AT this stage of the military operations just described the main body of the Federal army, united at Goldsboro', consisted of its right wing, under General Howard, aggregating 28,834 men ; its left wing, under General Slocum, aggregating 28,063 men; its centre, under General Schofield, aggregating 26,392 men, exclu sive of the artillery, numbering 2443 men, with 01 guns; and

the cavalry division, under General Kilpatrick, with an effective strength of 5659 men; making a grand aggregate of 91,391 men.* This estimate does not include General Stoneman's force of cavalry, amounting to 4000, then operating around Greensboro' and Salisbury, and which, though not originally belonging to General Sherman's army, was then under his command.f

For about fifteen days after its junction with General Schofield this army remained quiet near Goldsboro', preparatory, as it ap pears, to the effort General Sherman was about to make to place it " north of Roanoke River, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac." ^

The small Confederate army, under General Johnston, stood between the two roads leading to Raleigh, on the one hand, and to Weldon, on the other, so as to be ahead of the enemy on which ever line of march he might adopt, and in order, also, to be able to unite with the Army of Northern Virginia, in case General Lee should favor such a movement, although it was now, probably, too late to carry it out successfully. The position was wisely selected. Wheeler's cavalry was stationed north, and Butler's south, of the enemy's camps surrounding Goldsboro'.

On the 1st of April, owing to a despatch just received from General Lee, empowering him " to assume command of all troops from Western Virginia and Western North Carolina within his reach," General Beau regard left Greensboro' for Salisbury. His purpose was, if possible, to confer with Generals Lee and John ston relative to the actual condition of affairs, and the best dis position to be made of all available troops, from Salisbury to Greensboro'. As Salisbury appeared to be less threatened than Greensboro' by the enemy's cavalry—Stoneman's—reported to be advancing from Mount Airy and Wytheville, in West Virginia— General Beauregard ordered three brigades, under Featherstone, Shelly, and Gowan, with two light batteries, to move, without delay, in the direction of Greensboro', whither he returned the same evening. Soon -afterwards, Stoneman appearing more di-

* General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 334. Our addition differs from that of General Sherman, though made up from aggregates furnished by him. He finds 88,943—a difference of 2258. It is easy to perceive that the error is not ours.

t General Sherman's "Memoirs." See his answer to General Johnston, vol. ii., p. 347. | Ibid., vol. ii., p. 341.

II.—24

reetly to threaten Danville, which was then defended by a mere handful of troops, under General II. II. Walker, General Beau-regard sent him Shelly's brigade, of some six hundred men, three batteries from Hillsboro', and also ordered thither General Whee ler's cavalry, which had been sent by General Johnston to aid in the projected movement to oppose Sherman.

Just at this time occurred the too long delayed and now inev itable evacuation of Richmond (April 2d), which, in General Johnston's opinion, necessitated the recall of Wheeler's force, as General Sherman, altering his purpose to form a junction with General Grant, might be tempted to march at once upon Smith-field and Raleigh. Colonel J. F. Wheeler's cavalry was allowed, however, to proceed to Danville, where the Confederate Govern ment had now determined to take temporary refuge, supposing— and indeed knowing—that General Lee, upon his retreat from Petersburg, would endeavor to reach Danville with his army.*

The line of our defences around Petersburg was broken on the 2d of April, in the morning, and our troops were compelled to fall back on their inner works, thus making the evacuation of the city a mere question of hours.

General Lee had " advised that Richmond should be evacuated simultaneously with the withdrawal of his troops that night ;"f and President Davis, informed of the disaster, began immediate preparations for his removal and that of the heads of the various State Departments from the capital of the Confederacy. lie says : " The event had come before Lee had expected it, and the an nouncement was received by us in Richmond with sorrow and surprise; for, though it had been foreseen as a coming event which might possibly, though not probably, be averted, and such preparation as was practicable had been made to meet the con tingency when it should occur, it was not believed to be so near at hand." J And here it is appropriate to say that, far from la menting the abandonment of Richmond, to which it had clung with such blind pertinacity, the Government should have ordered it weeks, if not months, previously, when the military necessity for such a movement was clearly indicated as the best—and per haps the only—method of salvation. An effort to concentrate, at

* "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 068. t Ibid., vol. ii., p. 661. J Ibid., vol. ii., p. 656.

this late hour, when every avenue of retreat was closed and the enemy had formed his junction and accomplished his purpose, was vain and useless.

When this sad news reached General Beauregard—who on the day previous had received a confidential intimation of it—he was bitterly grieved; all the more, because he saw what the necessary result must now be. He was thoroughly convinced that the pres ent hopeless strait could have been avoided had his counsel pre vailed, when he urged the withdrawal of a portion of General Lee's army to strike Sherman's columns, then far from their base; and even later, about the 21st of February, when he again strenu ously advised concentration at or near Salisbury, with a reinforce ment of twenty thousand men from Generals Lee and Bragg, to defeat Sherman first, and attack Grant afterwards. The battle of Bentonville had proved to General Beauregard that the spirit of the Confederate troops was unbroken, and that, with approximate equality in numbers, those troops could achieve victory. It was now plain that the grand drama which had lasted for four years was fast drawing to an end. But he resolved, nevertheless, not to relax his efforts to uphold the cause until the last hour.

On his return to Greensboro', General Beauregard was greeted with kindness by its leading citizens, especially ex-Governor Morehead, whose hospitality he accepted, for himself and staff, during the remainder of his stay in that town.

A system of light defensive works was now devised by Gen eral Beauregard for the protection of Greensboro', which had become an important depot of supplies. The troops temporarily detained there were called out to construct these defences, in which he caused to be placed a few field-pieces, procured from Hillsboro', where they then lay, unsupplied with horses and of no use.

The reports concerning Stoneman's raid indicated that he was moving from Wytheville, along the Virginia and Tennessee rail road, with a force of cavalry, variously estimated at from four to eight thousand men, and some light artillery; that a portion of this force had been thrown well out on his right flank, towards Wilkesboro', Jonesville, Madison, etc., committing depredations on its way, and threatening the railroad from Salisbury to Dan ville, via Greensboro'; hence great alarm was felt in all these towns.

On the 4tli of April. General Beauregard received a telegram from President Davis, and another on the 5th, both from Dan ville, making inquiry concerning the movements of the enemy, and approving the forwarding of cavalry, which, he said, would be of special value to that place, with the infantry already on its way to it. He also stated that he had had no news from Gen eral Lee for several days. Neither General Johnston nor Gen eral Beauregard were better informed as to the movements of the Armv of Northern Virginia, concerning which the greatest anxi-

*/ t_5 / Q O

ety prevailed in all quarters. Danville, now the temporary seat of Government, "would have been guarded with the utmost care, in order to tranquillize Mr. Davis, had not the enemy's movements, since the fall of Richmond, required the presence of all our available forces with General Johnston. This was explained to the President by a despatch from General Beauregard, dated Greensboro', April 5th, 1805.

