" I remain, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. BEAUREGAHD, General."
The report reads as follows :
" General, — I arrived in Charleston on the 13th of September, 1862, and assumed command on the 24th of that month.
"In the interval I was engaged in ascertaining the plans and measures taken by Major-General Pemberton, my predecessor, for the defence, particu larly, of Charleston and Savannah, and in rapid inspections of the condition and defensive resources of the Department, the results of which were com municated to the War Department in two papers, dated, the one relative to Charleston, on the 3d, and the other, chiefly concerning Savannah, on the 10th of October, 1862.
"At the time the troops in that Department (as then arranged) consisted
of—
In South Carolina. Infantry .................................................... 6,504
Artillery in position ........................................ 1,787
Field artillery ..................................... .......... 1,379
Cavalry .......... ............................... 2,817
- 12,547
In Georgia.
Infantry .................................................... 3,834
Artillery in position ........................................ 1,330
Field artillery .............................................. 445
Cavalry .................................................... 1,580
- 7, 189
Total of all arms in Department ..................... .... 19,73(5
" Of this force, 1787 artillery in position, 727 light artillerists, 4139 infantry, and 410 cavalry, were assembled in the First Military District, for the defence of Charleston ; and 1330 artillery in position, 445 light artillerists, 3834 infan try, and 1580 cavalry, for defence of Savannah.
"My predecessor, before being relieved, furnished me with his estimate of the smallest number of troops which he regarded as essential for the defence of Charleston and Savannah ; to wit :
For Defence of Charleston. Infantry .................................................. 15,600
Artillery in position ...................................... 2,850
............ 19,450
And (9) nine light batteries.
Total of all arms required for defence of Charleston ) -^ QQQ
and Savannah Railroad and land approaches ..... ) "
GENERAL BEAUREGARD.
105
For Defence of Savannah. Infantry .................................................. 10,000
Artillery in position ...................................... 1,200
°"**" ............................. ^52 13,200
And (8) eight light batteries.
Total of all arms in South Carolina and Georgia, ex- ) ...... 43,650
elusive of (17) seventeen light batteries ............ >
"Hence, the following additional troops were needed at the following points respectively, to meet the requirements of this estimate :
For Defence of Charleston. Infantry ................... . .............................. 11,461
Artillery in position ...................................... 1,003
C a »'>- ................................................... _™ 1S,1U
Light Batteries for Defence of Savannah. Infantry .......... .' ....................................... 6,106
Ca ^' ................................................... -^ 6,586
Light Batteries for Defence of Charleston and Savannah
llailroad and Land Approaches. All arms ......................................................... 5,516
Total deficiencies ........................................... 25,216
" On the 7th of April, 1863. the day of the attack by the ironclad fleet, the troops at my disposal, in South Carolina and Georgia, gave an effective total of 30,040, distributed as follows :
First Military District.
Second Military District.
Third Military District.
Georgia.
Infantry
Light artillery. Heavy artillery Cavalry
6,807 1,007 2,238 1,117
1,819 288
3,655 496
1,686
5,661 546
2,038 1.880
Total..
11,229
2,849
5,837
10,125
" But the withdrawal of Cook's brigade to North Carolina immediately after the repulse of the ironclad fleet on the 7th of April, of Brigadier-Gen erals S. R. Gist's and W. II. T. Walker's brigades and light batteries, about the 4th of May, reduced my force materially.
" The Department is aware of the circumstances under which this reduction of the troops took place, and, in this connection, I beg to refer to my letters to the Hon. Secretary of War of the 10th of May, and to General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General, of June 15th and 20th of July, 1863.
" The forces in the First Military District on the 10th of July, 1863, were as follows:
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
FIIIST MILITARY DISTUIOT.
Infantry.
Heavy and
Li^ht Artillery.
Cavalry.
James Island 1,184 1,509 153
Morris Island 012 289 20
Sullivan's Island 204 720 228
City of Charleston 402 235 153
Total 2,402 2,839 5GO
Infantry 2,402
Heavy and light artillery 2,839
Cavalry 500
Total of all arms, First Military District " 5,800
Second Military District.
Infantry 441
Heavy and light artillery 281
Cavalry 07(5
Total of all arms, Second Military District 1,398
Third Military District.
Infantry 558
Heavy and light artillery 544
Cavalry 1,415
Total of all arms, Third Military District ~ " 2,517
District of Georgia.
Infantry 1,745
Heavy and light artillery 2,130
Cavalry 1,007
Total of all arms, District of Georgia ~ " 5,542
Recapit ulation.
Infantry, First Military District 2,402
Second " " 441
" Third " " 558
" District of Georgia 1,745
Total infantry ~ ~ 5,206
Artillery, First Military District 2,839
" Second " " 281
Third " " 544
" District of Georgia 2,130
Total artillery ~ ~ 5,794
Cavalry, First Military District 500
" Second " " 070
Third " " 1,415
District of Georgia 1,007
Total cavalry " " 4,318
Grand total 15 ;jiy
Being 28,000 less than the estimate of troops required in September, 1802.
Meanwhile, as in duty bound, by numerous telegrams and letters during the
months of April, May, June, and July, I kept the War Department advised,
both through yourself and directly, of the threatening nature of the enemy's preparations upon the coast of my Department, and of my own fears concern ing the imminence of an attack. On the 25th of April, however, in answer to my telegrams of the preceding day, asking for heavy guns for Morris Island and other points, the Secretary of War telegraphs :
" 'I regret to be unable to spare the guns now for the object mentioned; the claims of Wilmington and the Mississippi are now regarded as paramount.'
" On the 1st of May I was directed to send a full brigade to North Carolina, to report to General Hill, and in compliance General Clingmau's brigade was despatched.
" The following day the Secretary of War telegraphs:
" 'Advices show the enemy, abandoning the attack on the eastern coast, are concen-. trating great forces in the Mississippi Iliver. Send, with the utmost despatch, eight or ten thousand men, including those ordered heretofore to Tullahoma, to General Pem-berton's relief.'
" My answer was:
'"No orders sending troops to Tullahoma have reached here. Cook's and Cling, man's brigades have been returned to North Carolina. Have ordered 5000 infantry and 2 batteries to report forthwith to General Pembcrton, leaving only 10,000 infantry available for the whole of South Carolina and Georgia. Cannot send more without abandoning Savannah Railroad. Shall await further orders. Enemy still occupies in force Folly and Seabrook's islands, also Port Royal. To reduce this command further might become disastrous.'
" On the 4th of May I sent this despatch to the Hon. the Secretary of War:
" 'Enemy's fleet, reported at Hilton Head and Port Royal yesterday, is 4 steam frig ates, 5 wooden gunboats,6 ships,4 barks, 3 brigs,87 transports, and 58 schooners: 183 in all. A very remarkable increase since last report.'
" Hon. James A. Scddou, Secretary of War, telegraphs, on the 9th of May, 1803:
"' Foster, with his own and part of Hunter's forces, is believed to have returned to North Carolina. More reinforcements to General Pemberton are indispensable. If General Evans's brigade has returned to you, send 5000 men ; if not with you, a num ber which, with that, would make 5000 men.'
" On the following clay I telegraphed, in reply to the Secretary of War:
"'The order sending additional troops to General Pemberton will be executed, Evans's brigade included; leaving but 1000 infantry to support extensive lines and batteries at Savannah, but 750 infantry to hold line of railroad to Savannah, virtually yielding up that country and large stores of rice to the enemy, as well as opening even Charleston and Augusta and Columbia Railroad to attack at Brauchvillc, leaving here 1500 infantry at most, all of which will be known to the enemy in a few days. Meantime, General W. S. Walker reports increased strength yesterday of en emy's outposts in his vicinity. Hagood reports 2500 infantry on Seabrook's Island fortifying; five monitors still there. Enemy in force on Folly Island, actively erecting batteries yesterday. Season favorable for enemy's operations for quite a month.'
*' On the 12th I telegraphed as follows to the Hon. the Secretary of War:
"'Have ordered to General Pemberton (contrary to my opinion) Evans's brigade and one regiment, amounting to 2700 men, leaving only 6000 infantry available in whole South Carolina and Georgia; the other 1000 will await further orders of De partment. General Evans reports two brigades ot enemy on Folly Island yesterday. Please answer.'
"A letter to the same address, on the llth of May, exhibited certain con ditions and explained more fully my views on the subject of an attack, with the object of showing to the War Department the actual menacing aspect of the enemy on the coast of my Department. I transcribe an extract from that letter:
« <-* * «• A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson, Mississippi, two brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Gist and W. II. T. Walker, the former com manding South Carolina and the latter Georgia regiments — somewhat over 5000 infantry in all, and two light batteries of the best class in the Department.
" ' Your orders have been based, apparently, on the conviction that the troops of the enemy assembled in this Department for operations against Charleston have been mainly withdrawn and directed to other expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi. This conviction I regret that I cannot share, as I am satisfied, from the reports of district commanders and from other reasons, that there has been really but little reduction of the command of Major-General Hunter.
"'General Walker, commanding at Pocotaligo, reports that on yesterday the out posts of the enemy in his front had been much increased in strength. General Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrook's Island with at least 2500 infantry. They are erecting fortifications at that point, as also on Folly Island, which is likewise still occupied in force.
" 'Five of the monitors remain in the North Edisto, with some twenty gunboats and transports. With these and the transports still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which, I am unable to doubt, arc still at the disposition of the enemy, he may renew the attack by land and water on Charleston at any moment. Acting on the offensive, and commanding the time of attack, he could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and sooner than my command could possibly be reinforced from any quarter out of the Department.'
"A letter to you of the 20th of May further calls attention to the fact that important changes are reported to be on foot in the armament of the moni tors, and urges strenuously that Fort Sumter be armed, conformably to the original plan, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth-bore, which could be obtained, in anticipation of a renewal of the attack of the 7th of April.
"I was informed, however, through your letter of the 10th of June that—
" 'Northern papers report the reduction of Hunter's forces by sending troops to the Gulf. If this be true, you will, with such force as you can properly withdraw from your defensive line, proceed to Mobile to resist an attack, if one should be designated at that place; but if the purpose of the enemy be to send his reinforcements to the Mississippi, you will go on and co-operate with General Johnston in that quarter.'
"This I answered by a telegram, on the 13th of same month, as follows:
" 'Enemy's ironclads and forces still as heretofore reported to Department, except ing a gunboat expedition reported in Altamaha, and one preparing for St. John's River, Florida. I will prepare as far as practicable for contingencies referred to in Department's letter, 10th inst. Please send me any positive information relative to movements or intentions of enemy.'
" But, in order that the War Department should be thoroughly cognizant of the state of affairs in my Department, I further addressed to you a letter, on the 15th June, in which I pointed out how utterly insufficient were the forces at my command to resist those of the enemy, and that on my own responsibility I could not further deplete the force in the Department. I drew your attention, in this same letter, to the clanger of an attack by the way of Morris Island—indeed, to the very route on which General Gillmore has since operated. I take the following extract from that letter:
«<# # # Thus it will be seen that the force in the Department is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savaunah, constantly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's ironclads.
" ' The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defences. Reduce the command on James Isl and, and the enemy may readily penetrate by such a coup de main as was attempted last year at the weakened point. James Island would then full, and, despite our harbor defences, the City of Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe to have less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be taken in reverse and demolished. * * *
"' Late Northern papers say Admiral Dupont has been relieved in command of the fleet on this coast by Admiral Foote, an officer whose operations in the West evinced much activity and an enterprising spirit. And even were considerable reductions made in the enemy's forces, the valuable coast districts would still be left a prey to such destructive raids as devastated the Combahce some days ago. Thus far, however, I can see no evidence of reduction. General Hunter was at Hilton Head on the 8th instant; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore, and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folly, one on Seabrook's Island, and the balance on the islands about Port Royal. One of the monitors is at Hilton Head, and five are still in the North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats or transports diminished, or at any time recently been increased, as must have been the case had a material removal of troops taken place.'
" On the 25th of June his Excellency President Davis telegraphed the fol lowing:
" 'From causes into which it is needless to enter the control of the Mississippi con nection between the States east and west of it will be lost, unless Johnston is strongly and promptly reinforced within the next sixty days. Can you give him further aid without the probable loss of Charleston and Savannah ? I need not state to you that the issue is vital to the Confederacy.'
" My answer was:
" ' Telegram is received. No more troops can be sent away from this Department without losing railroad and country between here and Savannah ; Georgetown District would have also to be abandoned. (See my letter of the 15th instant to General Cooper.)'
" Thus, on the 10th of July, 1863,1 had but 5861 men, of all arms, in the First Military District, guarding the fortifications around Charleston, or more than one-third of the troops in my Department, with an enemy in my front whose base of operations threatened Savannah, the line of coast, and impor tant railroad connecting the former city and Charleston, and the latter city as well, with such immense transportation resources as to be able to concentrate
HO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
and strike at will at any selected point before I could gather rny troops to oppose.
"In attacking Charleston itself five different routes of approach present themselves to an cncmv: first, by landing a large force to the northward, say at Bull's Bay, marching across the country, and seizing Mount Pleasant and the northern shores of the inner harbor.
" Secondly, by landing a large force to the southward, cutting the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and taking the city of Charleston in the rear.
" Neither of these routes did I consider practicable, or likely to be adopted by the enemy, as his numerical force would not have allowed him to cope with us, unless under the shelter of his ironclads and gunboats, a fact which General Gillmorc has always carefully recognized. Before he adopts the over land approaches he will require a large addition to his land-forces.
" The third, fourth, and fifth approaches, by James, Sullivan, and Morris Islands respectively, permitted, however, the co-operation of the navy; and I always believed, as experience has demonstrated, that of the three immedi ate routes to Charleston, the one by James Island was most dangerous to us, and the one which should be defended at all hazards—that by Sullivan's Island ranking next, and the one by Morris Island last, in point of importance —for the following reasons :
"An enemy who could gain a firm foothold on James Island and overpower its garrison, at that time having to defend a long, defective, and irregular line of works, could have erected batteries commanding the inner harbor at once, taking in rear our outer line of defences, and by a direct fire on the city compelled its evacuation in a short period; because in such a case it would become of no value as a strategic position, and prudence and humanity would alike revolt at the sacrifice of life necessary to enable us to retain possession of its ruins.
