and opportunely thrown into the gap on the lines, and drove back the Federals, capturing
* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509. General Burnsidc, in his report, says he reached the position occupied by their troops at "about 10 A.M. on the 16th."
t In Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509, the hour is given as "about 4 r. M." General Hancock, in his report, says: " I was ordered to be prepared to commence the attack at G P.M."
| Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 509.
about 2000 prisoners. The conflict raged with great fury until after eleven at night.
Foreseeing the inevitable rupture of his lines, General Beanre-gard had selected during the day, with his Chief-Engineer, Colonel Harris, a new and shorter defensive line along a ravine (Taylor's Creek) in the rear, which he caused to be clearly marked out with white stakes, so that it might be occupied at night without confu sion, when the troops should be directed to retire upon it. Gen erals Hoke and Johnson were instructed to see that their staff-officers and those of the several brigades under them should ex amine and learn the new positions to be taken by their commands. This they did with their usual care and precision while the fight was still going on.
Shortly after 11 P.M., and just as the firing on both sides had almost entirely ceased, General Beauregard ordered all the camp-fires to be brightly lighted, with sentinels well thrown forward, and as near as possible to the enemy's.* Then, at about 12.30 A. M. on the 18th, began this retrograde movement, which, not withstanding the exhaustion of our troops and their sore disap pointment at receiving no further reinforcements, was safely and silently executed, with uncommonly good order and precision, though the greatest caution had to be used in order to retire unnoticed from so close a contact with so strong an adversary. Without a moment's rest the digging of trenches was begun, with such utensils as had been hastily collected at Petersburg, many of the men using their bayonets, their knives, and even their tin cans, to assist in the rapid execution of the work. Thus it was that, before daylight, and in spite of nearly insurmountable diffi culties, our new defences were partially constructed, and our weary troops again placed under cover. It was one of the boldest ma-
* At 10 P. M., or about that time, on the 17th, while General Beauregard was anxiously waiting for the firing to cease, in order to take up his new position, a messenger from General Burnside to General Meade rode into our lines and was captured. lie bore a despatch, which appeared to be an an swer to Meade by Burnside, representing that two of his divisions were badly cut up, and the third so scattered at the time that it would be impossible to gather it up so as to go on with the attack before daybreak, and that his command was very much exhausted. General Beauregard, being aware that the other Federal commands were in no better condition, felt convinced that the fighting would soon come to a stop, and thus enable him to begin his retrograde movement.
nceuvres attempted during the war—one that General Beauregard had already twice resorted to with equal success, as the reader, no doubt, remembers; first, upon his retreat from Corinth, on the 30th of May, 1SG2, and afterwards, on the 6th of September, 1863, upon the evacuation of Battery Wagner, pending the siege of Charleston. But here the movement was much more hazard ous, for it was undertaken and executed by troops who were con tending against not less than nine times their number, who were exhausted by three days of almost incessant fighting, and in whose hearts hope itself must have been almost extinct. This was the line held by the Confederates until the end of the war. It was subsequently strengthened and materially improved; but its loca tion, as then established by General Beauregard, remained un changed. General Meade, in his report of the campaign of 1864: (made in November of that year), speaks as follows of this new line:
"On advancing (on the 18th) it was found that the enemy, during the night, had retired to a line about a mile nearer the city—the one he now occupies."
During these eventful days — beginning as early as the 15th — General Beauregard had kept Mr. Davis, General Bragg, and General Lee constantly informed, by telegraph and messages borne by his staff, of the immense odds against which he was contending, a fact then placed beyond all question by the capt ure of prisoners from at least three corps of General Grant's army. A strange scepticism, unexplained—unexplainable—was persisted in by those whom he so urgently addressed.
General Beauregard, however, no longer doubting, from the character of the attack and the accumulated proofs of every kind then before him, that, on the evening of the 17th, most of General Grant's forces Lad been brought against Petersburg, and knowing that the reinforcement of one division would be
O
to no purpose, at 6.40 p. M. on the 17th telegraphed General Lee as follows:
" PETERSBURG, June 17th, 1804 : 6.40 P. M. " General R. E. LEE, Clay's House* (also to Chester, Va.) :
" The increasing number of the enemy in my front, and inadequacy of my force to defend the already much too extended lines, will compel me to fall
* On south side of James River.
within a shorter one, which I will attempt to effect to-night. This I shall hold as long as practicable, but, without reinforcements, I may have to evac uate the city very shortly. In that event I shall retire in the direction of Drury's Bluff, defending the crossing at Appomattox River and Swift Creek.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
He also despatched three of his staff (Chisolm, Roman, arid Cooke) successively, at different hours of the day, evening, and night, the last of whom (Major Cooke) reached General Lee's headquarters at about 3 A. M., on the ISth, and, more fortunate than the two who had preceded him, was allowed to see General Lee, and "accomplished, in part, his object in seeking him."*
Half an hour after Major Cooke's arrival at Drury's Bluff the following telegram was sent from General Lee's headquar ters :
"DRURY'S BLUFF, June 18t7t, 18G4: 3.30 A.M. "SUPERINTENDENT RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD, Richmond:
" Can trains run to Petersburg ? If so, send all cars available to Rice's Turnout. If they cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where the road is broken ? It is important to get troops to Peters burg without delay. R. E. LEE, General. "Official.
"W. II. TAYLOR, A. A. G."
On the same day General Lee transmitted the following tel egram to General Early:
" HEADQUARTERS, ARMY 1ST. VA., June IStJi, 1864. " General J. A. EARLY, Lynchburg, Ya.:
" Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan, or move upon Petersburg without delay. R. E. LEE, General."
Mr. Swinton, in his "Army of the Potomac," is, therefore, twice mistaken when he asserts (p. 50C) that " during the night of the 15th the van of Lee's army reached the town (Peters burg), and men of a very different mettle from the crude sol diers to whom its defence had been intrusted silently deployed in line of battle."
It must not be forgotten that, on and prior to the 15th, Gen eral Beauregard had been earnestly calling for reinforcements, including his own troops sent to General Lee; but that none
* See, in Appendix, reports of Colonel Roman and of Major Cooke on this subject.
Imd been forwarded, at that time, from the Army of Northern Virginia is shown by the following despatch:
" DRURY'S BLUFF, June IGth, 1864: 10.30 A M " To General BEAUREGARD :
"Your despatch of 9.45 received. It is the first that lias come to hand.* I do not know the position of Grant's army. Cannot strip north bank of James River. Have you not force sufficient ? R. E. LEE, General."
Kersliaw's division of Anderson's corps, the first of General Lee's forces that arrived at Petersburg, only reached that place on the morning of the ISth of June, as is established by the fol lowing telegrams, to which is also added a letter of General Ker-shaw himself:
1. "HEADQUARTERS, DRURY'S BLUFF, June 17th, 18G4: 10 p. M. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va.:
" General Kersliaw's division, which will camp to-night on Reclwater Creek, is ordered to continue its march to-morrow to Petersburg.
"R. E. LEE, General. "Official.
"W. II. TAYLOR, A. A. G."
2. " HEADQUARTERS, PETERSBURG, June 18th, 1864 : 11.30 A. M. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:
" Occupied last night my new lines without impediment. Kershaw's divis ion arrived about half-past seven, and Field's at about half-past nine o'clock. They are being placed in position. All comparatively quiet this morning. General Lee has just arrived. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
Extract from a Letter of General Kershaw to General Beauregard.
3. " CAMDEX, S. C., July 22d, 1876. "3/y dear General, —* * * I have been induced to think over the matter
more carefully, and am now reminded that my position, when first in line of battle at Petersburg, was, as you remember, with my right on or near the Jeru salem plank-road, extending across the open field, and bending back towards the front of the Cemetery. * * * The first of my division that arrived took the cars sent for them, and marched through the city while I was at your quar ters. The sun was just up when I arrived there. I was at your headquarters not more than an hour. I think within another hour my troops were in posi tion. * * * I am quite sure that the battle commenced within an hour after my troops were in position. * * *
" I am, dear General, sincerely your friend and admirer,
" J. B. KERSHAW.
