"You are to be sent to a fort," said General Beauregard, " deprived of all offensive capacity, and having now but one gun —a ?2-pounder—with which to salute its flag, morning and evening. But that fort is Fort Sumter, the key to the entrance of this harbor. It must be held to the bitter end: not with artillery, as heretofore, but with infantry alone; and there can be no hope of reinforcements. Are you willing to take the command upon such terms?" And, without giving Major Elliott time to formulate an answer, General Beauregard added, "I desire that you shall take twenty-four hours to reflect, and that meanwhile you shall examine the fort, before taking a final decision."

A few hours later Major Elliott returned to Department Headquarters, and, being once more in the presence of the Com manding General, in his own simple, earnest manner, said,

" I visited Sumter, and conferred with Colonel Hhett. Issue the order, General; I will obey it."

The order was issued, and on the evening of the 4th of Septem ber Major Elliott assumed command of the ruins of Fort Sumter.

On the next day the following important communication was forwarded to the Commander of the First Military District:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 5th, 1863. " Brig.-Gcneral K. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc.:

u General, —Forewarned of the enemy's purpose to attack the battery at Cuminings's Point, the Commanding General hopes we may be able to foil

and convert it into a signal disaster, to which end he wishes you to acquaint Flag-officer Tucker of the project, and request him to take such a position with his ships as may enable him to sweep with his fire the interior face of Morris Island and the mouth of Vincent's Creek. Battery Simpkins will fire likewise so as to sweep in front of the mouth of the same creek, and, later, to the left of Cummings's Point. Battery Bee will be specially enjoined to direct her fire between Fort Sumter and Cummings's Point, so as to assist the gun boats in sweeping the interior water face of Morris Island. Some of the guns of Fort Moultrie must also be brought to bear on the same face of the island, the rest of her armament giving attention to the monitors, but being employed in strict conformity with the views of the Commanding General, hitherto ex pressed, on the subject of the fire of the Sullivan's Island batteries at the monitors, at ranges which can promise no material results. This, of course, is not to be construed to prevent a fire when the monitors are seeking to run past, which it is believed may be determined in time by the exercise of judg ment when such an effort is really being made.

" Should the attempt on Battery Gregg be discovered in time at that point, rockets should be used there to give warning to our batteries and the navy, and small fires on Cummings's Point might be carefully located so as to assist to indicate it to our batteries without giving material advantage to the enemy.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

The knowledge of the enemy's purpose had been obtained by reading a signal despatch from General Gillmore to Admiral Dahlgren, which ran thus:

"MOBKIS ISLAND, Sept. 5th, 1863: 1.50 r. M.

" I shall try Cummings's Point to-night, and want the sailors again early. Will you please send in two or three monitors just before dark, to open on Moultrie as a diversion ? The last time they were in they stopped reinforce ments, and may do so to-night.

" I don't want any fire in the rear. Please answer immediately."

The "key " by which we were enabled to decipher the enemy's messages had been in our possession for several weeks. It had been obtained as follows: General Beauregard, in his anxiety to understand the enemy's movements, requested his chief signal officer, Captain Manigault, to endeavor to make out the meaning of the signals exchanged between the Federal land and naval forces. This, however, Captain Manigault was unable to do; then, at the suggestion of General Beauregard, another expedient was resorted to—namely, the capture of one of the enemy's advanced signal-pickets, in the Third Military District. This picket was brought to Charleston, and from him, through the devices of

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

Captain Pliny Bryan,* A. A. G., the mucli-desired "key" was finally secured. This important discovery was of incalculable advantage, and enabled the Commanding General to be ever prepared against a surprise.

The next morning (September 6th) Admiral Dahlgren asked, "Did you succeed last night?" and General Gillmore answered, " We found the enemy prepared at Cummings's Point, and failed." f

Being apprised in the same manner of the day and hour fixed for the final assault on Wagner (September Gth, at 9 P.M.), General Beauregard was able to perfect his plans for the prearranged evacuation of that work, and not only saved the garrison, but deprived the enemy of nearly—if not quite—all the fruits of his victory, as appears by the following signal despatch:

"MORRIS ISLAKD, Sept. 7?7i, 1803 : 5.10 A. M. "Admiral DAHLGREN:

" The -whole island is ours, but the enemy have escaped us.

" GENERAL GILLMORE."

While, in the course of this narrative, we have been led to re fer again to Battery Wagner, whose illustrious record so fully appears in General Beauregard's report of the defence of Morris Island,^: it is also appropriate, we think, to give here the remark able history of the only two heavy guns of that work (10-inch columbiads) bearing on the outer harbor of Charleston. They had been cast at the Tredegar Works, in Richmond. Both were surrounded w T ith massive traverses and merlons, forming a perfect " well," or chamber, for each, and an open embrasure, which was filled up with sand-bags (always kept close at hand) whenever — and this was of frequent occurrence—the fire of the fieet was concentrated on these guns.

These two guns were repeatedly dismounted by the enemy's

* Captain Pliny Bryan, of Maryland, was a member of the Legislature of that State at the beginning of the war. He reported to General Beauregard, at Manassas, and was, shortly afterwards, appointed in the Adjutant-General's Department. lie was active, intelligent, zealous, and did good service dur ing the siege of Charleston. He died in the summer of 1864, from exposure to the sun while in the performance of his duties.

t "Engineer and Artillery Operations against Charleston," by General Gill-more, p. 335. See also p. 337.

\ Sec preceding chapter.

heavy shells falling into their chambers. One of them was soon disabled, but the other remained uninjured to the last, though its chassis and carriage had, more than once, to be renewed. It had become necessary also to "rebush" it, or, in other words, change and repair its vent, which had been much enlarged by the heavy charges used in firing it, a fact which materially affected its accuracy and range.

The artillerists serving at the two pieces were occasionally compelled to take shelter in the bomb-proofs, after temporarily filling up the embrasures with sand-bags, as already explained. Hence the smallness of our loss. "In the history of no siege, except that of Fort Sumter," writes General Beauregard, " do we find such coolness, perseverance, and bravery as shown by these gallant officers and men, who belonged to the 1st South Carolina Regulars, forming the garrison of Fort Sumter. All honor to that regiment, whose heroism will forever stand pre-eminent in the annals of this war."

It was the opinion of General Beauregard—and he had so expressed himself on the night of the evacuation of Morris Island —that Admiral Dahlgren would soon attempt some movement of his own, if only to keep pace with the success of the land-forces under General Gillmore; and that in such an event Fort Sumter, now apparently harmless, would probably be the object of his attack. This had become much the more likely because the Admiral—'emboldened, no doubt, by his coadjutor's recent achievement—had, as early as 6.35 A. M., on the morning of the 7th, demanded, by flag of truce, the surrender of Fort Sumter. " If not complied with," he telegraphed to General Gillmore, " I will move up with all the ironclads and engage it." * Major Elliott had declined the request; and having referred the matter to Department Headquarters, immediately received this signifi cant reply: u Tell Admiral Dahlgren to come and take it." f

Previous to this, and in view of a probable assault on the ruins of Sumter, General Beauregard had ordered the nearest harbor batteries bearing on the fort to practise daily on the foot of its outside debris, to obtain the exact range and length of fuses re quired, marking the carriages, chassis, and traverse circles, so that

* General Gillmore's book, p. 335.

t General Hagoocl's narrative of the defence of Morris Island.

the firing of each piece might be almost as accurate at night as in the daytime. He had also arranged a system of signals for opening fire, in case of need, and for its cessation at the proper moment. The Commander of Fort Sumter had been specially enjoined to be vigilant, and the commanders of the batteries to have detachments all night at each trained gun, so as to be able, instantly, to open fire on the water approach, whenever the signal to do so should be given from Fort Sumter.

Admiral Dahlgren did not carry out his threat of attacking with all his ironclads, but fixed upon the night of the 8th to make an assault on Sumter, and so informed General Gillmore, who, by a singular coincidence, had also organized an assaulting

/ •/ O i3 Z3

party for the same night, composed of "two small regiments," while the Admiral, it seems, had "assembled five hundred men" for the purpose."* But there was, evidently, no concert of ac tion between them. Both claimed the right of conducting the expedition, and neither would yield to the w r isli of the other. General Gillmore thought that " an operation of this kind" should "be under command of the senior officer"—meaning the officer to be sent with the land forces—and Admiral Dahlgren would not "consent to let the commander be other than a naval officer." f

The result was the complete failure of the assault, as appears by the following extract from Major Elliott's journal, dated Sumter, September 9th:

<( * * * ^ i A M ^j g m0 rning I saw a fleet of barges approaching from the eastward. I ordered the fire to be reserved until they should arrive within a few yards of the fort. The enemy attempted to land on the southeastern and southern faces; he was received by a well-directed fire of musketry and by hand-grenades, which were very effective in demoralizing him; fragments of the epaulement were also thrown down upon him. The crews near the shore sought refuge in the recesses of the foot of scarp, those further off in flight. The repulse was decided, and the assault was not renewed. His force is reported to have been four hundred men, but it is believed to have been much larger.J His loss is four men killed, two officers and ninety-two men

* See, in General Gillmore's book, pp. 338, 339, signal despatches between Admiral Dahlgren and General Gillmore. t Ibid., p. 339.

I In his despatch of September 8th to General Gillmore, Admiral Dahlgren spoke of his assaulting party as being composed of 500 men. In a subsequent paper, referred to by Mr. Charles Cowley in " Leaves from a Lawyer's Life, Afloat and Ashore," p. 108, Admiral Dahlgren alludes to the same party as being "a fine naval column of 450 picked men."

captured. We secured five stand of colors and five barges; others were disa bled and drifted off. One gunboat and Fort Johnson and the Sullivan's Island batteries enfiladed our faces, and contributed to prevent the renewal of the assault. Many of the shots struck the fort. The garrison, consisting of the Charleston Battalion, behaved admirably; all praise is due to Major Blake, his officers and men, for the promptness and gallantry displayed in the defence.

" September StJi, 4.20 A. M. —Additional two officers captured are First Lieu tenant Charles H. Bradford, U. S. Marines, wounded; E. G. Dayton, executive officer, Wissaliickon.

" One of our gunboats assisted during the fight—unable to communicate with it afterwards.

" 4.45.—Enemy attacked me in barges. We have captured thirteen officers, one hundred and two (102) men, four boats, and three colors. Not one of my men hurt."

The fire of our guns from James and Sullivan's islands had surprised and demoralized the assaulting forces. Many of the boats at once put back. The troops in those that were foremost sought refuge on the berme of the fort, and held up their hands in token of surrender. Had our batteries remained silent until the whole Federal detachment had left the barges, it is probable that the 500 or 450 " picked men " alluded to by Admiral Dahlgren would have fallen into our hands. But though our success could have been more complete, it was, nevertheless, highly satisfactory, and brought forth the following congratulatory letter from Gen eral Beauregard:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. ( Jth, 18G3. "Major STEPHEN ELLIOTT, Comdg. Fort Sumter, etc., etc.:

"J/ojor,—The Commanding General directs me to compliment you and your garrison on the brilliant success of this morning. He hopes that all future attempts of the enemy to take Sumter will meet with the same result. The General will endeavor to have the prisoners removed in the course of the day or to-night. Should, meanwhile, the enemy bombard Sumter, and you have not enough cover for your command, you will expose the prisoners, instead of your troops, to the enemy's fire.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" A. N. T. BEAUREGARD, A. D. C."

The events succeeding those we have just related—but which are, relatively, of minor importance—are sufficiently explained by the following letters and instructions of General Beauregard to his subordinate officers, to the War Department, and to gen erals and citizens of note in South Carolina and elsewhere :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. Wth, 1863. " Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc.:

"General, — I am instructed to inform you of the arrival from Richmond of a party of one hundred and thirty officers and men, under the command of Lieutenant Rochelle, C. S. N. These men were ordered here for harbor ser vice, and have been directed to report to Captain Tucker.

"The Commanding General desires you to confer with Captain Tucker, and determine what arrangement may be best to carry on and protect our com munications with Sumtcr and Sullivan's Island. He thinks that two or more launches, with howitzers, the torpedo-ram, and Juno, should be used exclu sively for that purpose.

" Captain Haskell's launch, the one captured by the Juno, and others, might be fitted up at once for the police of the harbor, and to protect Captain Gray in putting down torpedoes in the outside channel.

"You will please give your immediate attention to the organization of the water transportation and harbor police, and ascertain from Captain Tucker how far he may be able to assist, or whether he would prefer superintending the organization himself. Of course the two—transportation and harbor po lice—should be under the control of the same head.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. lltli, 18G3. "Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist, etc., etc. :

" General, — I am instructed by the Commanding General to ask you the following questions, and direct the execution of the following orders:

" 1st. Are the roads and bridges from Fort Pemberton, along the Stono, to the upper batteries near the ' Overflow' in good condition ? If not, they should at once be so made. All those batteries and those in rear of the ' Overflow' must be connected, as soon as practicable, by a good wagon-road, passing not far in their rear along the shortest lines.

" 3d. Have you yet made arrangements about employing those officers and sailors from Richmond for guarding the harbor at night, and for communi cating with Sullivan's Island, in case of necessity ?

" 3d. Has that picket been maintained or re-established at Marsh Battery, north of Vincent's Creek ? It was doubtless through that creek that the boats of the enemy passed which captured ours at Cummings's Point. You will please explain why the orders relative to said picket were neglected.

"4th. It is reported by Major Elliott that the ordnance artificer sent to Fort Sumter to collect old iron, etc., remained there but one day. You will please have another sent, with orders to remain as long as necessary.

" 5th. Can the 10-inch columbiad still remaining in Fort Sumter be re moved to the city ? If practicable, request Mr. Lacoste to do so at once. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major, and A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. loth, 18G3. " Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist,, etc., etc.:

"General, —I am instructed to communicate to you the following orders of the Commanding General:

" 1st. That the treble-banded Brooke gun which burst on Sullivan's Island be brought to the city as soon as practicable.

"2d. That, if not already done, the other Brooke gun which arrived from Richmond be forthwith sent to Sullivan's Island. This was ordered several days ago.

" 3d. That you will please inform these Headquarters whether the order in reference to the picket at Monk's Corner has yet been complied with, and any deserters arrested.