The greatest energy was now used to hurry on the returned troops of Hood's army coming from Chester. Fifteen hundred of them had left that place on the 6th, on their way to Smith-field. And there being, in appearance, no further immediate danger threatening Greensboro', General Beauregard, upon in quiring whether he should remain there and await other develop ments,, received the following answer:

" NEAR SMITHFIELD, April 6th. 1865. " General G. T. BEATJREGARD :

" It is not necessary to remain longer. No ne\vs from General Lee.

" J. E. JOHNSTON."

General Beauregard consequently returned, on the 7th, to Ra leigh, which was, properly speaking, his headquarters at that time. He was anxious to see and confer with General Johnston about the disastrous events which, from all sides, were now crowding upon the country; and, on the 8th, he started for Smithfield, where he and General Johnston exchanged views. He returned during the same evening to Raleigh.

On the day following this telegram, in cipher, was handed to General Beauregard:

"DANVILLE, April Qth, 18G5. u General G. T. BEAUREGAHD :

" General Walker, commanding here, desires your presence, in view of the probable concentration of forces from Thomas's army against this place at a very early period, and I think your services here will be more useful than at

any other point on the railroad line. Please make the greatest possible de spatch in coming, as a revision of the defensive lines is desirable.

"JEFFN. DAVIS."

Before General Beauregard had had time to decide upon any course of action a second despatch came to him, in the following words:

" SMITHFIELD, April 9$, 1865. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

" The President wishes you to go to Danville immediately, to talk with him of general operations. J. E. JOHNSTON/'

This indicated great anxiety on the part of the President; and though he knew that the alleged danger of an attack by General Thomas's army on Danville, at that time, was purely imaginary, General Beauregard took immediate steps to obey Mr. Davis's behest. He was on the point of starting, when he received from Colonel Otey, his Adjutant-General, at Greensboro', the news of the capitulation of General Lee and his army on that day. The surrender of such an army, under such leaders, must necessarily cause discouragement and despair to settle upon the country. It was easy to see that the remaining Confederate forces, wherever they might be, would soon have to follow the example of General Lee's army, as our resources were small in comparison with those of the enemy, which seemed to be steadily increasing, while ours were no less steadily diminishing. Such were General Beaure-gard's thoughts, as he journeyed over the road to Greensboro', on his way to Danville.

Before reaching his destination, and supposing that the news from the Army of Northern Virginia might h,ave caused other dispositions to be taken, he inquired (April 10th) of General "Walker, if his presence was still necessary at Danville. The answer he received was an affirmative one; but almost at the same time came the following despatch from Colonel McLean, A. Q. M., in charge of the President's party :

" The President started for Greensboro' at 10 h. this evening, and would be glad to see you on his arrival. Please give me every information about raiders. Are Greensboro' and road now safe ?"

General Beauregard's immediate answer was:

" Will await here arrival of President. Road between this place and Dan ville safe. Raiders arc at or near Salem."

He then without delay telegraphed General Ferguson to hurry up with his cavalry brigade, from High Point, as fast as he could. The need of cavalry was greatly felt at that hour, not only to oppose the enemy, but to obtain trustworthy information. Gen eral Beauregard had mostly to depend for the latter on the scout ing parties, organized by him out of such "volunteers" as he could find, and sent in every direction.

In view of General Beauregard's repeated changes of locality, from Salisbury to Raleigh, and his expected trip to Danville, he had concluded to establish his headquarters, for the future, in a box-car, so as to be always ready to move, at a moment's notice. He gave orders accordingly, and was provided with three box cars, one of which he used as his office, bedroom, and dining-room, the other for the movable portion of his staff, and the last for the horses.

On arriving at Greensboro' he had these three cars put on a side - track, near the depot. Early in the morning he was in formed that the President's train, carrying himself, his Cabinet, and the Government officers, had arrived during the night, and was then close to his own. He crossed over to Mr. Davis's car, and, upon entering it, was struck by the helpless appearance of the gentlemen assembled there. A warm welcome was given to General Beauregard, who could hardly find time to answer the rapid questions that were poured from all sides upon him, es pecially by the members of the Cabinet, with whom he was but slightly acquainted. The President soon afterwards made his appearance. lie also extended a cordial greeting to General Beauregard; and, taking him aside, questioned him closely and anxiously about current military events. The facts were far from encouraging, and General Beauregard had a gloomy account to give.

He stated that Sherman, after the battle of Bentonville, had moved to Goldsboro', where he had formed a junction with Scho-field, and had re-supplied himself with all he required, and was now advancing with fully ninety-one thousand men on Smithfield, where was the greater part of General Johnston's force, amount ing to less than twenty thousand infantry, and some four thou sand cavalry, which had to be much scattered, in order to cover his front and flanks and protect his communications; that a very strong force of the enemy's cavalry, under Stoneman, was re-

ported to be moving along the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, having already reached "Wytheville, Christiansburg, and Salem, whence he was threatening our lines of communication, from Salis bury to Danville; and that he feared, every moment, to hear of his having broken these lines at some important point; that he. General Beauregard, was collecting at Salisbury, Greensboro', and Danville all the remnants of the Army of Tennessee, still coming in, in small fractions, to rejoin their commands; that he was en deavoring to assemble the convalescents and furloughed men, as well as all the stragglers and deserters he could reach; that he was in great need of cavalry with which to defend our communi cations and ascertain the movements of the enemy, all his scouts and couriers being persons too old or too young to be very efficient, who had patriotically offered their services, furnishing their own horses and equipments; that he was, however, daily expecting General Ferguson's brigade of cavalry, which was com ing from Augusta, Ga., as rapidly as possible, and, in all likeli hood, would reach Graham that day.

General Beauregard, in his conference with the President, also told him that, from Macon, General Cobb reported that the ene my's cavalry had penetrated North Alabama, from the Tennessee Kiver, threatening Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery; while another force of cavalry, supported by infantry and artillery, was advancing, through North Georgia, on Atlanta, Columbus, and Macon, where he, General Cobb, had but few troops, principally local and State reserves, to oppose to them.

He reported further that General Taylor confirmed the news of the Federal advance on Selma and Montgomery, and feared a movement from the Mississippi River, Memphis, and Vicks-burg, through the interior of Mississippi, towards Okalona and Meridian; that a determined attack was soon to be expected on Mobile (as reported by General Maury, commanding there), from New Orleans and Pensacola, where there was a large increase of Federal troops; to oppose which General Maury had but an insignificant force under him.

General Beauregard also said to Mr. Davis that the picture he presented to him was most gloomy, but that he thought it his duty to attempt no concealment of the truth, so that the Presi dent might have a clear knowledge of the situation, and be pre pared for the inevitable.