" The route "by Sullivan's Island was also of great importance, for its occu pation would not only have enabled the enemy to reduce Fort Suinter as an artillery fortress, but would also have given entire control of the entrance to the inner harbor to his ironclad fleet. At that time, owing to the want of labor and of heavy guns, the important works which now line the shores of the inner harbor had not been erected and armed, and the enemy's fleet would have been able to shell the city comparatively unmolested; and, by controlling and cutting off our communications with Fort Sumter and Morris Island, would soon have necessitated their surrender or evacuation.
"The remaining route by Morris Island was certainly the least injurious to us, for the occupation of the island by the enemy neither involved the evacu ation of Fort Sumter, the destruction of the city by a direct fire, as from James Island, nor the command of movements in our inner harbor by the ironclad fleet.
" The Morris Island route I had long thought most likely to be attempted by the enemy, as its proximity to Folly Island, for many months back in their possession, gave them facilities for the execution of a coup de main ; while the neighboring harbor of the Edisto gave their fleet convenient shelter from bad
GENERAL BEAUREGARD. HI
weather, \vhicli they could not have enjoyed on the Long Island coast, had their attack been via Sullivan's Island. Moreover, the seizure of the island would afford the Federal Government opportunity for making capital with its people and with foreign powers.
" To counteract these very apparent advantages of the enemy, as soon as suitable guns could be procured I had ordered to be erected on the south end, of Morris Island proper batteries.
" On Black Island, which lies between James and Morris islands, and from its position enfilades Light-house Inlet, between Folly and Morris islands, I had ordered to be built, several months previously, two batteries for two guns each. This island was, further, to have been connected with the mainland by a branch from the bridge planned to connect James and Morris islands, and nearly completed when the enemy made their attack in July.
t: At Vincent's Creek a battery was commenced, and had it been completed would have played effectively upon the sand-hills on the south end of Morris Island.
" Battery Wagner was substantially strengthened and arranged for four heavy guns in the sea-face, but, owing to the scarcity of labor and the want of the necessary ordnance to put into the works at the south end of the island when completed, they were not, on the 10th of July, 1803, in that condition which would have characterized them had I had sufficient labor, transporta tion, and ordnance at my disposal.
" Want of labor and transportation has always been a serious drawback, not only to the defence of Charleston, but of the whole Department.
u In reference to labor, I may here state that no subject connected with the defence of this Department has engrossed more of my attention. Constant appeals were made to the Governors and Legislature of South Carolina, and to eminent citizens, since my first arrival. Few seemed to appreciate the vital necessity of securing a proper amount of slave labor for the fortifications around Charleston ; and instead of the State providing 2500 negroes monthly, as desired by me, for Charleston, I received for the first six months of 18G3 the following number of negroes from the State's authority: January, 19G; February, 201; March, 804; April, 491; May, 107; June, GO—total, 1979; or an average of 330 monthly, when I ought to have received 2500. Hence it became a necessity that I should detain these hands longer than the thirty days, which was the original term of service required from each negro. This step caused considerable discontent among the owners of slaves; and in the month of July, 1863, the number of negro hands in the employ of the Engi neer Department, provided under my call on the State, amounted to only 299, including a number of hired negroes.
" In the mean time the troops of the command, in addition to their regular duties, were employed in erecting fortifications, the whole of the works in the south end of Morris Island having been thrown up by its garrison.
" The Engineer Department used every exertion to hire labor, but their efforts were not crowned with any appreciable success.
" In the middle of June the batteries on the south end of Morris Island were engaged with the enemy on Little Folly Island, and undoubtedly re-
tardcd considerably the progress of their operations, as the following extracts of reports from Brigadier-General Ripley will show :
, 1863.
« <# * # The enemy having advanced light guns to Little Folly Island yesterday, to shell the wreck of the steamer Ruby, now ashore at Light-house Inlet, in accordance with directions Captain Mitchell, commanding the batteries on the south of Morris Island, opened lire, silencing them at the second shot.
" 'This morning I gave directions for him to open fire in case he observed any indi cations of work on Little Folly on the part of the enemy; and this afternoon, about five o'clock, seeing parties apparently at work, he commenced shelling. About fifty men left Little Folly for the main island. The enemy replied from liis batteries on Big Folly and his light guns.'
"Again, on the 14th of June, the same officer reports :
" <* * * The enemy having appeared to be at work on Little Folly Island, Lieuten ant-Colonel Yates opened fire upon them, shelling them for about three-quarters of an hour, putting a stop to their operations, which appeared to be erecting a shelter or batteries near the inlet.
"'A close watch has been directed to be kept up, and their work to be stopped whenever attempted. 1
"At the time of the attack on Charleston, in the beginning of April, the enemy occupied Big Folly and Seabrook's islands in force, estimated at one or two brigades, before the 10th of July a considerable number of troops landing on Cole's and James islands.
"During the latter part of June, and up to the first week in July, 18G3, no extraordinary activity was manifested by the enemy. On Big Folly Island they were occupied, as usual, in fortifying the neck, strongly picketing Little Folly Island, and interfering with the wrecking-parties on the steamer Ruby.
"On the morning of the 7th of July four monitors appeared off the bar, but no other increase of the fleet in that direction was discernible.
"On the night of the 8th of July a scouting party, under the command of Captain Charles Haskell, visited Little Folly Island, and discovered the ene my's barges collected in the creeks approaching the island. Commencing on the 7th of July, and for the three succeeding days, working parties of the enemy were seen engaged at labor on Little Folly Island, supposed to be light works for guns. The wood on the island, but more especially the peculiar configuration of the ground, which consists of sand - hills, gave the enemy every facility for the concealment of his designs.
" On the night of the 8th of July considerable noise from chopping with axes was heard, and in the morning some works were discernible, the wood and brush having been cleared away from their front.
" On the night of the 9th of July an immediate attack being anticipated. the whole infantry force on the island was kept under arms at the south end.
"At five o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July the enemy's attack commenced by a heavy fire on our position, from a great number of light guns apparently placed during the preceding forty-eight hours in the works lately thrown up on Little Folly Island. Three monitors about the same time crossed the bar, and brought their formidable armaments to bear on the left flank of
our position, while several barges with howitzers in Light-house inlet flanked our right.
"For two hours the enemy kept up the fire from these three different points, our batteries replying vigorously.
''The barges of the enemy, filled with troops, having been seen in Light house Inlet in the direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the near est and most accessible spot for debarkation from them, it was justly consid ered the one most necessary to protect, and therefore the infantry, consisting of the 21st South Carolina Volunteers, about 350 effective men, were stationed by Colonel If. F. Graham, the immediate commander of the island, on the peninsula leading to that point.
"In this position the infantry were unavoidably exposed to the fire of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground from that of the guns on Little Folly Island.
"About seven o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a flotilla of boats containing between two and three thousand men, a considerable portion of whom endeavored to effect and hold a landing, in which they were opposed by the infantry until about eight o'clock, when another force of two or three regiments made good a landing in front of our batteries on the south end of Morris Island proper. These formed in line of battle on the beach, and ad vanced directly upon our works, throwing out on each flank numerous skir mishers, who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking the batteries in reverse. After an obstinate resistance our artillery had to abandon their pieces — three 8-inch navy shell guns, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, one rifled 24-pounder, one 30-pounder Parrott, one 12-pounder Whit worth, three 10-inch sea-coast mortars—eleven in all—and fall back.
" Two companies of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, which arrived about this time, were ordered to the support of the batteries; but they could not make head against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.
"This success of the enemy threatened to cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of retreat; and consequently, about nine o'clock, Colonel Graham gave the order to fall back to Battery Wagner, which was accomplished under a severe flanking fire from the monitors.
"The enemy thus gained possession of the south end of Morris Island, by rapidly throwing a large number of troops across the inlet, which it was im possible for the available infantry on the spot, about 400 effective men, to resist.
" It was not the erection of works on Little Folly Island that caused the abandonment of our position; it was clearty the want on our side of infantry support, and the enemy's superior weight and number of guns, and the heavy supporting brigade of infantry, that swept away our feeble, stinted means of resistance.
"The w 7 oods that remained unfelled on Little Folly Island were of no ma terial advantage to the enemy; for even had there been labor to remove them (which I never had), the formation of the island, covered with ridges of sand hills, formed a screen which hid the enemy's movements completely from us, and afforded all the concealment he could desire. IT.—8
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
"The attack was not a surprise, neither was the erection of the cnemv's works on Little Folly Island unknown to the local commanders or to these Headquarters. The enemy, indeed, made little effort to conceal them.
"With a sufficient infantry force on Morris Island, the result of the attack of the 10th of July, I am confident, would have been different; but, as I have already explained, the threatening position of the enemy on James Island entirely precluded the withdrawal of a single soldier from its defence until the point of attack had been fully developed; and the only reinforcements that could be sent to Morris Island, some 300 men of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, arrived too late to render material assistance on the morning of the 10th of July.
"The long-protracted defence of Battery Wagner must not be compared with the evacuation of the south end of Morris Island, by way of throwing discredit on the latter movement. The two defences are not analogous. In the one a large extent of exposed ground had to be guarded with an entirely inadequate force; in the other a strong earthwork, with a narrow line of ap proach, could be held successfully against any attack by a body of men nu merically quite insufficient to have opposed the landing of an enemy on the south end of Morris Island.
" While the enemy, on the 9th of July, was threatening Morris Island, he also made a strong demonstration against James Island by the Stono River.
" At 12 M. on that day Colonel Simonton, commanding at Seccssionville, telegraphed :
'"The enemy are landing on Battery Island; their advance pickets and ours are
firing. Pickets from Grimball's (on the Stono) report the enemy landing at that place.
41 ' Three gunboats and a monitor proceeded up the Stono as far as the obstructions.'
"On the morning of the 10th of July, while the attack was progressing on Morris Island, Colonel Simonton telegraphed that the main body of the enemy were moving in force from Battery Island to Legare's house, having a line of pickets extending from a point at Legare's in an oblique line up the Stono, cutting the Grimball causeway about midway. Later in the day, however, the same officer telegraphed that the reported advance of the enemy was premature : ' They are in force on Battery Island.'
"Though the demonstration of the enemy in the Stono and on James Island was instituted to distract our attention from Morris Island, yet it was made in such strength that at any moment it could have been converted into a real attack of the most disastrous kind to us, had the garrison been weakened to support Morris Island.
"On the afternoon of the 10th of July detachments of 1st, 12th, 18th, and C3d Georgia (534 effectives) arrived from the District of Georgia, under the command of Colonel Olmstcad, with the 21st South Carolina Volunteers; and Nelson's Battalion became the garrison of Battery Wagner.
"At daylight on the morning of the llth of July the enemy assaulted Bat tery Wagner, and was repulsed with much loss; two (2) officers and ninety-five (95) rank and file being left dead in front of our works, and six (6) offi cers and one hundred and thirteen (113) rank and file taken prisoners; about
forty of the latter being wounded. Our loss was one (1) officer and five (5) privates killed, and one (1) officer and five (5) privates wounded. During the day three (3) monitors and three (3) wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner, and in the evening a fifth monitor crossed the bar.
" Colonel Simonton, on James Island, at 7 A. M. reported no forward move ment in his front; two gunboats and several transports off Battery Island.
"At 9 P.M. he telegraphed that the enemy was advancing in force from Legarc's house to Grimball's, our pickets falling back on the reserves.
" On the 12th of July the Marion Artillery, four guns and 39 effectives, arrived from the Second Military District, and was placed on James Island, as well as the llth South Carolina Regiment, from the Third Military District (400 effectives); but these last soon had to be returned, to guard our communi cations with Savannah.
"A portion of Brigadier-General Clingman's brigade, 550 men of the 51st North Carolina Volunteers, and 50 men of the 31st North Carolina Volunteers, arrived from Wilmington about the same time, in consequence of my urgent call for reinforcements.
" The enemy was occupied during the day in erecting works on the middle of Morris Island, while five monitors and three wooden gunboats shelled Bat teries Wagner and Gregg. The armament of Battery Wagner was increased by four 12-pounder howitzers and two 32-poundcr carronadcs, on siege-carriages.
" On the 13th of July the enemy was o,ctivcly engaged in throwing up works on the middle of Morris Island, but were interrupted by our fire from Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter. During the day four monitors, three gunboats, and two mortar-vessels shelled Batteries Wagner and Gregg, but with little effect and slight casualties. Four monitors only were with the fleet; the fifth was seen going to the south, without a smoke-stack, on the evening of the 12th.
" Orders were issued on this day for the construction, at once, of a new battery on Shell Point—Battery Siinkins—in advance of Fort Johnson, for one 10-inch columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke gun, and three 10-inch mortars. The armament of Fort Moultrie was ordered to be increased by guns taken from Fort Sumter.
"An appeal was made to his Excellency Governor Bonhani for slave-labor for work on the fortifications.
" The arrival of Clingman's brigade and reinforcements from other quarters having increased to some extent my available force, the consideration arose whether or not the expulsion of the enemy from Morris Island yet was feasi ble. The number of men required for such an attempt would have been 4000, the surface of Morris Island not permitting the manoeuvring of a large number.
" The only hope of the attempt being successful lay in the possibility of our troops carrying the enemy's works and position before daylight; otherwise the advance and attack would necessarily have been made under the fire of the enemy's fleet, in which case it must have ended disastrously for us.
"After a consultation with my general officers, the idea of this attack was abandoned when it became apparent that our means of transportation were so limited as to render it impossible to throw sufficient reinforcements on
Morris Island in one night, and in time to allow the advance of our troops to the south end before daylight.
*• Two regiments under Brigadier-General Colquitt arrived on the 14th, and were sent to James Island. During the day the enemy's wooden gunboats and mortar-vessels shelled Battery Wagner at long range, doing, however, little damage. The enemy worked hard on his Morris Island batteries, mak ing considerable progress. The fire, however, from Fort Sumter and Bat teries Wagner and Gregg appeared to harass him considerably.
" The impossibility of expelling the enemy from Morris Island being fully recognized, I was obliged, reluctantly, to adopt the defensive. Orders were issued for closing the gate-way in the gorge of Fort Sumter, and removing a portion of the guns, also for the construction of a covered way from Fort Moultrie to Battery Bee.
" During the night Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding at Morris Island, sent out a party of one hundred and fifty men under Major Rion of the 7th South Carolina Battalion, who drove the enemy's pickets from his rifle-pits across the island some three - quarters (f) of a mile from Battery Wagner.
" On the 15th the enemy on Morris Island appeared to be largely reinforced; and during the night of the 14th the frigate Ironsides crossed the bar.
" The enemy was busy on his works—our men employed in repairing dam ages in Battery Wagner and answering the fire of the monitors and gunboats.