"4th. That you turn over, temporarily, to Lieutenant Rochelle, C. S. N., for army transportation and guard purposes in the harbor, all row-boats, barges, etc., not required for your current wants, taking proper receipts.

" 5th. That, as soon as possible, you have removed from Fort Sumter all the lead, copper, good carriages, and chassis, etc., especially the carriage and chassis of the 11-inch gun now required in the city.

" 6th. That you have reconstructed the observatory at Seccssionville, and. also erect one near Battery Cheves or Haskell.

" 7th. That the commanding officer at Fort Johnson be directed to em ploy actively the troops there in constructing bomb-proofs and rifle-pits.

"8th. That Colonel Butler, at Moultrie, be directed to employ actively as many of his regiment as practicable in removing the debris from the interior, to throw over the parapet into the ditch of the water-face, under the direc tion of the Engineer Department, to form a chemise to the scarp. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 19^, 18G3. "Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"General, — The Commanding General instructs me to communicate the following orders:

" 1st. That the batteries about Redoubt No. 1 fire occasionally on vessels in Light - house Creek, if their guns can reach that far without too great danger of bursting.

" 2d. That Sumter and the surrounding batteries be supplied with a sure

and well-understood signal for opening fire in case of another attack by barges.

" 3d. That Fort Sumter be kept always fully supplied with at least one

month's provisions for the garrison. You will please, in this connection,

report the supply now on hand in that fort.

" I am also directed to inform you that the enemy is constructing a battery in rear of the middle of Black Island.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 23d; 1803. " Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comclg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc,:

" General, —The Commanding General instructs me to inquire if Fort Suin-tcr is amply provided with water.

" He also directs that, in the daytime, our batteries only fire on Morris Isl and when they see the enemy actively at work, and at night they should fire only at irregular intervals. We must economize our ammunition and guns as much as possible for a long siege.

"It is the wish of the Commanding General that Fort Sumter be furnished with disinfectants, and that one company of the garrison be changed weekly.

" He further directs that you send a detachment of Earlc's battery, under Captain Earle, with the larger Foote gun, to Buckingham Ferry, for the pur pose of annoying the enemy's communication between Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JOHN F. O'BRIEN, Mnjor, and A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 23d, 18G3. " Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comclg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc.:

" General, —It is the wish of the Commanding General that you call on Generals Hagood, Colquitt, and Taliaferro, and Colonels Keitt and Harrison, to furnish the names of such officers and men who have specially distin guished themselves for zeal and gallantry in the discharge of their duties on Morris Island during the turns of duty of those commanding officers on that island; also on Colonel Rhett and Major Elliott for the same in reference to the defence of Fort Sumter.

" You will also please carry out the following orders:

" Moultrie House, Sullivan's Island, not to be destroyed by our troops un less too close to our batteries. It serves as a good object to draw the ene my's fire.

" The 8-inch rifled and banded gun heretofore ordered to the foot of Lau-rens Street (where a 10-inch gun has been put) will be sent to Fort Moultrie; Colonels Butler and Harris to determine its position.

"The 11-inch gun on Sullivan's Island will have to be transferred to the eastern chamber of Battery Bee, designated by Commanding General to Engi neer officer, to a position east of an 8-inch columbiad.

"The old 32-pounder rifled gun (No. 27) in Moultrie should be sent to the city for re-rifling, and a proper mechanic to Moultrie, to bush another 32-pounder, rifled, in position there.

"The sand-bags of embrasures to be kept wet during action. The Yates traversing arrangements in Moultrie and the outside batteries appear to be all out of order, which was not the case in Fort Sumter. Order an ordnance officer to sec to this at once. If Colonel Yates be available, order him to make an investigation forthwith.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" H. W. FIELDEN, Capt. and A. A. G."

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 25th, 1863. "Lieut.-Col. D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

"Colonel, —I am instructed to say in this way what lias already been com municated to you verbally by the Commanding General—that he approves of every measure practicable to give Fort Sumter means for contributing to the general defence of the entrance of the harbor; and, therefore, he desires cer tain casemates in northeast face, which Major-General Gilmer* has designated in his communication of the 23d instant, to be put in condition to receive two 10-inch columbiads, one 42-pounder, and one 32-pounder, rifled and banded; these pieces to be thoroughly protected from a rear and vertical fire of the enemy's batteries. Respectfully, your obdt. servt,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 29th, 1863. "Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

" General, —The Commanding General instructs rne to inquire whether the traversing arrangements of the guns on Sullivan's Island have been put in order. They needed repairs last week. He desires also that you will send an artificer to Fort Ripley to remedy the defects in the traversing arrange ments of the guns at that point, as they are represented as being out of order.

" The General also directs that Fort Ripley be supplied with one hundred and fifty to two hundred rounds of shot to the gun. There are now only one hundred and twenty-eight. Finally, the General directs me to say that there is too much powder at Fort Ripley. The surplus will be removed to Castle Pinckncy, if required there for its three guns, one of which will be added to its present arrangement. Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

"CLIFTON H. SMITH, Asst. Adjt.-Gcnl."

14 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 30tf*, 1863. ''General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-General, Richmond,Va.:

"General, —The published report of Brigadier-General Gillmore, of the 7th instant, to his government, relative to his acquisition of Batteries "Wagner and Gregg, contains several errors, which I feel called upon to correct.

" 1st. Seventy-five men were not taken on Morris Island, for only two boats' crews—about 19 men and 27 sailors, or about 46 men in all—were captured by the enemy's armed barges between Cumniings's Point and Fort Sumter.

" 2d. Colonel Keitt's captured despatches could not have shown that the garrison of Wagner and Gregg amounted to ' between 1500 and 1600 effective men on the day of the evacuation (6th inst.),' for Colonel Keitt reported that morning 900 men, all told, only about two-thirds of whom could be con sidered ' effectives;' the others being wounded, or more or less disabled from exposure for so long a period to the weather and the incessant fire, day and

* Promoted, about the 15th of September, 1863. IL—10*

night, of the enemy's land and naval batteries. The forces holding these works and the north end of Morris Island, during the fifty-eight days' siege, varied from 1000 to 1200 men, seldom exceeding the latter number when it could be avoided.

" 3d. Battery Wagner was not ' a work of the most formidable kind,' but an ordinary field-work, with thick parapets, but with ditches of little depth. The sand thrown up by the enemy's shells and drifted by the wind, during so long a siege, had nearly filled up the ditches in many places, and had partially covered up the explosive shells, spiked planks, and pikes placed in the ditch for its defence. *

"4th. The bomb-proof of Wagner could not contain 1800 men, or more than 600; the garrison of the work being about 800 men.

"5th. 'Nineteen pieces of artillery and a large supply of excellent ammu nition were captured.' The pieces of heavy and light artillery left in Wag ner and Gregg were more or less damaged, and all with their vents not too much enlarged were spiked. The carriages, chassis, etc., were more or less disabled by the enemy's shots and shells. Only 1800 pounds of ammunition (200 in Wagner and 1000 in Gregg) were left to explode the magazines and bomb-proofs; but, unfortunately, through some accident, the fuses left burn ing did not ignite the powder.

"6th. The city of Charleston may be completely covered by General Gill-more's guns on Morris Island, but at the distance of four miles from his ad vanced battery to the nearest point of the city.

" I will conclude by stating that, strange as it may appear, the total loss in killed and wounded on Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, was only 641 men; and, deducting the killed and w r ounded due to the landing on the 10th of July, and to the assaults of the llth and 18th of July, the killed and wounded due to the terrible bombardment, which lasted al most uninterruptedly, night and day, during fifty-eight days, only amounted to 296 men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is still more remarkable that during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from 30 pounds to 300 pounds, only 3 men were killed and 14 wounded. Indeed, the hand of the Almighty would seem to have protected the heroic garrison of that historic

work.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Coindg."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. 0., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 1th, 1863. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Commanding near Chattanooga, Tenn.:

" Dear General, —I have just been informed from Richmond that the Army of Virginia is about to take the offensive again, to prevent Meade from rein forcing Rosecrans, thus repeating, to a certain extent, the campaign of last

* See also General Gillmore's book, p. 74, § 168, where the same incorrect statements are made.

July into Pennsylvania, which did not save Middle Tennessee and the Missis sippi Valley. You must, no doubt, recollect what I wrote on the subject to General Johnston, on the 15th of May* last, to endeavor to prevent that offensive campaign, which, I thought, would not effect the object in view.

" I now address you my views on the reported intentions of General Lee or the War Department, to see if our small available means cannot be used to a better purpose.

" It is evident to my mind that, admitting Lee's movement can prevent Meade from reinforcing Rosecrans and drive the former across the Potomac, Lee cannot prevent Rosecrans from being reinforced by about 40,000 or 50,000 men from Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri, and the Mississippi Valley, in about one month's time; hence, admitting that Rosecrans has now about your own supposed effective force—say 60,000 men of all arms—he will then have about 110,000 men against 60,000.

" War being a contest of ' masses against fractions,' all other things being equal, you would certainly be defeated; then, either you must be reinforced from Johnston's or Lee's army, or Middle Georgia would be lost, and the Confederacy, now cut in two, would then be cut in three. Meanwhile, Meade, having been reinforced by the new levies of the enemy, and taking his time to organize and discipline them, would retake the offensive, and Lee would be driven back towards Richmond, admitting that his supplies would enable him to maintain his army that long on the south side of the Potomac; or a large army might be concentrated here, and, having taken this place and marched into the interior, towards Augusta, the Confederacy would again be subdivided; or, should the enemy find it impossible or too tedious to take Charleston, he might concentrate again his forces on the coast of North Caro lina, and, marching to Raleigh or Weldon, would cut off all our present com munications with Virginia.

" The question now arises, can these calamities be avoided, and in what way? If my opinion for once could be listened to, I would say again, act entirely on the defensive in Virginia, send you immediately 25,000 men from Lee's army, 5000 or 10,000 more from Johnston's forces, to enable you to take the offensive forthwith, and cross the Tennessee to crush Rosecrans before he can be reinforced to any large extent from any quarter. Then you could attack and defeat the enemy's reinforcements in detail, before they could be concentrated into a strong army.

" In the mean time, Lee, if necessary, could fall back within the lines around Richmond until a part of your army could be sent to his relief. I fear any other plan will, sooner or later, end in our final destruction in detail.

" Should you approve of this plan, can you not address it as your own to the War Department, in the hope of its being adopted ? What I desire is our success. I care not who gets the credit for it. Our resources are fast getting exhausted; our people, I fear, are getting disheartened; for they can sec no bright spot in the horizon to revive their drooping hopes after the patriotic sacrifices they have made in this terrible contest. Let us, then, unite

* See Chapter XXXI.

all our efforts in a last deadly struggle, and, with God's help, we shall yet triumph.

" I regret I have not time to pay you a short visit, to present you my views more fully, and to discuss with you our future operations.

" Wishing you ample success, I remain, sincerely your friend,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 8th, 1863. " Brig.-General R, S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc.:

"General, —It is the wish of the Commanding General that you should at once have inquiries made where the fault lies in Evans's brigade not being properly supplied with ammunition.

u With the exception of the 22d South Carolina Volunteers, now on Sulli van's Island, none of the regiments are completely supplied with the regu lation number of forty rounds.

" The 23d Regiment, stationed some seven miles from Brigade Headquar ters, is extremely deficient, and has no immediate means of replacing any necessary consumption, as all ordnance wagons and ordnance sergeants are attached to Brigade Headquarters, and not with their respective regiments.

"Those regiments that are armed with rifles of 54 calibre say that the ordnance officer of the brigade cannot supply the required ammunition. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" II. W. FIELDEN, Capt., and Asst. Adjt.-General."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 28th, 18G3. %k Major-General J. F. GILMER, Second in Command, etc., Savannah, Ga.:

"General, —On examination I find that General Mercer lias now thirty-four companies in his command, on duty as heavy artillery, while the number of companies here, for manning all the batteries around Charleston, docs not exceed thirty-eight. Of course, to man all his batteries on the most efficient footing, he has not too many—indeed, not as many as it would be desirable for him to have—but, relatively, it would appear that his force of heavy ar tillery is too large, and may be reduced without material detriment, when we consider the demands of the service elsewhere in the Department, and the chances for operations, or the risk of any serious movement for the re duction of Savannah, at least without some notice. Accordingly, Company E, 12th Battalion Georgia Volunteers, has been ordered here to join the rest of the battalion, and it will be well to sec that it is replaced by a company of Olnistead's regiment (1st Georgia Volunteers), as there is one company of that regiment already there, and it is desirable to have homogeneity in the composition of these garrisons.

"There are, moreover, three companies (F, H, and I) of the 54th Regi ment (Way's) Georgia Volunteers in the District of Georgia—two at llosedcw, and one at Beaulieu—on heavy artillery duty, which, I have suggested to the General, ought to be brought here for James Island and consolidated with the

other six companies for infantry service. Therefore the General Command ing instructs me to lay the matter before you, to investigate whether these companies may not be replaced either from Gordon's or Olmstead's regiment, and ordered here, without material risk of exposing Savannah to fall by a coup de main.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 29^, 1863. " Colonel D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc.:

"Colonel, — The Commanding General directs that you will repair to night to Fort Sumter, and give the necessary instructions for repairs to that fort.

" You will also determine, upon consultation with the commanding officer and local Engineer, what is the minimum garrison and force of laborers that should be kept at that post.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" CLIFTON II. SMITH, Asst. Atljt.-Genl."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30^, 1863, " Colonel ALFRED RHETT, Corndg. Fifth Mil. Dist., etc., etc.;

" Colonel, —Major Elliott must arrange, through you, with Generals Riplcy and Hagood and Flag-officer Tucker, of the navy, some definite signal, upon the giving of which by him the batteries on Sullivan's and James islands, and the ironclads of our navy bearing on the several faces of that work, shall open fire so as to sweep every point of approach.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30£/i, 1863. " Brig.-Genl. JOHNSON HAGOOD, Comdg., etc., James Island, S. C.:

" General, —In reply to your letter of the 29th instant I am directed by the Commanding General to inform you that the Engineer Department has been ordered to alter the embrasure of one of the guns at Battery Simkins, so as to allow it to be brought to bear upon and against Fort Sumter if neces sary.