"General G. T. BEAUREGARD, New Orleans, La."
* General Lee evidently meant the first despatch received that day; other wise his statement would have been altogether erroneous. Sec the telegrams already submitted to the reader, and Colonel Sain. Paul's report, to be found in Appendix.
4. " CLAY'S HOUSE, June nth, 1864 : 3.30 p. M. " Major-Genl. W. H. F. LEE, Malvern Hill, via Meaden Station :
" Push after the enemy, and endeavor to ascertain what lias become of Grant's army. Inform General Hill. R. E. LEE."
5. " CLAY'S HOUSE, June 17*7*, 18G4 : 4.30 p. M. "Lieut.-Genl. A. P. HILL, Riddle's Shop, via Meaden Station:
" General Beauregard reports large number of Grant's troops crossed James River, above Fort Powhatan, yesterday. If you have nothing contradictory of this, move to Chaffin's Bluff. R. E. LEE.
" Official.
" W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G."
C. " CLAY'S HOUSE, June llth, 18G4 : 12 M.
" General G. T. BEAUREGARD :
" Telegram of 9 A. M. received. Until I can get more definite information of Grant's movements, I do not think it prudent to draw more troops to this side of river. R. E. LEE."
7. " CLAY'S HOUSE, June llth, 1864: 4.30 p. M.
" General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Petersburg, Va.:
" Have no information of Grant's crossing James River, but upon your re port have ordered troops up to Chaffin's Bluff. E. E. LEE."
Ko further proof is necessary to show how impossible it is that " the van of Leds army " could have reached Petersburg during the night of the 15th, when, from evidence furnished by General Lee himself, the first division of his forces only came np on the morning of the 18th.
This settles the point as to Mr. Swinton's first error. The sec ond, referring to the " mettle" of the troops defending Petersburg, although of less importance, is still deserving of comment.'
The only difference between the "crude soldiers" Mr. Swin-ton speaks of and those belonging to the army of General Lee was, that some of them, numbering two hundred local militia, were less inured to the hardships of war, and were mostly old men and boys. But the other part consisted of Wise's brigade, which few commands in the service equalled, and of two small regiments of cavalry, under Dearing, who had infused into his men the dash and spirit that so eminently characterized him. The proof, how ever, that the "mettle" of the forces at and around Petersburg on the loth was identically the same as that of all the Southern troops is that, although they numbered but 2200 effectives,* they
* See, in Appendix, synopsis of General Wise's report of the operations around Petersburg on the 15th of June, 1804.
so gallantly manned and fought the extensive works on the south side of the city that three columns of Federals, amounting to not less than 22,000 veteran troops, were kept at bay during the whole day, and only succeeded, towards nightfall, in carrying a portion of the works, " without the possession either of Peters burg or of the line' of the Appoinattox^ * The enemy had been informed that these fortifications were such that "cavalry could ride over them" —a representation, says Mr. Swinton ("Army of the Potomac," p. 502), " that did not turn out to be justi fied by experience; for Kautz, who, with his mounted division, essayed to work his way round on the left, found himself com pletely estopped by a heavy fire ; and in front the approaches were discovered to be so covered by the play of artillery from the works, that from every point on which Smith attempted to place batter ies to silence the enemy's fire the guns were speedily driven off." The reinforcements that first reached Petersburg formed part of General Beauregard's own troops, detached on the 30th of May and on or about the 3d of June, by order of the War Department, to co-operate with General Lee.f They were: Hoke's division, the first brigade of which (Hagood's) arrived at nightfall on the 15th of June; part of Bushrod Johnson's division—which had been so seasonably withdrawn from Bermuda Hundreds, by order of General Beauregard—arriving a little before noon on the 16th; and Grade's brigade, of Johnson's division, the opportune arrival of which, in the afternoon of the 17th, saved the Confederate lines from utter destruction. None of these troops belonged to the Army of Northern Virginia. Part of them had been borrowed and were returned to their original command, though with evi dent reluctance. The others had not left the limits of their De partment. And here it may be said that, had General Beaure gard's protests, made as early as May 29th,£ been heeded at Rich mond, not a brigade, not even a regiment of his command, would have been taken away. But the War Department was ever will-ing to accede to any call made by General Lee on General Beau-regard, while the latter was denied all assistance from the former, and could hardly obtain the return of his own troops when he
* Swinton's " Army of the Potomac," p. 503. The italics are ours, t Sec Appendix.
\ See General Beauregard's letter to Mr. Davis, and his telegrams to Gen eral Bragg, in Appendix.
needed them most, during the days of the disproportionate con flict with General Grant's army, when General Lee had but few of the enemy in his front. Telegrams, to be found in the Ap pendix to the present chapter (to which the reader's attention is invited), will show that not only were General Lee and the "War Department most anxious at that time to draw troops from General Beauregard, but that they had actually requested his pres ence and personal co-operation on the north side of the James. Butler, they thought, had sent the greater part of his army to reinforce General Grant, and had left only a nominal force to guard his position. General Beauregard, however, was too far-seeing, too well-informed as to the enemy's movements in his front, to partake of these delusions. He expressed his readiness to obey any order given him by the authorities at Richmond, but warned them that at least 8000 men, under Gillmore, still con fronted his lines, and most strongly advised that no more troops should be withdrawn from his Department.
Like Mr. Swinton, who, in most instances, is a careful and im partial examiner of the events he chronicles, Mr. J. D. McCabe, in his work entitled "Life and Campaigns of General Robert E. Lee," falls into error with regard to the date of the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg.
We quote from pages 50T and 508 :
" General Lee hurried forward as soon as lie learned of the attack on Pe tersburg; but, as he \vas full forty miles from the Appomattox, his advanced forces did not reach the city until the night of the loth."
The reader is already aware that, on the 15th of June, General Lee had not the least idea of " hurrying forward" to the support of General Beauregard. His own telegrams exist to bear witness to this. Not only were none of his forces at or around Peters burg on " the night of the 15th," but as late as June 17th he did not believe that General Grant had left his front. He was endeavoring on that day to find out " what had become of Grant's army." Very clearly, Mr. McCabe had no such evidence, derived from General Lee himself,among "the valuable collection of ma terials for a history of the war" from which, he says, his book was written.
This, however, is not the only error concerning the siege of Petersburg into which Mr. McCabe has fallen.
We again quote from page 508 of his book:
" General Lee had ordered General Beauregard not to evacuate his line until Anderson's corps, tlien moving from Richmond, should relieve him; but, as the demand for troops at Petersburg was so urgent, and there was no prospect that Anderson would get up in time, General Beauregard as sumed the responsibility of withdrawing his command to Petersburg. 1 "
It has already been shown that General Lee never gave—and, in fact, could not have given—such an order to General Beaure gard, for the simple reason that General Beauregard was at that time in command of his own Department, arid not in any way under the orders of General Lee. When he was advised by General Beauregard of the necessity of Johnson's withdrawal from the Bermuda Hundreds line, and asked to fill up the gap with his own troops, he answered:
"BOTTOM'S BRIDGE, June 16th, 1864: 2 A.M. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :
"A division has been ordered to move to lines on Bermuda Neck. It will be important for it to march there by daylight. The pickets and skirmishers on the lines should be retained there until troops arrive, if practicable. Please send an officer to meet the troops and conduct them.
" R. E. LEE, General. "Official.