"The following instructions were given to the Engineer Department: To have Shell Point Battery constructed for three instead of two guns, the mor tar-batteries at Fort Johnson to be converted into gun-batteries for one heavy rifled gun or 10-inch columbiad each. To strengthen the gorge-wall of Fort Sumter by means of wet cotton-bales, filled in between with sand, and kept moist by means of tubes or hose from the upper tcrrc-plein.
" General Ripley was also instructed to reduce the forces on Morris Island to a command simply competent to hold the works against a coup de main, also to furnish the troops on that island with several hundred rice-casks for the construction of'rat holes ' in the sand-hills in rear of Battery Wagner.
" Instructions were given to the Chief of Subsistence to keep rations on Morris Island for 5000 men for thirty days, and on James Island rations for 5000 men for fifteen days, with a reserve supply in the city. On the same day the enemy's pickets along the Stono on John's Island were observed to be increased by the addition of negro troops. Brigadier-General Hagood made a rcconnoissance of the enemy in his front on James Island.
"At daybreak, on the morning of the IGth of July, Brigadier-General Ha good, in accordance with instructions, attacked the enemy on James Island, driving them to the shelter of their gunboats and to Battery Island. The loss was small on both sides: 3 men killed, 12 wounded, and 3 missing on our side. The enemy lost 40 negroes killed, and 14 prisoners left in our hands.
" This retreat of the enemy was followed by the advance of our troops, who have occupied the ground ever since. In the engagement the gunboat Pawnee was forced to retire down the Stono River, under fire from our light artillery.
" During the day the monitors, gunboats, and mortar-vessels shelled Bat tery Wagner. The enemy worked diligently on their batteries. In the even ing large bodies of infantry were landed on the south end of Morris Island.
" Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, was directed to increase the batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least twenty guns, on siege-car riages, so as to envelop the enemy with a circular fire whenever he might gain possession of the northeast end of Morris Island, all works to be pushed on day and night.
"On the morning of the 17th the enemy's fleet left the Stono River, after embarking his forces at Battery Island, and appeared to concentrate them on Little Folly and Morris islands.
"Both the fleet and land batteries of the enemy shelled Wagner throughout the day, answered vigorously by our guns. The construction of batteries on Morris Island by the enemy proceeded rapidly.
"In a telegraphic despatch forwarded on this date I pointed out that the contest had lapsed into one of engineering skill, where, with sufficient time, labor, and long-range guns, our success was very probable, owing to the plan of defence adopted; otherwise it was doubtful in proportion to the lack of these three elements of success.
"The fire from the enemy's batteries from this date prevented communica tion with Cummings's Point during daylight, and henceforth it had to be effected at night. The very limited transportation at my command added considerably to the difficulties of relieving the garrisons on Morris Island as frequently as I could have wished. The time of service was at first limited to forty-eight hours, but, owing to the difficulties in the way of transportation, I had to lengthen the period of duty on Morris Island to three days.
" On the morning of the 18th of July it became evident that the enemy was about to attempt serious operations against Wagner. The south end of Morris Island was crowded with troops, and in their batteries and advanced works great activity was apparent, large bodies of men being engaged hi pushing them rapidly to completion. Troops were continually being landed on Morris from Folly Island. These advanced and took up position in line of battle behind their breastworks. At 8.10 A. M. Battery Wagner opened, five minutes afterwards Battery Gregg joined. At 10 A. M. four of the enemy's vessels were in action. At 11.30 A. M. Fort Sumter opened on the enemy's rifle-pits on Morris Island. The guns of Battery Wagner about this time got the range of the enemy's working parties, and seemed to harass them ex tremely.
"At 12.10 P.M. the frigate Ironsides and one monitor moved up abreast of Battery Wagner, and at 12.80 were joined by two other monitors, when they opened fire on the work. At 1 p. M. the Ironsides, five monitors, a large wood en frigate, six mortar-boats—these latter could get the range without expos ing themselves—and the laud batteries, mounting five guns, concentrated their fire on Battery Wagner, and continued it until dark.
" The enemy's firing throughout the day was very rapid, averaging fourteen shots per minute, and unparalleled until this epoch of the siege in the weight of projectiles thrown.
" Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding at Battery Wagner, estimated that nine hundred shot and shell were thrown in and against the battery dur ing the eleven and a half (Hi) hours that the bombardment lasted. During that time our casualties in the work were four killed and fourteen wounded. Throughout the day the garrison replied slowly to the terrific fire to which it was exposed, while Fort Suniter and Battery Gregg tired rapidly.
" The main body of the enemy, after vainly endeavoring to gain a position upon the parapet, retreated in disorder under a destructive fire from our guns, including those of Fort Sumter. The ditch and slope of the southeastern angle of the battery were then swept by a fire of grape and musketry, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy lodged there, who, after a brief resistance, surrendered themselves prisoners.
u The garrison of Battery Wagner consisted of the Charleston Battalion, the 51st North Carolina, and the 31st North Carolina; two companies of the 63d Georgia Heavy Artillery and two companies of the 1st South Carolina In fantry acting as artillery.
" During the bombardment the garrison were kept under the shelter of the bomb-proofs, with the exception of the Charleston Battalion, which was sta tioned along the parapet of the work, a position which they gallantly main tained throughout the clay, exposed to a, feu tVcnfer. Providentially, the cas ualties did not exceed eight killed and twenty wounded.
'"At a quarter to eight o'clock in the evening the assaulting lines of the enemy were seen advancing from their works, and the bombardment from the fleet and land batteries subsided. The garrison were quietly called to their allotted positions, and, with the exception of one regiment, responded man fully to the summons. The Charleston Battalion guarded the right of the work, and the 51st North Carolina Volunteers the centre. These two regi ments drove back the enemy opposed to them with terrible slaughter, while our guns, discharging grape and canister into their shattered ranks, com pleted their discomfiture. On the left of the work, however, the 31st North Carolina disgracefully abandoned their position; and, no resistance being of fered at this point, a portion of the enemy succeeded in crossing the ditch and in gaining a foothold upon the rampart.
" Brigadier-General Hagood, who, in anticipation of an assault, was relieved from the command of James Island, and, with Colonel Harrison's regiment— the 32d Georgia Volunteers—was ordered to the reinforcement of Morris Isl and, arrived in time to assist in the dislodgment of that portion of the enemy who had gained a footing in the southeastern salient, but not before the attack was made and the enemy repulsed.
"The assault was terribly disastrous to the enemy. His loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must have been three thousand, as eight hundred bodies were interred in front of Battery Wagner on the following morning.
"The enemy's forces on this occasion consisted of troops from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and New York, and the 54th Massachusetts Negro Regiment, the whole said to be under the command- of Brigadier-Gen eral Strong, who died afterwards from the effects of wounds received on this* occasion.
" Brigadier-General Taliaferro reported that the garrison, with the excep tion of the 31st North Carolina Volunteers, behaved throughout with the utmost gallantry. The heroic conduct of the 51st North Carolina Volunteers counterbalanced the unworthy behavior of the 31st and retrieved the honor of the State.
" Our own loss during the bombardment and assault was 174 killed and wounded.
"At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 19th of July, during the engagement, I telegraphed to Brigadier-General Ripley that Morris Island must be held at all cost for the present, and, with the reinforcements thrown there, to push every advantage possible before daylight.
" The day passed in comparative quiet. The enemy sent in a flag of truce in the morning to arrange for the burial of the dead. Brigadier- General Hagood reported that six hundred (600) of the enemy's dead in and around our works were buried by our troops, and at least two hundred (200) more by the enemy.
"The strengthening of the gorge-wall of Sumter by cotton-bales and sand proceeded rapidly.
" On the 20th the enemy opened fire from two new batteries. Throughout the day the fleet joined in the bombardment, and were answered by Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner. At 3 p. M. information was received that the 10-inch gun at Battery Wagner was dismounted. I impressed upon General Hagood, commanding the work, that I did not consider 10-inch co-luinbiads essential to the defence of the position, for which siege-guns, mus ketry, stout arms and hearts, and the strength of sand parapets must be relied on. Orders were issued, however, for the remounting of the 10-inch gun, if practicable.
" The enemy's fleet this morning consisted of four monitors, the Ironsides, and seventeen vessels inside the bar, fourteen vessels outside, and thirty ves sels in Folly River. One gunboat and four vessels in North Edisto, and one steam-frigate, one sloop-of-war, one gunboat, and thirty-four transports at Hilton Head.
" Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed this day to have the guns in tended for the Legare Point Battery mounted immediately, and to open fire with them as soon as possible.
" Brigadier - General Mercer was telegraphed to send on, if practicable, another 10-inch columbiad from the Savannah works.
"At 2 P.M. a shell from the enemy's batteries struck Fort Sumter, and some eight or ten 30-pounder Parrott shots were fired at the fort from a dis tance of 3500 yards.
" Five casualties occurred in Battery Wagner on this date, and one in Fort Sumter.
" On the 21st the enemy sent in a flag of truce, with a communication from General Gillmore, requesting an interview between General Vogdes and the officer commanding Battery Wagner. The proposal was agreed to, and the flag of truce was met by an officer from that work. While the conference was proceeding the fleet opened a bombardment on Wagner. This gross
violation of the usages of war was responded to on the part of General Ha-good by an abrupt termination of the interview.
"During the day the enemy's gunboats and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner. The enemy had apparently mounted eight new guns in their batteries.
" Colonel Rhctt reported that from the want of proper appliances he had been unable to dismount the guns in Fort Sumtcr which I had ordered to be removed.
"The bombardment continued throughout the 23d from fleet and land batteries, with an interval, when General Vogdcs. U. S. A., requested, under a flag of truce, another interview with Brigadier-General Hagood. This was refused until an apology should be made for the breach of truce the day be fore. This having been given and deemed satisfactory, General Yogdcs ver bally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured having been sent North; that as we had the excess, of course we could select whom to exchange. He ab stained from any reference to negroes, while intimating that a mutual parole of prisoners without regard to excess would be agreeable.
" The following instructions were given to Brigadier-General Ripley :
" 'Not to open fire from the new James Island batteries until tlicir completion; then to carry on a vigorous fire with guns and mortars on the enemy's works. Sorties to be made at night whenever practicable.'
" In my telegraph to you [General Cooper] of this date I mentioned the continual reinforcement of the enemy, that I had to guard three important lines of approach—James, Morris, and Sullivan's islands—and requested the balance of General Colquitt's brigade, with more troops, as soon as possible.
"No gun was fired on either side during the 2od. Our men were engaged in repairing damages. The enemy was busy erecting batteries and throwing up traverses, to protect them from the fire of the James Island batteries.
" On the morning of the 24th a heavy bombardment was opened upon Bat tery "Wagner from five monitors, two gunboats, two mortar-vessels, the Iron sides, and land batteries, which continued until 9.30 A.M., when the steamer with the prisoners on board proceeded to the fleet, and the exchange MMS effectcd, as previously agreed on.
" Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, having inspected Battery Wagner, reported no material damage to the work. The guns on the sea face unserviceable, on the land front in good order. The enemy's stockade within seven hundred (700) yards of the fort.
'• Brigadier-General Taliaferro, who had relieved Brigadier-General Ilagood in the command of Battery Wagner, on the night of the 22d came to the city to confer personally with me regarding the condition of the garrison of Bat tery Wagner, the officers having reported their men as considerably dispir ited. After a conference with him I communicated my views as follows:
"The position must be held if possible until the guns en route from Rich mond shall be received and placed in position.
" No idea of evacuation must be entertained, if there is a chance at night to repair the damages of the day.
" Every night preparations will be on hand for removing troops from Morris Island in case of need.
" Battery Wagner must be held and fought to the last extremity. The gar rison might rest assured that every preparation will be made for their with drawal in case the work should become untenable.
" My telegram to you of this date was :
" ' The enemy's fleet and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner heavily this morning. Garrison lost only one killed and seven wounded—hope to repair damages during the night. Am anxiously waiting for heavy guns promised from Richmond.'
" On the 25tb the enemy's fleet remained quiet, owing to the high sea, and his land batteries fired but little ; Fort Sumter, Battery Gregg, and the James Island batteries answering. A 30-pounder Parrott was again brought to bear on Fort Sumter from the same battery as on the 20th. During the day I in formed you by telegraph that several of my new batteries were ready for their armament.
"The strengthening of Fort Sumter proceeded day and night, and in anti cipation of the damaging effect which the enemy's heavy rifled guns from stationary batteries would have on this work, a partial disarmament was carried on nightly.
"On Sunday, the 2Gth, the bombardment of the enemy slackened. During the night shelling of the enemy's works was carried on from Fort Sumter. Reinforcements were seen throughout the day disembarking on Morris Island.
" I telegraphed on that day:
"'Have nine positions ready. Not one gun promised from Richmond has yet ar rived. Cannot their transportation be expedited?'
" The weather on the 27th was too windy for the co-operation of the fleet, which had been increased by the addition of another monitor. During the day the bombardment from the land batteries slackened. Our defences were pushed on vigorously, while the strengthening of Fort Sumter and the with drawal of guns from that work proceeded. The enemy showed great activity in advancing their work, though harassed from the fire of our batteries.
" On the 28th Battery Wagner sustained another very severe bombardment from the enemy's land and naval batteries, but no great damage was done. Two men were killed and five wounded.
"My telegraphic despatch on the evening of the 28th was:
"' Many transports of the enemy arc arriving with troops. At least 2500 more men are required at present for James Island; cannot they be ordered here immediately? Enemy's land and naval batteries are now playing ou Wagner, which replies bravely with Gregg and Sumter.'
" On the 29th Battery Wagner was heavily bombarded throughout the day by the fleet and land batteries. In a telegram to you of this date I notified the arrival of some of the promised guns from Richmond:
" ' Have received four 10-inch columbiads and four 10-inch mortars. Regret to say, by order of Secretary of Navy, two Brooke guns have been taken from me, to be shut up in a new gunboat, so pierced as only to give a range of a mile and a half at most.'
" Throughout the 30th Batteries Wagner and Gregg were subjected to a furious fire from both land batteries and fleet. As an example of the rapid tire of the enemy, I may mention that between the hours of 10.30 A. M. and 1 P. M. five hundred and ninety-nine (599) shot were fired at our different batteries, principally Gregg and Wagner. During the same time one hun dred and ten (110) shots were fired from our works. Our loss to-day was two killed and seven wounded in Battery Wagner; no damage of conse quence done to the works.
"Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed to transport as early as possible one of the 10-inch columbiads lately arrived from Richmond to Battery Wag ner, which was accomplished on the night of the 30th.
"The enemy fired heavily on Battery Wagner throughout the 31st. Our loss was seven wounded. Our new works progressed very satisfactorily, and the strengthening of Fort Sumter and removal of its guns went on rapidly.
"The enemy's fire on the 1st of August was slack, and did but little exe cution, save a slight injury to the front traverse of the 8-inch shell-gun in Battery Wagner, which did not, however, disable it. The casualties to-day were only two wounded. The enemy w r as industriously engaged in throwing up new batteries and advancing his trenches; every endeavor was made by firing from Sumter, Gregg, Wagner, and the James Island batteries to annoy and delay his approach.
" Throughout the morning of the 2d of August the enemy did not answer our fire, but about two o'clock they opened with vigor on Wagner. The damage done to the work was, however, comparatively small. In my tele gram of that date I mentioned that—
"'Transports filled with troops arc reported going south from Stono, probably intended to operate against Savannah. Cannot some of my troops sent to General Johnston be ordered back immediately for defence of this city ?'
" Orders were given to the Chief Quartermaster to have trains in waiting sufficient to transport two regiments of infantry to Savannah. The difficul ties attending the defence of Charleston were greatly increased by the celerity with which the enemy could remove his operations from one point to another, and, from the paucity of troops in my command, Savannah and the coast line were nearly denuded.
"Instructions were given for increasing the armament of Fort Johnson by two G.40 Brooke guns turned over by the Navy Department, and to place noating torpedoes in certain localities.
"Brigadier-General Mercer was directed to forward a detachment of artil lerists to relieve those of the 63d Georgia Volunteers who had become re duced by casualties and sickness, and had been ordered to return to Sa vannah.
"The Ordnance Department in Richmond was applied to for Coehorn mortars.
" The fire of the enemy on the 3d was not heavy, but his sharp-shooters annoyed the garrison of Wagner considerably. No casualties occurred dur ing the day.
"Brigadier-General Mercer, at Savannah, was informed that transports were reported moving south from here, and that two regiments were held in readi ness to move at a moment's notice. I was informed that Evans's brigade was ordered to Savannah from Mississippi.
u ln a personal visit paid to Morris Island that evening I found Battery Wagner in very serviceable condition. The work was more solidly con structed than when the first attack took place. The garrison appeared to be in fine spirits and ready to defend the work to the last. At Fort Sumter the filling of the officers' quarters and the casemates was rapidly approaching completion. An exterior sand-bag revetement to the gorge-wall was ordered, as well as a series of traverses in barbette on the east, south, and northeast faces, and many changes and removals in the armament.
" During the 4th of August but little firing occurred on either side. Orders were given to re-arrange certain guns in the batteries and lines on James Island.
"Major Trezcvant, Commandant of the Charleston Arsenal, was requested to collect all the old iron in the burnt districts of the city, to be cast into projectiles.
" Orders were given to Brigadier-General Ripley to arrange with Captain Tucker of the navy for an attempt to capture the enemy's pickets in the Marsh Battery, near Vincent's Creek. On the 5th the guns in Battery Wag ner were all in fighting order. Our sharp-shooters, armed with Whitworth rifles, seemed to annoy the enemy greatly, who endeavored to silence their fire with Coehorn mortars.
"About nine o'clock on that night a picket of the enemy which had taken possession of our unfinished battery in Vincent's Creek, and, by signalling the arrival at night of our steamers at Cummings's Point, interfered materially with our operations, was attacked by a party from the navy and from the 25th South Carolina Volunteers. The result was satisfactory. One captain and ten enlisted men of the enemy were captured; our loss was one man killed.
" Our defensive works at Fort Sumter and other points progressed rapidly.
" The telegram of this day's date was :
" ' Enemy still being largely reinforced from northward. Cannot General Colquitt's other regiment be ordered here at once ? More troops are absolutely required.'
" Throughout the 6th the enemy fired occasional shots from his land bat teries and fleet, but without material result. One casualty occurred. Our batteries fired at intervals throughout the day. Brigadier-General Cobb was ordered by telegraph to send 500 infantry and one light battery to report to Brigadier-General Mercer, in Savannah.
"The enemy on Morris Island worked laboriously on his batteries and trenches, while strong reinforcements of troops were daily seen arriving.
"On the 7th I received a telegram from you informing me that the balance of Colquitt's brigade was ordered to Charleston.
"There was little firing throughout the day. Only two casualties occurred on Morris Island.
" On the 8th Brigadier-General Evans reported his arrival in Savannah. A
large increase was visible in the enemy's fleet in the Stono. During the day firing at intervals was carried on from our batteries, but the enemy remained quiet till the evening, when he opened on Battery Wagner, and continued the tire throughout the night.
"Instructions were given to the Chief-Engineer to expedite the putting up in Fort Sumter of the sand-bag 'chemise' to the gorge-wall, the interior trav erses, merlons, embrasures, and a covered way to be erected between Batteries Wagner and Gregg.
"The fire of the enemy during the morning of the 9th was heavy and rapid from his land batteries. The officer in command of the advanced pickets reported that the enemy worked industriously in his trenches until 2 A. M.
"The fire of our sharp-shooters evidently seemed to annoy the enemy, as he occasionally fired with great spirit to dislodge them, but ineffectually. One casualty in Battery Wagner during the day.
"The effective force on Morris Island was GG3 infantry, 248 artillery, and 11 cavalry—total, 923.
"During the day I received the following telegram from Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, dated Petersburg, Virginia :
" ' My scouts report shipment of troops, botli infantry and cavalry, from Norfolk, supposed for Charleston. Large quantities of forage shipped. Cavalry left Gth inst.'
" The Chief-Engineer was instructed to lay out and erect a line of works on James Island from Seccssionville to Dill's house, in lieu of the present defen sive lines, to consist of lunettes with closed gorges disposed at one-half to three-quarters of a mile apart, and connected with creraaillere lines.
"Captain Tucker, C. S. X., was informed of the practice on the part of the enemy of putting out boat pickets at night to observe the movements of our transportation to Morris Island, and it was suggested to Captain Tucker that steps should be taken by the navy to break up these pickets.
"Upon the approach of one of our transportation steamers signals could be exchanged between the enemy's boats and their land batteries, and these lat ter opening immediately a heavy fire upon Cummings's Point, rendered our communications extremely difficult and hazardous. At times, also, the enemy illuminated the landing with a powerful calcium light, so as to prevent the approach of our steamers, forcing us to transport our supplies of men and munitions by means of small boats.
"During the 10th the enemy remained comparatively quiet, until about 8 p. M., w r hen he opened briskly on Battery Wagner. On our side firing was kept up from Battery Simkins with columbiads, from 11 A.M. to 11 P.M., when mortar firing was resumed and continued until morning.
"The enemy on Morris Island were busy during the past night, and his advanced works w-ere then about six hundred yards from Battery Wagner, though no guns were yet in position.
" My telegram to you of that date was:
" ' Nothing of importance has occurred since yesterday. Evans's brigade is arriving in Savannah, and Colquitt's regiments arriving here.'
"About seven o'clock on the morning of the llth, the fleet and land bat teries opened heavily on Battery Wagner, and were replied to by Fort Suniter and Batteries Simkins and Gregg.
"One casualty occurred during the day, the enemy as well as ourselves working persistently, in spite of the excessive heat.
" Our garrison on Morris Island consisted of 1245, of all arms.
"At 5.45 A.M., on the morning of the 12th, the enemy opened on Fort Sumter witli an 8-iucli Parrott gun, firing from a battery north and west of Craig's Hill, Morris Island—distance estimated to be at least forty-four hun dred yards. Eleven shots, in all, were fired at the fort; four missed, three struck outside, and four within the fort. Again, at 5.30 P.M., the enemy opened on Fort Sumter from the same battery, firing at intervals of ten minutes till dark. Eleven 8-inch rifled shot struck the fort.
" Heavy firing was carried on throughout the day against Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter, and Batteries Gregg and Simkins directed their fire against the enemy's working parties on the left of his approach, and dispersed them, stopping the work they were throwing up.
"At dark Battery Wagner opened with eight guns on the enemy's ad vanced trenches, and, in conjunction with Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins, prevented any progress on the part of the enemy. His batteries in rear replied to the fire of Wagner, and interrupted our communications with Cummings's Point.
"On the 13th the enemy endeavored several times to repair the damages done to his advanced works during the preceding night, but well-directed shots from Battery Wagner as often drove him back. The batteries in rear and the fleet then opened fire on Wagner and Gregg, and were answered by Fort Sumter and Battery Simkins. At 5.30 A. M. the enemy opened with' 8-inch Parrotts from the same battery as the day before, firing two or three times only. At 11 A.M. three or four wooden gunboats, armed with heavy rifled guns, approached within four and five thousand yards of Fort Sumter, and opened a slow fire; some fifteen shots were fired w r ith great range; three only struck the fort. One shot passed over the fort at great elevation, and dropped a mile to the westward.
" At 5 P. M. the enemy opened again on the fort witli the 8-incli Parrotts. No great damage was done; the farthest penetration into the brickwork was about four feet.
" On the 14th the land batteries opened on Fort Sumter, firing three shots; two struck about 11 A.M. The wooden gunboats shelled the fort at long range, and at 5.15 p. M. the land batteries again opened on the fort.
" Throughout the day the enemy remained quiet, firing occasionally, and replied to by our batteries. The sharp-shooters on both sides kept up a con stant fire. During the night the fire from Battery Wagner put a stop to the enemy's operations in its front. The strengthening of Fort Sumter advanced rapidly, day and night.
" Brigadier-General Ripley r/aa instructed as to the armament of certain portions of the new lines on Juoies Island, and of a new battery thrown up near Fort Johnson.
"During the greater part of the 15th the enemy, both on land and sea, were unusually quiet, occasionally firing at Battery Wagner; later in the day they opened with some vigor on Battery Gregg.
" The enemj r 's fleet consisted this morning of the Ironsides, six monitors, eight gunboats, three mortar-hulks, and thirteen vessels inside the bar—out side, seven; at Hilton Head, fifty-two vessels, including gunboats and ironclads.
" My telegram of this date was:
"'No change worth recording since yesterday. Sand-bag reveteraent of gorge-wall of Sumtcr and traverses iuside of fort progressing as rapidly as means of transporta tion will permit.'
" On the 16th the enemy's batteries fired but little on Batteries Wagner and Gregg, but during the afternoon the two 8-inch Parrotts opened on Fort Sum-ter, throwing forty-eight shells. Four passed over, four fell short, ten struck inside the parade, and thirty hit in various places, exterior and interior.
"At this date the armament of the fort consisted of thirty-eight guns and two mortars, at least twenty guns having been withdrawn since the landing of the enemy on Morris Island.
"Orders were given to Brigadier-General Ripley to remove to Battery Gregg the two mortars in Fort Sumtcr as soon as it should become impossi ble to use them with advantage in the latter work, and to transport to other points every gun in Sumter not actually required for its defence and by the new relations of that work to the defence of the harbor.
"The Chief-Engineer was instructed to strengthen Castle Pinckney with sand-bags. Fort Johnson to be arranged for two additional 10-inch guns, and positions to be prepared for three 10-inch guns, to be placed on the James Island shore of the harbor.
"Battery Wagner was bombarded heavily by the enemy about daylight on the 17th; at about 9 o'clock A.M. the Ironsides and six monitors joined in the action. Their guns were turned also on Battery Gregg and Fort Sumtcr, n, heavy cannonade being directed against those three works, but principally against Wagner, which, having only two 10-inch columbiads and one 32-poundcr, rifled, to reply to the enemy's fleet, maintained the unequal con test more than one hour, when Colonel Keitt, commanding on Morris Island, ordered the brave artillerists and their gallant officers to the cover of the bomb-proofs.
"During this terrible fire the Engineer Department lost the valuable ser vices of a most promising officer, Captain J. M. Wampler, of Virginia, who was killed by'the explosion of a 15-inch shell.
" During the engagement Captain Kodgers, commanding the monitor Wee-hawJcen, was killed in the pilot-house of his ship. In the twenty-four hours 948 shots were fired against Fort Sumtcr; 448 struck outside, 233 inside, and 270 passed over. The casualties in the fort amounted to fourteen.
"On the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d of August the fierce bombard ment of Fort Sumter was continued by the enemy, both from his land bat teries and, at intervals, from his fleet. From the 17th to the 23d inclusive lie fired against the fort a total of 5G43 shots, of which number 2043 struck inside.
1699 outside, and 1301 missed. These projectiles varied in weight from thirty to three hundred pounds, and were fired from Parrott and 15-inch smooth bore guns. An average of one hundred and fifty pounds per shot would give a weight of nearly 385 tons discharged against the wall of Fort Sumter during this period of seven days. At the end of this time nearly all the guns remain ing in the fort were unserviceable, and the damage to the gorge-wall and the northwest face by the reverse fire was great; but the sand that had been placed on the outside of the gorge-wall, in conjunction with the filling up of the barracks and casemates with cotton-bales, and, above all, the crumbling of the masonry under the enemy's fire, converted this portion of Fort Sumter into a mass of debris and rubbish, on which the enemy's powerful artillery could make but little impression. Throughout the siege the unremitting exertions of the Engineer Corps hourly increased the defensive power of the work.
"The following extract from the journal of the Engineer officer at Fort Sumter, from August 23d, will show the condition of the work on that date:
"'The northwest front has now five arches with ramparts fallen in; northeast bar bette battery unserviceable; east front scarp much scaled by slant fire, with large craters under traverses ; principal injury at level of arches and terre-plein; two-thirds of southern wall of east magazine damaged, stone revetement unhurt and protected by rubbish, gorge not damaged since yesterday; another shot penetrated above sand fill ing of second-story rooms, making three since the attack began ; east barbette battery parapet much loosened and undermined, though not displaced; one 10-inch and one 11-inch gun untouched ; Brooke gun-carriage shattered, but can easily be mounted on 10-inch colurnbiad carriage.'
" * * * During the seven days that the enemy so vigorously bombarded Fort Sumter his approaches to Battery Wagner were slowly pushed forward under the fire of our guns and sharp-shooters. On the 21st he made an un successful attack on our rifle-pits directly in front of Battery Wagner. The same day, at 12 M., under flag of truce, General Gillinore sent a demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter and Morris Island, with the threat that in case of non-compliance he would open fire on the city. Four hours were allowed for a reply. This despatch was received at the Headquarters of the Depart ment at lOf P. M. The enemy carried his threat into execution by throwing several shells into the city about 1.30 A. M. on the morning of the 22d.