President Davis lent can attentive ear to the account thus given of the hopeless condition of the Confederacy, but appeared, nev ertheless, undismayed. He said that the struggle could still be carried on to a successful issue, by bringing out all our latent re sources ; that if the worst came to the worst, we might, by cross ing the Mississippi River, with such troops as we could retreat with, unite with Kirby Smith's army, which he estimated at some sixty thousand men, and prolong the war indefinitely. General Beau regard did not expect, and was amazed at, this evidence of visionary hope on the part of the President. He admired his confidence, but inwardly condemned what to him seemed to be a total want of judgment and a misconception of the military resources of the country.

The President on that day (llth April), after his interview with General Beau regard, sent three telegrams to General Johnston, by way of Raleigh; one to General Walker, at Danville; and one to Governor Vance, also at Raleigh. They fully indicate the state of Mr. Davis's mind at the time, and need no commentary :

1. " GREENSBORO', N. C., April llth, 1865 : 12 M. " General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, via Raleigh :

"The Secretary of War did not join me at Danville. Is expected here this afternoon.

" As your situation may render best, I will go to your headquarters imme diately after the arrival of the Secretary of War, or you can come here. In the former case our conference must be without the presence of General Beau-regard.

U I have no official report from General Lee. The Secretary of War may be able to add to information heretofore communicated. The important ques tion first to be solved is, at what point shall concentration be made, in view of the present position of the two columns of the enemy and the routes which they may adopt to engage your forces before a prompt* junction with General Walker and others ? Your more intimate knowledge of the data for the solution of the problem deters me from making a specific suggestion on that point. JEFFN. DAVIS."

2. " GREENSBORO', N. C., April llth, 18G5 : 3.30 p. M. " General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, via Raleigh :

" The enemy's cavalry, in small force, this morning cut the Danville Rail road, ten miles from here, and, as reported, moved eastwardly.

* The telegram in our files has the word " prompt," as we have given it, instead of " proposed," as written in Mr. Davis's book. The meaning of the despatch is not altered by the use of either word.

" Lest communication should be lost, I telegraph to say that General Beaurcgard proposes, after General Walker shall join him, which will be or dered to commence forthwith, to unite with you at the Yaclkin, in front of Salisbury. And this seems to me to be the most easy method, if pursued, of effecting the proposed junction. JEFFN. DAVIS."

3. " GREENSBORO', N. C., April llth, 1865. " General J. E. JOHNSTON, Headquarters, via Raleigh:

"Despatch of 1.30 p.M. received. Secretary of War lias not arrived. To save time and have all information it is probably better that you come here. In that event you will give the needful instructions to your second in com mand, and, if circumstances warrant, suspend the movement suggested in de spatch of 3.30 P. M. for a time, which will enable you to communicate from here with that officer, or to indicate that the line has been broken by the enemy, so as to interrupt communication. JEFFN. DAVIS."

4. " GREENSBORO', N. C., April llth, 1865. " General H. H. WALKER, Danville, Va.:

"The movements of the enemy in Eastern North Carolina indicate the ne cessity for prompt movement on your part to make a junction here with Gen eral Beaurcgard, and then with General Johnston, on the Yadkin, in front of Salisbury. You will keep in communication with General Beauregard, on whose information the supposed necessity for your immediate action is based.

"JEFFN. DAVIS."

5. " GREENSBORO', N. C., April lU7i, 1865. " Governor Z. B. VANCE, Raleigh, N. C.:

" I have no official report, but scouts, said to be reliable, and whose state ments were circumstantial and corroborative, represent the disaster as extreme.

"I have not heard from General Lee since the 6th instant, and have little or no hope from his army as an organized body. I expected to visit you at Ra leigh, but am accidentally prevented from executing that design, and would be very glad to see you here, if you can come at once, or to meet you else where in North Carolina at a future time. We must redouble our efforts to meet present disaster. An army holding its position with determination to fight on, and manifest ability to maintain the struggle, will attract all the scattered soldiers and daily rapidly gather strength.

" Moral influence is wanting, and I am sure you can do much now to revive the spirit and hope of the people. JEFFN. DAVIS."

General Johnston was, just then, busily engaged in removing stores and supplies from Raleigh, and in order to do so with more celerity he asked General Beauregard to send him one hundred cars, which was done. In his telegram, forwarded on that occasion, he also spoke of reinforcements (twelve hundred men of Pettus's brigade), which he was hurrying on to General

Beauregard for the additional safety of Greensboro'. The neces sity for such a movement was all the more urgent because, on the morning of that day (llth), the raiding cavalry had cut the Dan ville road, about twelve miles above Greensboro', and had arrived in the afternoon at High Point and Jamestown, on the Salisbury road. The damage done, however, was not great, and could easily be repaired.

Acting under the powers given him by General Lee, in his de spatch of April 1st, already referred to, General Beauregard was now issuing direct orders to Generals Lomax, Walker, and Bradley Johnson. Five hundred men were accordingly sent to Salisbury on the 12th, and minute instructions forwarded to General Loinax as to the best mode of saving supplies and of collecting his own as well as other cavalry commands for the protection of Greens boro'.

General Johnston had also been summoned to Greensboro' by the President. He arrived punctually, and at mid-day, on the 12th, after first consulting with General Beauregard, whose guest he then was, went, in his company, to meet Mr. Davis. The latter was found at his temporary headquarters, with three members of his Cabinet— Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan. After an exchange of formal courtesies, the President, without asking auo-ht

O ' O O

of the military condition in General Johnston's Department, or elsewhere, expressed his conviction that, by calling back the ab sentees and enlisting the men who had not, as yet, been reached by the Conscript Bureau, he could, in a few weeks' time, put a large army in the field, and thus enable us to go on with the struggle. These were very much the same views that he had previously ex pressed to General Beauregard and to Governor Yance, and which were also embodied in his proclamation of April 5th.* Generals Johnston and Beauregard differed entirely from him, as neither could see the possibility, at that hour, of bringing these men into the ranks. Here the conference rested, and was postponed to the next day, to await the arrival of the Secretary of War, General Breckinridge, whose presence was deemed necessary before any final action should be taken. He came in the cvenin<r, and con-

cT> *

firmed the news of General Lee's surrender. Generals Johnston and Beauregard were now more than ever convinced that the pro-

* " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,'' vol. ii., p. C77.

longation of hostilities with any hope of success was an impossi bility ; and that the only course left Mr. Davis while still, nomi nally, the Chief Magistrate of the Confederacy, was to open nego tiations for peace. This opinion was urged by General Johnston, in his own and in General Beauregard's name, at the renewal of the conference, on the 13th. After asking the opinion of the members of the Cabinet present—General Breckinridge included —and receiving the assurance from all, except Mr. Benjamin, that they agreed with the two generals, Mr. Davis openly stated his objection, basing it mainly upon his belief that the Federal Gov ernment would refuse to treat with him, or accept any proposition he might offer. It was then suggested by General Johnston that the preliminary overtures might be made by himself, and not by the President. This, at last, was agreed to, and a letter, dictated by Mr. Davis, written by Mr. Mallory and signed by General John ston, was handed to the latter, with authority to forward it to General Sherman.