" The right-hand gun of this battery cannot be thus altered without ex posing it too much to the fire of the enemy from Gregg and Wagner.

" I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

" CLIFTON H. SMITH, A. A. G."

U P. S.—The Commanding General further directs that you instruct the Engineer to close the embrasure at Battery Simkins every morning before daylight, as otherwise the gun may be dismounted by a fire from Battery Gregg. Respectfully, C. H. S., A. A. G."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 30^, 1863. "Brig.-Genl. R S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Disk, etc., etc.:

" General, —As a boat attack may be anticipated on Fort Sumter, after the heavy bombardment which that work has been undergoing for some days, the Commanding General directs that all the batteries bearing on it shall be held ready at night to sweep its exterior faces, at a concerted signal from Major Elliott, or whensoever the approach of hostile boats shall be evident. Concert of action, however, is most desirable.*

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 1st, 18G3. " His Excellency M. L. BONHAM, Governor of South Carolina, etc., etc.:

"Governor, —Your letter of the 24th inst. enclosing one from Colonel Waddy Thompson, and another from Messrs. Pnllian and Patten, has been received. I have ordered a light battery to report at once to Colonel Williams, at Green ville, S. C. I regret as much as you do my inability to send mounted troops for the defence of that part of the State.

" It is not prudent to withdraw, at this critical moment, from my already too small forces a regiment of old troops from the defence of Charleston. So soon as it can be done with safety I will gladly send all the assistance in my power to Governor Vance.

"I remain, very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 4t7i, 1803. " Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist,, etc., etc.:

"General, —Enclosed is a telegram! received from Major Norris, Chief of Signal Corps, Richmond.

" The Commanding General wishes you to make all necessary arrangements for the contingency, and with a view to the rapid reinforcement of the com mand on Sullivan's Island from the troops in Christ Church, which portion of your district, however, should not be left uncovered until the decisive moment.

" He suggests, also, that the 20th Regiment S. C. V. (Keitt's), alternating with some other good regiment, should take post for the present on Sullivan's Island at night, returning to their encampments just before daylight, to escape observation. Very respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* This order was also sent to Brigadier-General Hagood. t This telegram, like many others from the same source, proved to be erroneous.

A copy of the telegram referred to was, on the same day, for warded to General Taliaferro, commanding the Seventh Military District. lie was directed " to hold his troops prepared at night for the emergency," and "to look particularly to the east lines exposed to approach from Morris Island, giving due regard, how ever, to the proper protection of the new lines." Brigadier-Gen eral Wise, commanding Sixth Military District, St. Andrew's Par ish, was also instructed as to what course to follow, should he be called to the assistance of General Taliaferro.

The incident now about to be related is deserving of note. It produced a feeling of disappointment among some of the warm est friends of Mr. Davis.

About the middle of October, 1863, President Davis visited General Bragg at his headquarters near Dalton, to settle a diffi culty then existing between that officer and his subordinate com manders, and to suggest Longstreet's assault on Knoxville. While returning to Richmond he stopped a day or two in Savannah and Charleston, and made it a point to inspect some of their defensive works and the gallant troops manning them.

Unable to go in person to welcome the President upon his ar rival in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, General Beauregard sent several members of his staff—among whom were Colonel Roman and Lieutenant Chisolm—to perform that duty and accompany the distinguished visitor to Charleston. He reached there on the 2d of November, at about 1 p. M., and found General Beauregard awaiting him at the depot, or what served as such, with an imposing military escort. There was also a deputation of citizens, appointed by the civil authorities, to offer him the hospitalities of the city. But he declined their invitation, having already promised a personal friend—ex-Governor Aiken— to repair to his residence and make of it his headquarters during his short sojourn in Charleston.

The President was escorted with all due honor to the City Hall, where he gave a public reception, after delivering an eloquent and patriotic address. He spoke of almost every topic of the war, except one. The defence of Charleston at that time had lasted more than seven months, and, in face of the dreadful reverses of Gettysburg and Yicksburg and the general gloom resulting from them, it alone kept up the hope and spirits of the South. The officers and men had signally distinguished themselves during that

desperate and glorious siege. Several of them had been justly recommended for promotion. Yet he found but a single one to praise—Major Stephen D. Elliott, the recently chosen commander of Sumter, placed there after the first bombardment was over and the regular artillery withdrawn. !N"ot one word of General Beau-regard, who stood at his elbow while he spoke; not one word of Generals Taliaferro, Hagood, Colquitt, and Ripley, of Colonels Ilhett, Butler, Harris, Kcitt, and Harrison, or of the brave men who fought with and under them, was said by Mr. Davis, the Commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the Confed erate States. The President was speaking to Carolinians, in the heart of their devoted city. Such was his justice to those whose genius, courage, and unsurpassed fortitude had attracted the ad miration of Europe and the respect of their enemies.

When the reception was over Governor Aiken invited the Mayor, some of the leading citizens, and the ranking officers pres ent, to dine at his house with the President. Some accepted ; General Beauregard did not. He thought that, after the singular manner in which he and his subordinate commanders had just been treated, he could without impropriety free himself from all but official courtesies towards Mr. Davis. He therefore contented himself with accompanying the latter on his tour of inspec tion around James and Sullivan's islands, and with explaining to him all that had been done, since the destruction of Sumter, to perfect the interior harbor defences and lines in and about Charleston.

From General Hagood's narrative of the defence of James and Morris islands, from July, 1863, to the early part of 18G4, we take the following passage:

"In November, President Davis visited James Island. General Taliaferro was absent on leave, and General Hagood in command. Mr. Davis inspected the works closely, going at a rapid gallop, with his cortege, from battery to battery, and stopping long enough to receive a salute and ride around the regiments which were drawn up along his route, each at its post. He seemed in good spirits. The troops betrayed much enthusiasm, but he acknowledged their cheers for 'Mr. President' by simply raising his hat. General Hagood rode with him, as commander of the island, and necessarily had much conver sation with him. This, and on the field of battle at Drury's Bluff, when Gen eral Beauregard was pleased to present him again, with a compliment, to the President, were the only times when he was ever in conversation with this distinguished man."

When the President left Charleston, General Beau regard es corted him once more, and was among the last to take leave of him at the Northeastern Eailroad Depot.

In the "Else and Fall of the Confederate Government"—un less we are mistaken—Mr. Davis makes no mention of his visit to Charleston. If there is any reference to it in that work it is in such an incidental manner that we have not been able to dis cover the passage. And again, in that book, as in his address of the 2d of November, 1863, already referred to, he gives the merest passing notice to a period including fully nineteen months of the war; thus omitting to enlighten the student of history, and compelling him to look elsewhere for the evidence of facts which Mr. Davis apparently considered too insignificant to deserve par ticular mention. He says:

"The brave and invincible defence of Fort Sumter gave to the City of Charleston, South Carolina, additional lustre. For four years that fort, lo cated in its harbor, defied the army and navy of the United States."*

Who commanded the Department? Who planned that "in vincible defence ?" Who executed it ? What troops were there, and under what officers did they fight ? These are questions as to which complete silence is preserved; and from what fol lows the reader is led to believe that the Commanding General was General Hardee, and that Fort Sumter was never under any officer except Colonel Stephen D. Elliott. We quote:

"When the city was about to be abandoned to the army of General Sher man the forts defending the harbor were embraced in General Hardee's plan of evacuation. The gallant commander of Fort Sumter, Colonel Stephen El liott, Jr., with unyielding fortitude refused to be relieved, after being under incessant bombardment, day and night, for weeks. It was supposed he must be exhausted, and he was invited to withdraw for rest; but, on receiving the general order of retreat, he assembled his brave force on the rugged and shell-crushed parade-ground, read his instructions, and, in a voice that trembled with emotion, addressed his men in the glowing language of patriotism and unswerving devotion to the Confederate cause. The cheers which responded to the utterances of their colonel came from manly and chivalric throats. Yielding to the inevitable, they claimed for the Stars and Bars a salute of one hundred guns. As it was fired from Sumter it was re-echoed by all the Confederate batteries, and startled the outside blockaders with the idea that a great victory had been won by the Confederacy." f

* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 204, first edition. t Ibid.

That such a statement should have been inserted in a work purporting to be a true exposition of Confederate history is beyond comprehension. The facts are these:

Colonel Elliott, who had been promoted to the rank of Brig adier-General, was relieved, on the 4th of May, 1864, from the command of Fort Surnter, and sent to Virginia, to take charge of Walker's brigade, of South Carolina. The successor of General Elliott at the fort was Captain John C. Mitchel, of the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). He remained in command until the 20th of July, 1864, when, during the third regular bombardment of Suinter, he was killed by a mortar-shell. Captain Mitchel was a son of the distinguished Irish patriot, and a highly accom plished and daring officer. On his death Captain T. A. Iluguenin, of the South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), was appointed in his place, and held command of Surater until its evacuation, on the 17th of February, 1865 — nearly eight months after General Elliott had been relieved. The evacuation of Sumter was effected at night, in silence, without a speech from any one, without a cheer from the garrison, without the firing of a gun. In order to keep the enemy in ignorance of the movement then in course of execution, the withdrawal was proceeded with as secretly and noiselessly as possible. And yet the ex-President of the Confederate States and ex-Commander-in-chief of its armies published to the world in his work (seventeen years in preparation) this extravagant fiction. The enormity being pointed out to him by friends, he has, in a second publication of the first edition of his book, resorted to another and different version, but one which is also erroneous in several particulars. We shall again refer to this matter when treating of the evacuation of Charleston.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

CHAPTER XXXIY.

General Beaurcgard Prepares for an Attack upon Charleston.—Instructions Given to General Gilmer.—Attack of the 19th of November upon Fort Sumter.—Orders and Instructions Given by General Beauregard.—Grad ual Cessation of Aggressive Operations by the Federal Commanders.— Plan of Campaign Drawn up by General Beauregard, to be Submitted to the President through the Hon. Pierre Soule.—War Department does not Take it into Consideration.—Report from Richmond of an Impend ing Movement on the Carolina Coast.—General Beauregard's Letter to General Whiting.—How Lieutenant Glassel Damaged the Neio Ironsides. —Lieutenant Dixon's Attack with the Torpedo-boat upon the Housatonic. —Loss of the Boat and Crew.—Construction of the Submarine Torpedo-boat.—Its History.—Boats Destroyed by Torpedoes in Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. — Landing of a Federal Force at Jacksonville. — General Finegan Concentrates his Forces. — Arrival of Reinforcements. — Battle of Ocean Pond.—General Finegan's Report.—What General Beauregard Says of the Battle.—His Difficulties in Sending Troops to Florida.—He Leaves for "Camp Milton."—His Despatches to the War Department.— Cavalry Withdrawn from South Carolina and Georgia.—General Beau-regard Returns to Charleston.—His Instructions Left with General An derson.—He Demands Leave of Absence.—Telegram from War Depart ment Desiring his Co-operation with General Lee. — He Accepts. — He Turns over the Command of the Department to General Samuel Jones. —His Parting Address to the Troops.

WITHOUT placing implicit faith in the telegram received from Richmond, through Major ISTorris, Chief of the Signal Corps, wherein an immediate heavy attack upon. Charleston was pre dicted, General Beauregard took every precaution to be prepared for such a contingency. He had a force of two hundred infantry held in readiness, nightly, at Fort Johnson, to be thrown as a re inforcement into Fort Sumter, and had secured, for that purpose, from Flag-officer Tucker, the services of the steamer Juno, Lieu tenant Porcher commanding. As an additional means of defeat ing any attempt of the enemy, either to assail Sumter or to carry Battery Simkins, he suggested that one or two of our ironclads should take such a position, at night, as would enable them to sweep the space between Cummings's Point and Fort Johnson and between the latter and Battery Simkins. He also advised

Commander Tucker that, in case the enemy's ironclads should endeavor to remove the obstructions between Sumter and Moul-trie, while attacking the Sullivan's Island batteries, his gunboats should be placed in the vicinity of Fort Sumter, out of the direct fire of our works, and in such a manner as to foil the enemy's object; that should an effort be made by the Federal fleet, or any part of it, to pass by our obstructions, without stopping to remove them or fight the batteries, then Commander Tucker's ironclads should so change their position as to be somewhat in rear of our second line of defence—that is to say, James Island, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney, according to the channel through which the enemy's vessels might attempt to force their passage. In order to complete these precautionary arrangements the following instructions were forwarded to Major-General Gil-mer on the 7th of November:

" General,— Should the enemy's ironclads enter the harbor, the Command ing General thinks it probable they will endeavor to take the Fort Johnson lines facing towards Morris Island in flank and reverse, to favor an infantry attack upon Battery Simkins, and, possibly at the same time, make a similar front attack from Fort Johnson to the Martello Tower.

" It becomes important, then, to guard against the first by traverses wher ever required, and against the second by a line of rifle-pits or infantry para pets, connecting the batteries near the Martello Tower with the one at Fort Johnson.

"The Commanding General, therefore, desires you, assisted by Colonel Har ris, to make a proper examination to determine whether these rifle-pits should be prolonged to the creek below Battery Wampler, or turned back near the Martello Tower towards the marshes facing Morris Island, wherever the ground is most favorable for such a defensive line ; or whether the detached redoubts, ordered some time ago, should be at once commenced, suspending meanwhile further labor on the ' new lines,' which are now deemed quite defensible. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

Nothing of much importance occurred between the 7th and the 19th of November. On the latter date another boat attack was made by General Gillmore's force against Fort Sumter, resulting io utter failure, as had been the case with the former attempt. The following is an extract from Mr. Charles Cowley's book, from which we have already had occasion to quote some passages:

"On the night of November 19th, 1863, General Gillmore made an attempt to surprise and capture Fort Sumter. He asked no aid from the navy; but

Admiral Dahlgren, hearing of it, and anxiously desiring its success, ordered his pickets to cover the assaulting party. * * * The thoughtful care of the Admiral for the army column on this occasion shines, by contrast, with the failure of Gillrnore to support the navy column on September 6th."*

We copy the following extract from Colonel Elliott's journal, dated November 20th, 1863:

" * * * At three o'clock a detachment of the enemy's barges, variously esti mated at from four to nine in number, approached within three hundred yards of the fort, and opened fire with musketry. Most of the troops got into posi tion very rapidly, but, in spite of all instructions, commenced a random fire: into the air on the part of many, at the distant boats on the part of others. The troops stationed in the centre bomb-proof for the most part refused to ascend the parapet, though encouraged by the example of Lieutenant Mironell and a few other brave men.

