" The telegram of the President not being explicit as to the status of Au gusta, I have requested that it should be included in your Department, as you now have under you the whole of Wheeler's cavalry and nearly all the avail able forces of Georgia, which are also required by you for the defence of South Carolina. The defence of the city is so intimately connected with that of the western portion of this State, that you will consider it within the limits of your Department until further orders from the War Department.
" I have already given you all the verbal instructions possible for the defence of Charleston and this State. The answer of the War Department, not yet re ceived, to my telegram of the 27th instant, will determine whether, in the event of evacuating this city, you will retire towards Georgia or North Caro lina as a base. The first is your natural base; but should you have reason to expect large reinforcements from the latter State, you should, of course, retire in that direction.
" You will apply to the defence of Charleston the same principle applied to that of Savannah: that is, defend it as long as compatible with the safety of your forces. Having no reason at present to expect succor from an army of relief, you must save your troops for the defence of South Carolina and Georgia.
" The fall of Charleston would, necessarily, be a terrible blow to the Confed eracy, but its fall, with the loss of its brave garrison, would be still more fatal to our cause. You will, however, make all the preparations necessary for the possible evacuation of the city, and ' clear your decks for action.' Should it not take place, the trouble and expense of transportation will amount to little ; but should you be compelled to evacuate the city when unprepared, the loss of public property would be incalculable.
"All the cotton in the city should be removed; and if any be in the city afc the time of its evacuation, it must be destroyed.
"As already instructed, you should organize all your troops for the field, collecting sufficient transportation, ammunition, and provisions for an active -campaign. You must have depots of provisions and forage at several points in the interior of the State. Columbia would be a very suitable point; Florence also, if you expect to move in the direction of North Carolina. Augusta, May-field, and Milledgcville must be depots for future operations.
" Your defensive lines from the Savannah River would be as already ex plained to you:
"1st. The Combahee and Salkehatchie to Barnwell Court-house, thence to the Savannah River.
" 2d. The Ashcpoo and Salkehatchie to Barnwell Court-house, thence to Savannah River.
" 3d. Edisto to Branchvillc, thence across towards Barnwell Court-house.
" 4th. Edisto and Caw-caw Swamp, or Rantool Creek.
" 5th. Edisto and Ashley.
>¥ Wheeler's cavalry must protect your front towards Savannah River, and your right flank from Barnwell Court-house towards Augusta. At least, the larger portion of his cavalry must be south of that river to watch the move ments and check the progress of any force moving towards Augusta or the interior of Georgia, until the rest of the cavalry and other forces could be sent to give battle to the enemy.
"Please keep General Cobb and myself advised of your movements and those of the enemy, in order that we may give you in time any assistance in our power.
" Ploping that you may be successful in holding Charleston, and repelling any advance of the enemy,
"I remain, respectfully, your obt. servt.,
" G. T. BEAUEEGARD, General."
These dispositions being taken, General Bean regard left Charleston on the 2d of January, 1805, and on the 8th reached Montgomery, on his way to Tupelo, Miss. He carried with him sad forebodings of inevitable calamity to the Confed eracy—the consequence of General Hood's disastrous campaign into Middle Tennessee.
CHAPTER XLIIT.
General Hood Desires General Beauregard to Visit the Army of Tennessee.— Despatches Concerning General Cheatham.—General Beauregard's Inabil ity to go to General Hood's Assistance.—The Disaster at Nashville.—Gen eral Beauregard's Great Anxiety.—He is Again Urged to go to the West. —He Telegraphs the War Department for Authority to Place General Taylor in Command of the Army of Tennessee, if Necessary.—The War Department Approves.—General Beauregard Starts for Corinth.—His In structions to General Hardce.—Reaches Macon on the Gth of January.— Confers with General Cobb.—Suggests Advisability of Restoring General J. E. Johnston to his Former Command.—Despatch from General Hood Stating that the Army had Recrossed the Tennessee River.—He Again Calls on General Beauregard.—Urges One Hundred Days' Furlough for the Trans-Mississippi Troops.—The Idea Disapproved by the War Depart ment and by General Beauregard.—Troops from the Army of Tennessee Sent to the Assistance of General Hardce.—General S. D. Lee's Corps, under Stevenson, goes First.—Shattered Condition of the Army.—General Hood Asks to be Relieved of his Command.—Lieut.-General Taylor Ap pointed in his Stead.—General Hood's Farewell Circular to his Troops.— General Taylor Assumes Command.—General Beauregard Visits Mobile January 21st.—He Inspects all the Works.—Leaves for Augusta.—The Enemy Believed to be Advancing on that City. — General Beauregard Gives his Attention to all the Threatened Points of his Vast Department
JUST before the battle of Nashville, which began on the 15th of December, and ended on the 16th, General Hood expressed the wish that General Beauregard should visit the Army of Ten nessee, if he could.* This was proof sufficient that matters were not going on satisfactorily in that quarter, for at no previous time had General Hood evinced the least desire to have General Beauregard with him or his army.
A few days before the following telegram, in cipher, had also been forwarded to General Beauregard, but it was not received until on or about the 15th at Charleston:
"HEADQUARTERS, Six MILES FROM NASHVILLE,
ox FRANKLIN PIKE, Dec. 8th, 18G4. " A good lieutenant-general should be sent here at once to command the
* See his telegram, in Appendix.
corps now commanded by Major-General Cheatham. I have no one to recom mend for the position. Have sent same despatch to the Secretary of War.
" J. B. HOOD, General."
The motive actuating him in this instance will be found in his report, entitled " Operations of the Army of Tennessee," already referred to in one of our preceding chapters. In his book ("Ad vance and Retreat," p. 286 ct seq.) General Hood also explains why he was so desirous that General Cheatham should no longer serve with him. In justice to the latter, however, it is but fair to lay before the reader this additional telegram, forwarded both to the Secretary of War and to General Beaure^ard, and of the
•/ o /
same date as the preceding one:
" HEADQUARTERS, Six MILES FROM NASHVILLE,
ON FRANKLIN PIKE, Dec. Sth, 18G4.
u Major-General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November, which will T)Q a lesson for him. I think it best he should remain in his position for the present. I withdraw my telegrams of yesterday and to-day on this subject.
" J. B. HOOD, General."
Unfortunately, when General Beauregard received the two telegrams he was so much absorbed in the operations along the southern coast of South Carolina and at Savannah, which was then threatened by General Sherman's army, that he could neither go to the Army of Tennessee, nor, at that time, assist General Hood in any way whatever.
On the 15th of December, General Thomas, having collected all his available troops at Nashville, while General Hood had, unfortunately, divided his own,* commenced his attack, which was, at first, handsomely repulsed. It was renewed the next day with great vigor, when, at about 3.30 p. M., " a portion of our line, to the left of the centre, suddenly gave way,"f creat ing no small confusion among the Confederates, and resulting in the loss of fifty pieces;}; of artillery, with other materials of war, and a hasty retreat — by many termed a "rout" — to the south side of Duck River. It was there that S. D. Lee's gallant corps protected the retreating Confederate columns until Franklin was
* He had sent General Forrest and some infantry towards Murfreesboro 1 , to watch or capture a small force of Federals.
t General Hood's telegram of December 17th. Sec Appendix.
I In his book ("Advance and Retreat," p. 303) General Hood says "fifty-four" pieces.
readied,* when Forrest so opportunely joined the army, and thence, with skill, determination, and endurance, formed its rear guard to the Tennessee River.
Speaking of this battle, General Hood in his book saysrf "At an early hour (16th) the enemy made a general attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at all points, with heavy loss, especially in Lee's front. About 2.30 r. M. the Federals con centrated a number of guns against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left of our centre, and which had been occupied during the night. This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery. Accord ingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men — apparently one division — at the base of the mound, and, under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our intrenchments. Our line, thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion."
On the 24th and 25th of December, General Beauregard, who was still in Charleston, received telegrams from Colonel G. W. Brent, his Chief of Staff, then at Montgomery, Ala., informing him that he had " nothing official from Hood," but that, from a despatch received from General S. D. Lee, then at Florence, he was "apprehensive that some reverse may have occurred."J Such information, vague in the main, but significant in more than one respect, caused great anxiety to General Beauregard; but he could not leave Charleston at that juncture, and was therefore compelled to await further tidings.
A day or two later Colonel Brent again telegraphed as fol lows :
" MONTGOMERY, ALA., Dec. 27£A, 1864. " To General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C.:
"If you can be spared from your present duties, I think it important that you should come here as soon as practicable.
" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."
* There it was that General S. D. Lee was severely wounded in the foot, and compelled to leave the field.
f " Advance and Retreat," p. 302.
| See the two telegrams referred to, in Appendices to the present and to the preceding chapter.
General Beanregard's determination to go to the Army of Tennessee as soon as lie could had been taken before the receipt of these despatches; but, fearing now that a disaster might have happened to General Hood, he telegraphed President Davis as
follows:
" CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 25th, 1864.
" Should circumstances require another commander for the Army of Tennes see, I respectfully recommend Lieut.-General Richard Taylor for that position. He is zealous, energetic, intelligent, and judicious. He might remain still in command of his department until relieved by a competent officer.
" G. T. BEArREGARD."
When five days had elapsed, no answer having been made to this despatch, General Bean regard reiterated his inquiry, by sending to the President the following telegram.:
" CHARLESTON, Dec. 31s£, 1864.
" On reaching Army of Tennessee am I authorized to appoint General Tay lor to its command, should I find its condition such as to require a change of
commander ? Please answer at Montgomery.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
When General Beauregard ]effc Charleston, on the 2d of Jan-nary, 1865, General Hood's headquarters were supposed to be at or near Corinth, Miss. It was not, just then, an easy mat ter to reach that point; for the railroad between Augusta and Montgomery had been destroyed, and a circuitous route, via Milledgeville and Macon, was the only one left; this unavoid ably prolonged the journey and delayed General Beauregard in his effort to join General Hood's army.
At Augusta, on his way to Milledgeville, he received President Davis's despatch of January 2d, authorizing him to give the com mand of the Army of Tennessee to Lieutenant-General Taylor, should circumstances justify him in so doing.* This relieved General Beauregard of much anxiety for the moment.
He took advantage of his short stay at Augusta to issue in structions to General Ilardee relative to the defence of Branch-ville against Sherman. He informed General Ilardee that he had selected a defensive line behind Briar Creek, in Georgia, to cor respond with that of the Salkehatchie, in South Carolina/)- put-
* See telegram of Mr. Davis, in Appendix.
t Sec telegram from General Beauregard to General Hardee, in Appendix. See, also, order of War Department giving limits of Department South Caro lina, Georgia, and Florida.
ting it under General G. W. Smith, who then had command of the Georgia reserves.
General Beauregard reached Macon on the 6tli of January, in the afternoon, and remained there a whole day, in conference with General Cobb in regard to military affairs in his district. It was after this conference that General Beauregard, who had had oc casion to speak of his efforts to procure the services of Major-General D. H. Hill, bethought himself also of another officer, General Joseph E. Johnston, whose retirement, for months past, had been the subject of varying comments and painful regret throughout the South. General Beauregard was of opinion that the military experience and other eminent qualities of such an officer could not, at this juncture, be well dispensed with; and, with his usual rapidity of action, he immediately telegraphed the Hon. "W". P. Miles, member of Congress, and Chairman of the Mil itary Committee of the House, that, should the War Department be willing to restore General Johnston to active duty in the field, he, General Beauregard, would gladly yield to him his former command. But nothing was then done in the matter; nor was it likely that the suggestion would ever be favorably entertained. So thought the lion. W. P. Miles, who, in his answer to General Beauregard, said:
" I received your telegram with reference to General Johnston, and showed it to the Secretary of War. I fear he will not be assigned to duty."
General Beauregard had not yet left Macon when he received the following despatch from General Hood :
" HEADQUARTERS, CORINTH, Jan. 3d, 1865.
" The army has recrossed the Tennessee River without material loss since the "battle of Franklin, It will bo assembled in a few days in the vicinity of Tupelo, to be supplied with shoes and clothing, and to obtain forage for the animals. Copy sent to the Secretary of War.
" J. B. HOOD, General."
This afforded a gleam of comfort to General Beauregard, who was now inclined to think that rumor had perhaps exaggerated the report of General Hood's disasters. On the same day, how ever, another telegram arrived. It was in these w r ords:
" HEADQUARTERS, AT CORINTH, Jan. 3d, 1865. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :
"Your despatch of January 1st received. My despatch from Spring Hill, Tenn., informed you of the result of the battle of Nashville, after which I
thought it best to withdraw the army from Tennessee, which was done, crossing the river at Bainbridge. To make the army effective for operations some rest is absolutely necessary, and a good supply of shoes and clothing.
"I think it of vital importance that the Trans-Mississippi troops should be furloughed, by organizations, for one hundred days, and will so telegraph the President. It would be well if you could visit the army.
"J. B. HOOD, General.''
The telegram of January 1st, referred to by General Hood, had been forwarded to him to ascertain what was then the real con dition of his army, as no direct intelligence from him to that effect had been received for more than two weeks. It ran thus:
"MONTGOMERY, ALA., Jan. 1st. 1865. " General J. B. HOOD, Corinth:
" General Beauregard desires a report of your operations since your report of llth of December. Advise by telegraph as far as practicable. Write fully the condition of the army, and what is necessary to give it effective means for operations. We have no despatch since yours of 15th of December.
" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."
The idea of granting furloughs of one hundred days to entire organizations, when the service of every man in the army was then of such vital importance to the cause, could not for a mo ment be encouraged. General Beauregard referred the matter
o o
at once to the War Department and openly opposed it. Mr. Seddon's views coincided with his own, as is shown by the fol lowing despatch:
" RICHMOND, YA., Jan. 8th, 1865. " General BEAUREGARD :
" Repress, by all means, the proposition to furlough the Trans-Mississippi troops. The suggestion merely is dangerous; compliance would probably be fatal. Extinguish the idea. JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."
The "idea" was accordingly "extinguished," as Mr. Seddon so energetically expressed it; for, on the same da} T , after informing the War Department that he would lose no time in carrying out its instructions, General Beauregard informed General Hood that his "application relative to his Trans-Mississippi troops" was disapproved by the Secretary of War; that it was considered a dangerous experiment, and that he fully agreed with Mr. Seddon in that respect. "Discountenance it in full," were the ending words of the despatch forwarded to that effect.* General Hood was thus compelled to abandon his strange plan for increasing
* See Appendix.
the effectiveness of his army; but the following telegram shows how reluctant he was to do so:
"TUPELO, Jan. llth, 18G5. " To General BEAUREGARD :
" I am very anxious to see you here in reference to the Trans-Mississippi troops, and also as to some system of furlough for other troops, and on other important matters. J. B. HOOD, General."