Thus closed the last official interview held between President Davis, General Johnston, and General Beauregard.*

General Johnston lost no time in causing this letter to be for warded to General Sherman. It was intrusted to the care of Lieutenant-General Hampton, at or near Hillsboro', and was, in obedience to his orders, delivered on the succeeding day. It read thus:

" The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary sus pension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies; the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."

Except some raids of the Federal cavalry, at Salisbury and other minor points, in relation to which General Beauregard was yet is suing orders to Generals Lornax, Bradley Johnson, and Ferguson,

* For further and confirmatory details concerning this conference the reader is referred to the Appendix to this chapter, where will be found a letter from General Johnston to General Beauregard (with the latter's endorsement), dated Baltimore, Md., March 30th, 18G8.

nothing of importance occurred from the 14th to the day of the meeting of Generals Johnston and Sherman. The greater part of the Confederate forces, then temporarily under Lieutenant-General Hardee, was inarching towards Greensboro', where General John ston's headquarters had been established. The army proper was within a few miles of that place on the morning of the 16th.

It is necessary to mention an occurrence of the day before, which, though in itself of no great importance, was the cause somewhat later of much complication and annoyance.

Mr. John N". Ilendren, " Treasurer, C. S.," as he signed him self, had been ordered by the President to turn over to General Beauregard, " as a military chest to be moved with his army train," certain silver coin, " estimated at §39,000," with the re quest that an officer should be designated to take charge of the sum and accompany its transfer to him " by a schedule of ex planation." General Beauregard referred the matter to General Johnston, as was plainly the proper course to be pursued by him, and stated in his endorsement that the Secretary of War author ized the use of said coin for the wants of the army, in case of need.* It appears—owing, no doubt, to General Johnston's ab sence at the time—that no immediate attention was paid to the matter, which greatly incensed the Treasurer, who thus brought upon himself a rather sharp reprimand from General Beauregard. Further than that, the latter disclaims all personal knowledge of any incident connected with this money, or any other alleged to have been distributed at that period, except that, after the sur render, he and each member of his staff received, as a last pay ment— and the first for many months — the sum of 81-15, said to have formed part of the above-mentioned §39,000 in silver coin.

General Sherman's answer, dated the 1-ith, met with some delay, and only reached General Johnston on the 16th. It was as follows:

"I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hos tilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by my self, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column to-morrow to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the

* See Appendix lor letters of Mr. Ileudren, and endorsement on them by

General Beauregard.

University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree.

" That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court-house, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the dam age they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State."

In accordance with this arrangement General Hardee was or dered to halt his command wherever it might be, and to draw his supplies from Greensboro'. The same order to halt was extended to the other commands. The officers to whom it was sent—Gen eral Hardee especially—were much concerned as to its meaning, and thought its effect would be detrimental to the troops, if it were not quickly explained. To their inquiries and remarks General Beauregard's answer was, that he could not, just then, inform them of General Johnston's purpose; that the latter would, no doubt, do so himself, on his return from Hillsboro'; and that, meanwhile, the troops should be kept well in hand for rapid movement, at a moment's notice. But that was a difficult task to perform. The men knew they were on the eve of an extraordinary event; that something worse than a battle over hung them; that, like General Lee's forces, they also might at any hour be compelled to surrender; and they feared that they might thus lose their arms and whatever private property they might then be possessed of. This apprehension—which, we must admit, was a natural one—induced many a good and gallant sol dier—especially in the cavalry—to abandon the ranks and start for " home," without first obtaining permission to do so. Indeed, the whole army seemed to understand that they had fought their last fight; that the cause, for which they had so intrepidly strug gled, was now lost; and that the sooner they were disbanded the better. Their irregular manner of leaving the army, by hundreds and more at a time, was another argument against the sanguine expectations indulged in by Mr. Davis.

Through General Hampton's instrumentality the time and place of meeting were arranged for the proposed conference between Generals Johnston and Sherman, who met, accordingly, at noon,

on the 17th, at Durham Station, some sixteen miles east of Hills-boro'. Nothing definite having been concluded at 2 o'clock p. M. on that day, it was agreed to adjourn until ten o'clock on the morning of the 18th.

Just before the opening of the second day's conference Gen eral Beauregard sent to General Johnston the following suggestion, the substance of which we find embodied in article 2d of the terms of agreement about to be submitted to the reader:

" GREENSBORO', April 18£/<, 1865 : 8 A. M. " General J. E. JOHNSTON, near Hillsboro', N. C.:

" Should your negotiations terminate favorably, let me suggest that you se-• cure, if possible, the right to march our troops to their homes, and there mus ter them duly out of service, depositing their regimental colors in their re spective State capitals for preservation.* G. T. BEAUIIEGARD."

General Breckinridge, who had been telegraphed for by Gen eral Johnston, was present at the meeting of the IStli, but not in an official capacity, as General Sherman would have objected to that. It was thought by General Johnston that, should the Sec retary of War be with him during the negotiation, the Confederate Government would be more apt to ratify whatever terms might be agreed upon.

After a long but courteous discussion, wherein General Breck inridge, more than once, expressed his opinion, the following pa per was drawn up, accepted, and signed by the two Commanding Generals:

"Memorandum or basis of agreement made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-Gcueral William T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States in Xorth Carolina, both present.

" 1st. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the status quo until notice is given by the Commanding General of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say forty-eight (48) hours—allowed.

" 2d. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and con ducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be re ported to the Chief of Ordnance, at Washington City, subject to the future

* The dotted words were written in cipher.

action of the Congress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

"3d. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States of the several State Governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths pre scribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State Governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be sub mitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

" 4th. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution and laws of Congress.

" 5th. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

"6th. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

" 7th. In general terms, the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disband-ment of the Confederate armies, the disposition of the arms, and the resump tion of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

"Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

" J. E. JOHNSTON, General Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

" W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina."

General Breckinridge returned to Greensboro' on the 19th, and thence to Salisbury, carrying with him a copy of the liberal agree ment to submit to the President, promising an immediate answer, which he hoped would be favorable; but which, nevertheless, w r as long delayed, owing to some unexplained objection on the part of Mr. Davis, and to the fact of his having gone to Charlotte, with out waiting for the conclusion of the conference.

Five days had elapsed since its termination, and still nothing was heard from President Davis. General Johnston had gone back to Greensboro', and there had published General Orders E~o. 14, for a suspension of arms pending negotiations between the two Governments. A like order had also been issued by General Sherman.

Unable to account for such procrastination, General Johnston, on the 23d, forwarded the following telegram to General Breckin-ridge:

"General Sherman writes that ho expects the return of his officer from Washington to-morrow."

To this no answer came, but the result was that General Breck-inridge saw the President, and also addressed him the following strong and urgent letter :

" CHARLOTTE, K C., April 23d, 18C5. " To his Excellency the PRESIDENT :

" Sir, —In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit my advice on the course you should take upon the memorandum, or basis of agreement, made on the 18th instant, by and between General J. E. Johnston, of the Con federate States Army, and General AY. T. Sherman, of the United States Army, provided that paper should receive the approval of the Government of the United States.