"I have sent a despatch to General Taliaferro, asking him to relieve two lieutenants who did not behave well. I have not evidence enough to con vict them, but do not want them here longer. I have taken measures which, I trust, may insure better conduct in the future.

" No rockets were sent up, because positive attacks were not made. The ricochet practice from Sullivan's Island was very handsome. The fire from Johnson was very bad, the balls passing directly over the fort.

" Private T. Whestcr, Company D, 1st S. C. Artillery, was wounded slightly in the head yesterday by a brick.

" I respectfully request that, if practicable, Captain Harleston be retained here until the dark nights have entirely passed by. His removal just at this time will be a great misfortune to me, as I am greatly dependent on his watchfulness and ability." f

The orders and instructions now submitted to the reader will show the untiring vigilance of the Commanding General, and how extremely careful he was to prepare against every possible emergency. The first is a circular addressed to Generals Walker, Wise, Eobertson, and Mercer, commanding respectively the Third, Sixth, and Second Military Districts of South Carolina and the District of Georgia. It read thus:

* "Leaves from a Lawyer's Life, Afloat and Ashore," p. 115. The date •riven should be " September 9th," and not " Gth."

t Captain Harlestou remained as desired by Colonel Elliott. On the 24th of November, at 4.30 A.M., while examining obstructions reported as being washed by the tide, that gallant and meritorious young officer was mortally wounded by a Parrott shell, and died a few hours later, lamented by all.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA., CHARLESTON, S. C., Nov. 25th, 1863.

" General, —The following views of the Commanding General are communi cated for your information:

" 1st. Further depletion of the already too weak forces left for the defence of Charleston is improper, and, therefore, you must depend solely upon the troops of your command to repel any attack of the enemy by moving rapidly your cavalry and light batteries to any point in your district which may be threatened. Should you be compelled to abandon the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, you will retire fighting obstinately, so as to protect, as much and as far as practicable, the country in your rear, especially the line of the South Carolina Railroad, for which latter object the best defensive line would be the * Overflows, 1 the Ashley River, from Bee's Ferry to the Little Lakes; thence across to Givham's Ferry, on the Edisto River, and along that river to the South Carolina Railroad bridge, above Branchville; and thence along and as near the southern boundary-line of Barnwell District as shall be determined by a close reconnoissance by General Walker's Engineer officer.

" 3d. The line of the ' Overflows' and the works in advance of it along the Stono will be defended by the troops under Brigadier-General AVise, com manding Sixth Military District, together with such additional troops as he may receive from Brigadier-General Taliaferro's command, in the Seventh Military District.

" 3d. The line in rear of the Ashley River, from Bee's Ferry inclusive, to Bossua Creek, near Dorchester, will be held by troops from the Fifth and the First Military Districts.

"4th. The forces under Brigadier-General Robertson are intrusted with the defence of the line from Bossua Creek to Little Lakes, thence across to Giv ham's Ferry, on the Edisto, and the Four Hole Creek. Colonel Harris, Chief-Engineer, has been directed to throw up certain defensive works across the country, from the Ashley to the Edisto.

"5th. The line in rear of the Edisto, from Four Hole Creek to the South Carolina Railroad bridge, above Branchville, will be defended by Colonel Williams's regiment of State troops already there, reinforced by a portion of Brigadier-General Walker's command, until they can be relieved by other troops in the Department.

"Cth. From the Edisto to the Savannah River, near the southern boundary of Barnwell District, will be defended or guarded, as far as practicable, by the remainder of Brigadier-General Walker's command. That officer will construct such field-works, rifle-pits, abatis, and make such overflows, as the means at his disposal and the nature of the country will permit.

" 7th. Brigadier-Generals Robertson and Walker will resort to such expedi ents as the beating of drums, firing of salutes and rockets, as will deceive the enemy. A temporary concentration of cavalry at various points near the ene my's pickets, and lighting numerous camp-fires at night, must also be resorted to as frequently as possible. In other w T ords, W T C must make up for our defi ciency in numbers, as far as practicable, by ingenuity and activity. A thorough knowledge of the country should give us an advantage over our adversary.

which must be improved and made available to the utmost; and each district commander will be expected to provide himself with an ample number of tried and reliable guides.

" The Commanding General desires particularly to impress upon you his inability to reinforce your command at present. It is an axiom of war that no work is sufficiently strong to resist a ' determined attack unless properly garrisoned.' The defences of this city require a force of 18,500 infantry, and at least ten light batteries; in lieu of that force only 12,695 infantry (of which a portion are unreliable troops) and eight light batteries compose its present garrison.

" If one portion of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad is worth guard ing, the rest has the same claim. Hence, if 1000 men are sent to the Third District, nearly a like number should also be sent to the Second District, and thus, weakening the already too small force absolutely required for the defence of Charleston, invite an attack from the enemy before these troops from those districts could possibly be recalled.

" The question then arises, whether it is better to risk the safety of Charles ton or that of the country lying between it and Savannah ? The Command ing General cannot hesitate in the selection.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.' 1

« P. S.— November 2Sth, 1863.—Since the date of this circular Clingman's brigade, 1810 effectives, has been ordered back to North Carolina. T. J."

To General Hagood, to whom a copy of the foregoing circular had not been forwarded, the following communication was sub sequently sent:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C.. GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C.,Dcc. 5th, 1863.

u General, —I am instructed to say to you that, while the movements of the enemy appear to indicate an attempt to operate within the limits of the Second and Third Military Districts, rather than any effort to effect a lodg ment within your district, nevertheless your troops should be held constantly on the alert and ready for any effort to surprise you.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

General Gillmore admits that "with the second bombardment of Sumter ended all aggressive operations for the season against the defences of Charleston." * The truth is, that the taking of

j O

Battery Wagner, on the 7th of September, w r as the enemy's last step forward; and though, from such a result, high expectations

* " Engineer and Artillery Operations against the Defences of Charleston Harbor," pp. 79, 80.

had arisen, not only on the part of the Federal commander in front of Charleston, but also throughout the Northern States, nothing more had been accomplished. Wagner and the whole of Morris Island were in the possession of the enemy; Sumter had been silenced and reduced to a heap of ruins, but bomb-proofs had been speedily erected, and the Confederate flag still floated over it, and its capacity for resistance was daily increasing.

The harbor, too, remained as impenetrable as it was when the Federal fleet first attempted to enter it; and Charleston, encom passed now and surrounded by a new line of inner defences, was as ready as ever to cope with the combined military and naval attack prepared against it. Fort Sumter had gradually become a new work; Fort Johnson had greatly gained in strength and im portance; so had almost every battery on James arid Sullivan's islands; and General Beauregard, as was justly said in Pollard's " Lost Cause," * " had given another illustration of the new system of defence practised at Comorn and Sebastopol, where, instead of there being any one key to a plan of fortification, there was the necessity of a siege for every battery, in which the besiegers were always exposed to the fire of the others."

From Cummings's Point and the other works of Morris Island the bombardment was maintained during the whole of the month

O

of November and up to the 19th or 20th of December. It did not entirely cease even after that time, but decreased in intensity from day to day, until only a few occasional shots were fired: as usual, mostly at Fort Sumter.

General Beauregard, taking advantage of this relative lull in

O ' £5 o

the enemy's operations in his front, and believing that there was then no threat of immediate danger, began to consider other and more distant points of the Confederacy; and, while con templating the military situation in Virginia and the West, drew up, at the request of the Hon. Pierre Soule, of Louisiana, a comprehensive plan of campaign, which the latter desired, if it were possible, to submit to the authorities at Richmond. Mr. Soule was a man of high capacity, lie had been a Senator in the United States Congress, Ambassador to Spain under President Pierce's Administration, and, owing to his firm and unyielding attitude after the fall of New Orleans, in April, 18G2, had been

* Page 437.

sent, by General B. F. Butler, as a prisoner to Fort Lafayette. At the time we speak of he had but lately been released from cap tivity, and had run the blockade to Charleston, whence he had left for Richmond, with a view to offer his services to the Con federate Government. The plan referred to was as follows:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. StJij 1803. k ' Hon. PIERRE SOULE, Richmond, Va.:

" My dear Sir, —In compliance with your request, made on the eve of your departure for Richmond, I have prepared for you a sketch of certain opera tions by which we may yet retrieve our late losses, and possibly baffle the immense resources of men and warlike material of our enemy.

" 1st. The system hitherto followed of keeping in the field separate armies, acting without concert, on distant and divergent lines of operation, and thus enabling our adversary to concentrate at convenience his masses against our fractions, must be discontinued, as radically contrary to the principles of the art of war, and attended with inevitable results, such as our disasters in Mississippi, Tennessee, and North Georgia.

" 3d. We must arrange for a sudden and rapid concentration, upon some selected, decisive strategic point of the theatre of war, of enough troops to crush the forces of the enemy embodied in that quarter. This must neces sarily be done at the expense or hazard, for the time, of other points less important, or offering less advantages for striking the enemy. A blow thus struck will necessarily disorganize his combinations and give us the choice of the field of operations.

" I am sensibly aware of our limited means, our want of men, the material and appliances of war and of transportation, and hence the difficulties which will embarrass us in the execution of this plan of concentration. But I see no way to success except through and by it, and nothing but ultimate dis aster without it. A different course may, indeed, protract the contest, which will become, day by day, more unequal. We may fight stoutly, as hitherto, many bloody and indecisive battles, but will never win a signal, conclusive victory, until we can manage to throw a heavy and overwhelming mass of our forces upon the fractions of the enemy, and at the same time successfully strike at his communications, without exposing our own.

" I believe this may yet be done. Not knowing, however, our present avail able forces, and their exact locations, I am unable to make a definite or de tailed plan of operations.. But I believe I am warranted in assuming that we have under arms 210,000 effective men, distributed nearly as follows:

In the Trans-Mississippi Department, say 40,000

In the Department of Alabama and Mississippi, say 15,000

Under Hardee, including Longstreet, say 60,000

In the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, say.. 28,000

In the Department of. North Carolina, say 7,000

In the Department of Virginia, say 00,000

Total 210,000

II.—11

" Looking at a map of the Confederate States it will be seen that the most injurious blow which the enemy could strike, at present, would be to take possession of Atlanta, thus isolating still more completely the Trans-Mississippi States, and detaching, in a great measure, the States of Mississippi and Ala bama from the eastern portion of the Confederacy. It would also be a deplorable injury to the energetic, populous State of Georgia, and cripple the great resources of that people.

"We should, therefore, regard Atlanta as the actual objective point of the large force which the enemy has concentrated about Chattanooga, and the one which we must, at all cost, prevent him from obtaining. In this state of affairs, throwing aside all other considerations, subordinating all other operations to this one vital campaign, at a concerted moment we must with draw from other points a portion of their forces—all, indeed, not absolutely essential for keeping up a show of defence, or safety against a coup de main — and concentrate in this way every soldier possible for operations against General Grant.

" Such strategic points as Richmond, Weldon, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and Meridian—or Jackson, Mississippi, at the same time-should be fortified, garrisoned, and provisioned, according to their relative present value to the Confederate States, sufficiently to prolong their defence, if attacked or besieged, until troops for their relief could be detached as required from the army in Northwestern Georgia.

" I will now state approximately what troops may, in my belief, be with-drawn from the following quarters and added to the army at or about Dai-ton, namely:

From Alabama and Mississippi 10,000

From South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida 8,000

From North Carolina 2,000

From Virginia 20,000

Total 40,000

"These 40,000 men, added with celerity to the force now under Hardee, and including that with Longstreet and other detachments, would make an army of 100 ; 000 men. Let this army take the offensive at once, and, properlv handled, it should crush any force that Grant could assemble in time and oppose, scattered as he evidently is, and unprepared as he would be for such an event.

" To insure the success of such a plan of operations the Press must be led to preserve complete silence touching all military movements. Depots of sub sistence, munitions of war, ambulances, wagons, horses, etc., should be estab lished at certain points, not too far from Atlanta, for rapid concentration at the proper time. Meanwhile, whatsoever troops could be safely withdrawn from the Department already indicated, should be quickly, quietly concen trated at suitable central points, thence to be thrown forward, with all possi ble despatch, to Dalton, with all the means of transportation available of all sorts.

"At the same time the officer appointed to command this army should

make all his preparations for such a trust, and the sudden accumulation of troops of all arms, so that he may be able to mould it into a homogeneous mass as early as practicable, and to inaugurate offensive operations without loss of one moment of time that may be obviated. And, further, he must be invested with an unrestricted, unembarrassed selection of staff-officers, and thoroughly emancipated from the least subordination to the views and con trol of the heads of bureaus at Richmond, a reproduction in this war of that fatal Austrian system with which no eminently successful commander ever had to contend; a pernicious plan of administration which will clog and hamper the highest military genius, whether a Napoleon or a Caesar.

U I believe the success of the plan of campaign thus sketched, and the utter defeat of the enemy, would be almost certain.

" The question would next be: whether to pursue the routed enemy with vigor to the banks of the Ohio and the Mississippi, or to return to the several sources whence the army was gathered their respective detachments or quo tas for the campaign ? This should be left, however, to be determined by the nature of the enemy's operations at the time.

" I must finally remark that were it possible to concentrate with sufficient expedition, at or about Knoxville, such an army as I have indicated, that would be the better point whence to take the offensive into Middle Tennessee than Dalton—that is, according to the principles of war—and would promise more decisive results; for it is evident we should thus threaten the enemy's communications, without exposing our own. (Principle II.) l Le secret de la guerre est dans la surete des communications' 1 (Napoleon). By a movement from Knoxville we should be doing what is taught in connection with the third maxim ('Art of War'), to wit: * That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly on the enemy's flanks or rear.' There may be, however, such practical difficulties in the way of the execution of such a movement on that line as may not make it advisable to adopt it.