"W. II. TAYLOR, A. A. G. 1 '
This was evidently no order. It was received by General Beau-regard at 4.30 A. M. on the 17th, not only after the withdrawal of Johnson from the Bermuda Hundreds line, but after his arrival at Petersburg, where he had so effectually assisted the evening before in repulsing the enemy. Had General Bushrod Johnson's fractional division been left at Bermuda Hundreds Keck, and not been ordered by General Beauregard to Petersburg, at that su preme moment Petersburg—and Richmond also—would have been captured before General Lee discovered whether or not General Grant's army had actually crossed the James. Both General Lee and the War Department had been previously informed by Gen eral Beauregard of the absolute necessity for that movement. General Lee readily complied with the hurried call then made upon him, and did his best to replace Johnson's division with troops drawn from the Army of Kortliern Yirginia. No one blames him for the delay which ensued. But the War Depart ment obstinately refused to say which, Petersburg or the Ber muda Hundreds line, should be abandoned; though it must have
been evident, even to the War Department, that both could not be held with the troops then at General Beauregard's disposal. Instead of an answer to the questions asked, a series of inquiries came, the next day, from the War Department: "At what hour, during the night of the 15th, did you evacuate the line across Bermuda Hundreds Keck?" asked General Bragg in his official capacity, as Chief of Staff and military adviser of the President. "At what hour during the night did General Johnson make the movement? Did you inform General Lee of that movement? If so, at what hour and through what channel?" Such was, in substance, the strange and querulous communication forwarded from Richmond to General Beauregard.
Here was one of the three leading generals of the Southern armies straining every nerve to guard the "entrance-gate" to the Confederate capital, with no reliance but his own tenacity of pur pose and the intrepidity of the handful of men he had under him ; with an attacking foe becoming hourly bolder and hourly increas ing in number; and because, after repeatedly pointing out the precariousness of his condition, and asking for advice which was persistently denied him, he finally determined to act with prompt ness and vigor, he was called upon, amid his anxieties and multi tudinous duties, to suspend his weighty task and respond to this inquisitorial investigation of his conduct.*
Another very serious error we find at page 510 of Mr. McCabe's book.
We quote as follows:
"Grant's whole army was now before Petersburg; and, still holding to his original resolve to capture the city, he ordered a general assault for the morn ing of the 18th. In the mean time, however, General Lee had been engaged in constructing a formidable line of works immediately around the city, and on the morning of the 18th he withdrew from the temporary line he had held in advance, and occupied that which was destined to become memorable for the siege it sustained.*'
Here Mr. McCabe evidently drew from his imagination, and not from the reliable sources from which he claims to have derived his knowledge of the events he deals with. This new line has already been specially referred to in another part of this chapter. General Lee had had nothing to do with it. General Beauregard
* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's answer to General Bragg. II.—15
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
had not only located and staked it out, without even consulting General Lee, but the line was already occupied by our troops, and had been so occupied for more than ten hours, when General Lee in person arrived at Petersburg.
Many inaccuracies concerning the Petersburg campaign are also to be found in Mr. John Esten Cooke's " Life of General Robert E. Lee." It is well to refer to some of them.
Speaking of the arrival of the Army of Northern Virginia at Petersburg, Mr. Cooke says :
" General Lee had moved with his accustomed celerity, and, as usual, with out that loss of time which results from doubt of an adversary's intentions." *
This eulogy is the more surprising, because General Lee him self, in several of his telegrams, already given to the reader, ad mitted how little he knew of General Grant's movements at that time; and it is now made clear how long he hesitated before he finally determined to come to General Beauregard's assistance. The truth is, he could not have waited longer.
Mr. Cooke proceeds as follows :
" On the 16th he " [General Lee] " was in face of his adversary there " [at Petersburg]. " General Grant had adopted the plan of campaign which Lee expected him to adopt."
This would be ludicrous, were it not so poor a compliment to General Lee's ability as a commander. If General Lee ex pected General Grant to do what he actually did, why did he not foil his purpose? The entire Federal army did not cross the James in a single day, nor did it march at once and together upon Petersburg. If General Lee foresaw Grant's movements, either he should have joined General Beauregard and annihi lated the separate Federal corps as they came up, one after the other; or, he should have thrown his whole force upon what remained of Grant's army, on the north side of the James, after his first corps had effected a crossing. Mr. Cooke would have been correct had he made this assertion, with reference not t» General Lee but to General Beauregard, whose letters and tele grams to the War Department, as early as June 7th, show how correctly he had interpreted General Grant's intentions.
* " Life of General Robert E. Lee," p. 44.
" General Lee had scarcely gotten his forces in position on the 16th," says Mr. Cooke, "when he was furiously attacked; and such was the weight of this assault that Lee was forced from his advanced position, east of the city, behind his second line of works, by this time well forward in process of construction."
Whatever of truth is contained in the foregoing sentence is found in the reference to the fact that "the second line of works," occupied by General Lee's forces when they reached Petersburg, on the 18th and 19th of June, "were well forward in process of construction;" so much so, it may be added, that General Lee's forces, on their arrival, had only to file into that " second line of works," already located and already constructed •—though not finally completed — by General Beauregard.
"While commenting upon these erroneous statements, so strik ingly alike in their false conclusions, we might also object to Mr. Pollard's account, in "The Lost Cause," of the various events relative to the attack upon Petersburg, from the 15th to the 18th of June. His recital is, in the main, accurate, but his purpose seems to be to leave the reader under the impression that it was General Lee who instigated and executed all the movements of the Southern forces operating, just then, in that part of the country. He will not admit that by General Beau-regard's energy and farsightedness alone the Federal attempt was frustrated and the salvation of both Petersburg and Rich mond was effected; thus prolonging the struggle for nearly an other year.
It has always been a matter of surprise to many who were eye witnesses of those great events that more credit was not ac corded at the time, throughout the South, to General Beaure gard and his small and exhausted force. Those who are sup posed to have correctly chronicled the events of that campaign have erred grossly, even as to dates, and have unjustly ascribed to General Lee alone the almost incredible repulse of the Federal army in front of Petersburg. Mr. Davis is one of these writers. "With the original knowledge of tho facts and with the facilities at his disposal, during arid since the war, it is hard to believe that the errors found in his book,* concerning these events, were not the result of a biassed mind. To him, to General Bragg,
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 638.
and to General Lee was sent every telegram necessary for the full and complete knowledge of the important movements of the Federal army; and the " Southern Historical Papers," to which Mr. Davis often refers, had already published, months before the appearance of his book, most of the Held telegrams reproduced by us.* These show when and how General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia first reached the City of Petersburg. And yet Mr. Davis says:
"Lee crossed the James River on the 15th, and, by a night march, his ad vance was in the intrenchuieuts of Petersburg before the morning for which the enemy was waiting. The artillery now had other support than the old men and boys of the town."
And further on he adds:
"On the 17th an assault was made with such spirit and force as to gain a part of our line, in which, however, the assailants suffered severely. Lee had now constructed a line in rear of the one first occupied, having such advantages as gave to our army much greater power to resist/'
Whether Mr. Davis derived his information from Swinton, McCabe, or Cooke, he has certainly ignored the clear and signif icant telegrams cited above, several of which are signed by General Lee himself.
The present writer well remembers the harassed and almost despairing look that gradually grew upon General Beauregard's bronzed and martial features, as each laborious day and sleep less night passed away without bringing the long-expected and often prayed-for reinforcements.
And here may be explained how General Beauregard became acquainted with every incident that occurred around him, and acquired such correct knowledge, not only of the enemy's po sitions, but even of his intended movements.
lie established along the James River, below Fort Powhatan, a well-organized system of couriers, by means of which commu nications with his headquarters, from various divergent points, far and near, were regularly kept up. Indeed, these communi cations continued, from the date of the battle of Drury's Bluff until long after the enemy's landing at City Point, and even during the siege of Petersburg. This was no new experiment, for he had reduced the system almost to a science, and had
* " Southern Historical Papers" (vols. iii. and iv.) for 1877.
fully tested its efficacy along the Tennessee River, while at Jackson, in 1862; and also, in 1862-63, along the Atlantic coast, in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. "In war" — he was wont to say — "it is as important to know where your enemy is, and what he intends doing, as it is to have men, arms, and ammunition." This maxim, or aphorism, is worthy of a place among those of Jomini.