" The principal army of the Confederacy was recently lost in Virginia. Considerable bodies of troops not attached to that army have either dis persed or marched towards their homes, accompanied by many of their offi cers. Five days ago the effective force in infantry and artillery of General Johnston's army was but 14,770 men; and it continues to diminish. That officer thinks it wholly impossible for him to make any head against the overwhelming forces of the enemy. Our ports are closed, and the sources of foreign supply lost to us. The enemy occupy all or the greatest part of Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina, and move al most at will to the east of the Mississippi. They have recently taken Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, Macon, and other important towns, depriving us of large depots of supplies and of munitions of war. Of the small force still at command many are unarmed, and the Ordnance Department cannot furnish 5000 stand of small-arms. I do not think it would be possible to assemble, equip, and maintain an army of 30,000 men at any point east of the Missis sippi. The contest, if continued after this paper is rejected, will be likely to lose entirely the dignity of regular warfare. Many of the States will make such terms as they may; in others separate and ineffective hostilities may be prosecuted ; while the war, wherever waged, will probably degenerate into that irregular and secondary stage, out of which greater evils will flow to the South than to the enemy.

"For these, and for other reasons which need not now be stated, I think we can no longer contend with a reasonable hope of success. It seems to me that the time has arrived when, in a large and clear view of the situation, prompt steps should be taken to put a stop to the war. The terms proposed arc not wholly unsuited to the altered condition of affairs. The States are preserved, certain essential rights secured, and the army rescued from degra dation.

"It may be said that the argrecmeut of the 18th instant contains certain

stipulations which you cannot perform. This is true, and it was well under stood by General Sherman that only a part could be executed by the Confed erate authorities. In any case grave responsibilities must be met and as sumed. If the necessity for peace be conceded, corresponding action must be taken. The modes of negotiation which we deem regular, and would pre fer, are impracticable. The situation is anomalous, and cannot be solved upon principles of theoretical exactitude. In my opinion you are the only person who can meet the present necessities.

" I respectfully advise—

" 1st. That you execute, so far as you can, the second article of the agree ment of the 18th instant.

" 2d. That you recommend to the several States the acceptance of those parts of the agreement upon which they alone can act,

" 3d. Having maintained with faithful and intrepid purpose the cause of the Confederate States while the means of organized resistance remained, that you return to the States and the people the trust which you are no longer able to defend.

"Whatever course you pursue, opinions will be divided. Permit me to give mine. Should these or similar views accord with your own, I think the better judgment will be that you can have no higher title to the gratitude of your countrymen and the respect of mankind than will spring from the wis dom to see the path of duty at this time, and the courage to follow it, regard less alike of praise or blame.

" Respectfully, and truly your friend,

" JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War."

Another telegram from General Johnston to the Secretary of War, following close upon this letter to the President, had, at last, the desired effect; and, on the 2-ith, from Charlotte, Mr. Davis wrote:

"General J. E. JOHNSTON, Greensboro', N. C.:

" The Secretary of War has delivered to me the copy you handed to him of the basis of an agreement between yourself and General Sherman. Your action is approved. You w T ill so inform General Sherman; and if the like authority be given by the Government of the United States to complete the arrangement, you will proceed on the basis adopted.

"Further instructions will be given as to the details of the negotiation and the methods of executing the terms of agreement when notified by you of the readiness on the part of the General commanding the United States forces to proceed with the arrangement. JEFFERSON DAVIS."

Hardly had the foregoing communication been received by General Johnston, when two despatches were brought to him from General Sherman, the purport of which is clearly ex-II.—25

plained in the following telegram to the Confederate Secretary

of War:

" GREENSBORO', April %ith: 6.30 p. M. " Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

"I have just received despatches from General Sherman informing me that instructions from Washington direct him to limit his negotiations to my com mand ; demanding its surrender on the terms granted to General Lee, and notifying me of the termination of the truce in forty-eight hours from noon to-day. Have you any instructions ? AYe had better disband this small force, to prevent devastation of country.

" J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

This news was disheartening in the extreme; and the stringent measures the Federal Government was now preparing to adopt were perhaps the result of the calamity that had befallen the South, no less than the Korth, in the assassination of President Lincoln. Throughout every State of the then dying Confederacy there was but one feeling—that of abhorrence of the crime, and outspoken regret for its commission. The idea that any Con federate, whether in the army or out of it, had, through a feeling of vengeance and with the approbation of the country, suggested, countenanced, or planned such an act of barbarism, could only be entertained by those who were ignorant of the history of that period, and of the characteristics of the Southern people. Cer tainly Mr. Lincoln's sad end can no more be laid to the account of the Confederacy, or of any of those who formed part of its government, than the lamentable death of the late President Garfield can be attributed to the Republican party and its leaders. The South knew that, had President Lincoln's life been spared, lie would have ratified the treaty entered upon by the com manders of the two armies then in the field; for, as both General Sherman and Admiral Porter testify, "he wanted peace on almost any terms," and his greatest desire was " to get the men com posing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work on their farms and in their shops."* It was the overstrained, em bittered zeal of the new Federal Administration — born of a double crime, murder and apostasy — that destroyed in its bud the work of peace and reunion, so ably and liberally prepared —to their honor be it said—by Generals Johnston and Sherman.

* General Sherman's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 32G. See also "Admiral Por ter's Account of General Sherman's Interview with Mr. Lincoln," Ibid., pp. 328, 329.

Apparently, the Secretary of War did not understand the meaning of General Johnston's last despatch to him; or his views might have been altered by exterior pressure, for he was then at Charlotte, with Mr. Davis, who was still bent on organ izing a cavalry force to escort him and his party to the South west.

General Breckinridge answered:

" CHARLOTTE, N. C., April 24^, 1865 : 11 r. M. " General J. E. JOHNSTON, Greensboro', N. C.:

"Does not your suggestion about disbanding refer to the infantry and most of the artillery ? If it be necessary to disband these, they might still save their small-arms and find their way to some appointed rendezvous. Can you not bring off the cavalry and all the men you can mount from the trans portation and other animals, with some light field-pieces ? Such a force could march away from Sherman, and be strong enough to encounter anything be tween us and the Southwest. If this course be possible, carry it out and telegraph your intended route.

"JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War. 1 '

This reached General Johnston on the 25th. His reply was prompt and energetic. It deserves attention and respect:

" GREENSBORO', April 25tk: 10 A. M. " Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

" Your despatch received. We have to save the people, save the blood of the army, and save the high civil functionaries. Your plan, I think, can only do the last.

" We ought to prevent invasion, make terms for our troops, and give an escort of our best cavalry to the President, who ought to move without loss of a moment. Commanders believe the troops will not fight again. W^e think your plan impracticable. Major-General Wilson, U. S. A., has capt ured Macon, with Major-Generals Cobb and G. W. Smith, Brigadiers Mackall and Mercer, and the garrison. Federal papers announce capture of Mobile, with three thousand prisoners. J. E. JOHNSTON, General."