" On the 24th the fire on Fort Sumter lessened considerably; not more than one hundred and fifty shots were thrown against it in the course of the day.
" Every endeavor was made to retard the approach of the besiegers to Bat tery Wagner; his working parties were fired on from the battery, but this had to be discontinued and the embrasures closed, in order to prevent our pieces from being dismounted.
"Until three o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th the enemy's fire was prin cipally directed against Fort Sumter; after that time Battery Wagner was fiercely bombarded, as well as the space between our rifle-pits and the works; at dusk the enemy endeavored to carry the position held by our pickets, but were repulsed. Our loss was five killed and nineteen wounded.
" A very large amount of ammunition and ordnance-stores were removed from Fort Sumter during the ni^ht.
" On the 2Gth one hundred and thirty shots were fired at Sumter, Batteries Wagner and Gregg receiving the bulk of the fire. At five o'clock in the evening the enemy concentrated his fire on our rifle-pits in front of Battery Wagner. Bctwen 7 and 8 P. M. the rifle-pits were carried by an overwhelm ing force, which also succeeded in capturing seventy-six out of eighty-nine men of the Olst North Carolina Volunteers, who formed the picket.
"The fire against Fort Sumter was limited, on the 27th, to four shots. In front of Battery Wagner the enemy had advanced his trenches to within three hundred yards of the work, while the number of the enemy's guns and the accuracy of his fire prevented the opening of the embrasures in Battery Wag ner, except at night.
"The lion. Secretary of War informed me by telegraph, in answer to a request that I had made for the services, as boatmen, of some of the sailors stationed in Savannah, that the Secretary of the Navy declined sending them, and urged detail of men. I replied by letter, setting forth the fact that the army in this Department was already depleted by details for the navy, and that no more men could be spared. The importance of keeping our water transportation to Morris Island in an efficient condition was represented, and that, without an additional force of boatmen, it could not be preserved; fur ther, that the ironclads at Savannah are safely sheltered behind obstructions, and, were a portion of their crews sent to Charleston, they could be returned in the event of an emergency there.
"On the 28th the enemy was extremely quiet, firing only six shots at Sum ter; but his approaches towards Battery Wagner advanced rapidly, notwith standing the fire directed upon him from Gregg, the James Island batteries, and the sharp-shooters in Battery Wagner.
"The enemy did not fire at Fort Sumter during the 29th, but worked industriously at his fortifications on Morris Island. His advanced works were shelled throughout the day by Battery Wagner, Fort Moultrie, and the James Island batteries.
"During the night the enemy's guns were silent in front of Battery Wag ner, but they renewed the bombardment of Fort Sumter before daylight on the morning of the 30th, and during the day threw six hundred and thirty-lour shot against it. They were also busily engaged in completing their ad vanced works, though greatly disturbed by the fire from Wagner and our James Island batteries, which compelled them to desist from the work of advancing a sap on the left of Battery Wagner. In the evening the enemy opened a brisk fire on Wagner with both mortars and Parrott guns; no seri ous damage was done to the work, but several casualties occurred. During the night Battery Wagner kept up a steady and effective fire on the enemy's advanced works. Early on the morning of the 31st, as the steamer Sumter was returning from Morris Island with troops on board, she was unfortunately iired into from the Sullivan Island batteries and sunk.* Four men were killed or drowned, and the greater portion of the arms were lost.
" Between 11 and 12 M. one of the monitors approached Fort Moultrie, and
The officer in charge had failed to show the signal light.
when within range was opened on by the fort. The enemy replied with shrapnel, all of which fell short. After about an hour's engagement the monitor withdrew.* About 2 P. M. the enemy again approached with four monitors and engaged the fort for four hours; a steady fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan's Island batteries. During the engagement the enemy fired about sixty shots, striking Fort Moultrie fifteen times, but doing no damage. The fort fired one hundred and thirty-two shots.
" The enemy's fire on Fort Sumter w r as slack throughout the day. Captain Leroy Hammond, 25th South Carolina Volunteers, reported during the day that, in obedience to instructions, he had made a recounoissance of Light-house Inlet and the south side of Black Island; on the island he saw pickets and bivouac fires, but discovered no earthworks.
"During the night the enemy succeeded in advancing their sap a short distance towards Battery Wagner, notwithstanding the heavy fire that was kept up on them from that work. At daylight, on the 1st of September, the enemy opened on Wagner with mortars, and continued at intervals during the entire day. The two 8-inch howitzers on the salient and curtain of the work were disabled, and the two 6-inch shell-guns on the land face were also partially disabled. From early morning the Morris Iskncl batteries kept up a heavy fire on Fort Sumter, firing throughout the day 382 shots, 166 striking outside. 95 inside, and 121 missing. The fire \vas very destructive, disabling the remaining guns in barbette, and damaging the fort considerably. An ex tract from the report of the Engineer in charge gave the following account of its condition:
" 'Towards noon the effect of the fire Was to carry away at one fall four rampart arches on northeast front, with terre-plein platforms and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a half, which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Sonic of the lower casemate piers of same front have been seriousty damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done is to be noticed at southeast pass coupe and two next upper casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp has fallen away completely, and left the arches exposed, as well as the sand filling half down to the floor of the second tier.'
"At 11.40 P. M. six monitors opened on Fort Sumter from distances of eight hundred to one thousand yards. They were joined, at 1 A.M., on the 2d, by the Ironsides, and together fired 185 shots, of which 116 struck outside, 35 inside, and 34 passed over. The projectiles used were 8-inch Parrotts, rifle-shell, and 11 and 15 inch smooth-bore shot and shell.
"Fort Sumter was unable to answer, not having a gun in working order, but a heavy fire was kept up on the fleet from Fort Moultrie with good effect, t\vo of the monitors being apparently injured, and requiring assistance when they retired. The effect of this fire on Fort Sumter was thus described by the Engineer officer:
" 'The chief external injury has been done upon the east scarp, which now has lost its integrity, and hangs upon the arches apparently in blocks and detached masses.'
* One 8-inch columbiad was opened, and struck the vessel eight times in succession before it got out of range. II.—9
"The remainder of the day was passed in comparative quiet. The fleet was occupied in placing sand-bags on the decks of the monitors, the enemy's land batteries firing but 148 shots; 38 of these were directed against Sumter. In the same period our batteries fired 66 times.
"During the night the enemy in front of Wagner was engaged in strength ening his advanced position, which was then within eighty or one hundred yards of the salient. Owing to the difficulty of transporting ammunition to Battery Wagner the fire from that work was slack.
" Early on the morning of the 3d the enemy opened on Battery Wagner with mortars, and continued it throughout the day. Fort Sumter was not fired at. In that work all hands were busily engaged in repairing dam ages. During the past night, as usual, large quantities of ordnance-stores and several guns were removed by that gallant and zealous Acting Engineer officer, Mr. J. Frazer Mathews, of Charleston, who persistently worked at this dangerous and laborious undertaking until every disabled gun which could be recovered from the debris had been transferred to its new position. The condition of the fort at this date was as follows:
"The northeast and northwest terre-pleins had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated, and lower east magazine wall cracked; the eastern wall itself nearly shot away, and large portions down ; ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached. The casemates on the eastern face were still filled with sand, and gave some protection to the garrison from shells. Not a single gun remained in bar bette, and but a single smooth-bore 32-pounder in the west face that could be fired as the morning and evening gun.
" During the night of the 3d Battery Wagner fired steadily, and the James Island batteries occasionally. Throughout the 4th the enemy did not fire on Fort Sumter, but confined themselves to shelling Battery Wagner, and were answered by the James Island guns. During the night of the 4th the enemy's approach was pushed close to Battery Wagner. At 12 M., on the 5th, the Federal flag, which had been one hundred yards south of Wagner, was abreast of the south angle of the work. Throughout the day a very heavy fire was concentrated on Battery W T agncr from the New Ironsides, moni tors, and land batteries, which severely injured the work. Our casualties were also greatly increased, some forty occurring during the day.
" Large bodies of troops were transferred from Folly to Morris Island, and other indications pointed to an early assault. There is good reason to believe that the enemy's plan was to carry Battery Gregg by a boat attack on the night of the oth, or early on the morning of the 6th; that the fleet should prevent the landing of reinforcements at Cummings's Point; that Battery Wagner should be shelled fiercely by the ironclads; and on the morning of the Gth, on a given signal, the assault on Battery Wagner was to take place.
" This plan was frustrated, however, by the repulse of the attacking party on Battery Gregg. About 1.30 A. M., on the morning of the 6th, they were seen approaching, in from fifteen to twenty barges, by the passages leading from Vincent and Schooner creeks that lie between James and Morris islands.
The garrison at Cummings's Point was on the alert, and received them with a brisk fire of grape and musketry. The enemy was evidently greatly dis concerted, and, after discharging their boat howitzers, retired.
" On the 4th of September, 18G3, I had convened a meeting of General Officers and the Chief-Engineer of the Department to assist me in determin ing how much longer the Confederate forces should attempt to hold batteries Wagner and Gregg and the north end of Morris Island.
"The rapid advance of the enemy's trenches to Battery Wagner having made it evident that before many days that work must become untenable, the following questions were propounded at the council:
" 1st. How long do you think Fort Wagner can be held, without regard to safety of garrison ?
" 2d. How long can the fort be held, with a fair prospect of saving its garrison, with the means of transportation at our command and circumstances relative thereto, as heretofore indicated by actual experience ?
" 3d. How long, after the loss or evacuation of Wagner, could Fort Gregg be held ?
"4th. Can the heavy guns (two in Wagner and three in Gregg) in these two works be removed before their evacuation without endangering the safety of the works and their garrisons ?
" 5th. Can we take the offensive suddenly with a fair prospect of success by throwing, during the night, 3000 men on north end of Morris Island, making in all 4000 men available; bearing in mind that no reinforcements could be sent there until night, and perhaps none for several nights, according to the movements of the enemy's ironclads and the fire of the land batteries ?
" These questions were thoroughly discussed, as well as the probable plan of attack by the enemy, our means of defence, of transportation, and reasons for prolonging our possession of the north end of Morris Island.
" It was agreed that the holding of Morris Island as long as possible was most important to the safety and free use of the harbor of Charleston, and our ability to keep up easy communication with the works on Sullivan's and James islands, in view of which I deemed it proper to renew application by telegraph to the Secretaries of War and Naval Department for some two hundred sailors for oarsmen.
"It was further decided that the five heavy guns on Morris Island were necessary, morally and physically, for the defence of the positions to the last extremity; and such Avere the difficulties, if not, indeed, the insurmountable obstacles, in the way of their removal at this time, that no effort should be made to save them, and consequently that they should be ultimately de stroyed, with as much of the works as practicable, when further defence was abandoned.
"The result was, my determination to hold Morris Island as long as com munication with it could be maintained at night, by means of row-boats, but for which purpose sailors or men able to handle boats and oars with efficiency were essential.
" On the 5th inst. Brigadier-General Ilipley, commanding the First Military District, prepared, by my order, as per my instructions, a confidential letter
which was forwarded to the officer commanding Battery Wagner, pointing out that it might be necessary to evacuate Morris Island. The Brigadier-General in the letter gave full instructions, as directed bj me, for destroying the magazine and rendering the guns useless in the event of abandoning the island.
"Early on the morning of the 6th of September a despatch was received from Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Battery Wagner, to the following effect:
" ' * * * The parapet of salient is badly breached; the whole fort is much weakened ; a repetition to-morrow of to-day's fire (alluding to the 5th hist.) will make the work almost a ruin. The mortar fire is still very heavy and fatal, and no important work can be done. Is it desirable to sacrifice the garrison? To continue to hold it is to do so. Captain Lee, the Engineer, has read this, and ngrees.'
"The casualties in Battery Wagner on the 5th of September were about 100 out of 900.
" Another despatch was received from Colonel Keitt, dated 8.45 A. M.
" ' Incessant fire from Yankee mortars and Parrott battery ; can't work negroes; bet ter look after them promptly. Had thirty or forty soldiers wounded in an attempt to work. Will do all I can, but fear the garrison will be destroyed, without injuring the enemy. The fleet is opening, but I hope that we may stand till to-night.'
"Again, at 10.30 A. M., Colonel Keitt signalled,'Boats must be at Cam-mings's Point early to-night without fail.'
" During the clay a letter was received from the same officer as follows:
" 'The enemy will to-night advance their parallel to the moat of this battery (Wag ner). The garrison must be taken away immediately after dark, or it will be destroyed or captured. It is idle to deny that the heavy Parrott shells have breached the walls and are knocking away the bomb-proofs. Pray have boats immediately after dark at Cummings's Point to take away the men. I say deliberately that this must be done, or the garrison will be sacrificed. I am sending the wounded and sick now to Cummings's Point, and will continue to do so, if possible, until all are gone. I have not in the gar rison 400 effective men, excluding artillery. The Engineers agree in opinion with me, or rather shape my opinion. I shall say no more. * * *'
" Colonel Keitt's last telegram was as follows :
" 'The enemy's sap has reached the moat, and his bombardment has shattered large parts of the parapet. The retention of the post after to-night involves the sacrifice of the garrison. If the necessities of the service make this advisable the men will cheer fully make it, and I will cheerfully lead them. I prefer to assault the enemy to await ing an assault, and I will at four o'clock in the morning assail his works.'
" Tilings being in this condition, it became evident that an attempt still to retain possession of Batteries Wagner and Gregg must of necessity involve the loss of their garrisons.
" But before giving the final orders for the evacuation I directed Colonel IX B. Harris, my Chief-Engineer, to proceed to Morris Island and examine into and report on the condition of affairs. His opinion was as follows:
•"***! visited our works on Morris Island to-day,and, in consideration of their condition, of our inability to repair damages at Battery Wagner, as heretofore, of tho dispirited state of the garrison, and of the progress of the enemy's sap, am reluctantly
constrained to recommend an immediate evacuation of both Batteries Wagner and Gregg-. * * *
"'In consequence of the accuracy of fire from his (enemy's) land batteries, which are now in close proximity to Battery Wagner, say from five to eight hundred yards, aided by reverse fire from his fleet, it is impossible, in the opinion of the oflicer of the fort, to keep up a fire of either artillery or small-arms, and the enemy is thus left free to work in the trenches, which he is pushing rapidly forward, the head of the sap being within forty yards of the salient, which is so severely damaged by a battery of Parrott guns kept constantly playing upon it as to render it untenable.