The enemy's force at Petersburg on the 18th embraced Han cock's, Burnside's, and Warren's corps, with a portion — the stronger portion — of Smith's corps, under General Martindale, and Neill's division of Wright's corps, with all its artillery.*
At about noon on that day the attack was renewed by the Fed-erals.f Partial assaults, however, had been made on some parts of the line before that hour, but with no decided result, as they were mostly engagements between skirmishers. The withdrawal of our troops, during the night, from their former positions to the new line of intrenchments selected by General Beauregard had surprised the enemy to such an extent as to cause a halt in his operations; and this explains the delay of the general at tack, which should have begun early in the morning, but was in fact begun in the afternoon. General Burnside, in his report, says:
" A grand attack was ordered by the Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac for 4 A.M. on the 18th, and General Wilcox was directed to take the advance of this corps (the 18th), supported by General Potter. On pushing out the skirmishers in advance of the attacking column it was dis covered that the enemy had withdrawn from the line of the open ground in front of the Shade House, but their skirmishers were found in the woods that intervened between it and the Taylor House. * * * At 3.30 P.M. a general at-
* General Meacle, in his report, says : " During the night of the 10th Neill's division, 6th Corps, arrived, relieving Brooks's division of the 18th, who, ac companied by Major-General Smith, returned to Bermuda Hundreds, leaving General Martindale in command of Smith's troops." In a preceding part of his report General Meade also says: "Early on the morning of the 16th I proceeded to City Point, and from thence to Petersburg, meeting, when about half-way to the latter place, the Lieutenant-General Commanding, by whom I was instructed to take command of the troops then in front of Petersburg, and, if practicable, push the enemy across the Appomattox. At the same time orders were sent to Wright to move up his artillery and one division of his infantry to Petersburg, and to take the two others by water to City Point."
t In another part of his report General Meade says: " An unsuccessful assault by Gibbon's division was made about noon on that day."
tack was ordered by the Major-General Commanding (General Meade), which resulted, on the part of this corps, in driving the enemy entirely out of the cut and ravine, and establishing our extreme advance within about one hun dred yards of the enemy's main line, beyond the railroad. * * * The troops of General Hancock, on our right, and Warren, on our left, fully co-operated \vith us in this engagement."
General Meade also says that—
"Major-General Birney, temporarily commanding the 2d Corps (Hancock's), then organized a formidable column, and, about 4 p. M., made an attack, but without success. Later in the day attacks were made by the 5th and 9th Corps, with no better results/'
General Beauregard's extreme right confronted "Warren's corps, but was merely a thin skirmish line of infantry behind the de fences. It was here that he placed Kershaw's division, as soon as it arrived on the field, barely in time to resist one of the assaults of the enemy in that quarter. This reinforcement gave General Beauregard at that time about 15,000 men, against not less than 90,000 Federals; for Field's division, which had arrived two hours after Kershaw's, was not yet in position.
Four entire Federal army corps were there. One division (Brooks's) of Smith's corps was absent, but its place had been filled by a division (Xeill's) of Wright's corps; and the whole of Wright's artillery had also been moved up. The fight went on with determined vigor on the one side, with indomitable resist ance on the other, and, despite the overwhelming odds against us, closed, before dark, by the total repulse of all the assaulting col umns. "When made, it" (the assault) "was a complete repulse at every point, and was attended with another mournful loss of life."*
General Lee reached Petersburg at 11.30 A. M. on the 18th, and his forces (except Kershaw's and Field's divisions) were brought up afterwards. General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, already given in a preceding portion of the present chapter, full/ settles that point. By Sunday afternoon (the next day) the two corps then constituting the Army of Northern Virginia were within the defences of the cit} T . f
* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 511.
t Less the forces left on the north side of James River, to protect Richmond from that direction.
Upon General Lee's arrival, General Beauregard, after riding with him towards the right of our line, on an elevation somewhat in advance of the City Reservoir, from whence a very good view was had of the whole field, proposed to him that, as soon as Hill's and Anderson's corps should arrive, an attack should be made upon General Grant's left flank and rear. General Lee refused his assent, on the ground that his troops needed rest, and that the defensive having been thus far so advantageous to him against Grant's offensive, north of the James, and to Beauregard, at Pe tersburg, he preferred continuing the same mode of warfare.
The Federals, with their ample resources, were so speedily and strongly intrenched against attack—as was foreseen by General Beauregard in his conference with General Lee — that, at any later date, the offensive became impracticable.
Had General Beauregard's warning of the situation and his ur gent requisitions been heeded in season, or as late as mid-day of the 16th (that is, twenty-four hours after Grant's whole army had crossed the river), even if no offensive operation had been under taken by the Confederates, the repulse of the Federals, that after noon, must have been so severe as to change entirely the face and fortune of the campaign: a repulse far more important than that inflicted at Cold Harbor might then have been given. Or, if General Lee, when informed by General Beauregard that he had taken prisoners from three of the Federal corps, had boldly moved forward, with his whole force, or even with two-thirds of it, he might have crushed one-half of General Grant's army. The fail ure to attempt such a movement is the more justly subject to criticism, because it could have been effected without in any way uncovering Richmond.
General Beauregard's reports and demands, at that period, were discredited and neglected, even by General Lee. Yet it is known that, on June 14rth, the latter was aware, from his own sources of information—and he reported the fact to the authorities at Rich mond—that General Grant's whole army was massed at Wilcox Landing and Westover—the very point of its passage from the north to the south side of the James—and that its depot, at the White House, had been broken up, and all its material and stores removed, even including the railroad stock. What else could these facts have been supposed to indicate than an entire change of base on the part of the enemy ?
CHAPTER XXXVII.
Unconquerable Spirit of our Troops around Petersburg.—Tribute to the Ladies of that City.—Southern Women.—Quietude of the Federal Army after June 18th. — General Meade Intrenches.—What General Badeau Says of the Failure to Capture Petersburg. — His Comments upon the Late Arrival of General Lee's Army.—How General Beauregard Saved the City.—Inaction of General Meade's Army.—Erroneous Explanation of it by General Badeau.—General Beauregard's Comprehension of the Depression of the Enemy.—He Proposes an Immediate Attack.—General Grant's Words.—The Siege of Petersburg.—Criticism of the Confederate Line of Intrenchments. — Denial that General Lee Consulted General Mahone Concerning the Location of the Line.—Details of General Beau-regard's Proposed Attack upon the Federal Army.—General Lee Fears that the Topography of t lie Country will Interfere with the Movements of the Troops.—Consults General Malione with Reference to the Position of " Second Swamp " and the Railroad Cuts.—General Lee Refuses to Make the Attack.—Reasons for Holding to the Jerusalem Plank Road Line. — That Line Maintained until the Close of the War. — Untrust-worthiness of Southern Historians on this Point.
BEFORE entering upon the events which followed the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg it is but fair to pay a passing tribute to the handful of heroes who unflinchingly bore "the heat and burden" of the four days of unparalleled fighting which we have just described. The beautiful devotion and patriotism of the women of the beleaguered city, during the whole period of the siege, claim also an honored place in these pages. Equal praise should be meted out to those who never wavered before the overwhelming odds confronting them, and to those who nobly encouraged their valor and attended to their needs. It will also be our object, in this chapter, again to direct the reader's atten tion to the location of the new Confederate lines, so successfully occupied by our troops on the eventful night of the 17th of June.
Throughout the Confederate war no epoch was more trying to our troops in the field, or more clearly demonstrated their powers of endurance and their unconquerable spirit, than the Petersburg campaign. Reference is here made particularly to the struggle of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of June. The exhausting work per-
formed, the fatigue endured, night and day, by officers and men, and the knowledge that they were outnumbered seven to one, make the courage and stubborn resolution there displayed truly sublime. It was a great feat in military annals. On the 15th 2200 men defending Petersburg prevented 22,000 from effecting its capture. On the evening of the 16th 10,000 men stood a successful barrier to 60,000. The same 10,000 men, on the 17th, confronted 90,000, and were not defeated. On the 18th our troops, reinforced, first by Kershaw's, then by Field's division, of Gen eral Lee's army—making an aggregate of 15,000 in the forenoon, and about 20,000 in the afternoon—not only withstood, but blood ily repulsed, the combined attack of these 90,000 men. The loss of the enemy exceeded ours in more than the proportion of his strength to ours—it was nine times greater. Indeed, it amounted to more than the number of men we had in action.