" ' The whole science of war,' it has been well said, ' may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you.'

" Those conditions, I sincerely believe, may all be filled by very much such a plan as the one which I have hurriedly placed before you. Of course my views must be subject to such modifications as my want of precise informa tion relative to the number and location of our troops may render necessary. The hour is critical and grave. I am filled with intense anxiety lest golden opportunities shall ue lost—lost forever. It is concentration and immediate mobility that are indispensable to preserve us.

" Yours sincerely, G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Mr. Sonic communicated the foregoing paper to the War De partment, but no action was taken in the matter. The Wai-Department was, no doubt, too much engrossed in other business to pass upon the merits of this or any other plan of battle. When,

about eleven months later, Atlanta fell and was destroyed, and most of the disastrous consequences predicted by General Beaure-gard ensued, the War Department must have seen — though too late, as usual—that the plan had been a good one, and that if it had been adopted a very different result might have been obtained. Some further information had been received from Richmond, disclosing a probable movement of the enemy on the South Carolina coast, and warning General Beauregard to be prepared for it. He acted accordingly, in his accustomed prompt and energetic way; but, knowing how prone the War Department was to credit such reports, and having heard nothing of the kind from his own signal-service corps, he felt sure this news would prove false, as had been the case on many previous occasions. The following letter refers to this subject, and explains General Beau-regard's views and opinions upon the future operations of the enemy in Tennessee and farther South :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C.,Dec. 25th, 1863. •' Major-Genl. W. II. C. WHITING, Comdg. Dept., Wilmington, N. C.:

" My dear General, —A merry and lucky Christmas to you ! Your letter of the 23d instant has just been received. I got a copy of the same telegram sent you; but / have been deceived every time that ' same scout,' or some other coming from Baltimore, has furnished news of enemy's movements in my Department. Hence I am very cautious to believe his reports now, al though, of course, I make my preparations all around, so as not to be caught napping. I sent, in return, pretty much, your answer—that I could not defend with success here Savannah and the railroad without additional troops. De fensive works are next to useless if not garrisoned properly. I have there fore applied for the temporaiy return of Walker's brigade, which is now doing nothing, at or near Dalton. It is evident that the enemy, having taken Chattanooga for their spring campaign, are now returning Meade's corps as fast as possible, for fear of being forestalled by Longstrcet joining Lee, and the two together crushing Mcade, which should have been done by this time; for Longstreet would move on 'interior lines,' while Meade's three corps have to go around the circumference of the circle.

"It is probable, however, that when the roads in Virginia shall have be come perfectly impracticable a part of Meade's reinforcements may be sent South for a winter campaign against Charleston, Savannah, or Wilmington; hence Johnston or Lee must be prepared to reinforce us. Hallcck is just find ing out what can be done with sudden and rapid concentration of troops. Our side, meanwhile, is still trying the reverse: see Chattanooga and Knox-ville. I suppose that by the time we shall have no more troops to concen trate we will learn better.

"By-the-byc the President does not seem to place more reliance in that scout's statement than I do : see the conclusion of Colonel Brown's commu nication, i. e., ' Wilmington is believed to be the point threatened, instead of Savannah.' I am happy to hear, though, that the Yankees have given up all hope of taking Charleston ; for I am tired of this useless burning of powder which might be saved for a better purpose. My batteries, however, fire very little— as little as possible. Sumter is stronger, as a defensive work, than it ever was before the late accident to one of the small magazines. Those dam ages will soon be repaired, and I am going to add two 10-inch columbiads to its present armament.

"Hoping that you will be equally successful in case of an attack on Wil mington, I remain, Yours, very truly,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD.

"P. S. — Troops are still reported passing here from the North, going to Hilton Head. General Walker reports about COOO men encamped on that island alone. G. T. B."

In October, 1863, Lieutenant Glasscl performed a daring feat against the New Ironsides. In spite of the enemy's equivocal statement to the contrary, that vessel, the Admiral's flag-ship at the time, was so seriously crippled as to be unable, thereafter, to perform any service in conjunction with the hostile fleet in front of Charleston. The following account is transcribed from General Beauregard's article on the " Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Charleston," published in the " Southern Historical Society Papers" of April, 1878 :*

David reached the New Ironsides about 10 o'clock p. M., strik ing her with a torpedo about six feet under water; but, fortunately for that steamer, she received the shock against one of her inner bulkheads, which saved her from destruction. The water, however, being thrown up in large volume, half filled her little assailant and extinguished its fires. It then drifted out to sea with the current, under a heavy grape and musketry fire from the much alarmed crew of the New Ironsides. Supposing the David disabled, Glassel and his men jumped into the sea to swim ashore ; but, after remaining in the water about one hour, he was picked up by the boat of a Federal transport schooner, whence he was transferred to the guardship Ot tawa, lying outside of the rest of the fleet. He was ordered at first by Admi ral Dahlgren to be ironed, and, in case of resistance, to be double ironed ; but, through the intercession of his friend, Captain W. D. Whiting, commanding the Ottawa, he was released on giving his parole not to attempt to escape from the ship. The fireman, Sullivan, had taken refuge on the rudder of the New Ironsides, where he was discovered, put in irons, and kept in a dark cell

* Vol. v., No. 4, p. 145, et seq. The article was also published in the "An nals of the War," p. 513.

until sent with Glasscl to New York, to be tried and hung, as reported by Northern newspapers, for using an engine of war not recognized by civilized nations. But the Government of the United States has now a torpedo corps, intended specially to study and develop that important branch of the mili tary service. After a captivity of many months in Forts Lafayette and War ren, Glassel and Sullivan were finally exchanged for the captain and a sailor of the Federal steamer Isaac Smith, a heavily-armed gunboat, which was capt ured in the Stono River, with its entire crew of one hundred and thirty offi cers and men. * * * Captain Glassel's two other companions, Engineer Tomb and Pilot Cannon, after swimming about for a while, espied the David, still afloat, drifting with the current. They betook themselves to it, relit the fires from its bull's-eye lantern, got up steam, and started back for the city. They had to repass through the fleet, and they received the fire of several of its monitors and gunboats, fortunately without injury. With the assistance of the flood-tide they returned to their point of departure, at the Atlantic wharf, about midnight, after having performed one of the most daring feats of the war. The New Ironsides never fired another shot (on the coast of South Caro lina) after this attack upon her. She remained some time at her anchorage off Morris Island, evidently undergoing repairs; she was then towed to Port lioyal, probably to fit her for her voyage to Philadelphia, where she remained until destroyed by fire after the war."

On the 17th of February, ISG-i, an expedition, in every respect as hazardous and fully as bold, was prepared and carried out, under Lieutenant Dixon, of Mobile, Alabama, with the submarine tor pedo-boat, as it was called,* against the United States steamer Ilousatonic. She was struck before realizing her danger, and sank almost instantaneously; but the torpedo-boat went to the bottom with her; and though, as it seems, most of the officers and crew of the Ilousatonic were saved, neither Lieutenant Dixon nor any of his associates were ever seen afterwards. They all perished together, for none were reported as being captured by the enemy. They, no doubt, knew how perilous was the attempt they were undertaking. There are principles and there are causes that men hold sufficiently dear to inspire and justify heroic sacrifices. Lieutenant Dixon and the few who were with him evidently looked upon the Southern cause as one of these. We quote again from General Beauregard's article referred to above:

"Nearly about the time of the attack upon the New Ironsides by the David j Mr. Horace L. Hunley, formerly of New Orleans, but then living in Mobile, offered me another torpedo-boat, of a different description, which had

* Also called the " fish torpedo-boat." t It was four months later.

been built with his private means. It was shaped like a fish, made of gal vanized iron, was twenty feet long, and at the middle three and a half feet wide by five deep. From its shape it came to be known as the ' fish tor pedo-boat.' Propelled by a screw worked from the inside by seven or eight men, it was so contrived that it could be submerged and worked under water for several hours, and to this cud was provided with a fin on each side, worked also from the interior. By depressing the points of these fins the boat, when in motion, was made to descend, and by elevating them it was made to rise. Light was alForded through the moans of bull's-eyes placed in the man-holes. Lieutenant Payne, C. S. N., having volunteered, with a crew from the Confederate navy, to man the fish-boat for another attack upon the New Ironsides, it was given into their hands for that purpose. While tied to the wharf at Fort Johnson, whence it was to start under cover of night to make the attack, a steamer passing close by capsized and sunk it. Lieu tenant Payne, who at the time was standing in one of the man-holes, jumped out into the water, which, rushing into the two openings, drowned two men then within the body of the boat. After the recovery of the sunken boat Mr. Hunley came from Mobile, bringing with him Lieutenant Dixon, of the Alabama Volunteers, who had successfully experimented with the boat in the harbor of Mobile, and under him another naval crew volunteered to work it. As originally designed the torpedo was to be dragged astern upon the sur face of the water; the boat, approaching the broadside of the vessel to be attacked, was to dive beneath it, and, rising to the surface beyond, continue its course, thus bringing the floating torpedo against the vessel's side, when it would be discharged by a trigger contrived to go off by the contact. Lieutenant Dixon made repeated descents in the harbor of Charleston, diving under the naval receiving-ship, which lay at anchor there. But one day, when he w r as absent from the city, Mr. Hunle} r , unfortunately, wishing to handle the boat himself, made the attempt. It was readily submerged, but did not rise again to the surface, and all on board perished from asphyxia tion. When the boat was discovered, raised, and opened the spectacle was indescribably ghastly: the unfortunate men were contorted into all kinds of horrible attitudes, some clutching candles, evidently endeavoring to force open the man-holes; others lying in the bottom, tightly grappled together, and the blackened faces of all presented the expression of their despair and agony. After this tragedy I refused to permit the boat to be used again; but Lieutenant Dixon, a brave and determined man, having returned to Charleston, applied to me for authority to use it against the Federal steam sloop-of-war Ilouscdonic, a powerful, new vessel, carrying eleven guns of the largest calibre, which lay at the time in the North Channel, opposite Beach Inlet, materially obstructing the passage of our blockade-runners in and out. At the suggestion of my Chief of Staff, General Jordan, I consented to its use for this purpose, not as a submarine machine, but in the same manner as the David. As the Housatonic was easily approached through interior chan nels from behind Sullivan's Island, and Lieutenant Dixon readily procured a volunteer crew, his little vessel was fitted with a Lee spar-torpedo, and the expedition was undertaken. Lieutenant Dixon, acting with characteristic

coolness and resolution, struck and sunk the Ilousatonic on the night of February 17th, 1864 ; but, unhappily, from some unknown cause, the torpedo-boat was also sunk, and all with it lost. Several years since, a ' diver,' ex amining the wreck of the Ilousatonic, discovered the fish-boat lying alongside of its victim."

Other Federal steamers and transports, in other portions of the Department, were also struck, and often greatly damaged, by torpedoes planted, by General Beauregard's orders, in several streams, in Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Thus were destroyed, in April, 1864, on the St. John's River, Florida, first, the Maple Leaf, and, afterwards, the General Hunter • and in the Ossabaw Sound the Columbine and the Water Witch. Both the latter were captured by boarding parties, in May and June, 1864.

The main incident of this particular period of the war, in Gen eral Beanregard's Department, was the battle of Ocean Fond, in Eastern Florida, which took place on the 20th of February, 1864, and shed lustre on the Confederate troops engaged.

At Jacksonville, Florida, on the 7th of February, the enemy landed a considerable force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which was increased by further arrivals on the 8th. General Finegan, with his well - known energy, immediately issued all necessary orders for the concentration of his scattered troops, and lost no time in notifying General Beauregard of the emer gency. From Jacksonville the enemy, unhindered, pressed on to Baldwin ; then to Barber's; then to Sanderson, and was, on the llth, within three miles of Lake City. There his progress was checked by a force composed of about 450 infantry, 100 cavalry, and two pieces of artillery. He fell back to Sanderson, and thence to Barber's, on the east bank of the St. Mary's, where he evidently intended to concentrate before moving on Lake City.

In the mean time General Finegan, with all the reinforcements he had thus far been able to procure, had marched to Ocean Pond, on the Olustee River, and, on the 13th, with not more than 2000 men of all arms, resolutely awaited the enemy's advance.

Several days of anxious suspense w r ere thus passed, during which, to the great relief of all, the following troops arrived, namely : the 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 2Sth Georgia Regiments, and the 6th Florida Battalion, with four guns of the Chatham Artillery. They w T ere placed under Brigadier-General Culquitt, and formed what General Finegan termed his First Brigade. The

32d and 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st Georgia Regulars, the 1st Florida Battalion, and Bonaud's Battalion, with Guerard's Light Battery, all under Colonel G. P. Harrison, constituted the Second Brigade. The cavalry was organized into a Third Brigade, under Colonel C. Smith: thus making a total effective force of about 4600 infantry, 600 cavalry, and three batteries of light ar tillery.

The rapidity with which our forces were concentrated from different points, and especially from Charleston and Savannah, is worthy of all praise ; the more since between the Georgia and Florida lines of railroad there then existed a gap of some twenty-six miles, over which the Carolina and Georgia troops had to march before reaching their destination. And here it is proper to remark that, shortly after the eastern part of Florida had been added to General Beauregard's command,* he had called the at tention of the War Department to that obstacle in the way of rapid concentration, in case of urgency, and had recommended that the iron on the Key West Railroad, which was not used at the time, be taken for the purpose of closing up this gap. Noth ing was done in the matter, however, owing, it was said, to the opposition of ex-Senator Yulee, of Florida, the President and principal owner of the Key West road.

On the 20th the enemy moved forward, in three columns, num bering together about 8000 infantry, with corresponding artillery, and some 1400 cavalry. At 12 M. of that day he was within three miles of General Finegan's position. Our cavalry, sup ported by the 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32d, was ordered to advance and skirmish with the front line of the enemy, and, if possible, to draw it to our works. General Colquitt, with three regiments of his own brigade and a section of Gamble's artillery, now marched to that point, and, by orders, assumed command of the cavalry and infantry forces already sent to feel the strength of the enemy. lie found the latter advancing rapid ly, and our cavalry retreating before him. Without the loss of a moment his skirmishers were pushed forward, and his line of battle formed, with the 19th Georgia on the right, the 2Sth on the left, and Gamble's section of artillery in the centre. The 64th Georgia and the two companies of the 32d were moved to the left

* On the 7tli of October, 1862. See Chapter XXVII.

of the 28th; and, to guard against an attack in flank, the 6th Georgia was extended farther still, in the same direction. Colonel Smith, with the cavalry, was instructed to take a position on the extreme flank, so as to check any movement of the enemy from either side. After these preliminaries, the advance began with true Confederate dash; the opposing forces gradually giving way, though fighting hard to hold their ground.