" 'The coverings to the bomb-proof and magazine also need repair. We have been thus far able, not only to repair damages at night, but to add from day to day to the strength of the battery; but now that the enemy's sap is in such close proximity to the battery, and he has contrived to throw a calcium-light upon the parapets at night, it is impossible to do so without a heavy loss of men. In the efforts last night to re pair damages the Commanding Officer of the fort reports a loss, in killed and wounded, of sixty to eighty men of the working party alone.
'"Without our ability to repair damage at night the battery would become,under the incessant fire of the enemy's land batteries and fleet, untenable, say in two days. It is in view of these facts that I have thought it my duty to make the recommenda tion at the commencement of this report.'
" ' The gradual approaches of the enemy' (I quote now from Colonel Kcitt's report), '"had passed the front of the battery, and the termination of their sap was not over fifty yards from the parapet of the sea-face, enabling them to throw a mass of troops upon this flank when our men were mostly in the bomb-proofs, where I was forced to keep them by the increasing fire of mortars and rifle guns on land, with an enfilading fire from the fleet during most of the day.
'"The salient on the left of the battery had been swept by such a terrible cross-fire as to breach the parapet and throw it into irregular shapes, rendering the ascent from the moat easy, and, moreover, men could not be kept there during this cross-fire with out the certainty of most of them being wounded or stunned.'
" Under these circumstances I concluded that the period had arrived when it would be judicious to evacuate Morris Island, and in the following special order detailed the manner in which I desired the movements to be accom plished : * * *
"'Battery Wagner, Morris Island, being no longer tenable without undue loss of life, and the risk of final capture of its garrison, the position and Battery Gregg will be evacuated as soon as practicable, to which end the following arrangements will be made by the District Commander :
"'1. Two of the Confederate States ironclads should take up positions near Fort Sumter, with their guns bearing on Cummings's Point, and to the eastward of it. At the same time all our land batteries will be held prepared to sweep all the water faces of Battery Gregg. Transport steamers will take positions within the harbor, but as near as practicable to Cummings's Point, to receive the men from the row-boats, by which the embarkation will be effected from Morris Island.
"'As many row-boats as necessary, or which can be manned by efficient oarsmen, will be provided and kept in readiness at once to proceed to and reach Cummings's Point or that vicinity, as soon after dark as may be prudent. Having reached the beach of Morris Island, a courier or relay of foot men will be despatched by the naval officer in charge with notice of the fact to the officer in command of Battery Wagner, and of the exact transport capacity of the boats. A naval officer, with proper assistants, will have exclusive charge of the boats and of their movements.
'"2. The Commanding Officer of Battery Wagner having made during the day all arrangements for the evacuation and destruction of the work and armament, when in-
formed of the arrival of the boats will direct, first, the removal and embarkation of all •wounded men, and thereafter, according to the capacity of the boats at hand, will with draw his command by companies with soldierly silence and deliberation. Two com panies will remain, in any event, to preserve a show of occupation, and repair and de fend from assault during the embarkation; and it is strictly enjoined that no more men shall be permitted to quit the work and go to the landing than can be safely em barked. The embarkation will be superintended by the field-officers or regimental and battalion commanders, who will halt and keep their respective commands about out-hundred (100) yards from the boats, divide them into suitable squads for assignment to the boats, in exact conformity with the direction of the naval officers in charge of em barkation, and then superintend the disposition of the men accordingly, impressing on all the vital necessity of silence, obedience to orders, and the utmost coolness.
'"3. The companies left to occupy Battery Wagner to the last will be under the charge of a firm and intelligent field-officer, who will not withdraw his command until assured there is sufficient transportation for the remaining garrison of the island, including that of Battery Gregg.
" '4. The final evacuation will depend for success on the utmost coolness and quiet, on the part of every man. At least two officers, previously selected, will be left to light the fuses, already arranged and timed to about fifteen minutes, to blow up the magazine and bomb-proof, and to destroy the armament, in the manner already indi cated in special instructions from District Headquarters. But the fuses must not be set on fire until it is certain that there is transportation for the removal of all the gar rison, or except the enemy become aware of the evacuation, and are evidently about to storm and enter the work. The men must be embarked with arms loaded, ready to repel an attack by the boat-parties of the enemy.
"'5. The garrison of Battery Gregg will stand staunch and at their post until the last company from Battery Wagner shall be embarked; it will then take to the boats with silence and deliberation, provision having been duly made, as at Battery Wagner, for the destruction of the work and its ordnance. Both explosions shall be as nearly simultaneous as possible, and the complete success of the evacuation will probably be in the hands of those whose high duty will be to apply the fire to the fuses at Battery Wagner.
'"The garrison of Battery Gregg will be embarked with the same precaution and regulations as prescribed for Battery Wagner.
41 'In case the enemy should carry Battery Wagner immediately after the garrison shall have evacuated, or in any way the explosion of the magazine should be pre vented, a signal of three (3) rockets, discharged in rapid succession, should be made from Battery Gregg, when the naval vessels in position and our land batteries bearing on Battery Wagner will be opened with a steady fire on the site of that work, as will be done likewise immediately after an explosion shall take place; and this fire will be maintained slowly during the night.
"'Brigadier-General Ripley will give such additional orders as will be calculated to secure the successful evacuation of Morris Island or to meet emergencies. He will confer with Flag-officer Tucker, and procure all necessary assistance.
"'The operation is one of the most delicate ever attempted in war. Coolness, resolute courage, and judgment and inflexibility on the part of officers, obedience to orders and a constant sense of the necessity for silence on the part of the men, are essential for complete success, and the credit which must attach to those who achieve it. * * *'
" The evacuation began at 9 h. p. M. on the night of the 6th of September. According to instructions, a guard of 35 men, under command of Captain T. A. Iluguenin, had been left to bring up the extreme rear, and to fire the only magazine which contained powder. The necessary arrangements being com-
plcted, and Colonel Keitt having been informed that the transportation was ready, the embarkation commenced, and was continued with the utmost quiet ness and despatch. The wounded were first embarked, and were followed by the remnants of the infantry garrison. Captain Kanapaux, commanding light artillery, was then ordered to spike his three howitzers and embark his com mand. Captain Lesesne, commanding at Battery Gregg, spiked the guns of that battery and followed with his command; and the rear-guard from Wag ner, coming up at this time, in pursuance of orders from Colonel Keitt. the safety-fuses communicating with the magazines were lighted—that at Wag ner by Captain Huguenin, and. that at Gregg by Major Holcombe, C. S.— and the remainder of the command was safely and expeditiously embarked. Owing to defects in the fuses themselves, they failed of accomplishing the purpose designed, though their lighting was superintended by careful and reliable officers. The magazines, therefore, were not destroyed. The guns in the batteries were spiked as far as their condition allowed, and the imple ments generally destroyed, and equipments carried off.
"The evacuation was concluded at about 1^- h. A. M. of the 7th inst. The boats containing the portion of the garrison last embarked were fired upon by the enemy's barges, but without effect. Only two of our boats, containing crews of about 19 men and 27 soldiers—or some 46 in all—were captured by the enemy's armed barges between Cummings's Point and Fort Sumter.
" Thus Morris Island was abandoned to the enemy on the morning of the 7th of September, 1803, with but little loss on the part of its garrison, either in men or material. The total loss in killed and wounded on Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, was only six hundred and forty-one men; and, deducting the killed and wounded due to the landing on the 10th of July, and to the assaults of the llth and 18th of July, the killed and wounded by the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly, night and day, during fifty-eight days, only amounted to two hundred and ninety-six men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is still more remarkable that, during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from thirty to three hun dred pounds, only three men were killed and forty-nine wounded.
"It is difficult to arrive at the loss of the enemy during these operations, but, judging from the slaughter made in their ranks on the llth and 18th of July, it will be within the mark to say that his casualties were in a ratio of ten to one of ours.
" It may be well to remark that the capture of Morris Island resulted in but a barren victory to the enemy, if his only object was to gain a position from which he might hurl his missiles and Greek fire into the city of Charles ton. A reference to the map will show that the possession of Cummings's Point placed him no nearer the city than when he held part of James Island, prior to the battle of Secessionville, in June, 1862, and again in July, 1863, from whence he was driven on the morning of the 16th of the same month.
" In conclusion, I cannot express in too strong terms my admiration of the bravery, endurance, and patriotism displayed by the officers and men engaged in these operations, who, during so many days and nights, withstood unfliiich-
ingly the extraordinary fire from the enemy's land and naval batteries, and repulsed with heroic gallantry every attempt to surprise or carry the works by storm.
"I have particularly to commend the gallantry, coolness, and zeal of Briga dier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Brigadier-General Johnson Hagood, Brigadier-General A. II. Colquitt, Colonel L. M. Keitt, and Colonel G. P. Harrison, who, at different periods, had immediate command of the defence of Morris Island. To particularize would be invidious—they, one and all, on every occasion, did their duty nobly.
"I have to express my acknowledgments of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, in command of the First Military District, which included the City of Charleston and its outworks; he was invariably active, industrious, and intelligent, and carried out his important duties to my entire satisfaction.
"Although Major-General J. F. Gilmcr arrived at Charleston only a few days before the evacuation of Morris Island, he was, nevertheless, active, zeal ous, and of assistance to me in holding the island to the last moment.
" To Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer of the Department, I have to re turn my most sincere thanks; he was ever cool, gallant, and indefatigable in the performance of his arduous duties during the whole period of the opera tions on Morris Island; always present in the hour of need, he exposed him self, when necessary, to the hottest fire and to the greatest dangers in the most reckless manner.
" I also take pleasure in recording the services of Colonel Alfred Rhett, who, during the siege of Battery "Wagner, had command of Fort Sumter, and with his brave garrison endured a long and terrific bombardment from the enemy's batteries by land and sea. His conduct throughout gained my approval and satisfaction.
" I commend, also, to the attention of the War Department the indefatigable zeal of my personal and general staff, who, on all occasions, were found equal to the calls made on their energy, activity, and devotion to the service."
The foregoing report and careful narrative carries us through many of the most important incidents of the defence of Charles ton, and not only presents with careful fidelity letters, orders, and telegrams of those high in authority at the time, but lays hare the causes that produced the events which so materially shaped that period of the war. It is corroborated, furthermore, in every re spect, by the reports* of all the subordinate commanders who, in turn, from July 10th to September 7th, had charge of Battery Wagner.
£3
Such facts only as are not mentioned by General Beauregard in
* Reports of Generals Ripley, Taliaferro, Hagood, and Colonel Keitt, "Re-bellion Record," vol. x., p. 535, ct scq.
his communication to the "War Department, and some matters to which he could merely make incidental reference, will now be specially noticed.
Arrangements for the exchange of prisoners taken on both sides during the recent engagements were entered into in the early part of August, but certain points in their execution gave rise to much reproach from General Gillmore, who even charged General Beauregard with a "breach of faith." The Federal Commander wrote as follows :
" DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
MORRIS ISLAND, S. 0., August 5th, 1863. " Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Cornelg. Confederate Forces, Charleston, S. C.:
" General, —Your two letters of the 22d ultimo, one of them being in reply to mine of the 18th, have been received.
" You express yourself at a loss to perceive the necessity for my statement that I should expect full compliance on your part with the usages of war among civilized nations 'in their unrestricted application to all the forces under my command.' At that time I considered my remarks as pertinent and proper. Events that have since transpired show them to have been emi nently so, for after having entered into a solemn agreement with me for mut ually paroling and returning to their respective commanders the wounded prisoners in our hands, you declined to return the wounded officers and men belonging to my colored regiments, and your subordinate in charge of the exchange asserted that that question had been left for after-consideration. I can but regard this transaction as a palpable breach of faith on your part, and a flagrant violation of your pledges as an officer.
" In your second letter of the 22d ultimo you request me to return to you Private Thomas Green, of Company H, 1st Regiment South Carolina Volun teers, for the alleged reason that he left your lines on the 19th, during the suspension of hostilities under a flag of truce. 1 beg leave to state that you are laboring under a misapprehension. Private Green did not enter my lines during the existence of a flag of truce. It is true that under a flag of truce on the day referred to I requested permission of the officer in command of Fort Wagner to receive and bury my own dead, a request that was refused me, and there the truce ended.
" I refrained from opening my batteries on that day, because some of my own wounded were seen lying just outside the fort, in plain view, exposed to a burning sun throughout the entire day.
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
" Q. A. GILLMORE, Brig.-Genl. Comdg."
This necessitated the following letter, which further explains the point at issue between the two commanders, and reverses the
imputation of double-dealing thrown upon the officers who had acted under General Bean regard's instructions :
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 18£7*, 1803. " Brig.-Gencral Q. A. GILLMORE, Commanding U. S. Forces, etc., etc.:
^General, —Your letter of the 5th was not received at these Headquarters until the 8th instajit.
" I cannot bandy allegations with you, and much less shall I emulate the temper and spirit in which your communication was conceived; but will simply confine myself to showing how groundless is your imputation of bad faith on my part, in connection with the return of wounded prisoners of war.
"You knew that there existed an order of the President of my Govern ment, and, possibly, were aware of an Act of the Congress of the Confederate States, which expressly excluded armed negroes from recognition by Confed erate States officers as legitimate means of war. You knew, moreover, that, in accordance with this position of the constituted authorities of my people, as in duty bound, I had uniformly refused to receive or communicate in this Department with flags of truce borne by officers or escorted by men of negro regiments of your service.
" You had thus due notice of my views and of my practice, and could have no right to expect me to deviate from either on such an occasion. Indeed, you must have felt assured of the fact that I could not assent to any course which, in effect, places negroes taken in arms in the State of South Carolina on the same footing with recognized soldiers. Therefore, if not prepared to yield your consent, or obliged to exact an acquiescence on your side in the pretension of the United States, but recently set up, after two years of war. to employ negro soldiers, you were surely bound to demand definitely that negroes should be included in the proposed arrangement; but you did not demand it. The fact is, you were well satisfied of what would be my course had you attempted to make such conditions; and bearing in mind that I had many more of your wounded than you liad of mine, you chose, Sir, to ignore your negro ally, after having given him the right or head of your storming column on the 1.8th of July. This, Sir, will be the record of history, I dare to say, even as made up by your own countrymen.