" In these preliminary operations against Petersburg, which may be brought together under the definition of' the period of assaults,' though no large ac tion had taken place, the rolls of the army showed a loss of 15,000 men.*
If we cannot here inscribe the names of all those who figured in that bloody drama, we may at least make mention of their com manders and of those whose untiring efforts aided them success fully to maintain their ground. Hoke, Johnson, "Wise, Ilagood, Colquitt, Gracic, Martin, Bearing, are names that should be re membered. To the men who fought under them the highest praise is due; and whatever of glory belongs to the former belongs also to those whose strong arms and stout hearts so effectually carried out their orders. Nor should the name of Harris, the able Engineer and fearless officer, be omitted from that list of heroes.
When the war-cloud settled upon that part of Virginia, and the fate of Petersburg hung in the balance, the noble women of the besieged city and its environs could be seen, night and day, throng ing forth, as far as they were permitted to go, rendering invalu able assistance to the wounded, and breathing words of solace and peace in the ears of the dying. The work performed by them w r as efficient and intelligent, and not the well-meant but fitful efforts of the favored daughters of fashion. Personal comfort was put aside by them ; and many a Confederate soldier, now in
* Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 515.
the enjoyment of full health and strength, may attribute his recov ery from illness, from wounds, or from physical exhaustion, to the unremitting attention given him by these patriotic women. Dur ing the whole war, and in all parts of the Confederacy, the women of the South were up to this high standard. They never, to our knowledge, in any single instance failed. Their conviction of the justice of the cause was profound, and truly has it been said of them—" their hearts were in the war."
After the total repulse of the Federal army on the evening of the 18th no further effort was made by the enemy to renew the assault upon Petersburg. The musket was replaced by the spade in the hands of the Union soldiers, and nothing of moment oc curred between the two armies then confronting each other until
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the memorable event so appropriately termed by Mr. Swinton " the mine fiasco." * " Being satisfied," says General Meade, in his report, " that Lee's army was before me, and nothing further to be gained by direct attacks, offensive operations ceased, and the work of intrenching a line commenced, which line is part of that at present held." f
In his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant" (vol. ii., p. 372) General Bad can uses the following language:
" The General-in-chief \vas greatly chagrined at the failure of Smith to capture Petersburg. The plan of the movement had been to take that place by surprise; 'and when, on the 15th, Grant ascertained that Lee was still on the northern side of the James, while Smith and Hancock were combined, with nearly forty thousand men, in front of Petersburg,^: he looked upon vic tory as assured. Even after the early success of Smith had been left unim proved, it was still possible, by further attacks, to secure the capture of the place before Lee's entire army could arrive. The assaults of the IGth, 17th, and 18th were all made with this idea; for if the rebels were not at once dislodged, it was apparent that a long and tedious siege must follow; in fact, a new series of combinations would become necessary, and a chilling disappointment fall upon the spirit of the North. Every effort was therefore made south of the Appomattox; and when an unexpected opportunity was offered in front of Bermuda Hundreds, Butler was urged again and again to hold what he had acquired, and even to retake the position, after it had slipped from his grasp. He seemed, indeed, to appreciate the importance of his prize, but did not succeed in retaining it, and, at the end of three days, the rebels again held the railway between Petersburg and Richmond, and all
* " Army of the Potomac," p. 518.
t General Meade's report bears date November 1st, 1864.
I A fact which even President Davis appears not to have known.
the great avenues connecting the Confederacy and its capital were in their control.
" But, if the well-laid plans of the National commander had thus been doub ly and trebly foiled, Lee had by no means displayed consummate generalship. lie made at the outset the grave mistake, which came so near being fatal, of remaining north of the James till Grant had arrived in front of Petersburg; and, even after starting from Cold Harbor, his alacrity was not conspicuous. It was not until the morning of the 18th that his principal columns again confronted the Army of the Potomac; and he himself only arrived in Peters burg on that day.* It was Beauregard who saved the town. It was he who foresaw the intention of Grant, and brought the troops from Bermuda Hun dreds without orders, neglecting or, rather, risking the lesser place, to secure that which was all-important; massing and strengthening the inner works on the night of the 15th, and, afterwards, holding Meade and Smith at bay, until Lee arrived in force. Then the combined rebel army, amounting to sixty thousand men, again on the defensive, and again behind earthworks, was able to withstand the attacks of the wearied veterans who were brought up, after their march of fifty miles, to still renewed assaults."
While noticing the general correctness of this account, so strikingly in contrast with what is said upon this subject by many a Southern writer, including Mr. Davis himself, we deem it necessary to point out a palpable omission on the part of General Badeau.
On the 20th of June, after the arrival of General Lee's forces at Petersburg, the Confederate army was still inferior in num ber to the Federal army to the extent of 30,000 men; and the ''wearied veterans" alluded to by General Badeau had under gone no such fatigue as General Beauregard's troops had borne from the 15th to the 18th, inclusive ; nor had they been sub jected to more marching than General Lee's two army corps; nor were the breastworks they would have assaulted so "for midable" as they are represented to be; for, though begun by General Beauregard during the night of the 17th, they were not completed until days and weeks after General Lee's arrival. Some other reason must be assigned for the inertness and com-
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parative inactivity of the Federal army after the 18th of June, and that reason General Badeau himself finally gives in the following language:
* General Badeau quotes General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, dated June 18th, wherein it appears that General Lee, in person, readied Pe tersburg on that day, at 11.30 A.M.
" * * * Hancock and Burnsiclc crossed the river, and then moved and manoeu vred with alacrity and skill; and the men themselves never flagged nor failed. Every one was earnest, every one did his best, till the fatal moment that lost the result which all had been striving for, which had, indeed, been absolutely attained, all but secured; when Smith, having won Petersburg, hesitated to grasp his prize. Then, indeed, when all their exertions had proved fruitless, when, having out-marched and out-manoeuvred Lee, the soldiers found them selves again obliged to assault intrenched positions— then they seemed in some degree to lose heart, and for the first time since the campaign "began their attacks were lacking in vigor; when they found the Army of Northern Virginia again in their front, sheltered by formidable breastworks, their zeal was lessened, and their ardor cooled. Had the assaults in front of Petersburg been made with the same spirit as in the Wilderness, Petersburg would even then have fallen. But it was not in human endurance to hold out in this incessant effort, and the limit had for a time been reached."
And Mr. Swinton says:
" Indeed, the Union army, terribly shaken, as well in spirit as in material substance, by the repeated attacks on intrenched positions it had been called on to make, was in a very unfit moral condition to undertake any new enter prise of that character."
Here is again illustrated General Beauregard's military fore sight. When, about mid-day on the 18th, he took General Lee to the elevated site of the Petersburg Reservoir, and, showing him the field, urged upon him to order an attack on the next day by all the Confederate forces, he based his advice upon his in tuitive apprehension of that wide-spread feeling among Gen eral Grant's forces. Weighing the discouragement of the Fed-
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erals against the revived spirits of our troops, then united and reinforced, General Beauregard knew that the chances of victorv,
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notwithstanding the exhausted condition of our men, would be all in our favor; and General Badeau's and Mr. Swinton's ad missions now show the correctness of his judgment. Had Gen eral Lee attacked General Grant at that moment, the war would probably have had a different termination.
General Badeau reports General Grant as having said, at ten o'clock, on the evening of the 18th:
" I am perfectly satisfied that all has been done that could be done, and that the assaults to-day were called for by all the appearance and information that could be obtained. Now we will rest the men, and use the spade for their protection till a new vein can be struck." *
* " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 374.