Iii the mean time, and acting upon the suggestion of General Beauregard, who as early as December 23d had advised General Hood "to come with or send to Augusta" such of his forces as were not absolutely required to hold his defensive line,* the War Department expressed its willingness that troops from the Army of Tennessee should be sent, in the direction of South Carolina, to the assistance of General Ilardee. Immediate steps were taken by General Beauregard to hasten the execution of this judicious measure ; and on the 16th of January, the clay following his arrival at Tupelo, he held a long and important conference with General Hood on this subject. The latter, while expressing his willingness to obey the President's and General Beauregard's orders, declared the impracticability of doing so before removing, not only his sick and wounded, but all his stores, from Tupelo; which, he thought, would require at least four days.
Of all the shattered corps of that gallant army, General S. D. Lee's, then under the command of Major-General Stevenson, was in the best condition. General Beauregard, therefore, desired that it should be sent off as soon as transportation could be col lected, without waiting for the remainder of the army; and all necessary orders were issued to that effect.f The bad condition of the roads, the scarcity of provisions, or rather the extreme dif ficulty of gathering them for distribution on the inarch, added to unavoidable delays consequent upon the inadequate means then at our disposal—not to speak of the demoralized condition of the men themselves—thwarted, and more than thwarted, the useful ness of that and all other measures tending towards the same end.
General Beauregard could now realize the full truth of the re ported disintegration and confusion of the Army of Tennessee. Very little — if anything — remained of its former cohesive
* See, in Appendix, General Beauregard's telegram to Colonel Brent, t See Appendix.
strength. If not, in the strict sense of the word, a disorganized mob, it was no longer an army. None seemed more keenly alive to the fact, and suffered more from it, than General Hood himself. So humiliated, so utterly crushed was he, in appear ance, by the disastrous results of his defeat and its ruinous ef fects upon his army, that General Beauregard, whom he had just apprised of his application to be relieved from its command, had not the heart virtually to disgrace him by ordering his im mediate removal. He had not the slightest doubt that General Hood's application would be readily acceded to, and therefore generously abstained from using the power with which he had been clothed.
Two days after his arrival at Tupelo the following telegram
was received by him:
"RICHMOND, Jan. 15th, 1805. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD, Tupelo, Miss.:
" By telegraph yesterday General Hood requested to be relieved from com mand of the Army of Tennessee. His request is granted, and you will place Lieutenant-General Taylor in command, he retaining command of liis Depart ment as heretofore, and you, with such troops as may be spared, will return to Georgia and South Carolina.
" JAMES A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."
Both Generals Hood and Taylor were immediately informed of this order; and General Beauregard, after giving detailed in structions to General Smith, Chief - Engineer, for the defence of Choctaw and Open Bluff, Ala., and the river at those points, started on the 19th of January for Augusta, Ga., via Mobile. lie had on that day requested General Hood to hold Cheatham's corps (less Gibson's brigade) in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and to see to it that one hundred rounds of small-arms am munition per man should be sent with the troops going to Georgia.
On his departure from Tupelo he left with General Taylor the following special field order, with date in blank, to be filled on the day of its ^oin^ into effect:
»/ CT? £T>
" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
TUPELO, Miss., Jan. , 18G5.
" 1st. General J. B. Hood is relieved, at his own request, by the War De partment from the command of the Army of Tennessee. He will report for orders to the War Department, at Richmond, Virginia.
" 3d. Lieutenant-General II. Taylor, commanding Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana, will assume command of the Army of Tennessee until further orders. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
It was only on the 23d that General Hood took leave of the army, after addressing a circular to his troops, in which, with characteristic manliness, as will be seen, he took upon himself the entire responsibility of the Tennessee campaign. He said:
" Soldiers, —At my request I have this clay been relieved from the command of this army. In taking leave of you accept niy thanks for the patience with which you have endured your many hardships during the recent campaign. I am alone responsible for its conception, and strived hard to do my duty in its execution. I urge upon you the importance of giving your entire support to the distinguished soldier who now assumes command, and I shall look with deep interest upon all your future operations and rejoice at your success.
"J. B. HOOD, General."
From that day till the time of its transfer to Georgia and South Carolina, Lieutenant-General Taylor became the commander of what was left of the Army of Tennessee; not, precisely, against his will, but strictly in obedience to orders, and without having either sought or desired the position. lie wrote a simple but energetic address to the troops, and did his best to stimulate them to the performance of their last duty to the cause for whose triumph they had so nobly fought and bled. But he well knew, while he thus endeavored to quicken to new deeds of heroism the overtaxed valor of the broken forces he now had under him, that it was too late to arouse them to further hope and endurance.
General Maury had repeatedly called General Eeauregard to Mobile, for the purpose of inspecting its defensive works and of giving such advice as his experience should suggest. Other du ties, more pressing at the time, had prevented compliance with the request, which, however, had not been overlooked or for gotten.
General Beauregard reached Mobile on the 21st of January, and remained there four days. He visited every work around the city, and gave minute instructions for its protection, as well as that of the various harbor approaches. To Major-General M. L. Smith, Chief-Engineer, who was not with him during this inspection, he telegraphed, on the 23d, as follows:
" City land defences, next to lower bay, where enemy will probably attack, are still unfinished. System of barbette guns adopted for land batteries is the worst possible. Their fire will be silenced by enemy's sharp-shooters as soon as they get within range."
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF
On the 25th General Beauregard was on the road to Augusta, where he was anxiously awaited. From Tensaw Landing, Ala., he forwarded the following telegram to General Hardee:
" I suggest the immediate preparation of a pontoon-bridge of at least fifty boats."
The purpose of this suggestion was to protect General Hardee's retreat northward, especially across the Santee, in case the rail road bridge over it should be destroyed by Sherman's cavalry, an event which might have compelled the surrender of all our forces south of that stream.
The services of Major-General D. II. Hill had at last been accepted by the War Department, and General Hardee, to whom he was ordered for duty, had, on the 19th of January, assigned him to the command of Augusta. From that city, on the 28th, he reported the enemy rapidly advancing towards him, and ex pressed the hope that troops would be hurried up as fast as pos sible. General Hardee immediately forwarded his telegram to General Beauregard, adding to it these words: " I think your presence of extreme importance at this juncture." The next day the following telegram was also sent by General Hardee:
"Enemy failed in his attempt to cross the Combahee, but 15th and 17th Corps are about to cross the Savannah, to unite with column moving towards Augusta." *
Pursuant to General Beauregard's orders, Cheathanvs corps had been pushed forward to Georgia with all possible speed; and, on the 30th, at Lieutenant-General Taylor's own suggestion, Stew art's corps was also made to move eastward. Its services, Gen eral Taylor thought, would be of far more value against Sher man than in any fitful effort to arrest Thomas, should he begin in earnest a movement southward.
From the time General Beauregard left Mobile till his arrival at Augusta, on the 1st of February, he was incessantly engaged in issuing orders and giving and sending instructions for the rapid transportation of the remnant of General Hood's army. It was then that he called the attention of the War Department to
* See Appendix for these two telegrams.
t See General Taylor's telegram, in Appendix.
the necessity of speedily finishing the railroad from Milledgeville to Mayfield, and asked authority to assign Major Hottle, A. Q. M., to that important work, which he deemed essential to further military operations. But General Gilmer was of a different opinion, and the War Department, therefore, paid no attention to General Beauregard's suggestion. He likewise appealed to Governors Brown (of Georgia) and Clark (of Mississippi), strongly advising them to use the militia of their respective States, and all other means in their power, to secure the return of deserters and absentees to their commands. To Brigadier-General Mackall, as he passed through Opelika, he gave specific orders concerning Palmer's battalion and the impressment of horses for the artillery on its way to the east. Truly may it be said that, during these trying weeks of depression and anxiety, his presence being called for, simultaneously, at almost every point, he displayed unfailing energy and forethought, spoke words of comfort to the depressed —whose number increased with every additional reverse—and never allowed the minutest details of his multitudinous duties to escape his attention.
CHAPTER XLIV.
Generals Beauregard and Hardee Meet, by Appointment, at Augusta.—They Hold a Conference at Green's Cut Station with Generals D. H. Hill and G. W. Smith.—Military Situation as there Developed, and Plan Adopted and Forwarded to the War Department, with General Beauregard's En dorsement.— Disappointment as to the Number of Troops. — Order to General Stevenson.—Enemy begins his Forward Movement on 1st of February.—Disposition of his Forces on the March.—General Beaure gard's Plan for Opposing him.—He Advises Concentration at Columbia, and Abandonment of Sea-coast Cities and Towns.—His Plan of Opera tions, if Aided by the Government.—Ordered to Resume the Command of General Hardee's Department.—General Beauregard's Instructions to General Wheeler.—Telegram to General Cooper.—Tardiness of General Hardee in Evacuating Charleston.—General Beauregard in Columbia.— Confers with General Hampton and the Mayor.—General Hardee's Anx iety.—General Beauregard Goes again to Charleston.—Finds no Definite Steps Taken for the Evacuation.—His Instructions to General Hardee.— Despatches to General Lee.—Returns to Columbia.—General Beauregard Orders Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence to Remove Stores from that City.—General Hardee becomes 111.—His Command Turned Over to General McLaws.—General Beauregard's Telegrams to General Lee.
ON his arrival at Augusta, General Beauregard was met by Lieutenant - General Hardee, who had been invited to await him there. The object of their conference was to adopt a plan for opposing the probable immediate advance of Sherman from Savannah, Beaufort, the southeastern portion of South Carolina, and the whole extent of the Confederate line, along the Salke-hatchie and the Combahee.
Major-General D. II. Hill, commanding the Subdistrict of Augusta, and Major-General G. W. Smith, commanding the " Georgia reserves," occupied at that time the defensive line of Briar Creek, some twenty-five miles south of Augusta, with their headquarters at or near Green's Cut Station, on the Augusta and Savannah Railroad. General Beauregard was desirous that both of them should be present at the projected meeting; and as they could not, just then, absent themselves from their com mands, it was decided that Generals Beauregard and Hardee should go to them.
The conference was held on the 2d of February, at Green's Cut Station, and lasted several hours. The views and measures there presented by General Beauregard were accepted with but little — if any — modification. They are embodied and clearly expressed in the following document, which is laid before the reader. Therein will be found a succinct but correct picture of the military situation at that time, and the reasons actuating General Beauregard in the formation of his judgment upon the subject:
" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST, AUGUSTA, GA., Feb. 3<7,1865.
" Notes of conference had on the 2d day of February, A.D. 1865, at Green's Cut Station, Ga., at which General Beauregard, Lieut.-General Hardee, Major-General D. H. Hill, and Major-General G. W. Smith were present.
" The following was the estimated strength of the forces, in and about Au gusta and the State of South Carolina, which could be relied on as effectives to resist the advance of Sherman :
General Hardee: Regular infantry, P. A. C. S 8,000
Militia and reserves 3,000
- 11,000
Light artillery 2,000
Butler's division, mounted and dis mounted 1,500*
3,500
Total under General Hardee 14,500
Major-General Smith: Georgia militia 1,200
General Brown: Reserves 250
1,450
Total 15,950
" infantry 12,450
Lee's corps: Infantry 4,000
Chcatham's corps: " 3,000
Stewart's corps: " 3,000f
- 10,000
Total infantry 22,450
Artillery 800
Army of Tennessee 10,800
Wheeler's cavalry 6,700
Recapitulation.
Total infantry 22,450
" light artillery 2,800
" cavalry, mounted and dismounted 8,200
Grand total 33,450
* One-half only available at that date.
t Only about two-thirds of that number ever reported.
II.—21
" Cheatham's and Stewart's corps had not arrived. The head of Cheat-ham's corps was expected to come on the 4th or 5th, and the head of Stewart's on the 10th or llth.
"In view of Sherman's present position, his manifest advance towards Branchville from Pocotaligo and Coosawhatchie, the weakness of our forces, and the expected arrival of the reinforcements above referred to, it was deemed inadvisable to concentrate our forces at Branchville and there offer battle to Sherman.
"During the pending negotiations for peace it was thought of the highest importance to hold Charleston and Augusta as long as it was humanly possi ble. Moreover, it being in violation of all maxims of the military art to adopt a place as a point of concentration which it was possible that the enemy, with a largely superior force, could reach before our columns could arrive, it was, therefore, concluded—
" 1st. That the line of the Combahee should be held as long as practicable, resisting the enemy strongly at all points.
" 2d. Should the enemy penetrate this line or turn it in force, General Hardce should retire with his forces, covering his rear with about five hundred cav alry, towards Charleston, resisting the advance of the enemy in that direc tion vigorously behind every available creek, river, or swamp ; while Wheeler, dividing his forces temporarily, should fall back with the main portion in the direction of Columbia, checking the enemy's advance, should he follow, and hold the line of the Congaree until reinforcements could arrive. The other portion of his cavalry was to fall back towards Augusta, covering that place.
" 3d. Should the enemy follow General Hardee and indicate an attack on Charleston, and whenever it should become evident that a longer defence was impracticable, General Hardee should abandon the place, removing all valua ble stores, and hasten to form a junction in front of Columbia with the forces of General Beauregard, who would have to cover Columbia, and take up the Congaree as a line of defence.
"4th. That the infantry now on the line of Briar Creek (about twenty-five miles south of Augusta) should be removed as soon as the stores were brought back, and take up a new position along Spirit Creek, about fifteen miles nearer, which should be fortified. A four-gun battery, with embrasures and heavy traverses, was to be placed on the Savannah River, near the mouth of Spirit Creek, and a similar one at Sand Bar Ferry, both batteries aided by torpedoes in the river.
" 5th. It was held in contemplation to send Lee's corps to Branchville; and in the event of the happening of the contingency alluded to in the second and third resolutions, Major-General Stevenson, commanding that corps, should retire towards the Congaree, protected by the cavalry, where he would watch and guard its crossings until the arrival of Generals Beauregard and Hardee.
"In the course of the conference General Hardee expressed the opinion that it would require at least twenty thousand men to defend Charleston success fully during about twenty days—the extent of provisions there accumulated. He said, however, that his subordinate commanders in that district, Briga-
dier-Generals Taliaferro and Elliott, and Colonel Rhett, estimated the force re quired at from that number to about twenty-five thousand men.
" The troops arriving from the Army of Tennessee were still without artil lery and wagons. Three batteries were expected to arrive at Augusta in two or three days, but the other six and the wagon-trains could not be expected to commence arriving before eight or ten days.