ISTo answer was given to this. General Johnston received neither orders nor instructions from Mr. Davis after the latter's communication of the 21th of April. His memory serves him amiss if it suggests otherwise—unless General Breckinridge's telegram of the 25th to General Johnston can be considered as an answer from the President; but that, as must be evident to the reader, was not an answer to the foregoing despatch.

It was because nothing was heard from the President or the Secretary of War that, again, on the 25th, at 11.30 A.M., General Johnston telegraphed as follows:

" Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War:

" I have proposed to General Sherman military negotiations in regard to this army."

This was done after due consultation with General Beauregard, who thoroughly approved General Johnston's course, and thought it imperative that some positive and immediate step should be taken, to extricate the army and its commanders from the des perate position in which they were placed.

The same unaccountable silence was maintained on the part of what was still called the Government of the Confederate States. General Johnston and General Beauregard were forced to con clude that Mr. Davis was unwilling to assume any further re sponsibility, and wished to transfer its weight to their shoulders. They were not deterred by this consideration, however, and Gen eral Johnston, in harmony with General Beauregard, at 7 A. M., on the 2Gth, sent a third telegram to the Secretary of War, in these terms: " I am going to meet General Sherman at the same place."

The meeting was held, and the following terms agreed upon by Generals Johnston and Sherman, without any difficulty what ever :

" Terms of a military convention entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 18G5, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station, N. C., between Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-Gencral TV". T. Sherman, commanding the United States army, in North Carolina.

" 1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

" 2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and de livered to an ordnance officer of the United States army.

" Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the Commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation, in writing, not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obli gation.

"4. The side-arms of officers and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them.

"5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes: not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside. " J. E. JOHNSTON, Genl. Comdg. Confed. States forces in N. C. " W. T. SHERMAN, Maj.-Genl. Comdg. United States forces in N. C."

Additional terms were agreed upon the next day between Gen eral Johnston and General Schofield, who had been empowered to complete all necessary arrangements relative to the surrender. "We ask attention to General Sherman's letter to that effect, in the Appendix.

The supplemental terms were as follows:

" 1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation, if necessary.

" 2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the General commanding the Depart ment may direct.

" 3. Private horses, and other private property, for both officers and men, to be retained by them.

" 4. The Commanding General of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water, from Mobile to ISTew Orleans, to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

"5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

" 6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention.

" J. E. JOHNSTON, Genl. Comdg. Confed. States forces in N. C.

" J. M. SCHOFIELD, Maj.-Genl. Comdg. United States forces in N. C."

Not knowing, on the 27th, where the President or the Secretary of "War could be found, General Johnston addressed the following despatch to Brigadier-General Echols (whom he believed to be at Charlotte), through Colonel Hoke, then commanding that post:

"A military convention has been made by General Sherman and myself terminating hostilities between our commands. Send intelligence to Secre tary of War, if you can, and give the information to Major-General Stone-man." *

Colonel Hoke, in transmitting the message to the Secretary of War, added:

" I have sent a flag of truce with a letter of General Cooper to General Stonernau."

* This telegram, and those preceding, to and from General Breckinridge, as also his letter to President Davis (April 23d), are copied from files of the late Secretary of War of the Confederate States, now in the possession of his son, Major Clifton R. Breckinridge.

The fact is patent that the Confederate Government (or those who formerly constituted it) abandoned Generals Johnston and Beauregard, and the forces under them, in their extremity, with out advice or instructions, and without any information whatever concerning its whereabouts or its intended movements. The truth is, that at the time we speak of Generals Johnston and Beaure gard represented the only Confederate organization then in exist ence in the East. They fully realized the fact, and knew that nothing could be gained by hesitation or delay with an adversary so conversant as General Sherman was with the exact condition of affairs in his front. Hence General Johnston's determined action. His circular to the Governors of the surrounding States explains the motives actuating him.*

What would have become of the Confederate forces under Generals Johnston and Beauregard, what height of demoralization would the army not have reached, had General Johnston waited for authority to act from the President, whose only care at that juncture appeared to be to seek personal safety in flight? His efforts to organize and fit out a large cavalry escortf for himself and suite are only partially excused by attributing them to trepi dation and bewilderment. The letter of General Breckinridge to Mr. Davis, dated May 3d, gives a melancholy account of the de moralized condition of the body-guard of the President's party. "Nothing can be done with the bulk of this command," said Gen eral Breckinridge. "It has been with difficulty that anything has been kept in shape. I am having the silver paid to the troops, and will in any event save the gold and have it brought forward in the morning, when I hope Judge Reagan will take it. Many of the men have thrown away their arms. Most of them have resolved to remain here, under Vauirhn and Dibbrell, and will

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make terms. A few hundred men will move on, and may be depended on for the object we spoke of yesterday."J

President Davis seems to have been unconscious of the fact that he was not in the position of a Charles Stuart, or any other mon arch, fleeing from his country and from rebellious subjects, who

* Sec Appendix.

t Mr. Davis gives the number of men forming it as " about two thousand, representing six brigade organizations." ("Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., pp. 689, 690.)

I The entire letter is given in the Appendix.

believed he had the inherent right to sacrifice the lives of his followers in efforts to insure his individual safety. As soon as the Confederacy was overthrown—and it was virtually so when General Lee surrendered at Appomattox — Mr. Davis became a private citizen. Had he then wisely accepted that position and left the country (as General Breckinridge and Mr. Benjamin did, after the fall of General Johnston's army), using his own means to do so, and unbetrayed by official display, he would, undoubted ly, have escaped both capture and imprisonment, and would have been spared the stories circulated at the time, which, false though most of them were, went far to impair his dignity.

General Beauregard, in accordance with instructions from Gen eral Johnston, had again stopped all further movements of our troops, and informed the Federal officer commanding the 6th Corps, at or near Danville, that the truce had been resumed be tween the two contending armies. The following order was then published to the Confederate forces:

" HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, NEAR

GREENSBORO', N. C., April 27th, 1805. "General Orders. No. 18:

"By the terms of a military convention made on the 26th instant, by Major-General W. T. Sherman, U. S. A., and General J. E. Johnston, C. S. A., the of ficers and men of this army are to bind themselves not to take up arms against the United States until properly relieved from that obligation, and shall re ceive guarantees from the United States officers against molestation by the United States authorities, so long as they observe that obligation and the laws in force where they reside.

" For these objects duplicate muster-rolls will be made immediately, and, after the distribution of the necessary papers, the troops will march, under their officers, to their respective States, and there be disbanded, all retaining personal property.

" The object of this convention is pacification to the extent of the authority of the Commanders who made it.

"Events in Virginia, which broke every hope of success by war, imposed on its General the duty of sparing the blood of this gallant army and saving our country from further devastation and our people from ruin.

" J. E. JOHNSTON, General. " Official.