The regular siege of Petersburg had now begun; and the Confederate forces, including General Lee's army, occupied the new defensive lines to which General Beaureojard had with-
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drawn his troops, during the night of the 17th, unobserved by his vigilant adversary. These lines were necessarily taken under the pressure of circumstances, as most lines are on the field of battle, but had, nevertheless, been selected after due reflection and with great care. General Beauregard's object — and he ac complished it — was to hold the overpowering forces of the enemy at bay until the arrival of the long-delayed reinforce ments of General Lee.
The location and retention of these lines have met with more than passing criticism. It has even been asserted that—
" General Lee's first expression on his arrival at the front was that of dis satisfaction touching the general features of the new line; and, with the view of rectifying this important element of his defence, he called to his assistance Major-General William Mahone, an officer in whom he reposed great confi dence, and who, besides being an engineer by profession, was familiar with the topography of the country around Petersburg." *
General Beauregard is clear and positive on this point. He says:
" General Lee was too good a soldier and engineer, and had recently had too much practice in hastily selecting new positions to hold his enemy in check, to ' express dissatisfaction' with the lines in rear of Taylor's Creek, which were just begun, when he first visited them, after his arrival at Peters burg. He was, on the contrary, thankful, and well might he be, for the shel ter they then offered, and only feared that the remainder of his troops would not get up in time to save the town."
General Lee did not at any time consult General Mahone with reference to the Taylor's Creek and Jerusalem plank road lines. lie knew that he himself, and General Beauregard, and their two able Engineers, Colonels Harris and Stevens, were fully com petent to select between those two defensive lines, when their sites were so plainly visible. General Mahone may have been a good and experienced civil engineer, but no one then knew that he laid claim to skill as a military engineer. Civil and
* See criticism by Captain John D. Young, late a commander of sharp shooters, 3d Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, as published, June 22d, 1878, in the Philadelphia Weekly Times.
military engineering are as distinct from each other as geometry and algebra. Both require special studies; but efficiency as a military engineer demands above all things great practice in the field under trying circumstances. Where had General Mahone acquired skill by such practice ?
General Lee consulted him concerning the topographical feat ures of the country outside of the Dimmock lines,* but for an other purpose, and not with reference to the location of our de fensive works, as will now be explained. General Beauregard, on the day of General Lee's arrival—the 18th of June—at about 1 P. M., urged upon him, as has been stated, the advantage of tak ing the offensive before the enemy could have time to know the country and protect himself by abatis, rifle-pits, or trenches. He proposed an attack upon General Grant's left flank, so as to double him up on his right and centre, while his rear should be assailed by all the cavalry that could be massed against it. General Lee at first appeared to favor the idea, but expressed some fear that the Norfolk Railroad cuts and the " Second Swamp" would prove too great obstacles in our way for the offensive. It was upon this point that he consulted General Mahone, who had been the civil engineer and builder of the Norfolk road, and was necessarily familiar with the country over which our forces would have to operate. General Mahone was of General Lee's opinion, -and the suggested plan was not carried out. Meanwhile, and after a thorough examination of the new lines — of the Jerusalem plank road and of the Bland-ford ridge—General Beauregard expressed the opinion that we had better hold on, for the time being, to the line we then occupied, for the following reasons :
1st. That it kept the enemy's batteries at a greater distance from the besieged town.
2d. That it would act as a covered way (as the phrase is, in reg ular fortification), should we deem it advisable to construct better works on the higher ground in the rear. In the mean time we could construct a series of batteries to protect our front line by flanking and over-shooting fires; and w r e could throw up infan try parapets for our reserves, whenever we should have additional troops.
* The name given to the original defensive lines of Petersburg.
3d. That the new line gave a close infantry and artillery fire on the reverse slope of Taylor's Creek and ravine, which would pre vent the construction of boyaus of approaches and parallels for a regular attack.
General Lee concurred in General Beauregard's opinion, and approved his selection. The mine explosion, which occurred a few weeks later, showed how judicious this opinion had been; for it was the terrible fire of infantry and artillery on that reverse slope which prevented reinforcements being sent forward rapidly and continuously to the Federal columns which had already gained a footing in the Confederate works. Thus, it became possible to bring our troops from the extreme right for the recovery of our lines. If the movements of the enemy could not be distinctly seen from these lines, they could be readily observed from the batteries referred to, giving ample time to us for offensive oper ations.
The best proof that General Beauregard's new lines were prop erly located is, that they were held till the end of the war, at times by mere handf uls of jaded troops against vastly superior numbers, and without the necessity of building a second system of works on the more elevated grounds in the rear.
If, on the 17th of June, as Mr. Davis has it, "Lee had con structed a line in rear of the one first occupied, having such ad vantages as gave to our army much greater power to resist," * it is evident that he never "expressed dissatisfaction" as to a posi tion he had himself selected. If, on the other hand, he did con demn the location of that new line (for which we have only the unsupported testimony of Captain Young), then Mr. Davis, who, in that respect, disagreed with General Lee, unconsciously lauds General Beauregard for the skill he there displayed; and Messrs. McCabe and Cooke lead their readers into error when they assert that the line spoken of was the selection of General Lee, and not of General Beauregard.
The inconsistencies of the authors of these fugitive histories and essays are so evidently self-destroying that no further effort is required to show how untrustworthy they are, and how unfair in their estimates of the events connected with this period of the war.
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. G38.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
After the 18th of June General Beaurcgard is no longer in Command of the Army around Petersburg.—Enemy's Raids to Interrupt our Communica tions.— No Material Advantage Gained. — Completion of Confederate Lines.—General Beaurcgard's Forces Occupy Works in Front of Peters-burgh.—Rumors Concerning the Mine.—The Salients upon General Beau-regard's Lines.—He Orders Countermines, and Establishes Batteries Com manding Exposed Points.—His Instructions to the Officers there Posted. —Elliott's Salient the Point Selected by the Enemy.—Mining Commenced on the 25th of June, and Completed on the 23d of July.—When the Ex plosion took Place.—The Federal Column of Assault: how Composed. —Dcnudcment of Confederate Lines in Consequence of the Threatened Movement of the Enemy North of the James.—Bushrod Johnson's Divis ion.—Its Position along the Works.—Elliott's Brigade.—General Elliott Wounded.—Colonel McMaster.—General Beauregard in Front.—His Or ders Carried out.—Is Present with General Lee, pending the Action.— Prompt and Accurate Firing of the Confederate Troops.—Raking Fire of their Batteries.—The Enemy Demoralized.—Is Unable to Advance.— His Critical Position.—General Grant Acknowledges the Impossibility of Success.—Suggests the Order to Withdraw.—General Meade Issues it.— Arrival of General Mahone with Part of his Division.—Throws Forward his Brigade.—North Carolina and South Carolina Regiments Join in the Movement.—Separate Action of Wright's Brigade.—Its Repulse.—Com bined Attack under Generals Mahone and Johnson.—Slight Resistance on the Part of the Enemy.—Crater and Lines Abandoned by the Feder als.— Ours and the Enemy's Loss. — General Badeau's Opinion of this Affair.
FKOM the hour of 12 M., on the 18th of June, General Beaure-gard ceased to be first in command of our forces at and around Petersburg; and, though he continued on that day to direct, to some extent, the movements of the troops, he did so only because General Lee had not yet become sufficiently familiar with the position of our various commands on the new line occupied.
Comparative quiet now prevailed in both armies, and Federals as well as Confederates were actively engaged in strengthening their defensive works.
On the 21st, however, the 2d and 6th Federal Corps were with drawn from the lines and sent on a flanking movement to the
left, with a view to encircle the besieged city farther towards the west, and, if possible, to seize the Weldon road. The 2d Corps (Hancock's), now temporarily under General Birney, had the lead. It established itself west of the Jerusalem plank road, and soon formed a junction with a division (Griffin's) of the 5th Corps, which had been posted on the east side. The other corps (the 6th) came up during the night, taking position on the left and rear of the 2d; and Wilson's and Kautz's cavalry were then sent to cut the "VVeldon and Southside railroads.