" The enemy, moving with a certain number of days' rations for all his troops, with the hope of establishing a new base at Charleston after its fall, has in re ality no lines of communication which can be threatened or cut—his overpow ering force enables him to move into the interior like an ordinary movable column. Respectfully submitted.
" GEO. WM. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G."
The foregoing report, written by Colonel Brent, from notes furnished him by General Beauregard on his return from the conference, was forwarded to the War Department, with the following endorsement:
" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OP THE WEST,
AUGUSTA, Feb. 5th, 1865.
" Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for the information of the President. If it be true, as reported by prisoners and deserters, that Schoe-field's corps (23d), from Middle Tennessee, and Sheridan's (19th), from the Valley of Virginia, have joined Sherman's army, it cannot be estimated at less than fifty-four thousand infantry and artillery— i. <?., six corps, at nine thousand men each—to whom must be added about four thousand cavalry, forming a total of not less than fifty-eight thousand disciplined and well-organized men.* G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.*'
When it became necessary to operate with the Confederate forces mentioned in the first part of the foregoing report, it was found that their number was most sadly diminished. This re duction—which caused extreme disappointment to General Beau-regard—was due to the exhaustion of the men, numbers of whom had dropped out of the ranks on the march, never afterwards reporting for duty; and to the fact that the Georgia State troops, or " reserves," amounting to about fifteen hundred effectives, were not allowed to pass beyond the boundaries of their State, and were, therefore, not available for any operations in the two Carolinas. Cheatham's and Stewart's corps had also been delayed on their march from Tupelo, Miss.; and Lee's corps, under Major-General
* General Sherman afterwards informed General J. E. Johnston, in North Carolina (April 18th, 1865), that lie had over seventy thousand men in all.
C. L. Stevenson, was still destitute of its means of transportation and of its artillery.
On the 3d General Hill was required to return one of the brigades of Lee's corps which he then had with him at Green's Cut Station, and the following order was thereupon issued to Major-General Stevenson :
" AUGUSTA, Feb. M, 1865.
"General, —General Beauregard desires that you will forthwith move with your corps by rail to Branclivillc, and assume command at that point of all troops which may be there. You will carry with you five days' cooked ra tions. On reaching Branchville you will open communication with Lieuten ant-General Ilarclee, at Charleston, and advise him of your arrival. You will report here in person to General Beauregard, to receive instructions from him.
" Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"GEO. W. BRENT, Col., and A. A. G.
" Major-General C. L. STEVENSON,
Comdg. Lee's corps."
During the latter part of the month of January reports were rife that General Sherman would resume his inarch, on or about the 1st of February, after having consumed nearly a month and a half in recruiting and refitting his army. This would have given the Confederates ample time to collect and reorganize an other army in his front, if the resources of the country had not been exhausted, and if the railroad communications and rolling-stock then at our disposal had not been so much damaged by hard usage and the raiding incursions of the enemy. As it was, and despite very great efforts to that end, the remnant of Hood's army, with its artillery and wagon-trains, could not be trans ported in time to defend the interior of South Carolina.
On the 1st of February, General Wheeler, commanding the Confederate cavalry, with headquarters near Lawtonville, S. C., about half-way between the Salkehatchic and Savannah Ilivcrs, telegraphed that the enemy had commenced his forward move ment, with infantry and cavalry; that he had crossed the Coosaw-hatchie at McBride's Bridge, and was marching in a northerly direction. That Federal force consisted of the 14th Corps, com manded by General Jefferson C. Davis, first on the left, accord ing to General Sherman's map ; and of the 20th Corps, com manded by General A. S. Williams, second on the left; both un der General Slocum, and constituting the left wing of the ad vancing column. Then came the 15th Corps, commanded by
General J. A. Logan, being third from the left, and the 17th, commanded by General F. P. Blair, being fourth from the left. These two latter corps were under General Howard, and formed, together, the right wing of this invading expedition. Each corps consisted of about fifteen thousand men, infantry and artillery, exclusive of the cavalry, under General J. Kilpatrick, reported to be about four thousand strong.
On the 3d of February, having more fully ascertained the con dition of affairs in South Carolina and Georgia, and knowing how insufficient would be the forces then at our command in these two States to oppose any serious movement on the part of Sherman, General Beauregard conceived a plan by which he hoped, late as it was, to redeem the fortunes of the Confederacy, and sent to Mr. Davis the following telegrams:
O O
1. " AUGUSTA, Feb. 3t?, 1865. "To his Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:
" Three points threatened by enemy are of greatest importance to hold at present: Charleston, Branchville, and Augusta. Sherman is now apparently moving on Brauchville. If we had sufficient force to give him battle a concen tration of forces should immediately take place there; but General Hardee re ports only thirteen thousand seven hundred effectives, infantry and artillery, of whom about three thousand are State reserves and militia. Lee's corps, just arrived here, and now on its way to Branchville, numbers only about four thousand effectives.* Cheatham's and Stewart's corps, averaging about three thousand each,t will not all arrive here before 10th instant, by which time enemy will probably have possession of Branchville. Concentration of Har-clee's forces and mine cannot, therefore, take place south of Columbia.
u I respectfully urge the vital importance of concentrating at Columbia such forces as can be sent from North Carolina and Virginia. Ten or twelve thousand additional men would insure the defeat of Sherman and the re opening of General Lee's communications with his base of supplies. I will repair to Columbia as soon as practicable, and, with your approval, will as sume command of all forces which may be assembled there. When railroad to Branchville shall have been tapped by enemy General Lee's supplies will have to be sent via Washington, Ga., and Abbeville, S. C.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
2. " AUGUSTA, GA., Feb. 3d, 1865. " To his Excellency President DAVIS, Richmond, Va.:
" The fall of Charleston and Columbia would necessitate soon abandon ment of Wilmington and East North Carolina. If troops from there and
* It had no more than thirty-three hundred and fifty, t The strength of each was twenty-five hundred men.
from Virginia could be sent me at Columbia, with their transportation, I would defeat, and might destroy, Sherman's army. No time, however, should be lost. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
The two telegrams here submitted show how clear to General Beauregard was the necessity of abandoning all those cities and posts which he knew must soon fall of their own weight, and for whose protection troops were used that could now be better em ployed at other points. But no attention was paid to his sugges tions. The Government persevered in following its beaten track, and preferred fighting the enemy's superior forces with disjointed portions of our own ; thus reversing the essential maxim of war: '• To command success, concentrate masses against fractions."
If General Beauregard had been aided in his effort to collect, in time, at or near Branchville, along the Charleston and Augusta Railroad, a force of some twenty-five thousand men, infantry and artillery, independently of the ten or twelve thousand General llardee had behind the Combahee and Salkehatchie, his defen sive plan would have been as follows.
As soon as he ascertained how General Sherman's four corps were advancing towards Branchville and the four principal cross ings of the south branch of the Edisto (which are lined with endless, impassable swamps), he would have put some five thousand men to defend, aided by abatis and rifle-pits, the three left crossings from the west; guarding each of the minor ones with dismounted cav alry and two or three field-pieces. General Beauregard would then have retired, with the rest of his troops—numbering about twenty-two thousand—in front of Sherman's extreme right flank corps, the 17th, which crossed at Bionnecker's Bridge. He would have allowed this corps to cross about two-thirds of its number, when he would have attacked it with his whole force, and the re sult could riot have been doubtful. He would then have pursued the remainder of that corps with about five thousand infantry and some cavalry; and, with the main body of his troops—seventeen thousand, more or less—he would have turned westwardly, cross ing at Bionnecker's Bridge, and, marching thence towards Hob-man's Bridge, would have attacked the 15th Corps in rear, while the five thousand men left to defend the bridge would have as sailed them in front. Thus pressed the 15th Corps might have been captured or destroyed. General Beauregard, reinforced suc cessively by the troops at the other two bridges, and those left to
guard Augusta, would have been able to march against the remain ing two corps of Sherman's army. It is evident that these corps (isolated so far from their base), at Beaufort or Savannah, could not have reached either point without being sorely crippled, if not destroyed.
We have thus minutely transcribed this plan, because of its strategic value and entire feasibility. General Beauregard had veteran troops under him and veteran commanders, who were all confident of his ability to lead them; and he was justified, by the light of his past experience, in again counting upon victory. It was, indeed, unfortunate that the War Department and Generals Bragg and Hardee did not understand the wisdom and necessity, at this juncture, of the concentration he advised. It would have resulted in the re-establishment of our lines of communication and depots of supplies, and in the eventual relief—if not perma nent salvation—of the Confederate Capitol.
On the 4th of February, General Beauregard was ordered to " assume command of all the forces in the district as defined be fore his departure to the West," with authority, should he deem it advisable, to re-assign General Ilardee to his old corps, and at tach to it any other forces he might select. Had the reinforce ments asked of the War Department been sent with this order, the military situation in South Carolina would soon have worn quite a different aspect. As it was, the authority to act, without the means, could and did avail little.
On the same day General Beauregard forwarded the following instructions to General Wheeler. They are given in full, because they show the movements of the enemy at that time, and indicate what measures were about to be adopted to oppose him:
" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
AUGUSTA, GA., Feb. 4tf*, 1865 : 11.45 A. M. "Major-Genl. Jos. WHEELER, conidg. cavalry at Fiddle Pond, near Barnwell
Court-house, S. C.:
"General^ —General McLaws reports that the enemy, late last night, had forced a passage across the Salkchatchie, in the vicinity of River's Bridge, forcing him back towards Branchville. Should you have received no definite orders from General Ilardee, for the present contingency, you will cross the Salkehatchie, with the bulk of your forces, as close to River's Bridge as safely practicable, and re-establish your communications with General McLaws (of Stevenson) at or about Branchville, protecting, at the same time, the Charles ton Railroad from that point towards Blackvillc, and beyond it, if possible.
"When compelled to fall back from the railroad you will defend the cross ings of the Edisto above Branchville, operating in conjunction with General Stevenson for the protection of Columbia, and the crossings of the Congaree above and below that city.
"The remainder of your force (say about one brigade) left south of the Salkehatchie will retire fighting in the direction of Augusta, holding the enemy in check wherever practicable. It will be sent to rejoin you as soon as circumstances will permit.
''Continue to keep General Hill advised of your movements, and of those of the enemy. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General.''
On the Otli it was still uncertain whether the enemy, after reaching Branchville, would attempt to strike Augusta, Colum bia, or Charleston. lie was, no doubt, inclined to move on the two last at once, and our force was insufficient to check his progress. lie was advancing upon the Charleston Railroad, Gen eral Wheeler striving to get between him and Augusta, and
Or? ^D ;
having all bridges below Ilolman's Bridge destroyed.
The following telegram from General Beauregard to General Cooper, dated Augusta, February 8th, 18C5, describes the .situa tion then existing:
'•Enemy cut railroad to Charleston yesterday (the 7th) near Blackviile. Lee's corps is in position on south fork of Edisto, protecting approaches to Columbia. Head of Cheatham's corps arrived here last night. McLaws's division is at and about Branchville. I shall leave here to-morrow for Co lumbia.
Upon reaching Columbia, about noon on the 10th, General Beauregard immediately telegraphed General Ilardee advising the concentration of his forces from the Cumbahee line to a line behind the Edisto, so as to shorten it as much as possible.
On the day following, in answer to General Ilardee, who had informed him of the crossing of the enemy to James Island in
front of his works, General Beauregard forwarded the following > ~ ~
telegram :
'•COLUMBIA. S. C., Feb. 11M, 18C5. "Lieut.-General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C. :
" By late movements of the enemy it is apparent that he intends to move upon Charleston, or to cut off your communications along the Northeastern Railroad. It is therefore advisable that you proceed to execute, as soon as possible, the movement agreed upon the 2d instant. Guard well your left flank and the crossings of the Santee. G. T. BEAUKEGAKD.''
But General Hardee, for reasons which were never clearly ex plained, imprudently delayed following the advice thus given him. It is easy to understand that he was loath to abandon Charleston, in the effort to capture and destroy which millions of dollars had been spent in vain by the Federal Government, thousands of lives lost, and more than one military reputation irretrievably wrecked, No one felt greater reluctance than Gen eral Beau regard to abandon Charleston. lie had largely con tributed to build up that city's high renown, and valued it as he did his own. Still, an imperative duty lay before him and before those who, up to this time, had helped to place that brave city be yond the grasp of the enemy. The place must be evacuated ; and the sooner this should be done the better it would be; otherwise its garrison, its stores, and public property must fall into the hands of the enemy, thus adding disgrace to misfortune. On the 12th of February, the evacuation not having yet begun, and General Ilardee having asked for additional advice, General Beauregard replied that he could riot judge of the precise mo ment for beginning the movement, but that, in his opinion, further delay might be fatal.
In the mean time the War Department, as usual, had been kept well informed of the movements of the enemy, and knew that General Stevenson had fallen back to the north branch of the Edisto; that Wheeler was moving towards Augusta, to check the advance of the invading column ; also that a monitor was in the Stono, and constant firing maintained, though not, as yet, upon Charleston; that the enemy had crossed the North Edisto near Orarigeburg; that McLaws had retired from Branchville to the "Four-hole Swamp;" and that sixteen transports had appeared in Bull's Bay, north of Bull's Island, on the coast of Christ Church Parish.
A few hours after his arrival at Columbia, General Beauregard had a long interview with the Mayor of the city, Doctor T. J. Goodwyri, and, almost at the same time, with Major-General Wade Hampton, who was then in South Carolina with Brigadier-General Butler, for the purpose of recruiting men and horses for his division of cavalry. As they were both of that State, and well acquainted with its topography and resources, General Beauregard requested their assistance in the defence of Columbia. They re sponded with alacrity, and were forthwith assigned to duty. Gen-
eral Hampton was given the command of the city and its-vicinity, and General Butler placed under him. But soon perceiving the necessity of having a single head to the cavalry—now materially increased by the accession of General Butlers command — and desirous of availing himself of the ability of so distinguished an officer as General Hampton, General Beanrcgard applied for his immediate promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. His re quest being readily acceded to, that tried and experienced cavalry commander, the acknowledged peer of the hard-fighting Forrest, was thus enabled to take precedence over General Wheeler, who, though an active, zealous, and gallant officer, was comparatively unknown in South Carolina, and, therefore, could not have ren dered equal service with General Hampton.
At this juncture General Hardee's anxiety and uncertainty of mind as to the evacuation of Charleston appear to have been extreme. He had apparently forgotten, or was no longer heed ful of, the clear and definite arrangements agreed upon at the Green's-cut Station conference on the 2d of February, which should have been amply sufficient for his guidance. So urgent and repeated, however, were his calls upon General Beauregard, that the latter concluded to comply with them. Accordingly, notwithstanding the threatening movements of the enemy in the direction of Branchville and Columbia, which required his close supervision, he ordered the railroad track to be cleared of all trains that might impede the celerity of his trip; and, on the after noon of the 13th, after sending a telegram to that effect, started for Charleston, where he arrived shortly after daylight on the 14th.