"Certain papers herewith, I trust, will satisfy you that I had no idea of leading you to expect me to disregard the orders of my Government, and my usage in respect to armed negroes. Brigadier-General Hagood's report, marked ' B,' shows, I submit, the understanding of the officer who bore the flag on your part; to wit, Brigadier-General Vogdes, of your service." 4
* From General Hagood's narrative of the defence of Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1803, we copy the following: "* * * General Vogdcs stated his mission to be to ask for Colonel Putnam's body, and to return to us Lieutenant Bee's, with the sword of the latter. * * * His request was complied with ; and he then verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured
" While I may not descend to recriminations, I must submit for your con sideration whether your course was legitimate in permitting men of my com mand to be retained and not returned under the cartel, on the grounds that they had declined to return, and had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. I apprehend that, under no usage of war, were you warranted in permitting such an act, the aspect of which is by no means improved by the fact that, in this w r ay, you increased the inequalities of the transaction to your own advantage, and were enabled to return but thirty-nine Confederate non-commissioned officers and privates in exchange for one hundred and four officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of your own service.
"You are, of course, aware that the men whom you have thus retained, on their taking the oath of allegiance, according to the laws of war are incon-testably deserters, subject to the punishment set by law for that crime.
" In connection with the deserter Green, I am led to infer that you rest your refusal to surrender him on a denial of the fact that a truce existed on the 19th of July, at such times as our respective subordinates (Generals Ha-good and Vogdcs) were not in direct communication, under flags of truce, between the two forces. Of course I cannot hope to change your views by argument, and shall not attempt it, but will refer you to the report of Brig adier-General Ilagood, herewith, marked k C,' which, I believe, will show that
having been sent North; that, ' as we had the excess, of course we could select whom to exchange ;' while intimating that a general exchange, without regard to excess, would be acceptable. Pending the interview, General Ha-good received a despatch from General Ripley's headquarters, in Charleston, where the interview and its object were known, directing him to agree to an exchange of wounded prisoners without regard to excess on our side, except the negro prisoners; not to introduce them into the negotiation; but if intro duced by General Yogdes, to refuse, as they "would not be given up; and that it was desirable, on the score of humanity, to get rid of the numerous w r hite prisoners wounded in our hands, and for whom no adequate accommodation existed in our hospitals. The contents of the despatch are given in substance, and were not communicated to General Yogdes. lie carefully avoided any direct mention of negro prisoners, and his remark quoted above, that having the excess we could choose whom to exchange, etc., was in allusion to them, and all that was made. The Confederate proclamation outlawing negro troops and white officers commanding them was well known to the enemy; and, anxious to effect the exchange, it was apparent that the Federal party did not desire to complicate matters. It was observed that neither General Yogdes, or either of the three or four officers accompanying him, inquired after Shaw, the colonel of the negro regiment engaged in the recent assault, although they asked after everybody else. * * * The negotiation was arranged, all in parol, by accepting the basis proposed by General Yogdes, the time to be the following Friday, at 10 A.M.* * * The exchange took place; and General Gillmore afterwards accused General Beauregard of bad faith in not sending the negro prisoners for delivery."
there was a truce, de facto, and substantial, between the belligerent forces on Morris Island during the whole of the 19th of July, pending which my men were chiefly engaged in giving burial to six hundred officers and men of your troops, and removing the wounded of both forces. Further, it is confidently believed that, at the time Green entered your lines, Generals Hagood and Vogdes were in conference, and a white flag was actually flying. Be that as it may, there was an absolute truce or suspension of hostilities, which all soldiers observant of the usages of civilized war would acknowledge, with out reference to any lack of a mere symbol, such as a white flag.
"In conclusion, I have further to say that no wounded officer of the 54th Massachusetts negro regiment was retained. If any of the officers of that regiment were captured, they have assumed false names and regiments.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. BEAUREGABD, Genl. Comdg."
General Gillmore made no reply to the foregoing letter. On the 21st he wrote again, however, but, as already appears from General Beauregard's report, it was to forward the following
demand:
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH,
MORRIS ISLAND, S. C., August 21s?, 18G3. "Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD, Comdg. Confed. Forces about Charleston, S. C.:
" General, — I have the honor to demand of you the immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces.
"The present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive de struction which it is undergoing from my batteries, seem to render its com plete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty. All my heaviest guns have not yet opened. Should you refuse compliance with, this demand, or should I receive no reply thereto within ibur hours after it is delivered into the hands of your subordinate at Fort "Wagner for transmission, I shall open fire on the City of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective range of the heart of the city.
" I am, General, your obedient servant,
" Q. A. GILLMOUE,* Brig.-Genl. Comdg."
General Beauregard's refusal to comply with the foregoing request was in these words:
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 22<Z, 18G3. " Brig.-General Q. A. GILLMORE, Comdg. U. S. Forces, Morris Island, etc. :
" Sir, —Last night, at fifteen minutes before eleven o'clock, during my ab sence on a reconnoissance of my fortifications, a communication was received at these Headquarters, dated Headquarters, Department of the South, Morris
* By a strange oversight no signature was attached to this letter when first received at Department Headquarters.
GENERAL BEAUREGAED.
Island, South Carolina, August 21st, 18C3, demanding the ' immediate evacua tion, of Morris Island and Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces,' on the al leged grounds that ' the present condition of Fort Sumter, and the rapid and progressive destruction which it is undergoing from my (your) batteries, seem to indicate complete demolition within a few hours a matter of certainty;' and that if this demand were not complied with, or no reply thereto received within four hours after it is delivered into the hands of your (my) subordinate commander at Fort Wagner, for transmission, ' a fire would be opened on the City of Charleston from batteries already established within easy and effective [range] of the heart of the city. 1 This communication, to my address, was without signature, and was, of course, returned.
"About half-past one this morning one of your batteries did actually open fire and throw a number of heavy rifle-shells into the city, the inhabitants of which, of course, were asleep and unwarned.
" About nine o'clock this morning the communication alluded to above was returned to these Headquarters bearing your recognized official signature, and it can now be noticed as your deliberate official act.
" Among nations not barbarous the usages of war prescribe that when a city is about to be attacked timely notice shall be given by the attacking commander, in order that non-combatants may have an opportunity for with drawing beyond its limits. Generally the time allowed is from one to three days—that is, time for a withdrawal in good faith of at least the women and children. You, Sir, give only four hours, knowing that your notice, under existing circumstances, could not reach me in less than two hours, and that not less than the same time would be required for an answer to be conveyed from this city to Battery Wagner.
" With this knowledge you threaten to open fire on the city, not to oblige its surrender, but to force me to evacuate these works, which you, assisted by a great naval force, have been attacking in vain for more than forty days.
" Batteries Wagner and Gregg arc nearly due north from your batteries on Morris Island, and in distance therefrom varying from half a mile to two and a quarter miles. This city, on the other hand, is to the northwest, and quite five miles distant from the battery opened against it this morning. It would appear, Sir, that, despairing of reducing these works, you now resort to the novel measure of turning your guns against the old men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping city—an act of inexcusable barbarity, from your own confessed point of sight, inasmuch as you allege that the com plete demolition of Fort Sumter within a few hours by your guns seems to you ' a matter of certainty.'
" Your omission to attach your signature to such a grave paper must show the recklessness of the course upon which you have adventured, while the facts that you knowingly fixed a limit for receiving an answer to your de mand which it made almost beyond the possibility of receiving any reply within that time, and that you actually did open fire and throw a number of the most destructive missiles ever used in war into the midst of a city taken unawares, and filled with sleeping women and children, will give you a bad eminence in history—even in the history of this war.
" I am only surprised, Sir, at the limits you have set to your demand. If, in order to obtain the abandonment of Morris Island and Fort Sumtcr, you felt authorized to fire on this city, why did you not also include the works on Sullivan's and James islands—nay, even the City of Charleston—in the same demand ?
" Since you have felt warranted in inaugurating this method of reducing batteries in your immediate front, which were found otherwise impregnable, and a mode of warfare which I confidently declare to be atrocious and un worthy of any soldier, I now solemnly warn you that if you fire again on this city from your Morris Island batteries, without granting a somewhat more reasonable time to remove non-combatants, I shall feel impelled, to employ such stringent means of retaliation as may be available during the continuance of this attack.
"Finally, I reply that neither the works on Morris Island or Fort Sumter will be evacuated on the demand you have been pleased to make. Already, however, I am taking measures to remove, with the utmost possible celerity, all non-combatants, who are now fully aware and. alive to what they may expect at your hands.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comclg."
There was a rejoinder to General Beau regard's remonstrance, and an attempt was made by the Federal Commander to justify the course lie had followed. He must have been doubtful of the correctness of his position, however, for we find the following con cluding passage in his letter: "* * * But, upon your assurance that the city is still full of them " (meaning women and children), " I shall suspend the bombardment until eleven o'clock r. M. to-mor row, thus giving you two days from the time you acknowledge to have received my communication of the 21st instant." * General Gillmore did accordingly, but must have been disappointed at the result of his experiment. The 8-inch Parrott rifle with which he shelled the city of Charleston, from the work called " The Swamp Angel," fortunately burst at the thirty-sixth round. Ko other gun was placed in the Marsh Battery after this.f
From the 16th to the 23d of August, Sumter had been sub jected to the most terrific bombardment on record. This re nowned fortress was doomed to inevitable destruction. The journal kept at the time by its Commander J corroborates the
* General Gillmore's rejoinder is given in full in the Appendix. t General Gillmorc's book, " Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston,'" p. 62. | See Appendix.
Engineers' reports quoted by General Beauregard. But though its walls, riddled by shot and shattered by shell, had crumbled into a mass of ruins; and though its enemies could now ap proach it, no longer fearing the thunder of its artillery, it still stood invincible, with its battle-flag floating to the breeze, defiant as ever. The battered inner faces of its magazines had ceased to afford security, and a single well-directed missile might at any moment, before the removal of the powder, have launched the entire garrison into eternity. That this was the enemy's object was known to every officer and man in the fort. Truly, it re quired fortitude and cool daring, as well as admirable spirit and discipline, to endure, undaunted, such an ordeal. And it is un doubted that the example thus given by Sumter, from the first attack of the turreted fleet, on the 7th of April, to the 23d of August, and later, contributed no little to the unparalleled re sistance of Wagner, and of the other batteries around the harbor. So well had that example served to kindle the fire of emulation among the troops defending Charleston, that the same heroism prevailed everywhere; and it is matter of history to-day that the defence of Fort Sumter and that of Battery Wagner are looked upon as two of the most skilful, desperate, and glorious achieve ments of the war. They stand unsurpassed in ancient or modern times.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
General Beaurcgard Desires the Engineers' Reports of the Condition of Fort Sumter.—Conference between Colonel Rhett, the Engineer Officers, and Captain Harlcston on the 24th of August.—Additional Report of Colo nels Gilmer and Harris.—General Bcaurcgard Resolves not to Evacuate the Fort, but to Withdraw the Artillery from it, and Make it, for the Time being, an Infantry Post.—His Instructions to General Ripley.—He Recommends Colonel Rhett for Promotion.—Work Done by the Garrison of Sumter.—Gradual Transformation of the Fort.—Colonel Rhett With drawn, with the Artillery Regulars, and Major Elliott Placed in Command, with Infantry Guard.—Instructions Given to General Ripley.—Knowledge of the Enemy's Purpose to Attack Cuminings's Point.—How the "Key" to his Signals was Procured.—Enemy Foiled.—History of the Two Heavy Guns at Battery Wagner.—Admiral Dahlgren Demands the Surrender of Sumter.—General Beauregard's Answer.—Combined Federal Attack on Sumter.—Its Failure.—Major Elliott's Journal.—Important Letters raid Instructions of General Beaurcgard.—President Davis Visits Savannah and Charleston.—Cordial Reception Tendered him in Charleston.—His Address.—His Omission to Mention or Praise the Officers in Command of the Works, of the Military Districts and of the Department.—Slight Reference made in his Book to the Defence of Charleston.—Errors in his Account of the Evacuation of Sumter.—Partial After-correction.
IN order to form a correct opinion of the precise condition of Fort Sumter after the bombardment (of which a description was given in the preceding chapter), based on Colonel Rhett's and the Engineers' reports, the following order, on the 21th of August, was forwarded to Colonel Harris :
"Colonel, — General Beauregard directs that you proceed immediately to Fort Sumter (together with Colonel Gilmer, if agreeable to him), to confer with Colonel Rhett, his Chief of Artillery, and Lieutenant Johnson, Engineers, to report upon the defences of the place and the advisability of abandoning the work. In attempting to reach the fort the General desires that a proper regard should be had to your own safety. You must not undertake the trip, if too dangerous.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
u A. N. TOUTANT BEAUREGARD, A. D. C."
Colonels Gilmer and Harris complied with these instructions,.
and, the next day, presented the following report to Department Headquarters:
" In compliance with the above letter, a council of officers, consisting of Colonel Gilnier, C. S. Corps of Engineers; Colonel Rhett, 1st S. C. Artillery; Colonel Harris, C. S. Corps of Engineers; Captain F. H. Harleston, 1st S. C. Artillery; and Lieutenant Johnson, Corps of Engineers, met at Fort Sumter on the afternoon of the 24th of August, 1863.
" Captain Harleston acted as recorder.
" The first proposition proposed for consideration was—' The present offen sive condition of the fort.'
" Lieutenant Johnson, Engineer Corps: ' The present offensive condition of the fort is very limited: one very fine gun (11-inch), capable of being fired with advantage, two others (10-inch) at disadvantage, in consequence of shattered condition of parapet.'
" Captain Harleston: Of same opinion as Lieutenant Johnson.
"Major Blanding: 'The offensive condition of the fort is very nearly de stroyed; only one gun (11-inch) that can be used with any advantage.'
" Colonel Harris: Endorses Lieutenant Johnson's opinion.
" Colonel Rhett: ' In action would be impracticable to use but one gun— the 11-inch—and that would soon be disabled.'
" Colonel Gilmer: Of the same opinion as Lieutenant Johnson.
, "Second Proposition.
"' Can offensive power still be given to these guns by additional cover and change of location ?'
" Lieutenant Johnson: ' Yes, by sand-bag epaulements and timber platforms.'
" Captain Harleston : Considers it impracticable, on account of present shat tered condition of the fort, and that sufficient time will not be allowed.
"Major Blanding: Agrees with Captain Harleston.
" Colonel Harris: ' It can be done in present condition of fort, if time is allowed.'
" Colonel Rhett: Would like to see it carried out, but considers it imprac ticable.