General Lee divined the intention of the enemy, and counter-movements were immediately ordered to thwart his purpose: By some misunderstanding between the Federal officers command ing this expedition, the 2d Corps became separated from the 6th, thereby leaving a wide gap between them, which exactly served the purpose of the Confederate movement; for part of A. P. Hill's corps, rapidly inarching in columns by brigades, came up with its usual alacrity and occupied this interval. The at tack on the left of the 2d Corps was so vigorous that Barlow's division gave way in disorder; so did Mott's, soon afterwards. The Confederate troops now struck Gibbon on the flank and rear, carried his intrenchments, and captured a battery and several en tire regiments of his command. Barlow and Mott also lost several hundred prisoners. Gibbon's intrenchments were held by us until the captured guns were removed, when the Confederate column withdrew, carrying with it many standards and nearly 3000 pris oners, including several hundred from the 6th Corps. General Badeau*says the Federal loss on this occasion was "four guns and about 1600 prisoners." He rebukes those who give a higher number, and accuses them of always exaggerating "the National losses." Mr. Swinton, whose account of this expedition agrees with ours, puts the Federal loss at 2500, exclusive of several hundred from the 6th Corps.f The result of this movement to attempt interruption of our communications was in nowise bene ficial to the enemy, and merely extended his line to the left, with no further advantage to him.
During the several weeks that followed the regular investment of Petersburg cavalry raids were organized to cut and destroy the
* " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 884. t SwintorTs "Army of the Potomac," pp. 512, 513. II.—16
various railroads by which supplies were brought to our army. Wilson and Kautz, acting separately, succeeded in tearing up and otherwise damaging many miles of very important roads, includ ing the Weldon, at Reams's Station, the Southside and the Dan ville roads. The raiding columns then formed a junction at Meherrin Station, but, upon reaching the Roanoke bridge, were checked in their further advance by a force of Confederates. The return of Wilson's column became, at that time, a difficult problem. At the crossing of Stony Creek, on the 28th, a severe engagement took place, forcing Wilson to make a considerable detour to the left. His effort was to reach Reams's Station, which he believed to be still in possession of the Federals; but he was attacked by both cavalry and infantry, under General Hampton, and now fell back, "with the loss of his trains and artillery and a considerable number of prisoners." * Wilson barely succeeded in bringing his shattered forces within the Federal lines. These raids, though damaging and harassing to us, proved so unsatisfac tory to the enemy that further efforts of the kind were finally abandoned.
During this period of relative inactivity Generals Lee and Beauregard had so completed their lines of defence that assault upon them "had been pronounced impracticable by the [Federal] chiefs of artillery and engineers." f Beginning south of the Ap-pomattox, these lines encircled the city of Petersburg, east and south, and extended, in a westerly direction, towards and beyond the left flank of the Federal army. A similar system of defence extended north of the Appomattox, guarding Petersburg and the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, against the Federal forces under Butler, at Bermuda Hundreds. Notwithstanding the re ports of the Chief of Artillery and the Chief-Engineer of the Federal army, the Confederate lines, running from the southwest of Petersburg to the north-east of Richmond, and extending over a length of fully thirty-five miles, were vulnerable at more than one point. It must not be forgotten that the Appomattox was fordable a little above the permanent bridge, and it is very doubt ful whether we could have prevented a vigorous and well-directed
* Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 513. The statement is confirmed by General Meade's report.
t Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 515.
movement of the enemy from breaking through that part of out lines. General Grant, or General Meade, could also have ordered a powerful attack on the salient formed by the junction of our new lines with the old ones, east of the Jerusalem plank road, the ground in that locality being very favorable for such a movement. It is easy to understand how a success at that point would have enabled the Commander of the Federal army, strong as it then was (for it numbered at that time not less than 115,000 men, ex clusive of cavalry), to take in reverse and thus command both of our lines, which w r e would have had to evacuate at once. Or, General Grant could have occupied his lines with about 50,000 of his forces, and used the remainder—60,000 men, and perhaps more—as a column of active operations which would have been fully strong enough to meet any emergency.
General Badeau asserts that most of these operations were "conducted exclusively by Meade, to whom Grant now intended to allow a more absolute control of the movements of his own army than he had hitherto enjoyed." * It is none the less a fact that, whoever the Federal commander then was, and though Gen eral Lee may have been "outmanoeuvred" previous to the arrival of his army in front of Petersburg, since that time, or, rather, from the 15th of June to the 30th of July, and even later, the Federal Commander — whether Grant or Meade—never proved himself a match for either General Beauregard or General Lee.
During the 18th and 19th of June, General Lee's troops, as they arrived, were extended on the right of General Beau regard's, which were now contracted somewhat from their attenuated de velopment. General Beauregard remained in immediate charge of the Petersburg lines already'held by his troops; that is to say, from the Appomattox to about half-\vay between the Baxter road and the Jerusalem plank road. The small portion of the Army of Northern Virginia not within the lines was held as a general reserve.
About the beginning of July it became apparent, from the Northern newspapers and from accounts of deserters and prison ers, that the Federals had undertaken to direct a mine against some point of the Confederate works at Petersburg. General Beauregard, believing that the operation was aimed at his lines—
* " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. ii., p. 386.
for upon them were three salients (Colquitt's, Grade's, and Elli ott's), the ground in front of which was favorable for such an en terprise—directed countermines to be sunk from each of them. This work, however, did not reach an efficient state; the troops had no experience in that special service; they lacked the proper tools, and, besides, were so exhausted from heavy duty in the trenches, that the work was not carried on with the necessary activity.
In all other respects ample preparations for the event of the explosion of the mine were carefully made by General Beaure-gard. Batteries of 12-pounder Napoleons, 8 and 10 inch and Coehorn mortars, were erected on well-selected elevations in rear of and commanding the exposed points, assuring both a cross and front fire. Gorge-lines were also constructed in rear of these sa lients, for the troops to retire into in the event of a breach in the exterior line by the springing of the mine. Finally, and as the probable period approached, minute instructions were given by him to the officers in the menaced quarters, so as to prevent con fusion or a panic from the explosion, and to insure a prompt, vigorous concentration of the troops and of the fire of the bat teries for the repulse of any assaulting column that might attempt to enter the breach.
The salient actually selected by the Federals proved to be that occupied by Elliott's brigade, with Pegram's battery; and the mine, commenced on the 25th of June,* was ready to receive its charge on the 2od of July. The work was executed by the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteers, 400 strong, mostly composed of Schuyl-kill coal-miners, and whoso colonel, Pleasants, was himself an accomplished mining engineer.
The mine, starting from the interior of Burnside's line of rifle-pits, immediately across Taylor's Creek, terminated beneath Elli ott's salient, at a distance of one hundred and seventy yards, with lateral galleries beginning at that point, extending on the left thirty-seven feet, and on the right thirty-eight feet, and together forming the segment of a circle concave to the Confederate lines. In both of these lateral galleries were four magazines, one at the extreme end of each, and the remainder at equal distances along the segment of circle, containing in all eight thousand pounds
* Colonel Pleasants's testimony, in " Conduct of the War " (18G5), vol. i., p. 112.
of powder, equally distributed, when charged on the 27th of July.*
The Federal column of assault consisted of the four divisions of Burnside's corps — Ledlie's, Potter's, Wilcox's, and Ferrero's, the latter composed of negro troops — directly supported by Turner's division of the 10th Corps and Ames's division of the 18th, under General Ord—in the aggregate at least 23,000 men. At the same time 10,000 men of Warren's corps, concentrated on its own right — that is, on the left of Burnside — and the 18th, concentrated in the immediate rear of Burnside, were ac tively to support the movement. Hancock's corps was likewise concentrated as a support, for the same purpose, on the lines tem porarily vacated by the 18th; and Sheridan, with all the cav alry assembled in the quarter of Deep Bottom, was to move strenuously against the Confederate right by the roads leading into Petersburg from the south and west. Even the pontoon train was held in readiness, under the Chief-Engineer, Major Duane, to accompany the movement, and Engineer officers were assigned to each corps for the operation. The artillery of all kinds was to open upon those points of the Confederate works covering the ground of movement of the Federal troops.f The whole force thus made disposable for the operation consisted, according to General Meade's testimony, of nearly 50,000 men,;); exclusive of the cavalry.