To his extreme surprise and regret, he found that no positive step had yet been taken for the evacuation so much spoken of, because, it was said, of a certain opposition on the part of Gov ernor Magrath and of the Confederate Government itself. Gen eral Beauregard, however, had no trouble in convincing General Ilardee of the absolute necessity of abandoning the city and con centrating our forces, not at Columbia, as had been originally decided — for it was then too late to do so—but at another point on the Charlotte Railroad, namely, Chesterville, S. C.
Most of the day which General Beauregard spent in Charleston on that occasion was devoted to the preparations for the move ment of the troops, embodied in the following document, which he left with General Ilardee for his guidance:
" HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST, CHARLESTON, Feb. Iktli, 1805.
"Memoranda of Orders for Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee.
" 1st. One brigade of Wright's division in St. Paul's will move by railroad to Monk's Corner, and thence march into position (at or about Snowden's), from Sandy Run to Sautee Iliver.
" 3d. The remainder of Wright's division to move ma Summerville, thence to Groomsville, thence along Northeastern Railroad to St. Stephen's depot.
" 3d. The troops around Charleston will commence their movement when Wright's division shall have reached Summerville.
" 4th. Troops in Christ Church will take steamers to Strawberry Ferry, via Cordesville, to St. Stephen's depot.
" 5th. The troops from James Island along sea-front first, thence in succes sion to Ashley Ferry; thence to Six-mile House; thence to St. Stephen's depot.
" 6th. Troops in Charleston to follow movements to Six-mile House, thence to St. Stephen's depot.
" 7th. When the troops shall have arrived at Monk's Corner, McLaws shall commence the retrograde movement from the left flank, resting at Four-hole Bridge, passing in rear of Four-hole Swamp; thence by Piueville road to Pineville; thence to St. Stephen's depot.
"8th. The troops on McLaws's right shall follow the movement as they are uncovered from the left.
" 9th. The rear-guard of the troops executing these movements shall de stroy all bridges and trestle behind them, and railroads, when possible.
" 10th. The troops concentrated at St. Stephen's shall move to form a junc tion with the troops at Columbia, or with the same at Chesterville, following one of the routes, according to the movements of the enemy, as follows:
" 1st. Viet Manchester and Kingsville to Columbia or Manchester, Camdcn, and Brown's Ferry, on the Catawba, to Chesterville.
" 3d. Via Darlington, Kelly's Bridge, on Lynch's Creek, and Brown's Ferry, on the Catawba, to Chesterville.
" 3d. Via Cheraw, Chesterville, Lancaster, and Brown's Ferry, on the Ca tawba, to Chesterville.
" In view of the facility the enemy has at Branchvillc and Orangeburg, and in the direction of Columbia, to cut the line of retreat of the garrison of Charleston, as above referred to, it becomes necessary to commence the evac uation as soon as the necessary preparations can be made.
" The holding of Charleston is now reduced to only a question of a few days. Its loss does not jeopardize the safety of the State of South Carolina, but the loss of its garrison would greatly contribute to that end.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
That night (February 14th) General Beauregard ordered the track cleared again, and started on his return to Columbia. On
arriving at Florence, at 7 A.M., on the 15th, he sent the following telegram to General Hardee:
" Order all roads and bridges repaired on the three routes designated. Horses impressed in and about Charleston must be used for remounting Young's cavalry. Impress, also, saddles and bridles, if necessary.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
On the same day, and from the same place, he telegraphed General Lee as follows:
" I have arranged with General Hardee for the immediate evacuation of Charleston, and concentration of our forces at Chesterville, S. C.; if those of General Bragg could be added thereto success might crown our efforts, how ever dark may appear the present hour. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
While stopping, a few hours later, at Sumterville he forwarded this telegraphic message to General Lee:
" SUMTER STATION, S. C., Feb. 15th, 18G5. " General K. E. LEE, Richmond, Ya,:
" Generals Stevenson and Hampton report from Columbia enemy has ap peared in their front and driven their pickets across Congaree, at railroad bridge near Kingsvillc. They consider movement on Columbia serious. I am on my return there. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
And to General Hardee he sent the following important de spatch :
" SUMTERVILLE, Feb. 15th, 18G5. " Lieut.-General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:
"Commence immediately movement as arranged; and, if practicable, aver age twenty miles a day. Collect at once sufficient provisions and forage, at proper points, on the several routes designated.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
General Beauregard reached Columbia on the afternoon of the 15th, and soon afterwards sent a message to General Lee as fol lows :
" COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 15th, 18G5 : 7.30 p. M. "General R. E. LEE, General-in-chicf, Richmond, Ya.:
"Have just arrived from Charleston. Generals Stevenson and Hampton report Sherman's four corps moving on this place, two of them pressing our troops back on south side to within about four miles of the river. Cher.t-ham's corps has not yet arrived. We will hold the city as long as practicable with present available means. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
He had already had despatches sent to Generals Stewart and Cheatham, calling upon them to hasten their movements on Co-lumbia; and to Major Roland Rhett, A. Q. M., and Captain J. D.
"Witlierspoon, A. C. S., orders were given, on the 15th, to remove all quartermaster and subsistence stores, with the exception of fifty thousand rations, to some point on the Charlotte Railroad, in the direction of Chesterville.
During the evening of the same day (15th) General Beanregard received a telegram from General Hardee, enclosing one from Mr. Davis, showing that, even at that late hour, he was still hesitating concerning the evacuation of Charleston. As will be seen, the President encouraged, and, in a great measure, was the direct cause of this blameworthy procrastination.
General Hardee's telegram read thus:
" CHARLESTON, Feb. 15£A, 18C5. " To General BEAUREGARD :
"The following despatch was received last night from President Davis: 'Yonr despatcli of 12th received to-day. The enemy may, and probably does, intend an attack on Charleston, but it is by no means manifested by present operations. It is proper, under the view presented, to remove what ever is not needful for defence of the place, and then to postpone evacuation as long as prudent. If General Bcauregard can hold the enemy in the field, the course herein indicated may preserve the city and harbor for further uses, and save us the pain of seeing it pass into the hands of the enemy. General Beauregard and yourself are so well informed of the condition of the armies and the practicability of routes, that I must leave you to the free exercise of your judgment. It, however, seems to me that the bridge over the Santee can be defended against a boat expedition up that river without materially injur ing other operations; and a movement by the enemy, overland, from Bull's Bay is hardly to be anticipated.'"
General Beauregard's answer followed without delay. It was in the following words:
"COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 15th, 1865. " General HARDEE, Charleston, S. C.:
" Despatch of to-day received containing President's. I have far from suffi cient force to hold the enemy in check in the field. He is, at this moment, investing Columbia with his four corps (as reported), on the south side of Congaree. Hence I see no good reason for deviating from the plan already decided upon; on the contrary, I urge its immediate execution.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD, General."
The movement was accordingly ordered to begin, on the 16th, without further delay.* Unfortunately, however, General Har dee, who had been unwell for several days, was obliged, at this critical hour, to leave his post; and the command of his forces
* See General Hardee's telegram, in Appendix.
devolved upon the officer ranking next under him, General L. McLaws.* It is for this reason, 110 doubt, that the evacuation was not effected until the night of the 17th and the early morn ing of the 18th.
The following telegrams, sent by General Beauregard to Gen eral Lee, so thoroughly explain the whole situation, that no fur ther explanation seems necessary:
1. " COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 16*7*, 1865. " General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:
" I returned last evening from Charleston. I shall assume command to-day of all forces in South Carolina. The present military situation is thus: our forces, twenty thousand effective infantry and artillery, more or less demoralized, oc cupy a circumference of about two hundred and forty miles, from Charleston to Augusta. The enemy, well organized and disciplined, and flushed with suc cess, numbering nearly double our force, is concentrated on one point, Colum bia, of that circumference. Unless I can concentrate rapidly here in my rear all available troops, the result cannot be long doubtful. General Ilardee still hesitates to abandon Charleston, notwithstanding I have repeatedly urged him to do so, thereby losing several days of vital importance to future operations.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
2. " COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 16*7*, 1805. " General R. E. LEE, General-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:
" Enemy commenced shelling the city this morning. He is apparently mov ing up towards Saluda River. Our forces occupy south bank of that stream and Congaree. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
3. " COLUMBIA, S. C., Feb. 10*7*, 1865. " General R. E. LEE, Gcneral-in-chief, Richmond, Va.:
" Enemy has forced a passage across the Saluda River above Columbia. I will endeavor to prevent him from crossing the Broad, but my forces here are so small it is doubtful whether I can prevent it. Columbia will soon be evac uated. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
From the contents of this chapter, and the orders and telegrams annexed, it is evident that, in the amended version of his account of the evacuation of Fort Sumter,f Mr. Davis is hardly more cor rect than when he first stated that Colonel (afterwards General) Elliott was then in command, and "on receiving the general order of retreat * * * addressed his men in the glowing language of
* Sec Appendix for despatch of Major Ro} r , A. A. G.
t See the amended version of the first edition of " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 204.
patriotism and unswerving devotion to the Confederate cause" * Mr. Davis now admits that General Elliott was not there at the time, and that to Captain Ilnguenin, the last commander of the fort, was reserved the sad honor of retiring the garrison. The acknowledged efficiency of Captain Hugnenin, and the peculiar circumstances under which he was placed, deserved notice on the part of the ex-President of the Confederacy. We have already en deavored, in a preceding chapter, to do justice to Captain Ilngue nin and to the other meritorious officers who made famous the successful defence of Fort Sumter, but whose names are not even mentioned in Mr. Davis'S account.
The " plan of evacuation " of Charleston and its harbor—attrib uted by Mr. Davis to General Ilarclee—was devised by General Beauregard. The minutest details concerning it were marked down by him and impressed upon General Hardee, who, far from having formed any " plan " to that effect, did not even perceive the necessity of withdrawing the troops at that time, and so long delayed the execution of the movement that, with a view to carry it oat, General Beauregard resumed command of the Depart ment, and then ordered General Hardee to evacuate at once. This is the first error noticeable in Mr. Davis's amended account of that event. Another is his omission to state that, because of General Hardee's ill-health and absence at the time, it was Gen eral McLaws who commanded the troops at the evacuation. His third error is the mention he makes of " Colonel Stephen Elliott, Jr.," as " the gallant commander of that fort," intimating thereby, and leading the reader to believe, that, prior to July, 1864, when Captain Hiiguenin was sent there, no other officer than Colonel Elliott had been in command of Fort Sumter. The reader is aware that, after Colonel Hhett had defended the fort for a pro longed period, he was withdrawn from that work, to take charge of the city defences; and that Fort Sumter was afterwards com manded— first by Major Elliott; second, by Captain Mitchell, who fell at his post; and third, by Captain Iluguenin, one of the gallant officers of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), who was still on duty there when the evacuation took place.
* Sec first edition (as originally published) of "Rise and Fall of the Con federate Government, 1 ' vol. ii., p. 204. The italics are ours.
CHAPTER XLY.
The Enemy Crosses Broad River on the 16th of February.—General Beaure-gard Orders the Evacuation of Columbia. — It is Effected on the 17th.— General Bcauregard's Arrival at Ridgeway. — His Despatches to the War Department.—General Hampton's Plan to Oppose the Advance of the En emy. — General Bcanregard Goes to White Oak. — His Letter to General Lee. — He Reaches Chestervillc.—His Telegram to President Davis Urg ing Concentration.—Remarks upon General Badeau's Interpretation of this Telegram. — Apprehension of the Enemy upon this Point. — Reasons upon which General Beauregard Founded his Advice. — His Arrival at Charlotte on the 22d.—General Lee's Despatch Giving Command of the Southern Army to General Johnston.—Impossibility of Beating Back Sherman without Reinforcements. — General Lee's Despatch to the Secretary of War. — Comments thereon.—What Colonel Taylor (Lee's Adjutant) Thought of the Necessity for Concentration. — General Beauregard's Plan the only Wise One. — General Johnston Assumes Command. — His View of the Situation.—General Beauregard's Answer to General Lee. — Arrival of General Johnston at Charlotte on the 24th. — Sherman's Line of March after Destroying Columbia.—Fall of Fort Fisher. — General Bragg Re treats to Goldsboro'.—His Tardy Junction with General Johnston.— Wisdom of General Beauregard's Plan Vindicated.
THE enemy effected the crossing of Broad River during the night of the 16th of February. With our small force of infantry and a few light batteries, under General Stevenson, aggregating about three thousand men, and the cavalry, under Generals Wheeler and Butler, some four thousand men, commanded by General Hamp ton, we had endeavored, in vain, to impede his progress. The evac uation of Columbia therefore became a necessity, and General Beau-regard ordered its execution at daylight on the following morning. The infantry and artillery were to head the retreat, and the cav alry, bringing up the rear, was to file out of the city as the Fed eral columns should enter it.* This movement was carried out to the letter with perfect system and order. The conflagration and pillage that took place after our troops had left will form the subject of another chapter.
* Sec letters to Generals Hampton, Stevenson, and Cheatham, in Appendix. See, also, instructions to Colonel G. W. Brent.
General Beauregard rode out of Columbia, with his staff, at 10 A. M. on the 17th, taking a northerly route towards Chester, where he thought he might still be able to form a junction with General Hardens forces.
He arrived at Ridgeway, about twenty-five miles from Colum bia, on the night of the 17th, and remained there nearly two days, giving orders to his different commands, and reporting to the President and General Lee every incident of importance con nected with the movements of his troops. His first telegram to the latter read as follows:
" RIDGEWAY, S. C., Feb. 176% 1865 : 9.30 p. M. " General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va.:
" Enemy having forced crossing of Saluda and Broad rivers above Colum bia, city had to be evacuated this morning. My forces are now retiring on this place. Everything possible shall be done to retard enemy's advance, but I cannot separate cavalry from infantry without fear of disaster, owing to small number of latter—only about three thousand effectives. Moreover, having no
supply trains, troops must move along railroad.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
In answer to a despatch from the Secretary of War, alleging interference with provisions at Charlotte which had been ordered to Richmond by the Commissary-General, General Beauregard immediately forwarded this telegram:
" RIDGEWAY, S. C., Feb. Hth, 1865: 9.30 P.M. " General BRECKINRIDGE, Secy, of War, Richmond, Va.:
"Far from interfering with provisions at Charlotte Junction, I have done all I could to send everything forward from Columbia.* I advise removal of all supplies, except two hundred thousand rations, from Charlotte to a safer place farther north ; no time should be lost. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
On the 18th he informed General McLaws, who had tempo rarily relieved General Hardee, that Columbia had been aban doned ; that Hampton's cavalry was still near the city; that the future intentions of the enemy were not yet fully ascertained; but that all instructions given to General Hardee must be rapidly carried out.