" KISLOCH FALCONER, A. A. G."

CHAPTER XLIX.

General Beauregard Completes his Last Official Duties.—Turns his Thoughts Homeward.—Names of the Officers Serving on his Staff.—His Efforts dur ing the War to Obtain Promotion for Deserving Staff-officers.—His Tele gram to General Cooper, April 28th.—General Cooper's Reply.—Promo tion Demanded for other Meritorious Officers, but Granted for Two only. —Abandoned Box-car at the Depot at Greensboro' containing Confeder ate Archives.—General Beauregard Forwards it to Charlotte.—He Starts to Return Home on the 1st of May.—Expedients Employed to Defray his Expenses on the Journey.—Instance Given to Show the Patriotism of the Southern People.—General Beauregard Reaches Newbcrry, S. C., on May 5th.—He bids Adieu to those Members of his Staff who were from South Carolina.—His Parting Visit to Governor Pickcns.—He Passes through Augusta, Atlanta, West Point, and Montgomery, reaching Mobile on the 19th.—Is Impressed by the Depression of the People.—How General Sher man could have been Checked and Defeated.—General Beauregard Avoids the Visits of Confederate Officers and Men while in Mobile.—Leaves for New Orleans.—Arrives on the 20th of May at the Pontchartrain End of the Railroad, Five Miles from the City.—Is Informed of Crowds Waiting to Greet him.—Endeavors to Avoid all Public Demonstrations.—Is Wel comed at every Step.—Reaches Home at Sunset.

As soon as the work of arranging and verifying the muster-rolls and other papers relative to the return of the troops to their re spective States had been completed, General Beauregard, released from these sad but necessary duties, turned his thoughts to his own personal affairs and his approaching departure for Louisiana. He had, on the 27th of April, addressed an affectionate farewell letter to the officers of his personal and general staff, which we have al ready inserted in the biographical sketch immediately preceding the narrative of his military operations. We append a list of their names: *

PERSONAL STAFF.

1. Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm, of South Carolina, A. D. C.

2. Lieutenant A. J. Toutaut,' of Texas, A. D. C.

* A complete list of the staff, and of all detached officers and men serving at General Beaurcgard's headquarters, up to the 1st of May, is given in the Appendix.

3. Captain R. T. Beauregard, of Louisiana, Acting A. D. C.

4. Cadet II. T. Beauregard, of Louisiana, Acting A. D. C.

5. Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Rice, of South Carolina, Volunteer A. D. C. G. Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Paul, of Virginia, Volunteer A. D. C.

GENERAL STAFF.

1. Colonel George W. Brent, of Virginia, A. A. G.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Otey, of Virginia, A. A. G.

3. Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Roman, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G.

4. Major Henry Bryan, of Georgia, A. A. and I. G.

5. Major James Eustis, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G. G. Captain Albert Ferry, of Louisiana, A. A. and I. G.

7. Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Waddy, of Virginia, Chief Ordnance Officer.

8. Surgeon R. L. Brodie, of South Carolina, Medical Director.

9. Surgeon Samuel Choppin, of Louisiana, Medical Inspector.

During the war General Beauregard had exerted himself to the utmost to have additional rank given to staff-officers who, in his opinion, were worthy of promotion. lie thought that a full gen eral should be entitled, in war, to four aides-de-camp—a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, and a captain. Instead of which two aids only, with the rank of lieutenant, had been allowed a full gen eral, according to law. During the winter of ISGi-lSGo Congress, however, at last passed a bill giving three aids, with the rank of major, to every full general. But the law, as was well known, was never enforced by the War Department. Fearing lest the Con federacy should die without doing at least partial justice to that faithful and self-sacrificing class of officers, General Beauregard addressed the following telegram to Adjutant-General Cooper, who at that date was still at Charlotte:

" GREENSBORO', IT. C., April 2Sth, 1865 : 7.30 A. M.

"Before leaving here the Secretary of War promised to have General John ston's aids and mine commissioned majors, according to law. Has it been done ? It is highly desirable it should be done before disbanding troops. I am glad to

hear of Lieutenant-Colonel Riley's promotion.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

General Cooper's answer was forwarded and duly received the same day. It ran thus:

" CHARLOTTE, April 28th. 18G5. " General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

" The Secretary of War and myself strongly recommended to the President the promotion of yours and General Johnston's aides-de-camp; and though the matter was considered by him, the order for their promotion was not given. He has left, and I am powerless to effect your wishes. It would give me pleas ure if I could. S. COOPER, A. and I. G."

"While at Charleston, General Beauregard had also recommend ed many of his officers as deserving of promotion for gallant and meritorious services during the long and remarkable siege of that city; but none of them were promoted save two—namely, Major (afterwards Brigadier-General) Stephen D. Elliott, one of the com manders of Sumter after its first intrepid defender, Colonel lihett, had been withdrawn from the unconquered fortress, with all its heavy artillery; and Major D. B. Harris, the able and indefatiga ble Engineer, who was made a lieutenant-colonel, and was even promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, though he died with out being apprised of the fact. The others remained unnoticed until the very last moment during the expiring hours of the Con federacy, when, at General Beauregard's solicitation to the Secre tary of War, two of them, by going to Charlotte, N". C., in person, obtained deserved promotion. The first, Brigadier-General Talia-ferro, was thus made 3Iajor-General; and the second, Captain F. D. Lee, who had been in charge of the Torpedo Department at Charleston, became a major. This was tardy justice; and it is surprising, when we remember the confusion prevailing at that time in the Executive Bureaus, that even so much was obtained.

As an illustration of the intense preoccupation then existing among some of the high civil functionaries of the defunct Gov ernment, General Beauregard relates that, shortly after the Presi dent had left Greensboro' for Salisbury and Charlotte, he noticed at the depot, at Greensboro', a train of box-cars, from one of which some straggling soldiers were throwing out papers which were flying to and fro in every direction. Upon inquiry it was ascertained that these cars contained the official records of the Government from Richmond, and had been abandoned there, without a guard, and without directions as to the disposition to be made of them. General Beauregard gave orders at once that sentinels should be put over them, and that they should be imme diately forwarded to Charlotte; which was done. lie afterwards learned that General Johnston, on arriving at that place, found these cars again unprotected, and that he also took special pains to have them properly guarded. They were finally turned over to the Federal authorities, in order to prevent further destruction.

It was only on the 30th of April that General Beauregard was able to begin preparations for his homeward journey. He had collected from Greensboro' all the Louisianians who were there

GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

on detached service, separated from their commands, and had invited them to join his staff and to return with him to New Orleans. He thus got together about twenty of them, who gratefully accepted his kind offer; and on the 1st of May, at 10.30 p. M., after making his adieus to those members of his gen eral staff whose route lay in a different direction, to General Johnston, to his military household, and to many officers who had not yet left, he started, with his party, travelling sometimes by rail, sometimes on horseback, and sometimes even—for the few who had no horses—on foot.