Seeing at a glance that, with the handful of men under him, his success could only be temporary, General Colquitt now called for reinforcements. General Finegan, in anticipation of his de sire, had already ordered them forward. The (Jth Florida soon arrived, and with it the 23d Georgia. They were sent, the former on the right of the 19th Georgia, the latter on the left of the 64th ; and the 32d Georgia and the 1st Georgia Regulars, under Colonel Harrison, having also come up, were placed between the 23d and 6th Georgia, with instructions to guard the left of the line. The engagement had now become general. The enemy, in heavy force, under General Seymour, fought stubbornly, broke and re-formed his lines several times during the battle; but, after a resistance of more than four hours, finally gave way in confusion, and was closely pressed for three miles, until night compelled the pursuers to halt. In his report General Finegan said:

" Their loss in killed, both officers and men, was large. Four hundred and eighteen of their wounded were removed by us from the field, and four hundred, or near that number, of their killed were buried by us; also nearly two hundred prisoners were captured; several officers of high rank were killed, and others severely wounded. Their loss cannot be less than two thousand or two thousand five hundred men. Five superior guns, one set of colors captured, and sixteen hundred stand of arms; also one hundred and thirty thousand rounds cartridges (damaged by being thrown into water), as appears by the report of the ordnance officer herewith enclosed. The victory was complete, and the enemy retired in rapid retreat, evacuating in quick succession Barber's and Baldwin, and falling back on Jacksonville. * * * Our loss in the engagement was ninety-three killed and eight hundred and forty-one wounded, a large proportion very slightly." *

It may be of interest to revert to the difficulties encountered in forwarding reinforcements from Charleston and Savannah to the assistance of General Finegan. We quote from General Beaure-

* See General Finegan's report, given in full in the Appendix.

gard's report to General Cooper, dated Charleston, South Carolina, March 25th, 1864.*

«* * * On the 7th of February (received 8th) Brigadier-General Finegan reported by telegraph that five gunboats and two transports of the enemy had made their appearance in the St. John's, within five miles of Jacksonville, and on the next day announced the arrival at Jacksonville of eighteen ves sels—gunboats and transports—the landing of the enemy, presumed in large force, and an immediate advance on the night of the 7th of February. Gen eral Gilmer was at once ordered to put in motion, to report to General Fine gan, all the troops he had been previously ordered to hold in readiness for such an emergency. General Gardner, commanding in Middle Florida, was telegraphed to send to the imperilled quarter, with all possible celerity, every soldier he could spare. Colquitt's brigade was ordered from James Island to Savannah, with a light battery. General Finegan was advised of what was done, and instructed to do what he could with his means to hold the enemy at bay, and to prevent the capture of slaves; and at the same time I reported to you this hostile movement, and my intention to repel it, as for as practica ble, with infantry to be drawn from Charleston and Savannah, but requested, in consequence of the very recent discharge of some five thousand South Carolina militia, that other troops should be sent to take their places and avoid danger to Charleston and Savannah. Scarcely had Colquitt's brigade begun to move, when the enemy, in anticipation, doubtless, of my attempt to reinforce Finegan, made a strong demonstration on John's Island. Though assured of the purpose of this movement, it assumed, however, so serious a form as to compel me to divert, temporarily, General Colquitt and three and a half regiments of his brigade, to reinforce General Wise, then confronted by at least two brigades of the enemy (about four thousand five hundred strong), pushed forward in advance of the Haulover, or bridge-way between John's and Seabrook's islands, and in addition several regiments of infantry were detached from Sullivan's and James islands, to be in readiness for the development of the enemy's purposes.

"On the night of the llth ultimo I ordered all our batteries bearing on Morris Island to open a heavy simultaneous fire on that portion, as if a cover for an assault, and with the hope of forcing the enemy to withdraw from John's Island to the protection of his own works. This stratagem seems to have produced the desired effect, or assisted to make him abandon the move ment on John's Island, and withdraw hastily before daybreak, thus releasing and enabling Colquitt's command to reach General Finegan in time to meet and defeat the enemy at Ocean Pond, some thirteen miles in advance of Lake City.

" In the meanwhile other troops, fast as the means of railroad transporta tion would enable me, had been despatched to the theatre of war from the works around Charleston and Savannah, and the positions covering the Sa-

* The whole report, less such portions of it as are given in the text, will be found in the Appendix.

vannali Railroad. This was done, indeed, to a hazardous degree; but, as I informed the Hon. Secretary of War by telegraph, on the 9th ultimo, I regarded it as imperative to attempt to secure the subsistence resources of Florida,

"General Finegan was also apprised of these reinforcements on the llth of February, and instructed to manoeuvre meantime to check or delay the enemy, but to avoid close quarters and unnecessary loss of men.

"While these reinforcements were en route the enemy again attempted to delay them by a movement with show of force against Whitemarsh Island, near Savannah, and it became a measure of proper precaution to halt at Sa vannah two of the regiments on the way to General Finegan, for the devel opment of the enemy's plans, one of which regiments, indeed, I felt it but prudent to detain there for the present. The want of adequate rolling-stock on the Georgia and Florida Railroads, and the existence of the gap of some twenty-six miles between the two roads, subjected the concentration of my forces to a delay, which deprived my efforts to that end of full effect. The absence of General Hill making it injudicious for me to leave this State, I directed Brigadier-General Taliaferro to proceed to Florida and assume com mand, he being an officer in whose ability, field experience, and judgment I had high confidence, not knowing at the time that Brigadier-General William M. Gardner, commanding in Middle Florida, his senior, had returned from sick leave, and was fit for field service, and had gone to General Finegan's headquarters with the troops of his district. Apprised of this, I directed General Gardner, on the 21st ultimo, to assume command, and organize for a vigorous offensive movement preliminary to the arrival of General Talia ferro; but subsequently the victory of Ocean Pond having taken place, in which it was supposed General Gardner, though not in immediate command, had taken an active part, I directed that officer to assume the chief command, and, dividing his forces into divisions, to assign General Taliaferro to one of them. Soon after which, however, I was advised by the War Department of the assignment of Major-General J. Pattern Anderson to the command of the forces in the State of Florida.''

General Beauregard had done all in liis power to obtain from the War Department the appointment of three major-generals, to take command of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, with a view of thus converting these States into three military districts; and, to that end, he had repeatedly recommended for promotion several of the brigadier-generals then doing service under him. They were officers of tried merit, already familiar with the localities, and enjoyed the full confidence of their men. Had his suggestion been carried out, General Beauregard could have moved, freely and at will, from one district to another, whenever, in his opinion, circumstances required it, without in any way jeopardizing the interests or safety of any one of them. But, from all appearances,

the Secretary of War had always opposed the adoption of such a system, and was only induced to take a step in the matter on or about the day of the battle of Ocean Pond. At that time Lieu tenant-General D. II. Hill was ordered to Charleston, where he arrived on the 28th of February, eight days after the battle; and Major-General J. Patton Anderson was sent to Florida, but did not reach Camp Milton until the 3d of March — in other words, fourteen days after the battle. General Giliner, who had been in the Department for several months, but whose services, when he arrived, had not been requested (General Beauregard needed no additional chief - engineer at the time), had been assigned to the District of Georgia, where the Commanding General thought he might be useful, and was already there when the battle of Ocean Pond was fought. The consequence of this tardy action of the War Department was, that General Beauregard, who would have gone to Florida with the first troops sent thither to the assistance of General Finegan, could only do so after the arrival of General Hill; for the enemy, who had made serious demonstrations in General Wise's sub-district, might at any time renew them at other points, then necessarily denuded of troops for the relief of Florida. He reached Camp Milton on the 2d of March, after travelling two days and nights, with hardly any rest. General Anderson had not yet assumed command.

Immediately after his arrival General Beauregard carefully rec onnoitred the locality and its vicinity, and soon obtained all nec essary information as to our resources and those of the enemy. The next day (3d) he telegraphed to the War Department the conclusion he had reached, stating, in substance, that he would endeavor by strategy to bring the enemy out of his stronghold— Jacksonville — and would then give him battle, notwithstanding his superior numbers, reported to be 12,000, whereas ours amounted to but 8000. He stated that he had selected a good defensive line, a few miles in rear of the position our troops then occupied, where he hoped to be able to defeat the enemy, without much loss on our side. In answer came a despatch from Richmond, dated March 4th (received on the 5th), telling General Beauregard that he had been misinformed as to the strength of the enemy and of Jacksonville, and that he should attack at once. The reply sent was courteous but firm, and to the following effect: "Have been

here since the 2d, inquiring into condition of affairs and status of enemy. Am positive in my statement to the Department, and shall not attack. Am willing to transfer the command to next officer in rank — General Anderson — who will attack under the orders of the Department. "Will give him all the assistance in my power." This seems to have satisfied the War Depart ment, as no further direction was sent from Richmond.

A few days later, and while he was still busily engaged in re organizing the forces at Camp Milton, and preparing the de fensive line referred to above, General Beauregard received by telegraph from New Orleans, via Mobile and Charleston, the sad intelligence of the death of Mrs. Beauregard, whom he had not seen since his departure from Louisiana, on February 23d, 1861: more than three years before. Soldiers and patriots are often compelled to silence the voice of nature, to suppress the longings of a loving heart, to sacrifice all that man so fondly cherishes to duty and to country. Grateful should be the land that in spires such high virtue, and all honor to those who can practise it.

On or about the 18th of March orders from Richmond, with drawing most of the cavalry from his Department, induced Gen eral Beauregard to return at once to Savannah and Charleston, after leaving definite instructions with General Anderson as to his future conduct to meet impending events in his district.

They read as follows:

" HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, CAMP MILTON, FLA., March 20^, 1864. "Mtijor-Gcnl. J. PATTON ANDERSON, Comdg. Dist. of Florida, etc., etc.:

" General, —Having to return temporarily to Charleston sooner than I had intended, I desire giving you herewith rny general views as to future proba ble operations against the enemy, now occupying Jacksonville with about 12,000 or 15,000 men, and Palatka with about 1500, as reported by scouts, deserters, etc.

"Your present available forces (less than 8000 men) are not sufficient to enable you to drive the enemy out of Jacksonville, fortified and supported by four or five gunboats, as the place is at present. The task with regard to Pa latka would be less difficult, if you could detach on such an expedition, to in sure its success, a sufficient force from the troops at McGirt's Creek. But this might be attended with more danger than the object in view would warrant.

" Your present defensive line, in rear of McGirt's Creek, for a temporary purpose—that is, until the work around Baldwin (twenty miles from Jackson ville) shall be sufficiently completed to enable you to give battle at that point with all the chances of success in your favor, notwithstanding the disparity in numbers. I have ordered Colonel Harris to prepare positions on those

works for the guns of the siege-train and the 32-pounder, rifled, intended for the new battery ordered on Fleming's Island.

" Should the enemy advance upon you from Jacksonville you should retire on Baldwin slowly, drawing him after you. About one brigade will take po sition in the lines there, with some cavalry on the left; the other two bri gades and main body of cavalry will take positions on the right, ready to take the enemy in flank and rear, by advancing between the Little and Big Cypress Swamps, should he attack the lines in front. In the event of his again being defeated he should be pushed vigorously by the cavalry on his flanks, and the infantry on his rear.

" Should the enemy divide his forces by reinforcing strongly those already at Palatka, the proposed battery at Fleming's Island, on the St. John's, should be constructed at once, and torpedoes put in the river, so as to prevent its navigation.

" Should the enemy, after fortifying strongly Jacksonville and Palatka, leave those two places, with only a strong garrison in each, a battery should be put up at once near the mouth of Trout Creek, a few miles below Jacksonville, to cut off its communication with the mouth of the river. This would insure the fall or evacuation of both places.

" Colonel D. B. Harris, Chief-Engineer of the Department, will remain with you for the present, and has received my general instructions relative to the works referred to. As soon as you shall be able to dispense with his services you will send him to make the necessary examinations about St. Mark's and Tallahassee, to guard those important points from any attack from the Gulf.

"Captain Pliny Bryan, A. A.-Gcnl., is in charge of the torpedoes to be put in the St. John's River. He must consult Colonel Harris as to their location. Captain Bryan is also a very good signal officer; capable of reading the ene my's signals, he would be a good inspector of that branch of the service.

" You will please keep me well advised, at Charleston, of all movements of the enemy in your district. A telegram should be sent at least every other day. I will endeavor to rejoin you as soon as practicable, especially should the enemy intend any offensive movement in your front.*

" Look well to your means of transportation and commissary supplies. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

On the 23d, from Charleston, he telegraphed as follows to the War Department:

"Have returned here to make best disposition practicable incident to the departure of the cavalry ordered to Virginia. It has become more urgent

* General Beauregard verbally advised General Anderson, should the ene my advance, to give him battle; and should the high grass covering the country be sufficiently dry and the wind favorable, to set that grass (some distance in his own front) on fire just before engaging the enemy; then to charge him, while in confusion, with vigor, making as great use of his own artillery and cavalry as possible.

than ever to have an efficient officer of higher rank than brigadier-general to command in South Carolina. General Hill has not entered on duty; he is awaiting an answer to his communication to you from this place.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD/'

About a week later the following telegram was sent to General Anderson:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., March 30*7*, 1864.

*' Be prepared to return, soon as enemy's movements shall permit, Colquitt's brigade, then the Virginia regiments, then Harrison's brigade. Meanwhile, if you can safely strike at Palatka, you should do so. How are General Gardner's operations against deserters progressing?