On the same day General Hampton, by despatch, proposed a plan of concentration to check the enemy's further advance. It
* See; in Appendix to preceding chapter, General Bcauregard's orders to Major R. Rhett, A. Q. M., and to Captain Witherspoon, A. C. S., for removal «f stores from Columbia. II.—22
was ably conceived, and, under other circumstances, might have resulted successfully. But, as Cheatham's and Hardee's troops could not have reached the designated point in time, and as the 14th Corps (Federal) had already crossed to the east of Broad River, it being probable that the 20th would cross on the next-day, at Alston, General Beauregard was of opinion that, with our small forces then available, we could effect no serious damage to the 15th Federal Corps, and that our line of retreat to Chcster-ville might, on the other hand, be entirely cut off by the 14th and 20th Corps — thus opening an unobstructed country to the enemy through the State of South Carolina. General Hampton's suggestion, therefore, was not adopted.'*
From Ridgeway, General Beauregard passed on to White Oak, where, on the 19th and 20th, he sent important instructions to Generals Hampton and Stevenson, directing their movements and line of march, and advising necessary measures for the removal of rations at Chesterville.
He also forwarded the following message to General Lee :
" WHITE OAK, Feb. 19*A, 18G5. " General R. E. LEE, Richmond, Va. :
" General, — After close examination and exerting every means in my power, I find it impossible for the troops now in Charleston to form a junction with me this side of Greensboro' (North Carolina). Believing it best, from the in formation just received from Governor Vance and General Bragg, to transport the troops by rail to that point, I have directed General McLaws to move them by rail as rapidly as possible. I am also of the opinion that Cheatham, at Ncwbcrry, this morning, with two thousand men, and Stewart, eighteen hours behind him, with twelve hundred, cannot form a junction with me ex cept by moving across, via Statesburg and Manchester, and thence, by rail, to Greensboro'. This movement will require some days, owing to the difficulties of crossing Broad and Wateree rivers. The enemy has advanced to-day to near Winnsboro', in force, and is still moving along the railroad, keeping be tween this place and Broad River, thus cutting off Cheatham and Stewart.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
This was before the enemy had decided to move eastward. General McLaws was informed of the countermanded movement. and General Bragg, at Wilmington, was asked to communicate with and afford him all the aid in his power.
General Beauregard arrived at Chesterville on the night of the
* See Appendix.
20th. He remained there until the next day, at 10 A.M., when lie left for Charlotte, N. C., having lost all hope of concentrating at Chester, with Hardee's, Cheatham's, and Stewart's forces.
From Chesterville, on the 21st, General Beauregard sent the following telegram to President Davis:
" Should enemy advance into North Carolina, towards Charlotte and Salis bury, as is now almost certain, I earnestly urge a concentration in time of at least thirty-five thousand infantry and artillery at latter point, if possible, to give him battle there and crush him ; then to concentrate all forces against Grant, and then to march on Washington to dictate a peace. Hardee and myself can collect about fifteen thousand men, exclusive of Cheatham and Stewart, not likely to reach in time. If Lee and Bragg could furnish twenty thousand more, the fate of the Confederacy would be secure.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
It seems, according to Mr. Davis's book,* that this demand for reinforcements, although "implying a compliment" to General Lee, had no other result than to "disturb" him; and it is hardly necessary to add that no attention whatever was paid to it.
A curious feature of the Confederate history may here be eluci dated. In his " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," General Badeau speaks of the foregoing despatch and proposed concen tration in terms of complete discourtesy.f He alludes to Gen eral Beauregard's ill-health at the time, and to that cause ascribes what he considers the folly of his proposition. He even con nects it with the fact that on " the day after this despatch was received Johnston superseded Beauregard in command of the troops opposed to Sherman."
If it was folly on the part of General Beauregard to suggest and urge the concentration of our forces at that period—and it must not be forgotten that he had been attempting to bring it about ever since the 3d of February J — it was also folly on the part of General Lee to write, in the despatch wherein he asked for the appointment of General Johnston, the following words: "It is necessary to bring out all our strength and, I fear, to unite our armies, as, separately, they do not seem able to make head against the enemy" And again: "I fear it may be necessary to abandon our
* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 631.
t " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. iii., p. 397.
t Sec, in preceding chapter, General Beauregard's telegrams of that date.
cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency."* The only difference between the two generals was, that General Lee saw the necessity of concentration too late, and failed to act upon it; whereas Beauregard saw it much earlier, and would have tried to carry it to a successful conclusion, had the power been given him to execute his plans. That General Grant himself dreaded the effects of such " folly " —z. <?., the concentration pro posed and the demand for reinforcements by General Beauregard —is conclusively shown by the following quotation from General Badeau's book: "At tins time again Grant saw reason to appre hend a movement of Lee before Richmond or Petersburg, either to screen the withdrawal of the rebel army, or to distract attention from operations elsewhere"^ And General Grant is reported to have said, on the 25th of February : " Deserters from the rebel lines, north of the James, say it is reported among them that Hill's corps has left, or is leaving, to join Beauregard." J That, late as it was, the course proposed by General Beauregard was the true strategic measure to adopt, is shown by the appre hension of the enemy. And General Badeau again quotes, as follows, General Grant's words to General Meade, on the 3d of March: "For the present, it is better for iis to hold the enemy where he is than to force him South. * * ' r To drive the enemy from Richmond now would endanger the success of these col umns'^—meaning Sherman's and Schofield's.
And what was General Beauregard attempting to compass, with a view to a successful conclusion of the war ? That the end had been nearly reached by both contending parties was evident at the time, and has been set forth, with startling certainty, by researches among the Federal archives. The desire for peace was eager all over the North; and any decisive victory or series of victories, on our part, would not only have disheartened our adversaries, by re-opening before them a vista of long and pro tracted struggles, with levies of men now become most exacting, but would have reanimated the whole South, and brought back thousands of absentees to our ranks. Under such circumstances,
* General Lcc's communication, of February 19th, 1865, to General Brcck-inridge, Secretary of War, in Appendix. t "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. iii., p. 394. J Ibid., vol. iii., p. 395. § Ibid., vol. iii., p. 405.
with a wise, far-seeing Administration, and with prompt, energetic action in the field, was it folly to assume that we could have claimed and obtained an honorable peace? General Beauregard knew that the South was not exhausted; that there still remained in it strong powers of vitality; that the "granaries of that vast and fertile territory bulged with stores of corn."* He also knew that the Army of Northern Virginia was wasting away in a fu tile attempt to preserve Richmond and Petersburg; that General Lee was not in a position to undertake any movement against the army confronting him ; and that should reinforcements be drawn from his ranks, none of his plans would thereby suffer or be prevented; while, by utilizing one or two corps of the Army of Virginia, Sherman could have been checked, cut oif from his base, and, eventually, defeated. That the undertak ing was a perilous one, is undoubted; but it was practicable, nevertheless; and, situated as we then were, a bold and vigorous effort of the kind was necessary, unless we were willing to await, with crossed hands, the fate which the unimpeded movements of the enemy must inevitably draw upon us. Basing his opinion upon all these considerations, General Beauregard, who, despite liis great anxiety, could not and would not despond, wisely coun selled that measure of concentration which the Administration, unfortunately, disregarded, and General Badeau, with naught be fore him but the equivocal proof of an accomplished fact, pre sumptuously condemns.
On the night of the 22d General Beauregard arrived at Char lotte, where, to his no small surprise, the following telegram was handed to him:
" HEADQUAKTERS, Feb. 22<Z, 1865. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :
" I have directed General J. E. Johnston to assume command of Southern army, and to assign you to duty with him. Together, I feel assured you will beat back Sherman. R E. LEE."
Had General Lee accompanied this despatch with an order for two corps of his army to march to the assistance of Generals John ston and Beauregard, his assurance that, " together," they would be able to " beat back Sherman " would have been well found ed ; otherwise it was entirely meaningless. With what troops was
* SAvinton's "Army of the Potomac,-' p. 571.
this defeat of Sherman's army to be accomplished ? General Johnston had none, and General Beaurcgard's forces—marching from different points, and not yet united at any, notwithstanding his unceasing efforts to bring them together—consisted of about five thousand men of the Army of Tennessee and the troops of the Department under General Hardee, amounting to about eleven thousand. Two thousand of the former, commanded by Major-General Stevenson, were near Charlotte. One thousand, under Lieutenant-General Stewart, were near ISTewberry, ap proaching Charlotte; and two thousand, under Major-General Cheatham, were between Dewberry and Augusta, also marching towards Charlotte. The troops of the Department, under Lieu tenant-General Hardee's command, were moving from Charles ton to Cheraw. Eleven hundred of them were South Carolina militia and reserves, not expected to leave the State.*
The concentration of all their available forces within any given time, at any given place, was not the greatest obstacle that Gen erals Johnston and Benuregard had to overcome; the question was, how could they, with less than fifteen thousand men under them (for the South Carolina militia and cadets had to be de ducted), have driven back an army numbering fully seventy thousand men, according to General Sherman's own estimate of its strength? But it seems that, in General Lee's opinion, how ever courteous his language may have been, the deficiency lay in the commander, not in the number of his troops; for, on the 19th of February, in General Lee's despatch, already alluded to and addressed to General Breckinridge, Secretary of War, he thus ex pressed himself: " * * * I do not see how Sherman can make the march anticipated by General Beauregard; but he seems to have everything his own way, which is calculated to cause apprehen sion. General Beauregard does not say what he proposes, or what he can do. I do not know where his troops are, or on what lines they are moving. His despatches only give movements of the enemy. He has a difficult task to perform under present circum stances, and one of his best officers, General Ilardee, is incapaci tated by sickness. I have also heard that his own health is indif ferent, though he has never so stated. Should his strength give way, there is no one on duty in the Department that could replace
* General Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations,'' p. 572.
him, nor have I any one to send there. General J. E. Johnston is the only officer whom I know who has the confidence of the army and people; and if he was ordered to report to me I would place him there on duty." *
It seems strange that General Lee should have declared himself ignorant of the whereabouts of General Beauregard's forces, and of the lines upon which they moved, when so many despatches of General Beauregard, to him and to the War Department, were replete with the most exact information on these two points, as is shown by the telegrams contained in this and the preceding chapter, and in the appendices to both. But stranger still ap pears his further assertion that he has "also heard that his own [General Beauregard's] health is indifferent, though he has never so stated." And, acting upon this supposition, without making the least inquiry of General Beauregard, he proposes, not that General Johnston shall be called from retirement and held in readiness, should his services be required for the emergency re ferred to, but that he shall be immediately ordered to supersede General Beauregard and take command of his army.
And why should General Lee have been "disturbed" by Gen eral Beauregard's urgent demand for reinforcements from the Army of Virginia? Why should his plan for concentration have been the apparent immediate cause of his removal, when we find the vital necessity of just such a movement strongly advocated by Colonel W. H. Taylor, late Adjutant-General of the Army of Xorthern Virginia— "one who" as he says himself, "was brought into daily and intimate relations with General Lee" and whose statements upon such topics were but "the reflex of the views and opinions" \ of his commander? In Colonel Taylor's book, enti tled " Four Years with General Lee," we find the following sig nificant passage given as a certified extract from his war journal:
" EDGE HILL, Feb. 24th, 1865.
"Now that General Johnston has been placed in command of his old army by General Lee, it is not probable that the latter will go to South Carolina— at any rate, not immediately. * * * It is not to be denied that our condition at this time is a critical one; lut although it is a crisis in our affairs, it is the same with the enemy. Suppose we were to concentrate on Sherman and crush him,
* See, in Appendix, General Lee's despatch to General Breckenridge, Sec retary of War.
t " Four Years with General Lee," p. 140. The italics are ours.
\
would not the aspect of affairs "be entirely changed? Well, that is not beyond the range of possibility. Much dejwnds on the check given to Sherman's career. Rich-mond may ~be lost to us, and Sherman may le overwhelmed. The defeat of Sher man would restore Richmond. To he rid of him would more titan compensate for mch temporary sacrifice.''' *
We cannot understand, therefore, how General Beau regard incurred the disapproval of General Lee, for wishing to carry out a measure which General Lee's own better judgment seems to have approved,! but which failed of execution, because the General-in-chief bent before the will of those who would not abandon Richmond, even temporarily, and allowed, nay, proposed. General Beauregard's removal, although the latter was advocating the only plan which, at this dark hour, could have made success possible.
At the eleventh hour, and when delay, from whatever source it might arise, was so much to be dreaded, General Johnston, at the request of General Lee,;}: was abruptly placed in command of our forces operating in the two Carolinas, and instructed to "beat back Sherman," but without being given the means wherewith alone such a result could be obtained.
The question which naturally arises now is, how did General Johnston carry out these instructions? We know that when the troops under him were assembled, in obedience to orders already issued by General Beauregard, he officially assumed command on the 25th of February, and published on that occasion an able and soldierly address to his troops. But what were his expectations, and what course was it then his intention to pursue? He thought the Southern cause, at that time, irretrievably lost, and so, evi dently, did General Lee himself; and he resumed the duties of his military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances,
* " Four Years with General Lee, 1 ' pp. 143, 144. The italics arc ours.
t Ibid, pp. 145, 140.
| In President Davis's work, vol. ii., p. G31, we read: "A few days subse quent to the events in North Carolina to which reference has been made. General Lee proposed that General J. E. Johnston should be put in command of the troops in North Carolina. lie still had the confidence in that officer which I had once felt, but which his campaigns in Mississippi and Georgia had impaired. With the understanding that General Lee was himself to supervise and control the operations, I assented to the assignment."
ought to satisfy the Southern people and their Government.* General Boanregard and, in fact, most of our leaders, in the field and elsewhere, believed that the end of the war was close at hand. But, in Colonel Taylor's language, as already quoted. General Beauregard also knew that, "although it was a crisis in our affairs, it was the same with the enemy" lie there fore strongly believed that our best chance of obtaining an honorable peace was to base it upon a victory over the enemy, which could only be gained by great vigor and an immediate concentration.