The orders were to spring the mine at 3.30 A.M. on the 30th of July ;§ but, from some defect in the fuse, its fire died out, and a lieutenant and sergeant of the 48th Pennsylvania boldly volun teered to descend into the mine and ascertain the cause. They relit the extinguished fuse, and at 4.44 the explosion took place.||
In consequence of the withdrawal of troops to meet a threat ened movement north of the James the Confederate lines from
* General Burnside's report, dated "Before Petersburg, Va., August 13tli, 1864," to be found in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., p. 20.
t See General Meade's orders, July 29th, 1864, to be found in " Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., pp. 32, 33.
J General Meade's testimony, in same work, p. 37.
§ General Meade's orders of July 30th, 1864, in "Conduct of the War" (1865), vol. i., p. 33.
|| Colonel Pleasauts's testimony, in " Conduct of the War," p. 114. He says, " exploded at sixteen minutes to live."
the Appomattox to Eives's salient (that is, to a point about half-way between the Baxter and Jerusalem roads) were held only by Bushrod R. Johnson's division, less two brigades (Gra-cie's and Johnson's), which had been detached for the same service. General Beauregard at the time considered this as a most dangerous denudement and extension; and General John son, alluding to the same subject, in his detailed statement of the facts relative to this important incident of the siege of Petersburg, uses the following language: " General Field's di vision, which had been holding the part of our line of defences on the right of my division, was taken out of the trenches, and Colquitt's brigade, of Iloke's division, was temporarily trans ferred to my command in exchange for Grade's brigade, and I was left to hold, with less forces, defences double the length, or more, of that which I had previously defended. Indeed, my understanding is, that my command w y as all the troops in our trenches when the mine was exploded, all of the rest of the army having been moved or held ready to meet any demon stration the enemy might make on the north of the James Biver."
Elliott's salient w r as occupied by his own brigade, of John son's division, consisting of the 26th, 17th, 18th, 22d, and 23d South Carolina Volunteers, in the order given, the left of the 26th resting on the right of Ransom's brigade,* near the inter section of the lines with the Norfolk Railroad. Wise's brigade followed on the right of Elliott and connected with Colquitt's brigade.f The explosion threw up the terre-plein of the salient, burying two guns of Pegram's battery and a part of the IStli and 22d South Carolina regiments, most of the former being in the midst of the upheaval; but the greater portion of the parapets of the main and gorge lines remained standing, the part destroyed being near the angle of their junction on the right.
The rupture of the earth divided the brigade — the remainder of the 22d and the 23d on the right, and the remainder of the 18th, the 17th, and the 26th on the left. A momentary panic seized the men nearest the point of explosion. Thus suddenly
* Colonel F. W. McMaster's statement. Sec Appendix, t General B. R. Johnson's statement. See Appendix.
aroused from their sleep, they rushed in different directions along the trenches; but soon rallied around their officers, and opened, from their parapets, a rapid and effective fire upon the advancing enemy; while the batteries, so happily provided for this contingency by General Beauregard, also opened with tell ing effect. Colonel McMaster, who, after General Elliott fell, commanded his brigade during this action, thus describes the firing of our batteries at the time:
u* * * j n ] css than five minutes' time our men recovered from their panic the men of the 18th falling in indiscriminately with mine, and we shot with great rapidity and execution. About the same time the battery on the left of the ravine, a short distance in rear of Ransom's brigade, did great execu tion and fired about six hundred shots in a short time. This battery I ob served specially; the others, in rear and on the right also, did good exe cution."
Within ten minutes, or more, Ledlie's division had entered the breach in the parapet of the salient and plunged into the crater — a cavity 135 feet in length, 97 feet in breadth, and 30 in depth,* with sloping sides, the soil sandy, but filled with great blocks of clay. Wilcox's division immediately followed, and then Potter's, while the Federal artillery—guns and mor tars— opened all along their lines, concentrating their heaviest fire on the lines and ground right and left of the crater.
General Beauregard, having no reserves, had instructed each of his brigade commanders that, in the event of a breach and attack, they should close rapidly towards that point, leaving a picket line to hold the trenches elsewhere. This instruction was promptly executed upon the order of Division - Commander Bushrod E. Johnson. General Beauregard, aroused from sleep by the explosion, and immediately informed of its precise lo cality by Colonel Paul, an officer of his staff, despatched the latter to General Lee to make the report, request assistance, and appoint a rendezvous with him at Bushrod Johnson's head quarters, near Cemetery Hill. He then repaired at once to that point, and, after ascertaining that his previous instructions for the event were being properly carried out, went forward to the Gee House, within 500 yards and immediately in rear of Elliott's salient, and, from that commanding point, took a full view of
* General Johnson's statement. See Appendix.
the scene of combat. Returning soon afterwards to Johnson's headquarters — where, he had been told, General Lee was now awaiting him — he reported the situation, and learned that Gen eral Mahone's division had been ordered up. Generals Lee and Beau regard afterwards repaired to the Gee House, where they remained till the end of the action.
Meanwhile, and within ten or fifteen minutes of the explosion, General Elliott had ordered his regiments on the left of the crater to form on the brow of the hill, beyond the gorge-line which crossed the summit, and charge the Federals out of the mine; but he had no sooner reached the open ground, followed by Colonel Smith, of the 26th South Carolina, and half a dozen men, in execution of this movement, than he fell, severely wound ed, and was immediately borne to the rear.* Colonel F. W. McMaster, on whom now devolved the command, despatched Colonel Smith, with the 26th and three companies of the 17th, by the trench and covered way on the left, to hold a shallow ravine in rear of the hill of Elliott's salient, there to resist any direct advance by which the enemy might seek to fall on the rear of the Confederate lines.f
The Federals now attempted to force their way along the trenches. Numbers of them, emerging from the crater, got into the ditch of the gorge-line, where a hand-to-hand fight ensued; while others, creeping along the glacis of the exterior line, got over the parapet into the main trench.;}: The troops on the right and left of the crater fought them from behind the traverses con necting with the sinks, and from barricades thrown up at the angles of the trenches; while the adjacent brigades, from their main parapets, the covered ways, and ravines running to the rear, and from piles of earth at their bomb-proofs, concentrated a dead ly lire on such of the Federal forces as were moving across from their lines, and on those in and near the crater, whenever they exposed themselves.
The Confederate front and flanking batteries, so judiciously located, swept the ground in front and rear of the crater, so that the Federals found themselves obstructed from direct advance or retreat. These batteries also played into the crater itself, where
* General Johnson's and Colonel McMaster's statements. See Appendix, t Colonel McMaster's statements. See Appendix. I Ibid.
the shells were dropped with such precision upon the huddled mass of Federals that numbers of them preferred to run the gauntlet back to their lines. "Wright's battery of four guns, ad mirably situated and protected, on the left of Elliott's salient, poured its whole volume of fire, with astonishing rapidity and effect, directly into their right flank; while one gun of David son's battery, in Wise's line, threw its canister and grape at short range into their left flank, both batteries, as occasion required, sweeping the ground in front of the crater. Major Ilaskell's battery of four 8 and 10 inch mortars, under Captain Lainkin, in rear on the Jerusalem plank road, and one Coehorn and two 12-pounder mortars of Lamkin's, in the ravine, about 200 yards to the left and rear of the crater, and two 8-inch mortars, were served with unremitting and fatal execution; while a battery of three 8 or 10 inch mortars, on the right of the Baxter road, under Lieutenant Langhorn, fired at intervals with very good effect.