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On or about the 9th of April, finding that the enemy had near ly ceased his operations against Charleston and the coast, and be lieving he could, tinder such circumstances, absent himself from his command, without inconvenience to the service, General Beau-regard notified the War Department that he would soon apply for a short leave of absence; intending, as he had done in June, 1862, to repair to Bladon Springs, Alabama, to seek that quietude of mind and relief from the incessant routine of duty which, on a former occasion, had produced the most beneficial effect upon him. His despatch read as follows :

"CHARLESTON, S. C., April Mh, 1804. " General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va. :

u * * * ]\fy health requires I should apply for a leave, dependent, however, on operations of enemy. But I cannot make application without a competent major-general. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The next day he wrote as follows to General Gilmer:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., April IQth, 18G4. u Major-Genl. J. F. GILMER, Comdg. Savannah, Ga.:

"My dear General, — Your favor of the 8th inst. has been received. I fully appreciate the views therein expressed, which are correct, but of difficult execution under present circumstances.

'' With regard to General M., I am aware of the objections to him, but my fear was to fare worse. You are, no doubt, aware that not those officers who stand the highest in the estimation of the War Department are sent here per manently. In fact, this has been called ' the Department of Refuge.' More over, my recommendations of and applications for officers are seldom, if ever, heeded. With the exception of Brigadier-General Walker, Colonels Elliott and Harris, and Captain Johnson (the last two engineers), not one of my officers lias been promoted since the beginning of the memorable siege of Charleston, although I have recommended several. This is encouraging nei ther to myself nor to those under my orders.

" Since your other letter Major-General J. has been ordered to this Depart ment to relieve yon. I hope he will do, but from what I hear I fear not.

"I have to request that you will give him, as far as practicable, the benefit of your experience and observation, especially to keep him out of any faux pas or errors. Give him as full and detailed advice as possible, providing for such contingencies as may happen. 1 will, on my part, give him such general instructions as ought to suffice.

" Regretting to lose your services, and with my kind regards to Mrs. G., I remain, Yours, very truly,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Beauregard was preparing to leave about the middle of April, when a telegram from the War Department was re ceived during the night of the 13th, inquiring if his health would permit him to come and assist General Lee in the defence of Richmond. His answer was:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., April Hth, 1864.

" Genl. BRAXTOX BRAGG, Commander-in-Chief, Richmond, Va.: "Am ready to obey any order for the good of the service. * * *

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The order was therefore issued. It was as follows:

" RICHMOND, April 15t7i. 1864. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

" Repair with least delay practicable to Weldon, N. C., where instructions will be sent to you. S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Gcnl."

On the 16th no general officer had yet been sent to relieve him. This made him uneasy, and all the more so that troops were again being withdrawn from his Department as rapidly as the} 7 could be forwarded. His telegram to General Cooper, of that date, read thus:

" Owing to reduction of forces, I shall leave this Department with great concern, which would be much diminished if General Hill were ordered to relieve me; for since his arrival here he has been making himself acquainted with the forces and localities. My Chief of Staff is still quite sick, and can not be, at present, of much assistance to General Jones. I am confident a positive order from War Department would be obeyed with alacrity by General Hill. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

On the 17th he sent the following telegram to General Whiting:

"Am ordered to Weldon for present, but am desirous to see you as I pass through Wilmington, on Wednesday, about 10 o'clock.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD." II.—12

On the 18th General Cooper received the following despatch:

" General Jones lias not yet arrived. Have telegraphed Gilmer to come forthwith. I will leave to-morrow. I have recalled all South Carolina and Georgia troops from Florida, except one battalion infantry and one and a half regiments cavalry. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Jones finally arrived on the 19th. The next day Gen eral Beauregard telegraphed General Cooper in these words:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., April 2Qth, 1864.

"I have turned over command, temporarily, to General Jones to-day. I will leave for point of destination in one hour.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Before doing so, however, and in order to take official leave of the gallant troops of his Department, he issued to them this

address:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., April 20Z/&, 1804.

"Officers and Soldiers, —By an order of his Excellency the President I am relieved temporarily from the command of this Department by Major-General Sam Jones, to be assigned to another important command.

" I leave with the assurance that you will transfer to my successor, a meri torious officer of the Armies of Virginia and Tennessee, that confidence and spirit of prompt obedience to orders which have contributed so much to your success heretofore.

" Should you ever become discouraged, remember that a people from whom have sprung such soldiers as those who defended Wagner and Sumter caii never be subjugated in a war of independence.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

CHAPTER XXXY.

Arrival of General Beauregard at Weldon, April 22d.—He Disapproves Oper ations against Plymouth and Newbern.—Predicts Burnside's Attack upon Petersburg, and Advises Concentration of Forces. — Letter of General Bragg.—Alarm of the Authorities in Richmond.—General Butler Beaten oif on the 6th and 7th of May.—Kecall of Troops.—General Hoke's Junc-' tion with General Ransom.—General Beauregard Reaches Drury's Bluff. —His Plan to Destroy Butler's and Grant's Forces.—He Submits it to General Bragg.—The Latter Approves, but will not Consent without the President's Ratification.—President Davis Visits Drury's Bluff.—Refuses his Consent.—General Beanregard's Command is Extended.—He Forms a Plan of Attack.—Narrative of the Battle of Drury's Bluff.—Failure of General Whiting to Arrive in Time.—General Wise's Comments upon him.—He Resigns his Command.—Errors of Mr. Davis.

GENERAL BEAUKEGAKD reached Weldon, North Carolina, on the 22d of April, 1864; but, contrary to the assurances given him by the War Department, found no orders awaiting him there. He immediately called General Bragg's attention to the fact, and the next day was officially assigned to the command of what was called the Department of North Carolina and Cape Fear, including Vir ginia south of the James and Appornattox, and all that portion of North Carolina east of the mountains. On the 23d he assumed command of his new Department, which he henceforth designated as the "Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia," and applied for those officers of his former staff whose services lie deemed indispensable.

While at Weldon, watching and aiding certain operations spe cially ordered by the War Department against Plymouth and New-bern, but of which he did not approve, he carefully studied on the maps then in his possession the field around Petersburg, between that city and the James, and along the lines of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, then about to become the theatre of a hostile movement against the Confederate capital under Major - General B. F. Butler.

This expedition General Beauregard had anticipated for several weeks, and he had instructed his Chief-Engineer, Colonel Harris,

to reconnoitre, for the purpose of occupation and defence, the position at Bermuda Hundreds, which afterwards became the base of General Butler's operations. He had also instructed Colonel Harris to inspect closely old Fort Powhatan, a few miles below City Point, on the James, which he desired to strengthen and re-arm with heavy guns, besides blocking up the river — there narrower than elsewhere—with torpedoes and other obstructions. But before this could be done General Butler had landed at Bermuda Hundreds an army of about 30,000 men, composed of two corps, under Generals Gillmore and W. F. Smith.

On the 25th of April General Beauregard sent the following telegrams to General Bragg, who was then acting as military ad viser of the President and General Chief of Staff of the Con federate Armies:

li 1. Every indication is that Burnskle will attack Richmond via Petersburg. Are we prepared to resist him in that direction ? Can the forces of this Department be concentrated in time ? are questions worthy of immediate consideration by the War Department.

i: 2. Burnside's point of attack being still uncertain, and our ironclad in the Jseuse having grounded firmly, is it prudent to leave longer the forces in Department so scattered ? Is object in view worth the great risk incurred ? I know not yet what troops are about Petersburg. Here there is only one State regiment, and in Wilmington two regiments, infantry, movable troops."

He also wrote a letter to General Bragg on the same subject,* condemning the existing state of affairs, and pointing out the dan ger to be apprehended in case of a sudden attack by the enemy upon Petersburg or Weldon. He advised the division of his De partment into three military districts, under three major-generals, with a view to insure a successful defence with the smallest avail able force. But the Xewbern expedition was yet looked upon by the Administration as the true initiatory step to future and more important concentration. General Bragg, therefore, answered evasively, as follows:

1. " RICHMOND, VA., April 25th, 1864.

" General BEAUREGARD :

k ' Reports of yesterday represent Burnside landing in force at Yorktown. Evans's whole brigade was ordered to Wilmington. lias it arrived ? Which brigade can best be spared from South Carolina— Colquitt's or Wise's ? The Xavy Department has taken action to relieve the grounded gunboat.

" BRAXTON BRAGG, General.' 1

* See Appendix.

2. " RICHMOND, April ZQth, 1864.

" To General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"The movement under Major-General Iloke, if prompt and successful, will enable us to concentrate a formidable force to meet Burnside. If not made, or unsuccessful, a large portion of your force must be held in North Carolina, to guard the railroad. Knowing his energy and activity, the President has promoted him (General Hoke), to avoid any difficulty about commands. Urge him to action. BRAXTON BRAGG, General."

Still more, however, than the two foregoing telegrams does the following letter show what undue importance was attached to the Newbern expedition :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES CONFEDERATE STATES,

RICHMOND, YA., April 28£/i, 1804. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Weldon, Korth Carolina :

" General, —Your written communication of the 25th inst. received, and has been submitted to the President, with this endorsement, viz.: 'Respectfully submitted to his Excellency the President. Grade's brigade from Southwest Virginia and Colquitt's from South Carolina are now under orders, and it is proposed to draw others from South Carolina as soon as transportation will allow.' The paper was returned to me with the following endorsement by the President, viz.:

"'Returned to General Bragg. With due energy it is hoped the gunboat in the Neuse may be put afloat. The capture of Newborn, and possession of the Sound by our vessels, increased as they may be by the addition of others, will relieve the neces sity for guarding the whole line of railroad as proposed. The attempt should be made with all vigor to improve our condition in the manner indicated, and in the plan adopted for the campaign of General Hokc. Then we may spare troops for other service, either in West Virginia or east of Richmond.'

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"BRAXTON BRAGG, General.''

It being evident that the President would persevere in carrying out this divergent movement, General Eeauregard a few days later — on the 1st of May — forwarded a communication to General Iloke, in answer to the latter's request that he should take personal command of the Newbern expedition. He declined interfering in the matter, but counselled him, however, and carefully developed his views as to the means to be employed and the best method of attack.*

The movements of the enemy in the direction of Petersburg, and the pressing despatches of General Pickett, commanding there, at last opened the eyes of the War Department to the im-

* See communication in Appendix.

minent peril of the moment. It now realized the difficulty of concentrating the forces so injudiciously scattered by its improvi dent orders. The immediate danger to Richmond, apart from that to which Petersburg was subjected, aroused the apprehensions of the President to such an extent that, in spite of General Pick-ett's urgent demand for reinforcements, Hagood's brigade, from South Carolina—which General Beauregard desired to have halted at Petersburg — was ordered to be pushed straight through to Richmond, and not to stop at all on the way/" General Beaure gard insisted, however, that the order should be revoked, and thus were Petersburg and Richmond barely saved by the opportune presence and gallant conduct of Hagood's command. It was upon that occasion that General Butler's forces were baffled and beaten off, on the 6th and 7th of May, in their attempt to seize the Rich mond Railroad above Petersburg. Much praise is also due to the prompt action of General Bushrod Johnson and his Tennesseeans. 11GS in number, whom General Hagood found at the junction when he arrived in person with the remaining companies of the 25th South Carolina Regiment. General Johnson had marched from Drury's Bluff, in the direction of Colonel Graham's firing, with the purpose of giving him assistance. Owing to the po sition assigned to his forces, the part he and his men took in this sharp encounter, which overturned Butler's plans, was not so conspicuous as it would otherwise have been, though it neutral ized the action of the Federal force confronting his line, and thereby contributed to the successful repulse of the enemy. The loss of the latter was estimated at 1000 men, though General Hagood is of opinion that it was probably not so great. The entire population of Petersburg loudly applauded the timely in tervention of the South Carolina brigade. It was presented with a flag by the ladies. From the pulpit thanks were offered to the 1500 brave men composing it; and the merchants of the city, in acknowledgment of what they had done, would receive no pay from them for their divers small purchases at the time, f

Meanwhile troops were hastily called for from all quarters; and so great was the trepidation of the Administration, that their arrival was expected before they had had time to get fairly under

* See telegrams, in Appendix.

t See, in Appendix, extract from General Ilagood's memoirs.

way. Thus was General Hoke abruptly ordered back from the Newborn campaign* and sent to Petersburg, where he arrived, as did also General Beauregard, on May 10th.

Among the various telegrams sent to Richmond on that day

O O €/

by General Beauregard was the following to General Bragg:

"PETERSBURG, May IQtJi, 18G4.

" Am organizing rapidly brigades already here and those arriving into two divisions, under Pickett and Hoke, with battalion of artillery to each division. Many batteries are still en route. Hope to be in position for offensive to morrow night. Will inform you in time for co-operation with General Ran som. G. T. BEAUREGARD."

And on the next day this telegram was forwarded:

"PETERSBURG, May IWi, 1864. " General BRAXTON BRAGG, Richmond, Va.:

" My forces are being united as soon as practicable. You may then rely on my hearty co-operation in defence of Richmond. Appearances here this morning are that the enemy is about withdrawing from this point to rein force elsewhere. I will try to strike him a severe blow before he leaves.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The authorities at Richmond were now in a state of great ex citement. The enemy had been repulsed on the Richmond Rail road, and, to all appearance, had abandoned his original intention of investing Petersburg; but where he would next attempt to strike was the all-absorbing question. Richmond was his only immediate objective, thought Mr. Davis. Mr. Seddon and Gen eral Bragg were of the same opinion. Many telegrams were now sent from Richmond to Petersburg, showing more nervousness than wisdom on the part of the Administration, and seriously in terfering with General Beauregard's plans. No one could doubt that the Confederate capital was in imminent peril at that hour; but that Mr. Davis, and Mr. Seddon, and even General Bragg, from within the works of Richmond, should imagine that they

* General Iloke had already taken the outworks at Newbern, and demanded its surrender; when, in obedience to instructions from Richmond, General Beauregard sent him a special messenger (Lieutenant Chisolm, A. D. C.) with orders to repair forthwith to Petersburg, no matter how far his operations might have advanced against Newborn. General Beauregard had had trains collected at Kinston to facilitate the transport of his troops via Weldon. No time was lost in carrying out the order.

could better appreciate the situation than General Beauregard— who for weeks had warned them of the very danger they had persistently neglected to avert — was indeed more than strange. It is easily seen what the result would have been if General Beau-regard had not resisted the vexatious intermeddling of persons having none of his opportunities to judge of the real state of affairs around him. Fortunately, he finally wrested from the War Department full authority to follow his own course and handle his troops as he thought best.