The following is General Beauregard's answer to the order in forming him of his removal from the command of his army:
" CHARLOTTE, N. C., Feb. 22(7, 18G5. " General R, E. LEE, Richmond, Va.:
"Your despatch informing me that you had directed General Joseph E. Johnston to assume command of the Southern army and to assign me to duty with him, has just been received. In the defence of our common country I will, at all times, be happy to serve with or under so gallant and patriotic a soldier as General Johnston. G. T. BEAURECARD."
This was a noble answer, denoting an entire absence of personal ambition on the part of its author. To General Johnston—who, before accepting the command offered him, had visited General Beauregard, "to ascertain if he had been consulted on the sub ject 1 'f—the latter had also given, in substance, the same assur ance. It will be remembered, no doubt, that some time in January, after leaving Charleston and before reaching the Army of Tennes see, General Beauregard had endeavored to have General John ston restored to active service, and had even proposed to yield him his former command.^ Ko action, however, had been taken in the matter by the War Department, and General Beauregard had reason to believe that, after all he had accomplished with the re stricted means at his disposal, he would continue to control the military operations of his Department. He had made no com plaint whatever about his health, although others may have taken upon themselves to report it as being "indifferent." The truth is, he had seldom been so well since the opening of the war. Nor had he expressed any fear that his health might impair his
* General Johnston's " Narrative of Military Operations," p. 372. t Ibid., p. 371. J See Chapter XLIII. of this work, p. 329.
energy or prevent the full execution of his own or the Govern ment's plans. General Lee's ans\ver (which we give in the Ap pendix) shows how well he appeared to appreciate the disinterest edness marking General Beauregard's conduct. We must say, however, that had General Beauregard been aware of the per sonal intervention of General Lee and of the reason assigned for his removal, he would, while unhesitatingly sacrificing his rank for the public good, have plainly shown his consciousness of the injustice done him.
By some curious fatality, worthy of note, it seems to have been General Beauregard's destiny, at various periods of our four years' struggle, to be subordinated to officers of his own grade in the army, ranking him only by date of commission. At the battle of Manassas, in July, 1801, he was placed under General Joseph E. Johnston ; in Februaiy, 18G2, during the Shiloh cam paign, under General Albert Sidney Johnston ; in June, 1864, at Petersburg, under General R. E. Lee; in February, 1865, again under General Joseph E. Johnston. And it may be remarked that no other full general was ever so circumstanced, until, near the close of the war, when General Lee was given what Mr. Davis, perhaps appropriately, called " the nominal dignity of General-in-chief"* of the Confederate armies. General Hood, when under General Beauregard's orders, during the Tennessee cam paign, was only a provisional general, and had been elevated to that rank in order to give him precedence over other officers of his own army, who held commissions of older dates than his own. To General Beauregard's honor, it must be said that it was always through his single-minded efforts to effect a concen tration for some great object that he thus lost the prerogatives of his rank, and often the power to carry out his own plan for the defeat of the enemy. The truth is—and both the army and the people knew it—that his desire for the good of the service always predominated over the ambition to command. Congress, in acknowledgment of his eminent services, on four different occasions passed votes of thanks to him and to the troops under him: first, after the fall of Sumter, in April, 1861; second, after the battle of Manassas, in July, 1861; third, after the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862; fourth, for the repulse of the Federal
* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 361.
ironclad fleet in Charleston Harbor, in April, 1863. No other Confederate general was honored to that extent during the war. And may it not be added that a strange contrast was thus presented between the ill-will of the Administration and the manifest admiration and gratitude of the representatives of the people? It is known, furthermore, that Congress would have reiterated its thanks to General Beauregard, after the battle of Drury's Bluff, in May, 1864, and also after the almost incredible stand he made at Petersburg, from June 15th to 18th, of the same year, had not the fear been expressed by some members, that to pass votes of thanks again in his honor would indicate too much partiality for him.
General Johnston arrived at Charlotte on the 24th, and, after a long conference with General Beauregard, assumed command the next day. He desired the latter to continue the concentration of our forces, at the most available points, from Charlotte to Raleigh, which General Beauregard had been so long endeavoring to effect. General Johnston's intention, as soon as the place of concentration could be definitely fixed, was to repair to it and assume command in the field, while General Beauregard should complete all other arrangements, and, with such troops as he might have at hand, watch over our various lines of communication. The Appendix to the present chapter contains the telegrams, orders, and in structions issued by General Beauregard in furtherance of this end.
After burning and destroying Columbia, as will be shown in the next chapter, General Sherman sent forward the right wing of his army in a northerly direction, towards Winnsboro', where, on the 21st, a junction was made with his left wing, under General Slocum. From Winnsboro' they marched as follows: the right wing, cross ing the Catawba at Peay's Ferry, went towards Cheraw and Fay-etteville; the left wing, crossing at Rocky Mount, after a delay of several days, also began its march towards Cheraw. In the mean time, according to General Sherman,* Kilpatrick, with his force of cavalry, had been ordered to make a feint in the direction of Lancaster, so as to lead General Beauregard into the belief that the whole Federal army would soon be marching upon Charlotte. General Beauregard was perfectly aware of Kilpatrick's presence
* u Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman," p. 288.
" on the Lancaster and Camden road ;" * but he was convinced, nevertheless, as is shown by his despatch of the 24th to General Lee, that " the enemy's movements would seem to indicate Che-raw and Fayetteville as their present objective." f The tenor of this latter despatch and its date, which corresponds with the arri val of Kilpatrick near Lancaster, are proof sufficient that the "de lusion " so complacently referred to by General Sherman existed more in his own mind than in General Beauregard's.
While these movements were being executed Fort Fisher and the other Confederate works at the mouth of Cape Fear River, after a short but glorious resistance, were captured by the Federal forces operating against them. It was there that General Whiting redeemed his reputation, and, after receiving a mortal wound be hind the shattered ramparts of Fort Fisher, died in the hands of the enemy. Wilmington surrendered to General Terry on or about the 22d of February, and General Bragg, with nearly eight thousand men, retreated towards Goldsboro', to form a junction at last with General Johnston's forces. The wisdom of the policy advocated bv General Beanregard weeks before, but which had
i/ C_)
been disapproved of by the War Department, was here clearly de monstrated. Had our untenable seaports and harbor defences, and even the Confederate capital, been abandoned in time, and the troops occupying them withdrawn and concentrated at or about Branchvilie, S. C., reinforced by two or more corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, a stand could have been made by which Sherman's invading army, then so far from its base—the sea-coast —would have been effectually checked, and the course of events materially changed. As it was, place after place fell before over powering numbers, and the junction of General Brngg's forces with those of General Johnston was only partially effected, after Schofield had united his forces with those of Sherman.
* See, in Appendix, his despatch of 27th to General Lee.
t See, in Appendix, his despatch of that date to General Lee.
GENERAL BEAUBEGARD.
CHAPTEE XLVI.
General Sherman's Preconceived Determination to have Columbia Burned.— His Denial.—His Despatch to General Halleck, Showing his Intent.— Contradictions Contained in his Hartford Speech.—General Hampton's Advice not to Burn the Cotton in Columbia.—General Beauregard of the same Opinion.—Orders to that effect Issued on the 16th of February.— Statement of Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler.—Surrender of the City.—How it was Pillaged.—Signal Thrown up at 8 p. M. —Outbreak of the Fire.—Vain Efforts by the Citizens to Arrest its Progress.—General Sherman's Connivance in the Plan.—Testimony of General Howard.— Admission by General Sherman that his Troops Burned Columbia.—The City Destroyed.—Orders of General Sherman in the Morning to Arrest the Fire and Pillage.—Letters of General Wade Hampton.
IN a preceding chapter (Chapter XLII.) we had occasion to comment upon the threats, indirectly made, by General Sherman in his demand for the surrender of Savannah (December 17th, 1864); and the intention was declared to recur to the matter at the proper time, as evidence of the Federal commander's precon ceived purpose in regard to other Southern cities that might eventually fall into his power. The following is the passage:
"But should I be forced to resort to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest meas ures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army, burning to avenge a great national lorong they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have Tjeen, so prominent in dragging our country into civil war"*
It will give additional significance to this utterance, and show that it was not written in vain, if the reader will note the follow ing passage from Major-General Halleck's despatch to General Sherman, bearing date of Washington, December 18th, 1864— the day after the demand made for the surrender of Savannah : • ; Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident"-[the word "some" is italicized by General Halleck himself]—"the place may be destroyed ; and if a little salt should be sown upon its
* The italics are ours.
site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession" *
General Sherman says, in his Memoirs, while speaking of the burning of Columbia: "Many of the people think thio fire was deliberately planned and executed. This is not true." Despite irrefutable evidence staring him in the face, lie denies the part taken by his army in the work justly asserted to have been done by it. But on the 24th of December, 1864, he sent the following answer to Major-General Halleck's official despatch of December 18th, 1SG4: "I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think 'salt' will be necessary. When I move, the 15th Corps will be on the right of the right wing, and their position will bring them naturally into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak ven geance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. * * * I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston." f
Thus, General Sherman agreed with General Halleck in the barbarous programme, and promised its thorough execution. This furnishes unequivocal proof of "malice aforethought" and pre meditated incendiarism.
The fate of the towns, villages, and hamlets lying in the track of General Sherman's army in South Carolina shows the sincer ity of his expressions. Ilardeeville, Grahamville, McPherson-ville, Barnwcll, Blackville, Midway, Orangeburg, and Lexington, situated between the border of Georgia and the City of Columbia, were given to the flames, and a like doom was reserved for the capital of the State. The torch was mercilessly applied to build ings, public and private, for hundreds of miles on the route of the invading army. Gross indignities were perpetrated on the persons of inoffensive inhabitants. Agricultural implements were w r antorily destroyed ; dwellings, mills, barns were pillaged and pit ilessly reduced to ashes; horses, mules, cattle, goats, and donkeys,
* " Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," vol. i., p. 287. The italics are ours.
t " Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War," vol. i., p. 291.
not carried away, were killed. Provisions of all kinds were load ed on interminable trains of wagons, and what could not be thus taken was ruthlessly destroyed. For, as General Sherman openly said, in his address at Salem, 111., "We were determined to produce results * * * to make every man, woman, and child in the South feel that if they dared to rebel against the flag of their country, they must die or submit." This is in striking contrast with his Hartford speech of June 8th, 1881, in which he says: " These or ders were purposely most merciful, because I have not but most kindly feelings towards South Carolina, by reason of old asso ciates and friends made before the war, some of whom were known to be in Columbia, and to whom I extended, personally and of ficially, every possible assistance."
The facts of the case are these: On the 16th of February, the day on which Lieutenant-General Hampton received official news of his promotion, and was regularly assigned to the com mand of all the cavalry operating around Columbia, he gave it as his opinion, in a conference with General Beauregard, that, as the enemy was destroying cotton wherever he could find it on his inarch through South Carolina, it would be not only useless but, perhaps, dangerous to burn the cotton-bales, which, for want of time and a better place to put them, had been piled in the wide streets of Columbia. The reason then given by General Hampton w r as, that by burning the cotton, as was originally in tended, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy, we might set fire to neighboring buildings, and eventually en danger the whole city. As General Beauregard was aware that, owing to the destruction of the South Carolina Railroad by the enemy, the cotton then in Columbia could not be removed from its limits, he readily adopted General Hampton's suggestion, and, through the latter, issued at once explicit orders to that effect. Captain Rawlins Lowndes, General Hampton's adjutant at the time, was the officer who published and signed the orders we refer to, and saw to their prompt and faithful distribution among the troops.
This is corroborated by Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler; by Colonel Otey; by Captain Lowndes; by Lieutenant Chisolm ; by the various brigade and regiment commanders on duty that day; in fact, by every officer and private belonging to the Confederate forces then assembled in and around the threat-
ened city, which General Sherman hacLdeclared to be "quite as bad as Charleston" and therefore, in his opinion, doomed.
To give additional strength to this statement and present it in its proper light, we add the following statement of Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler, fully supported by the officers whose names have been already mentioned—not to speak of hun dreds of honorable citizens of Columbia, conspicuous among whom were Dr. Goodwyn, its respected Mayor, and the Rev. Doctors A. Toomer Porter and P. J. Shand—to wit:
"That when, between 9 and 10 o'clock A.M. on the 17th, General Butler's last trooper rode out of the capital of South Carolina, just as the vanguard of the Federal army was entering it, not one bale of the cotton piled in its streets had been set afire. The only thing burning at the time of the evacuation was the depot of the South Carolina Railroad, situated on the distant outskirts of the city—too far to have communicated the fire to any other building, and which, for want of material, very soon burned itself out."
This silences all contradiction, for this is simply the truth.
It remains none the less a fact, however, that Columbia was destroyed by fire. When was it so destroyed, and by whom?
Between 8 and 9 o'clock A. M., on the 17th, Dr. Goodwyn, the Mayor, and three Aldermen, whose names we are unable to give, formally surrendered the city to the first officer of the hostile army whom they met, and were " promised protection to the town and its inhabitants until communication could be had with General Sherman."* At 11 o'clock A. M. Columbia was in the possession of the Federal forces. The first detachment that entered it formed part of the command of the officer (Colonel Stone) to whom the surrender was made, and belonged to the 15th Corps, of whose work General Sherman had exultingly spoken in his despatch to General Ilalleck, already given.
No sooner had the Federals entered the city than universal pil lage began. Stores and private buildings were indiscriminately sacked, and neither check nor restraint was put upon the soldiery by their officers. At about 2 P. M. General Sherman rode in. He also promised protection to the city, as Colonel Stone had pre viously done. Meanwhile, and, in fact, hours before General Sherman's appearance, open and undisguised warnings were given the inhabitants of the fate awaiting them. Some were cautioned
* Testimony of Dr. Goodwyn before the Investigation Committee.
to leave immediately, as, before the next morning, everything around them would be reduced to ashes.* The signal at which the conflagration was to begin—three rockets, to be fired, at about eight o'clock, in front of the Mayor's residence—was also spoken of and distinctly described, at times with jeers and threats, occa sionally with an appearance of compassion for the unfortunate in habitants. At the appointed hour these rockets shot upwards, attracting the attention of the whole city, and shortly afterwards the troops scattered down the streets; suddenly fires broke out in every direction, at points distant from each other, and the flames spread on all sides. Citizens, with their fire-companies, at- first rushed to the burning houses, attempting, as best they could, to save them from destruction ; but they were unable to effect any good, not only on account of the extent of the conflagration, but because the Federals, wild with joy at the bonfires they had lighted, pierced the hose and disabled the engines.f
Before morning, on the 18th, the greater portion of the city was a heap of smouldering ashes. Most of its inhabitants—old men, women, and children—passed that winter night unsheltered from wind and cold. And General Sherman rode through the
O
streets that night and looked on.