"Colonel Gilnier: 'It is entirely within the capacity of the Engineer to accomplish the work in the manner suggested by Lieutenant Johnson, if not under fire, at night, when the fire ceases.'
" Third Proposition.
"' Capacity of the fort as a defensive position, in its present condition, against a barge attack, and the number of men needed.'
"Lieutenant Johnson: 'I think the capacity of the fort sufficient, and that it needs three hundred muskets.'
" Captain Harleston : ' I think the capacity of the fort sufficient, and that it needs from two hundred and fifty to three hundred muskets.'
"Major Blanding: 'Without outside assistance, in its present condition, five hundred muskets will be needed.' II.—10
" Colonel Harris: Agrees with Lieutenant Johnson.
" Colonel Illicit: ' The navy will not be able to assist in attack from barges; the fort can be held, in its present condition, with no less force than four hundred effective men; and a large part of these should be kept under arms during the night, as barges can come within fifty yards without being seen.'
" Colonel Gilmer: ' The defensive capacity of the fort is sufficient, if garri soned with three hundred effective men, giving them the assistance of splin ter-proof cover and sand-bag epaulements.'
" Fourth Proposition.
"' Power of the fort to preserve its present defensive condition against probable attacks.'
"Lieutenant Johnson : 'Against the probable combined attacks of the fleet Parrott guns and mortars—thirty-six hours.'
" Captain Harleston : Agrees with Lieutenant Johnson.
"Major Blanding: 'Against a combined vigorous attack—twelve hours.'
" Colonel Harris: Cannot undertake to answer as regards time.
" Colonel Rhett: ' The eastern wall is much shattered by fire of the 7th of April, and has never been repaired, except two casemates which have been re-built with new masonry; the wall has been reinforced in the casemates with sand-bags; it has also been seriously damaged by the fire from the land batteries on Morris Island. My opinion is that a fire from the iron fleet, from two to three hours, would destroy the integrity of the wall, if it did not bring it down.
'"A combined fire from land batteries on Morris Island, with a monitor attack, would most probably bring down a large part of the wall. The inner corner wall of eastern magazine is now cracked. The fort wall adjoining the pier of the upper magazine has been completely shot away; and I think a concentrated fire of two hours on the junction of the upper and lower maga zines would render the magazines unsafe.
"'The north wall of the upper western magazine is unprotected, and is exposed to a reverse fire from the fleet, firing one or two points north of per pendicular to east face effort. A few shots upon this wall, striking about the junction of upper and lower magazines, would render the magazines unsafe. This place is now being reinforced with eight feet of sand. The roof of the hospital is now only protected by brick arches that would be crushed through by a few shells.'
"Colonel Gilmcr: 'From the examination I have been able to make, as to the effect of the bombardment up to this time, I think the fort will remain tenable against any probable attack for many days, if the Engineer officer be supplied with the labor and material necessary to reinforce points compara tively weak.'
" ALFRED RIIETT, Col. Comdg.
" ORMSBY BLANDING, Major, 1st S. C. Art'y.
" F. II. HARLESTON, Capt., 1st S. C. Art'y.
" JOHN JOHNSON, 1st Lieut., Engr. Corps, P. A. C. S.
"The foregoing is a correct report of what occurred at the consultation of the officers named; but we do not consider it as embodying our opinion in full as to the advisability of abandoning the work, as called for by the Com manding General, in a letter a copy of which is embraced in the foregoing proceedings. " J. F. GILMER, Col. and Chief-Engr. of Bureau,
"D. B. HARRIS, Lieut.-Col. and Chief-Engr. of Dcpt."
Accompanying the foregoing- report was this additional paper:
" OFFICE OF CHIEF-ENGINEER, CHARLESTON, S. C., August 25^, 18G3. "General G. T. BEAUREGARD, etc., etc.:
" General, —We have the honor to report that in compliance with your in structions we visited Fort Sumter yesterday afternoon, made a careful ex amination of its condition, and held a consultation with a portion of its officers.
'•In addition to our answers to certain questions propounded at that con sultation we beg leave to state that, in our opinion, it is not advisable to abandon the fort at this time. On the contrary, we think it should be held to the last extremity. How long it may hold out is now only a matter of con jecture; but there are many elements of defence within the fort, in its present shattered condition, which, if properly used, may enable a resolute garrison to hold it for many days.
" The question of its abandonment, whenever it may arise, we respectfully suggest should be determined by the Commanding General, and not left to the discretion of the Commander of the fort.
"We have the honor to be, General, very respectfully yours,
" J. F. GILMER, Col. and Chief-Engr. of Bureau. "D. B. HARRIS, Lieut.-Col. and Chief-Engr. of Dept."
Incomplete, though sufficient in many respects, as was this hur ried examination of Sumter, it confirmed General Beauregard in his determination already taken, that the fort should not be evac uated. He therefore approved the conclusions arrived at by Colonels Gilmer and Harris, and began his arrangements accord ingly. The Artillery Department, he considered, had accom plished its task in the defence of that post—the entrance-gate of Charleston Harbor—and it now devolved upon the infantry arm of the service, aided by labor, " the pick, spade, and shovel," to perform the part required of them, until, if possible, other heavy guns could be mounted, under cover, amid the ruins that still bade defiance to the combined attacks of the land and naval forces of the enemy. It was a grave responsibility to assume, but General Beauregard resolutely took it upon himself; and thus, through him and those who defended Sumter, does its record remain, from Rhett to Elliott, from Elliott to Mitchel and IIti-
guenin, and the men who fotiglit under them, a grand story of engineering skill, soldierly daring, fortitude, and endurance. Thus, also, as was eloquently said by General B. II. Rutledge, in an address delivered in Charleston,* " While Greece has her Thermopylae, England her Waterloo, the United States her York-town, South Carolina has her Fort Sumter."
As soon, therefore, as most of its heavy guns, including those which the enemy's land-batteries on Morris Island had disabled and those which were previously removed, to prevent further loss, had been transferred to the inner circle of fortifications, the fol lowing order was given to the Commander of the First Military
District:
" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C.,GA., AND FLA.,
CHARLESTON, S. C., August 27^, 1863. u Brigadier-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.:
" General, —T-he Commanding General instructs me to direct the reduction of the garrison of Fort Sumter to a force of one company of artillery and two full companies of infantry—that is, the command not to exceed three hun dred or fall below two hundred men.f
" Of course you will select the companies, which must be of the best in your command of both arms; but it has been suggested that Captain Harles-toivs company of the First Regiment of Artillery would be suitable. The infantry should be carefully selected, and might be relieved once a week.
"As the garrison will thus be so much reduced.it may be that Colonel Rhett will prefer to remove the headquarters of his regiment; in which event lie will be assigned to the important command of Fort Johnson and adjacent batteries. He has the option to do this, or retain the command of Fort Sumter. In the former event, Major Stephen Elliott will be assigned to the command of Fort Sumter.
"The Commanding General has witnessed w r ith genuine pride and gratifi cation the defence made of Fort Sumter by Colonel Rhett, his officers and men, of the 1st Regiment of South Carolina Regular Artillery—noble fruits of the discipline, the application to their duty, and the soldierly bearing of the officers and men, and of the organization of the regiment. In the annals of war no stouter defence was ever made, and no work ever before encoun tered as formidable a bombardment as that under which Fort Sumter has been successfully held.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."
* November 30th, 1882, on the occasion of the unveiling of the Confeder ate monument in Charleston.
t One hundred and fifty men and four officers of Colquitt's brigade, of Georgians, were the first detail of infantry introduced into Sumter, under Captain Worthen.
This deserved tribute was read to the regiment at dress parade, amid the roar of shot and shell, and, coming as it did from one who could judge so well of true soldierly merit, produced a grati fying effect upon these valiant men, who had unflinchingly per formed their duty. As further evidence of the estimation in which he held Colonel Rhett, General Beauregard, shortly after this occurrence, strongly recommended him for promotion; but, as was so often the case with applications of this kind, no action was taken in the matter by the Administration.
Colonel Rhett remained in command of Suinter as late as the 4th of September. When the .last detachment of his artillery regiment was removed he retired, with his disciplined Regulars. From August 17th to that date his journal shows what havoc, both interior and exterior, the Federal breaching batteries and naval forces had made on the fort.* The following details, taken from his report of September 4th, forwarded, through General Ripley, to Department Headquarters, show the work which was done at the fort and its condition at that time:
" * * * Engineers engaged in preparing bomb-proofs and in opening em brasures in second tier of casemates, for the purpose of throwing out two 42-pounder rifled guns. During the night the 11-inch gun and the 32-pounder rifled gun were thrown over the parapet without injury, both guns having been previously disabled. There is now not a single gun en "barbette; and there is but one (smooth-bore 32-pounder, next the sally-port on western face) that can be fired. Mr. F. Mathews,f assisted by an officer and men of the Confederate States Navy, has done good service in removing disabled guns from the fort, having dismounted and removed one 10-inch gun and one 9-inch Dahlgren. He has also removed from the berme of the fort the Brooke gun, another 10-inch, an 8-inch, and one 32-pounder rifled gun. Lieutenant Rhett, with Company B, has dismounted the Brooke gun, two 10-inch, one 8-inch, one 42-poundcr, rifled, the 11-inch, and one 32-pounder rifled gun, in the last fortnight.
"The northeast and northwest tcrrc-pleins have fallen in. The western wall has a crack in it, extending entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of southern wall is clown; the upper eastern magazine is penetrated ; the lower eastern magazine wall is cracked. The east wall is very nearly shot away; a large portion of the wall is clown, the ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached, and the remaining wall very thin.
* See Appendix.
t General Beauregard refers to this patriotic citizen in his Morris Island report. See preceding chapter.
The casemates, however, on eastern face are filled with sand, sufficient to pro tect the garrison from shells.
"I consider it impossible to either mount or use guns on any part of the parapet; and I deem the fort in its present condition unserviceable for offen sive purposes. What the Engineers may effect by rebuilding or remodelling I am unable to say. Lot of ordnance stores shipped by Etiwan last night. Lieutenant Grimball, Company E, assigned to ordnance duty, has rendered efficient service in the collection and shipping of ordnance stores. Captain J. T. Champney's Engineer Corps has reported for duty at this post. Major-General Gilmer and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris visited the fort about half-past eleven o'clock last night. Brigadier-General Ripley also came over about ten o'clock this morning. The enemy opened fire from battery on Black Island last evening.
" ALFRED RIIETT, Colonel Commanding."
Now began that singular metamorphosis—that undertaking un heard of before—by which, out of the crumbling walls of what had once been Fort Sumter, a new and powerful earthwork was slowly but unremittingly constructed. This was done often under fire. The debris, consisting of brick, mortar, shot, and shell, was supplemented by boat-loads of sand painfully brought, by night, from the adjoining islands, after the parade-ground of the fort had furnished all the earth that could be obtained from that source. The appendices to this and the preceding chapter show at whose main suggestion and under whose special guidance this novel work was carried out and, step by step, perfected. General Beauregard's orders and instructions, which are there given, exhibit once more his forethought and unequalled method of grouping together the details of his plans and neglecting nothing. He was now in his favorite sphere of action, with a problem almost exclusively of engineering skill to solve; fighting his enemy " with sand, pick, spade, and shovel," and showing, as Mr. Davis himself had said, about a year before, how " his qualifications peculiarly fitted him" for such a defence.*
But his attention was not confined to Fort Sumter. Bat tery "Wagner, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney, " the pro visioning and ammunitioning of Morris, James, and Sullivan's islands," and of Christ Church Parish, also engrossed much of his time and thought. He again recurred, at this time, to the urgent
* Words used by Mr. Davis, September 13, 18G2, in his interview with a committee of Congressmen, on the subject of General Beauregard's transfer to the Army of the West. See Chapter XXV.
necessity of increasing the limited number of negro laborers furnished by the planters of the State. He ordered torpedoes to be placed between Forts Sumter and Moultrie, in Hog Island Channel, towards Sullivan's Island Point, in Folly Island Channel, and in the Middle Channel, east of Pinckney. He likewise gave most stringent orders to battery commanders to put a stop to all useless waste of ammunition. These measures were taken in anticipation of a renewed naval attempt by Admiral Dahlgren to remove the obstructions in the Main Channel and, afterwards, to pass into the harbor.
At about that time General Beauregard had occasion to pro pound to Brigadier-General Ripley a number of important in terrogatories, relative to the capture of the southern end of Mor ris Island, and as to the causes which brought about that result. He was preparing to write his report of that untoward event, which had given rise to criticism and censure on the part of the Secretary of War. These interrogatories, and General Ripley's answers thereto, will be found in full in the appendix to this chap ter. They confirm what we have already said upon the subject.
On the 3d of September, Fort Sumter being ready for the transformation it was about to undergo, and the guns of James and Sullivan's islands being trained to protect it from assault by water, General Beauregard caused the following instructions to be forwarded to Brigadier-General Ripley :
" General, —In reply to your letter of this date, suggesting the reduction of the garrison in occupation of Fort Sumter, I am instructed to say that the artillery, for the reasons stated by you, will now be withdrawn and an in fantry force substituted, of two hundred rifles or muskets. This will make it proper to relieve Colonel Rhett, and to place him in his proper position with his regiment and command, to which you will please assign him.
" Major Stephen Elliott will be directed to report to you for assignment to the command of Fort Sumter. Inasmuch as he is at present ignorant of the localities in the fort, it will be proper to request Colonel Rhett to remain for at least twelve hours, or until he can make Major Elliott properly acquainted with the means of shelter and defence left, and with all other details the knowledge of which (with Colonel Rhett's experience) he may deem it es sential that Major Elliott should know.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" THOMAS JOHDAN, Chief of Staff."
General Beauregard had taken more than ordinary pains in the selection of Colonel Rhett's successor. He was solicitous that
none but an officer of undoubted coolness and courage should take the place of the gallant commander, whose sphere of duty, now changed, called him and his artillerists to the land batteries, whither most of Sumter's heavy guns had already been trans ferred and mounted. Fifty days elapsed before the second bom bardment of Fort Sumter commenced.
Major Stephen Elliott, from Beaufort, South Carolina, was a relative of the Hon. K. "W". Earn well, of Bishop Stephen El liott, and of Colonel Alfred Bhett. He was a young officer of well-earned esteem, modest, thoroughly self-possessed, and dauntless, and his family connections were influential in the State. He was, therefore, worthy of the confidence reposed in him by the Commanding General. The incident of his inter view with the latter, previous to his assignment to the command of Sumter, is worthy of record.