By his orders General Hoke led the advance column from Petersburg, with six brigades of infantry and eight batteries, for the purpose of forming a junction with General Ransom, at or about Drury's Bluff, and began moving on the morning of the llth. General Beauregard remained to await the arrival of the last two brigades, hourly expected from Weldon, and also to see General Whiting, then just arriving to take command of the forces in Petersburg and relieve General Pickett, who on the day before had reported himself ill.

Butler's army now seriously menaced the position of Drury's Bluff, on the James, which was not originally included within the limits of the Department assigned to General Beauregard. The latter left Petersburg on May 13th with an escort of about 1200 men of Colquitt's brigade and Bakers small regiment of cav alry, after leaving specific instructions, oral and written, with General Whiting, as to the co-operation he was to give, in the im pending battle, with the forces expected at Petersburg from the South. From information received on the way General Beaure-gard's march was deflected from the straight route he was pur suing to the left, by way of Chesterfield Court-house ; and, as the Federals during the day had carried the outer line of works at Drury's Bluff, he was barely enabled to slip between their extreme left and the river, reaching his point of destination at three o'clock in the morning. Late as it was, he called in council Colonel Har ris, his Chief-Engineer, and Colonel Stevens, the Engineer of that post and of Richmond. They explained to him the main features of the Federal attack, its result, and the consequent dejection of our troops. Colonel Stevens also gave him an account of the battles of the Wilderness and of Spottsylvania Court-house up to the 12th, and described the position occupied since that time by the respective forces of Generals Lee and Grant, lie spoke,

likewise, of a reserve of 5000 men, held for the defence of Rich mond, and stationed in or near that city.

After a rapid survey of that theatre of the war, on a topograph ical map furnished him by Colonel Stevens, General Beauregard saw that, as both General Lee and himself occupied the interior lines, it was possible, by a bold, combined effort on our part, to destroy not only General Butler's forces but also those under General Grant. His plan was instantly conceived and communi cated to Colonels Harris and Stevens. He then despatched the latter to Richmond, to present his views to the President; or, if unable to see him, to General Bragg.

Colonel Stevens could not see the President. lie explained his mission to General Bragg, who, previous to taking any action, preferred to consult in person with General Beauregard. He arrived at the latter's headquarters at half-past live o'clock that morning, accompanied by Colonel Stevens.

The plan, now repeated by General Beauregard to General Bragg, was as follows: that General Lee should fall back from his position, near Guinea Station, to the defensive lines of the Chickahoniiny, or even to the intermediate lines of Rich mond ; that 10,000 of his men should meanwhile be swiftly transferred to General Beauregard, together with the 5000 reserves, in Richmond, under General Ransom; that upon the arrival of this reinforcement, which would give him an effective of about 25,000 men, General Beauregard, at day break on the 15th, should attack Butler on his right flank, so as to cut him off from communication with his base at Ber muda Hundreds; while General Whiting, with some 4000 men, moving simultaneously from Port Walthall Junction, should strike Butler's right rear, press him back upon the James River above Drury's Bluff, and force him to surrender by noon of that day, leaving his depot at Bermuda Hundreds a prey to the Con federates ; that General Beauregard should then throw his victori ous force across the James, and, by a concerted movement, strike General Grant on his left flank, while General Lee should attack him in front.

General Bragg expressed his approval of the plan, but also his inability to direct its execution without the consent of the Pres ident, to whom he would immediately submit it. Deprecating the loss of time that would thus ensue, General Beauregard

strongly urged General Bragg to take the responsibility upon himself and issue the necessary orders at once. He feared Mr. Davis might procrastinate and even oppose his views. But General Bragg could not be induced so to act, and left to seek the approval of the President.

Within about two hours after the conference between Generals Beauregard and Bragg the President himself reached Drury's Bluff; and General Beauregard, with more minuteness than be fore, again detailed his plan of operations. The President ob jected that the proposed retrograde movement of General Lee's army towards Richmond, and the withdrawal from it of 10,000 men, were altogether out of the question ; and that he could only add to General Beauregard's force the 5000 reserves of Ransom's division.

In ursine; the advantages of his plan General Beauregard in-

O O O 1 O

sisted that General Lee's withdrawal behind the Chickahominy, where McClellan had been so effectually held at bay in 1862, or even — which would be still better—behind the defences of Rich mond, for a few hours, would render General Grant's left flank more exposed, and bring it within easier reach of his proposed attack.* Among the arguments used by General Beauregard in pressing his views upon Mr. Davis was that, if successful, the stroke would in all probability terminate the war; while, if it should not be successful, the end to which the Confederate cause was helplessly drifting, unless redeemed by some early, bold, and decisive success, would only come sooner. Mr. Davis persisted in his refusal. He would only consent to the transfer of Ransom's division from Richmond, and that not until the next day (15th), expressing his desire that the attack should be made on Butler's army, and his confidence that the latter would be beaten and driven back to his base at Bermuda Hundreds. To this General Beauregard replied that the defeat of Butler alone would be but a barren victory, as had been so many former operations of the war, and was not the ultimate object to be obtained. What .he proposed accomplishing was, the extended decisive result which all the circumstances of the moment favored. But, to General Beauregard's chagrin, all his representations were unavailing: Mr. Davis could not be convinced.

* This was substantially the line in assaulting which, on the 3d of June, at Cold Harbor, General Grant was so bloodily repulsed.

The same day (May 14th) General Beauregard was officially no tified from Ilichmond by General Bragg that his command was enlarged so as to include all territory south of the James; and that he was also expected to protect the city of Richmond from any sudden movement against it from the north side.

Ransom's division was sent on the afternoon of the 15th, mak ing General Beauregard's force about 15,000 strong, which he has tily organized into three divisions, under Iloke, Ransom, and Col-quitt—officers who, except the latter, were then unknown to him.

With that promptness of execution which always characterized his movements on the field, and produced such confidence in those who came in close contact with him, General Beauregard, late as it was, perfected his plan of operations and order of battle; saw, conferred with, and counselled each of his division and some of his brigade commanders; forgot nothing, except his own comfort, and stood ready to meet the impending events of the next day.

Some of General Hagood's remarks in his memoirs referring to these events are so appropriate, that they are now placed before the reader. He says:

"That evening (15th of May) Beauregard, passing along the lines, asked some of his soldiers if they were not tired of this sort of fighting, and said he ' would change it for them.'

" At 10 o'clock at night, on the 15th, Hoke's brigade commanders were summoned to his headquarters, informed that the offensive would be taken in the morning, and instructed in the plan of battle. Bcauregard's plans showed the instinct of genius. They could not, under the circumstances, notwithstanding the difficulty of handling rapidly and effectively an army so recently organized, have failed substantially to have annihilated his antago nist, had not two of his division commanders failed him. The shortcomings of General Ransom and General Whiting are indicated in the official report."

Before 11 A. M., on the 15th, General Beauregard had sent in structions to General Whiting, then at Petersburg, and had fully informed him of his intended movement against Butler. His despatch to that effect was as follows:

"DnuRY's BLUFF, May loth, 1864, 10.45 A.M. " Major-General W. II. C. WHITING, Petersburg, Ya.:

" I shall attack enemy to-morrow at daylight, by river road, to cut him off from his Bermuda base. You will take up your position to-night on Swift Creek, with Wise's, Martin's, Bearing's, and two regiments of Colquitt's brigades, with about twenty pieces, under Colonel Jones. At daybreak you will march to Port Walthall Junction; and when you hear an engagement in

your front you will advance boldly and rapidly, by the shortest road in direction of heaviest firing, to attack enemy in rear or flank. You will pro tect your advance and flanks with Bearing's cavalry, taking necessary pre cautions to distinguish friends from foes. Please communicate this to Gen eral Hill. This revokes all former orders of movements.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gcnl. Comclg."

"P.S.—I have just received a telegram from General Bragg informing me that he has sent you orders to join me at this place; you need not do so, but follow to the letter the above instructions. G. T. B."

He had also delivered to each of his three division commanders the following circular, adding to it such oral advice as the oc casion required:

" HEADQUARTERS, ETC., DRURY'S FARM, May 15^, 18G4.

^General, —The following instructions for battle to-morrow arc communi cated for your information and action.

" The purpose of the movement is to cut off the enemy from his base of operations at Bermuda Hundreds, and capture or destroy him in his present position. To this end we shall attack and turn, by the river road, his right flank, now resting on James River, while his centre and left flank are kept engaged, to prevent him from reinforcing his right flank.

"Major-General Ransom's division will, to-night, take position the most favorable for attack on the enemy's right flank, to be made by him at day break to-morrow morning. His skirmishers will drive back vigorously those of the enemy in his front, and will be followed closely by his line of battle, which will, at the proper time, pivot on its right flank, so as to take the enemy in flank and rear. He will form in two lines of battle, and will use his battalion of artillery to the best advantage.

"Colonel Dunnovant's regiment of cavalry will move with this division, under the direction of General Ransom.

"Major-General Hoke's division, now in the trenches, on the right of the position herein assigned to General Ransom, will, at daylight, engage the enemy with a heavy line of skirmishers, and will hold the rest of his forces in hand, ready to attack with vigor the enemy's line in his front as soon as he shall find it wavering before his skirmishers, or so soon as Ransom's line of battle shall have become fairly engaged with the enemy. General Hoke will form in two lines of battle, four hundred yards apart, in front of his trenches, at the proper time, and in such manner as not to delay his forward movement. He will use his battalion of artillery to the best advantage.

" Colonel Boykcn's regiment of cavalry will move in conjunction with Hoke's division, so as to protect his left flank. He will receive more definite instructions from Major-General Hoke. Colonel Shinglcr's regiment of cav alry will move with the reserve division.

"The division commanded by Brigadier-General Colquitt will constitute the reserve, and will to-night form in column, by brigades, in rear of Hoke's

present position, the centre of each brigade resting on the turnpike. The division will be massed under cover of the hills now occupied by Hokc's troops, so as to be sheltered at the outset from the enemy's tire in front. During the movement the head of the reserve column will be kept at a distance of about five hundred yards from Hoke's second line of battle. As soon as practicable the intervals between the brigades of the reserve division will be maintained at from two to three hundred yards.

"The reserve artillery, under General Colquitt, will follow along the turn pike, about three hundred yards in rear of the last brigade. He will use it to the best advantage. Simultaneously with these movements Major-General Whiting will move with his division from Petersburg, along the Petersburg and Richmond Turnpike, and attack the enemy, flank and rear.

"The movements above indicated must be made with all possible vigor and celerity.

"The Generals commanding divisions, and Colonels Baker and Shingler, commanding cavalry, will report at these headquarters at 6 h. P. M. to-day. In the mean time they will give all necessary instructions for providing their respective commands with sixty rounds of ammunition issued to each man, and at least twenty rounds for each in reserve. They will cause their com mands to be supplied with two days' cooked rations.

" G. T. BEAUREGAUD, Genl. Comdg."

Nothing could bo more explicit and nothing clearer. Each di vision commander knew exactly what lie was expected to do. lie knew also, and so did each brigade commander, what movements would be executed on other portions of the field. To acquaint his subordinates with the general outlines of his plans when about to put them into execution, and thus insure unity of action, was one of the methods habitually used by General Beauregard during the war. The wisdom of this course was never more clearly ex hibited than upon this occasion.

General Beauregard's narrative of the battle of Drury's Bluff, and the divers incidents connected with it, will be found in the following passages, taken from his report to the War Department:

"Ransom moved at 4.45 A.M., being somewhat delayed by a dense fog, which lasted several hours after dawn and occasioned some embarrassment. His division consisted of the following brigades, in the order mentioned, com mencing from the left: Grade's, Kempers (commanded by Colonel Terry), Burton's (under Colonel Fry), and Colonel Lewis's (Hoke's old brigade).

"He was soon engaged, carrying, at G A.M., with some loss, the enemy's line of breastworks in his front, his troops moving splendidly forward to the assault, and capturing five stands of colors and some five hundred prisoners. The brigades most heavily engaged were Graders and Kcmper's, opposed to the enemy's right, the former turning his flank. He then halted to form, re ported his loss heavy and troops scattered by the fog, his ammunition short,

and asked for a brigade from the reserve. Colquitt's brigade was sent him at 6.30 A. AT., with orders for its return when it ceased to be indispensable.

" Before either ammunition or the reserve brigade had arrived he reported the enemy driving Ilokc's left, and sent the right regiment of Lewis's brigade forward at double-quick towards the point of supposed danger. This held the enemy long enough for the reserve brigade to arrive, charge, and drive him back from the front of our left centre, where the affair occurred, over and along the works, to the turnpike.

"It will be seen, in a subsequent part of this report, that one of Ilagood's advance regiments had unexpectedly come in contact with the enemy and been ordered back, it not being contemplated to press at this point until Ransom should swing round his left, as directed in the battle order. This possibly originated Ransom's impression as to the situation of Hoke's left, which had, in fact, steadily maintained its proper position.

"At 7.15 A.M. Colquitt's brigade, of the reserve, was recalled from Ransom, and a slight modification of the original movement was made to relieve Hoke, on whose front the enemy had been allowed to mass his forces by the inaction of the left.

" Ransom was ordered to flank the enemy's right by changing the front of his right brigade, to support it by another in echelon, to advance a third towards Proctor's Creek, and to hold a fourth in reserve. This modification was intended to be temporary, and the original plan was to be fully carried out on the seizure of the river and Proctor's Creek crossing.

" In proceeding to execute this order Ransom found the reserve brigade engaged and his own troops moving by the right flank towards the firing at the centre. He therefore sent Burton's brigade back instead of Colquitt's, and reported a necessity to straighten the lines he had stormed. Here his infantry rested during the greater part of the clay. Dunnovant's cavalry, dis mounted, being thrown forward, as skirmishers, towards a small force which occupied a ridge in the edge of George Gregory's woods, north of Proctor's Creek. This force, with an insignificant body of cavalry, believed to be ne groes, and a report of threatening gunboats (which came some hours earlier, as since ascertained), were the only menace to our left.