That General Sherman did not issue direct and open orders for the destruction of Columbia we are willing to admit; but that he knew what work would be accomplished by his army, " burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon /South Caro lina^ that he countenanced the vandalism of his troops, is un deniable. Otherwise, not only would there have been no ambigu ity about the order to burn, but a positive order not to burn would have been issued. Invading columns, such especially as composed the notorious 15th Federal Corps, require no prompting to be aware that, in military discipline as well as in law, what is not prohibited is allowed.
Among the witnesses summoned—so to say—by General Sher man in support of his allegation that the Confederate cavalry, and not his troops, caused the destruction of the capital of South Car olina, is General O. O. Howard, who commanded the right wing
* See testimony of Mrs. L. S. McCord and William H. Orchard before In vestigation Committee.
t Report of Investigation Committee. II.—23
of the Federal army at that time. General Sherman in his Hart ford speech said: "Mr. Davis was not in Columbia during that fire, nor was General Hampton. I was, and so was General O. O. Howard * * * and fourteen thousand honest, good, true Union soldiers. * * * The lire in Columbia, on the night of February 17th, 1S65, in my judgment, then and now, was caused by parti cles of burning cotton. * * * The cotton was unquestionably set fire to by the Confederate cavalry," etc. General Sherman is unfortunate in the selection of his witness, for we have it from the Rev. P. J. Shand, who was in Columbia at the time of its destruction, and saw and personally felt the effects of the rntli-lessness of the enemy, that, in November, 18G5, upon his visiting General Howard, at his headquarters in Charleston, on matters of business, the latter stated to him, in the presence of a friend, that " though General Sherman did not order the burning of the town, yet, somehow or other, the men had taken up the idea that if they destroyed the capital of South Carolina it would be peculiarly gratifying to General Sherman."* And upon another occasion, two years later, in the presence of the Hon. James L. Orr, then Governor of South Carolina, afterwards United States Minister to Russia, and of General John S. Preston, also of South Carolina, General Howard distinctly stated to General Hampton, referring to the burning of Columbia, that "no one was authorized to say that the Federal troops did not burn Columbia, as he saw them doing so in numerous instances, and in various localities of the town" f But, what is still more striking, is the fact that General Sherman himself admitted that the burning of Columbia was the act of his own troops, though he endeavored to screen them from odium by declaring them mad and irresponsible from the ef fects of liquor. To the Rev. A. Toomer Porter, "in the bright light of the burning city" and on the day following to Doctor Goodwyn, he said that, owing to the indiscretion of their Gov ernor and Mayor, who had allowed hundreds of casks of whiskey to be left in the evacuated city, his men had got so drunk as to be entirely beyond his control. Pointing to the ruins surrounding him, he remarked, "And this is the result." "There was no allu-
* The Ilev. P. J. Shand's testimony before Investigation Committee. t See letters of Hon. James L. Orr and of General John S. Preston, in Ap pendix. The italics are ours.
sion made to General Hampton, to accident, or to cotton," says Doctor Goodwyn.* That allusion was an after-thought, prompt ed, as General Sherman himself admits, by his desire "to shake the faith of his [General Hampton's] people in him, for he was, in my opinion, boastful, and professed to be the special champion of South Carolina."f
But the unconscious admission of General Sherman that Co lumbia was destroyed by the Federal troops is not confined to what has just been stated. In his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., p. 349), alluding to the death of Mr. Lincoln, of which he apprised Gen eral Johnston in his first interview with the latter, on the 17th of April, 1865, he says: " Mr. Lincoln was peculiarly endeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman or man in Raleigh might say something or do something that would mad den our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia would 'befall the place" This is significant, and shows conclusively that it was the men of the Federal army who burned Columbia. "Madden" the same men in Raleigh, and Raleigh will suffer a like fate to that of Columbia. This is clearly the meaning of General Sherman's words.
When, to "gratify" their Commander-in-chief, the men of the 15th Federal Corps, who "generally did their work np pretty well," had wreaked vengeance all night upon the defenceless peo ple now in their power, General Sherman, satiated at last with what he himself termed " a horrible sight," ;£ issued peremptory orders to turn out the guard and stop the burning and pillage then going on. In spite of the alleged drunkenness of the Fed eral forces, which has been denied by many a credible witness, so good was their discipline, so complete the control of their offi cers—and so obedient these to General Sherman — that scarcely an hour and a half had elapsed after his orders were given before quiet reigned throughout the city.
When, in General Sherman's opinion, it became time to put an end to what Mr. Whitelaw Reid has called "the most monstrous barbarity of that barbarous march ;"§ when he thought that even
* See, in Appendix, extracts from the Rev. A. Toomer Porter's and Dr. Goodwyn's testimony, as given before the Investigation Committee, t From General Sherman's " Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 287. \ The Rev. A. Toomer Porter's testimony. § From Mr. Whitelaw Reid's work, " Ohio in the War."
the capital of South Carolina had been sufficiently scourged, he issued the order, which was immediately and unhesitatingly obeyed. In proof of the stern discipline exacted by the officers of General Sherman's army, it may be stated here that nine Fed eral soldiers who, in various places, still loitered in the streets and disregarded the order, were, in the presence of many a citizen and by-stander, mercilessly shot dead.
We do not deny that some of the cotton piled in the streets of Columbia was set on tire and actually burned on the 17th of February; but what we assert is, that it was after—hours after— the city had been evacuated by the Confederate troops; and that it was the work of General Sherman's own men. They could not carry the cotton with them or use it; and whether on their march through the streets into which the cotton-bales had been rolled, or while reclining against them during their halts, with lighted cigars and pipes, unintentionally or by design, unquestionably they caused the cotton to ignite. This was easily effected, be cause the cotton was badly packed, and protruded from the bales in many places. The citizens, unhindered by the soldiery, quick ly extinguished this fire. The general conflagration of the build ings, shown to have been the premeditated work of the Federal troops, was, by understanding, begun at dark; and, fanned by a sharp wind blowing from the west, soon reached the cotton, set ting it in a blaze, thus increasing the conflagration in that part of the city. The Appendix to this chapter contains the proof of what is here alleged. So does the following letter, written, in 1866, by General Wade Hampton to the lion. Reverdy Johnson, then a Senator in the United States Congress:
" WILD WOODS, MISSISSIPPI, April 21s£, I860. " To Hon. REVERDY JOHNSON, United States Senate :
" Sir, —A few days ago I saw in the published proceedings of Congress that a petition from Benjamin Kawles, of Columbia, S. C., asking for compensation for the destruction of his house by the Federal army, in February, 18G5, had been presented to the Senate, accompanied by a letter from Major-General Sherman. In this letter General Sherman uses the following language : ' The citizens of Columbia set fire to thousands of bales of cotton rolled out in the streets, and which were burning before we entered Columbia. I myself was in the city as early as nine o'clock,* and saw these fires, and knew what efforts were made to
* Were this true—as it is not—General Sherman would have entered Co lumbia before the Confederate troops left it. We have already shown at what
extinguish them, but a high and strong wind prevented. I gave no orders for the burning of your city, but, on the contrary, the conflagration resulted from the great imprudence of cutting the cotton-bales, whereby the contents were spread to the wind, so that it became an impossibility to arrest the fire. I saw in your Columbia newspaper the printed order of General Wade Hamp ton, that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton should thus be burned, and, from what I saw myself, I have no hesitation in saying that he was the cause of the destruction of your city.'
" This charge, made against me by General Sherman, having been brought before the Senate of the United States, I am naturally most solicitous to vin dicate myself before the same tribunal. But my State has no representative in that body. Those who should be her constitutional representatives there are debarred the right to enter into those halls. There are none who have the right to speak for the South ; none to participate in the legislation which gov erns her; none to impose the taxes she is called upon to pay, and none to vindicate her sons from misrepresentation, injustice, or slander.
" Under these circumstances I appeal to you, in the confident hope you will use every effort to see that justice is done in this matter.
"I deny, emphatically, that any cotton was fired in Columbia by my or der. I deny that the citizens ' set fire to thousands of bales rolled out into the streets.' I deny that any cotton was on fire when the Federal troops entered the city. I most respectfully ask of Congress to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of ascertaining and reporting all the facts connected with the destruction of Columbia, and thus fixing upon the proper author of that enor mous crime the infamy he richly deserves. I am willing to submit the case to any honest tribunal. Before any such I pledge myself to prove that I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired; that not one bale was on fire when General Sherman's troops took pos session of the city; that he promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, system atically, and atrociously. I therefore most earnestly request that Congress may take prompt and efficient measures to investigate this matter fully. Not only is this due to themselves and to the reputation of the United States army, but also to justice and to truth. Trusting that you will pardon me for troub ling you, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"WADE HAMPTON."
It is needless to add a word more to show upon whom rests the responsibility for the burning of Columbia. In vain will General
hour the evacuation took place; when Generals Beauregard, Hampton, and Butler withdrew; when the Federal forces took possession; and W 7 hen— hours afterwards—General Sherman rode in. The Report of the Investigation Committee, ordered by the Legislature of South Carolina, clearly establishes that it was between the hours of 2 and 3 p. M. that General Sherman made his appearance in Columbia.
Sherman attempt to wipe this stain from his reputation as a mil itary commander. His wisest course would have been to main tain absolute silence concerning all that refers to Columbia, trust ing to the effects of time to soften, in the minds of his countrymen, the ignominy of having designedly connived at the destruction of a surrendered and t therefore, defenceless city.
CHAPTEE XLYII.
General Hardce's Despatch of the 3d of March to General Johnston.—His Despatch of the 4th.—Failure to Follow General Beauregard's Instruc tions.—General Hampton Forms a Junction with General Hardee on the 10th.—General Hardee Retires towards Averysboro'.—General Sherman's Entire Army Marching on Goldsboro'.—General Johnston at Smithfield.— Is Attacked on the loth, near Averysboro 1 , by two Federal Corps.—Enemy Repulsed. — General Hardee Falls Back towards Smithfield.— General Johnston Determines to Attack General Sherman's Exposed Flank.— Battle of Bentonville.—Success of the Confederates.—Distinguished Con duct of Troops of the Army of Tennessee.—Number of General John ston's Troops at the Battle of Bentonville.—Confederate Loss.—Probable Loss of the Enemy.—Junction on the 24th of Generals Sherman and Scho-field.—General Bcauregard Repairs to Smithfield on the 25th.—On the 2Gth he Returns to Raleigh.—His Various Telegrams, Suggestions, and Orders.—General Johnston's Despatch to him of the 30th of March.— General Bcauregard Declines the Command of Western Virginia and East Tennessee.—Various and Contradictory Reports of Threatened Raids by Stoneman's and Grierson's Commands.—General Beauregard Determines to Repair to Greensboro'.
ON the 3d of March, General Hardee, from Clieraw, S. C., for warded this telegram to General Johnston :
" The enemy changed position yesterday, advanced on Chesterfield Court house, and crossed Thompson's Creek, above that point, late in the afternoon. I am evacuating Cheraw, and shall move to Rockingham, where I hope to receive your instructions. General Butler thinks army of Sherman is moving on this place, or on Rockingham."
On the next day (4th), from Eockingham, he telegraphed Gen eral Johnston as follows:
" The enemy pressed us closely yesterday morning, on leaving Cheraw, and it was with great difficulty that the bridge over the river was destroyed. It was, however, effectively destroyed; but the enemy succeeded in laying a pon toon, and at last accounts (9.30 this morning) had crossed a brigade. Most of my command will reach this place to-night.
"I brought off all of the supplies that my transportation—which is in a \vretched condition—could admit of. In obedience to General Beauregard's instructions of 24th ultimo, I shall move towards Greensboro' to-morrow. I had made arrangements to move by Fayctteville, but received a despatch from
General Bragg stating that Schofield was moving up the west bank of Cape Fear River. His despatch contradicting this report was not received until yesterday, when my troops and trains were moving on the Rockingham road, and I bad ordered the destruction of all bridges on the Fayetteville road. Sherman, I think, will march to Fayetteville, to form a junction with Scho field and to obtain supplies."
General Ilardec here refers to General Bean regard's instruc tions of the 2-ith of February, but omits all mention of those of the 26th, which were full and explicit, and intended to meet every exigency which might arise. * lie made a great mistake in not adhering to them, as he himself must have seen, before his forces reached Rockingham. Much time and many supplies would have been saved had he adopted the course marked out for him. Gen eral Beauregard, in several despatches to General Johnston, frank ly—and, we think, properly—censured General Hardee's failure to follow his instructions. lie even sent him a direct order to march at once on Fayetteville, if possible ; and if not, on Raleigh.f
Owing to unavoidable delays and high-water General Hamp ton and the cavalry with him could only form a junction with General Ilardee, at or near Fayetteville, on the 10th of March, just before the enemy crossed the Cape Fear River, at Cedar Creek, Fayetteville, and Elliott's Ferry, seven miles above. On the llth the troops under General Bragg were on their way to Goldsboro' from Ivinston, where the Federals had been strongly reinforced from Wilmington. They had been beaten, on the 8th, by General Bragg, with Hill's and Iloke's forces, and suffered a loss of about fifteen hundred prisoners and three field-pieces, exclusive of a large number of killed and wounded. It was a creditable affair to the handful of Confederates who took part in it, and we must say that Major-General Cox and the three Federal divisions under him displayed lack of vigor in their resistance.
General Ilardee now retired towards Averysboro', leaving a brigade behind Silver Creek, to hold the enemy in check. This force was subsequently withdrawn, and replaced by dismounted cavalry, which occupied the slight works there thrown up by the infantry. On the 14th the enemy attacked the works sharply, but was repulsed, and fell back about four miles. There lie was reported to have received supplies, by the river, from Wilming-
* Sec these instructions, in Appendix. t Sec Appendix.
ton. General Beauregard was anxious that General Johnston should now immediately concentrate his forces against Schofield, and defeat him before he could effect his junction with the main body of General Sherman's army. Circumstances and the views of the General commanding, which, in that respect, differed from those of General Beauregard, prevented the execution of the sug gested movement.
On the 15th of March, General Sherman's entire army had crossed Cape Fear River, and was on its inarch to Goldsboro'. His four corps advanced in the following manner: the 17th on the right, the 15th next in order, the 14th and 20th on the left, with the cavalry in close supporting distance to that flank.
General Johnston, believing that the enemy might be inclined to move on Raleigh as well as on Goldsboro', had collected a por tion of his forces at Smithfield, while General Ilardee was on his way from Fayetteville to Raleigh, with part of his cavalry on the road leading to Raleigh, and part of it on the Goldsboro' road. On the 16th, at a point five miles south of Averysboro', he was attacked by the two Federal corps under General Slocum and by Kilpatrick's cavalry. General Ilardee had posted his force in two lines. On the first was formed Colonel Alfred Rhett's brigade of Regulars, from the defences of Charleston, supported by a bat talion of light artillery and some of Hampton's cavalry. That line was attacked by Jackson's division, a part of Ward's, and by a portion of Kilpatrick's cavalry, in two successive assaults and a movement in front and flank. After repulsing with slaughter two attacks and maintaining the front line for several hours, the
O . >
command fell back to the second line, which General Ilardee held, driving back the enemy. General Sherman speaks of this defence as "stubborn." Our loss was computed at five hundred. That of the enemy, according to prisoners' accounts, amounted to thirty-two hundred. General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," o-ives the casualties on the Federal side at "twelve officers and
to
sixty-five men killed, and four hundred and seventy-seven men wounded ; a serious loss," he adds, " because every wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance.""" General Johnston, in his "Narrative of Military Operations," criticises General Sherman's report, and says that if his soldiers were " driven back repeatedly
* Sherman's " Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 302.
by a fourth of their numbers, with a loss so utterly insignificant/' then "General Sherman's army had been demoralized."*
General Hardee, now fearing an attempt to turn his left, and knowing his incapacity to resist the odds against him, fell back, in the night, towards Smithfield.
On the day of this occurrence, and with a view to avoid all misunderstanding among subordinate commanders, General Beau-regard was officially announced as second in command to Gen eral Johnston.
The latter's telegrams to General Beauregard, dated March 20th, 21st, and 23d, speak of the encounter with the enemy at Bentonville, and give the various incidents of that fight—the last of the war, in the east—and one which was much to the honor of the Confederates. Taking advantage of the fact that General Sherman's left wing was at some distance from the right, General Johnston, on the morning of the 19th, determined
O / CD /
to strike a blow while he had the chance to do so. Of that de termination, and of the manner in which it was carried out, Gen eral Sherman says:
"I have always accorded to General Johnston due credit for boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville; but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at the time he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collected from Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc."
This last expression of opinion was evidently given in ex tenuation of the failure of the Federals to withstand the attack made by the much inferior force opposed to them; for, further on, General Sherman also says:f "With the knowledge now possessed of his small force, of course I committed an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865." Without attempting to discuss what General Sherman could or could not have done, had he known the real weakness of the Con federate troops in his front, we merely add that they were even weaker than he supposed them to be, for neither General S. D. Lee's forces, nor General Cheatham's, nor even Generals Wheeler's and Butler's cavalry, were with General Johnston at the time.
General Hardee was hurriedly marched to Bentonville, and, as
* Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 383. t General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 306.
soon as his troops reached that place, the battle opened. It lasted until evening. The enemy was driven a mile from his intrenchments, one of his corps was routed, and three of his guns were captured. lie rallied on fresh troops, however, and then attempted the offensive, which the Confederates successfully and easily resisted until dark. Nothing more was done that night. The next morning the entire Federal army was in front of Gen eral Johnston's forces, and intrenched. The 15th Corps had moved from the direction of Goldsboro', on our left flank and rear, necessitating, on our part, a change of front to the south. All further attack being impossible, General Johnston merely held his position to cover the removal of his wounded and oc cupy the enemy. On that and the following day (20th and 21st) several assaults were made by the enemy, but they were in variably repulsed. "The troops of the Tennessee army," said General Johnston, in one of his despatches to General Beaure-gard, "have fully disproved the slander that has been published against them." Such well-deserved testimony in their behalf must have been most gratifying to their old commander, who, having so often tested their mettle, knew that even at this dark hour of our struggle, and after they had been so hardly tried, there were no better troops in the Confederate service. What might not have been the result of the battle of Bentonville, if to Bragg's and Hardee's forces, and to the small portion of the Army of Tennessee there present, had been added two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia; or if, without them, General Johnston's forces had really amounted to 49,868 men, as General Badeau asserts, in his "Military History of Ulysses S. Grant!"*
The effective strength under General Johnston, at the battle of Bentonville, did not exceed 14,100 men. General Butler's division of cavalry, posted to watch General Sherman's right column, took no part in the action ; nor did General Wheeler's forces; nor did the 2000 men of the Army of Tennessee, under General Cheatham, who only arrived on the 20th and 21st, and had nothing to do during the first day's encounter, f The Federal army, on the other hand, must have numbered at least 60,000 men. Half of it — or the whole left wing, composed of two
* Vol. iii., p. 432.
t Johnston's " Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 392, 393.
corps—was engaged on the 19th; and the other half—that is to say, the two corps forming the right wing—appeared on the field, and participated in the fight, on the afternoon of the 20th.*
The Confederate loss was as follows: killed, 223; wounded, 1467; missing, 653; making an aggregate of 2343.f AYe took 903 prisoners, but were unable to ascertain the full extent of the enemy's casualties. " From the appearance of the field and the language of the Federals it largely exceeded 4000." £
On the 24th the junction of Generals Sherman and Schofield, at Goldsboro', was an accomplished fact. While apprising Gen eral Beauregard of it, General Johnston, after disposing of his troops to the best advantage, anxiously awaited the arrival of General S. D. Lee's forces, and urged all possible rapidity in his movements. That gallant officer, not then entirely recovered from his wound received at the battle of Nashville, was doing his utmost, in the face of untold difficulties, to press forward his heterogeneous and hastily gathered command.
On the 25th General Beauregard repaired to Smithfield to con fer with General Johnston, and ascertain in what way he could aid him most effectively, and whether his presence might not be beneficial with the troops in the field. General Johnston assured General Beauregard that his services, at this juncture, were more valuable where he then was than at any other point, and that, from rumors of the probable movement of some of the enemy's cavalry, his personal direction, at Greensboro' or Salis bury, might soon be required. He therefore, without further delay, returned to his headquarters at Raleigh.
The following telegrams forwarded by him to General John ston and others will show how actively engaged he was in pre paring troops for the front, and how, as usual, he was alive to the minutest necessity of the situation :
1. " RALEIGH, N. C., March 27th, 18G5.
" Colonel ALFD. ROMAN, A. A. G., etc., Augusta, Ga.:
" Send unarmed troops as rapidly as possible, properly organized. Subsist ence will be collected, as soon as practicable, at Newbcrry or Alston, on Broad River. Thence troops must march to Blackstocks or Winnsboro'. Ma jor McCrady, at Charlotte, will keep you advised of condition of Charlotte Railroad and of bridge at Alston. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
* Johnston's " Narrative of Military Operations,"" p. 393. t Ibid., p. 393. J Ibid.
2. "RALEIGH, N. C., March 27th, 1865. " General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C.:
"Middle and West Georgia, with Tennessee, form one Department. Cobb is in command of portion of Georgia referred to. Hill commanded remainder belonging to Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Best present arrangement would be to divide Georgia in two districts, under Mac-kail and Fry; the whole being under .Cobb, or higher officers, if they can be had. G-. T. BEAUREGARD."
3. "RALEIGH, N. C., March 21th, 1865. " General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C.:
" General Lee * reported on 25th, from Pinckneyville, he will strike railroad at Catawba Bridge. Why so high lie does not state. Colonel Roman reports yesterday from Augusta he will forward shortly eighteen hundred men, fully armed and equipped. He says arms and accoutrements are now exhausted there.
" General Holmes states that arms he had were issued by Colonel Hoke, at Charlotte, to Army of Tennessee. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
4. "RALEIGH, N. C., March 27th, 1865. " General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, Smithfield, K C.:
" On reconsideration I would suggest that each of the States embraced within your proper geographical Department shall form a separate military district, under a Major-General, reporting direct to you, with such subdivis ions in each as may be found necessary, under carefully selected officers.
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
5. " RALEIGH, K C., March 27th, 1865. " General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C.:
" For information relative to troops of Army of Tennessee left in Missis sippi, see my endorsement of March 5th on Major-General Stevenson's letter of February 27th.
" Sharp's and Brantley's brigades must be with Lee's forces now on their way to join you. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
0. " RALEIGH, K C., March 29th, 1865.
" General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, 1ST. C.:
" General Taylor reports Cauby's army attacking Mobile from eastern side, and heavy force of Thomas's cavalry moving down through North Alabama. I wonder if Minerva has stamped on the earth for our foes ?
" G. T. BEAUREGARD."
7. " RALEIGH, K C., March 29th, 1865.
" Major-General J. F. GILMER, Chief-Engineer, C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:
" General Cobb and Mayor of Macou having represented iron referred to cannot be taken without serious injury to public service and to that city, I have authorized General Cobb and Colonel Meriwether to select the road from which iron should be taken forthwith. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
* General S. D. Lee.
8. " RALEIGH, N. C., March 29^, 1865.
" Lieut.-Gcueral S. D. LEE, Chester, S. C.:
" Send wagon-train by most direct route (dirt road) to Raleigh. Send your artillery to Yorkville, or best point on Broad River, for supplying men and animals. Report point selected. G. T. BEAUREGARD."
On the 30th, General Johnston, by telegram from Smith field, informed General Beauregard that a raid, reported to be Stone-man's party, four thousand strong, was on the point of reaching Lenoir's Station, and that he should communicate with Briga dier-General Bradley Johnson, at Salisbury, or, if necessary, go to that point himself, and issue all orders required to meet the emergency. General Beauregard was already advised of the ru mor, and had been in correspondence with General Bradley Johnson on the subject. As a provision against the danger threatening Lenoir, he had also telegraphed General S. D. Lee, at Chester, S. C., to stop part of his forces at Salisbury, to meet and defeat the eneruy. In his answer to General Johnston he acquainted him with the various dispositions he had taken, and assured him he would certainly go there, should the necessity arise.
On the same day (30th) a hurried despatch was received by General Beauregard from General Johnston, emanating from the Commander-in-chief of our armies, General Robert E. Lee. A new and unforeseen danger had arisen in Western Virginia and East Tennessee, to guard against which the War Department and General Lee were, at that moment, embarrassed and distressed to no inconsiderable degree. It was an additional complication in our grave and perilous situation ; a crisis requiring, it was thought, the greatest promptitude, skill, and energy. Again, as in so many other instances during the course of the war, a call was made upon General Beauregard. The despatch we refer to was in these words:
" SMITHFIELD, March 30M, 1865. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :
"Following despatch just received: 'Can General Beauregard be spared for command of Western Virginia and East Tennessee—would the duty be agreeable to him ?—R. E. LEE.'
" General Lee apprehends movements in that direction by Thomas.
" J. E. JOHNSTON."
Without hesitation General Beauregard forwarded the follow-
" RALEIGH, N. C., March 30ta, 1865. "General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, near Smithfield, N. C. :
" My preference is to remain with you as at present, for I could scarcely expect, at this juncture, to be furnished with a force at all commensurate with the exigency, or able to make headway against the enemy, reported advan cing from East Tennessee towards Southwestern Virginia. A mere territorial command, substantially bereft of troops, and in which I could render no pos itive service, would not be agreeable, for I could not hope to be effective, whereas here I may be useful. G. T. BEAUREGARD. 1 '
Thereupon General Johnston telegraphed :
" I have received your despatch in reply to General Lee's offer, and read it with great pleasure. I shall forward it with the same feeling."
It now appeared that the raiding party mentioned above con sisted of Terry's force, not Stoneman's. General Beauregard was advised to verify the fact, through General Martin, at Asheville. Shortly afterwards General Johnston again telegraphed that Brig adier-General Bradley Johnson reported Stoneman's cavalry to be moving on the railroad, and desired that, for the present, troops should be ordered to stop at Greensboro' and Salisbury. And it might be well, he thought, for General Beauregard himself to go as far as Greensboro' — all of which he was preparing to do when he received the despatch. Ferguson's cavalry was, at the same time, hurried on from South Carolina.
On that day (31st) General Beauregard also received from Gen eral Featherstone, of S. D. Lee's troops, at Salisbury, the infor mation that he had two brigades with him, and another expected the next morning, as well as Johnson's battalion of artillery; with all of which he would begin to fortify at the bridge. He added that scouts were "scarce, and not very reliable," but that the reports made, such as they were, indicated a movement on the Danville Railroad, by Stoneman or Grierson ; and, further, that he counted upon a regiment of cavalry in the course of the next night.
General Beauregard, thereupon, concluded to stay at Greens boro', which he knew to be a central point, until events should assume a more definite shape, and, meanwhile, to examine into the defensive condition of the place. He reached Greensboro' late that evening.
CHAPTER XLVIII.
Strength of the Federal Army at Goldsboro'.—General Sherman's Reasons for Remaining there Two "Weeks.—Position of the Confederate Forces.—Gen eral Beauregard's Command Extended on the 1st of April.— Dispositions Taken by him. — General Lee's Withdrawal from Petersburg.— Evacua tion of Richmond.—General Beauregard Returns to Greensboro'.—Re ceives Despatches from Mr. Davis on the 4th and 5th.—Goes Back to Raleigh on the 7th, and to Smithfield on the 8th.—The President Urges him to Come to Danville.—Surrender of General Lee's Army.—President Davis Goes to Greensboro'.—General Beauregard Awaits him there.—In terview between them on the llth.— President Davis's Despatches of that Day. — General Beauregard's Orders to Generals Lomax, Walker, and Bradley Johnson.—President Davis Summons General Johnston to Greensboro'.—He Arrives on the 12th.—Conference between the Presi dent, his Cabinet, and the Two Generals.—General Johnston Reluctantly Authorized to Treat with General Sherman.—General Johnston Forwards Letter to General Sherman on the 14th.—Incident Mentioned of Silver Coin Transferred to General Beauregard.—General Sherman's Answer to General Johnston.—Troops Ordered to Halt at all Points.—General Beau-regard's Suggestion to General Johnston concerning Negotiations.—Gen eral Breckinridge Present on the Second Day of the Conference.—Agree ment Entered into between Generals Johnston and Sherman on the 18th. —General Breckinridge Communicates Paper to President Davis.—His Delay in Answering.—Letter of General Breckinridge to President Davis. •—His Final Answer to General Johnston.—Despatches from General Sher man.—Death of President. Lincoln.—What the South Thought of it.— General Breckinridge's Telegram of April 24th.—General Johnston's An swer.—Negotiation Renewed between Generals Johnston and Sherman.— They Meet Again at Durham's Station.—Terms Agreed upon, April 26th. —General Johnston Ignorant of the Whereabouts of President Davis.— Responsibility of Concluding Terms Thrown upon Generals Johnston and Beauregard.—President Davis's Efforts to Organize a Cavalry Escort,— Circular of General Johnston to his Army on April 27th.