General Beau regard felt the difficulty of procuring the neces sary funds for defraying his own and his companions' expenses on the journey. Except the silver coin (§1.15 each) which had been given to himself, his staff, and the troops, as already related, neither General Beau regard nor those who accompanied him had any money in specie; and even Confederate notes, which had become altogether valueless, were scarce among them.

But one of General Beauregard's aids, Lieutenant Chisolm, who was seldom at a loss for resources in an emergency, proposed that a wagon should be procured and stocked with provisions and stores, such as tobacco, nails, yarn, twine, thread, and whatever else the people along their route were likely to be in need of, and that these articles should be used in lieu of money. The suggestion was adopted; and as the quartermaster and the com missary of the post had received orders to distribute their supplies on hand to the several commands, the wa«;on was soon loaded as

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desired, and the plan of barter, when tried upon the journey, surpassed the most sanguine expectations. The people on the way were happy to secure these useful commodities in return for what few provisions they could spare. It is our duty to add that, however poor or helpless the people were, as soon as they learned that what they were asked to barter was needed by General Beauregard and his staff, they almost invariably refused to accept any compensation whatever. This was carried so far that General Beauregard, although deeply touched by it, had to forbid his name being mentioned until the exchange had been entirely effected and the goods carried off.

To show the patriotism of the Southern people—notably of the women—even at that hour, an incident may be mentioned which occurred just before General Beauregard and his companions

reached the South Carolina and Georgia border. They had come to a small town, and were relating the latest news of the surrender of our armies to the inhabitants, who had rushed to the road to obtain what they knew would be trustworthy infor mation. There, as everywhere, they heard it with great sorrow. Old men—for no others were there—and women of all ages, of all classes, shed tears as they took General Beauregard's hand and asked him " if he really thought the struggle was over forever." Among those present was a tall, gaunt old lady, who, although sun burned and with hands hardened by toil, had an unmistakable air of culture and refinement. She took the general warmly by the hand, the tears meanwhile running down her furrowed cheeks, and said, " General, is there no longer any hope of success?" " None, madame," was the answer; " we have fought our last fight, and must now submit bravely to our hard fate." "Ah! General, I lost four brave, manly sons in this war, and I have but one left, my youngest, but I would have given his life too for the triumph of our cause!" No Roman matron could have spoken more noblj T .

On arriving at Newberry, S. C., on the 5th of May, General Beauregard told those officers of his staff who were citizens of South Carolina that they must now leave him and return to their families. They strongly objected, and insisted upon accompany ing him until he should have reached his home in safety. This he positively refused to allow; for travelling was then very difficult, especially in Georgia, owing to the destruction of the railroads; and he was unwilling that they should put themselves to so much inconvenience on his account. They yielded, therefore, though reluctantly, and on the next morning (May 6th) finally parted from the General, after a most affectionate leave-taking. Four years of toil and dangers, shared together, had cemented between them a friendship which no after-event could possibly impair.

General Beauregard and the remainder of his party arrived at Augusta, Ga., during the afternoon of the 8th, after passing through Charlotte, K C., Rockhill, Newberry, Edgefield, and Hamburg, S. C. He had stopped at Edgefield on the morning of the 7th to pay a parting visit to Governor Pickens, whose resi dence stood just outside of the town. At the Governor's kind and pressing invitation he and his staff remained there an entire clay.

General Beauregard prolonged his stay in Augusta several days, for the sake of the rest he so much needed after the fatigue and emotions of the last few weeks. He then started by rail for Atlanta, which he had not seen since the destruction of the town by General Sherman's army. Of that handsome and fast-growing city there remained but a few houses standing here and there on its outskirts. Only blackened walls and chimneys now marked the alignments of the streets. It was a relief to General Beauregard when the train left for West Point, which was then the terminus of the railroad, since the destruction by Wilson's cavalry of that part of the track running to Montgomery. From West Point he went across country to Montgomery, then occupied by Federal troops under Major-General A. J. Smith, a former friend and classmate of General Beauregard at the United States Military Academy. This was on the 17th of May. General Smith did all in his power to assist General Beauregard in his further journey southward.

Mobile was reached on the 19th. General Beauregard went directly from the railroad depot to the steamer by which he was to leave for New Orleans. He refused to stop in the city, in order to avoid the visits of a number of Confederate officers and men, who, he was told, proposed calling on him. The fear of involv ing them in trouble with the Federal authorities was his reason for depriving himself of the pleasure of meeting them once more.

There were now but a few hours intervening before General Beauregard would ao-ain set foot in Louisiana. When about to

O O

enter upon this last stage of his long journey he could not help painfully noting the difference between the feeling, the tone, and the outward appearance of the people four years before, when he was on his way to take command in Charleston, and that which he now felt and saw around him. Free, resolute, hopeful were the masses then; sorrowful, despondent, heart-broken he found them now. Johnston's army after Lee's, Taylor's after Johnston's, had surrendered. The Trans-Mississippi forces, under Ivirby Smith, must soon do the same. It was for them a question not even of days but of hours. None, except perhaps Mr. Davis, could then imagine that General Kirby Smith was capable of making a stand in the Trans-Mississippi country and of continuing there to uphold our cause. " The great resources of his Depart ment, its vast extent, the numbers, the discipline, and the efficien-

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

cj of liis army"*—words copied from General Kirby Smith's order of April 21st to his forces—were in striking contrast with his refusal, and his reasons given at the time for refusing,f to send assistance to General Hood, in his hard campaign around Nashville, after the battle of Franklin. Mr. Davis had, no doubt, forgotten the expression of opinion of the War Department (De cember 4th, 1861) concerning General Kirby Smith: that he had heretofore failed to respond to many calls made on him, and "that no plans should be based on his compliance.''^

General Beauregard also bitterly reflected upon General Sher man's long and slow march, from Atlanta to Savannah, from Savannah to Goldsboro', and from Goldsboro' to Raleigh, a dis tance of C50 miles, which it had taken him 109 days, or an aver age of six miles a day, to accomplish. lie knew that this had been effected, without material opposition, because of want of forethought on the part of the officers of the War Department, from whom no reinforcements could be obtained, and by reason of whose apathy no concentration could be made at any point, notwithstanding his repeated and urgent appeals. And what added keenness to his regret was the recollection that, had Gen eral Hood crossed the Tennessee River at Guntersville when he should have done so, he would have had ample time to destroy the scattered Federal forces in that part of the State, take Nash ville, with all the supplies there collected, and march to the Ohio, without encountering serious obstacles. Or possibly he might, after taking Nashville, have crossed the Cumberland Mountains and gone to form a junction with General Lee, so as to strike Gen eral Grant before General Sherman could come to his assistance. The success of either movement might have compelled General

* u Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," vol. ii., p. 697.

t See his letter to General Beauregard, in Appendix to Chapter XLII., wherein he wrote, under date of January Gth. 18G5 : "* * * The country lias been so devastated by the contending armies, and is so exhausted, that the troops would require transportation for supplies for near three hundred miles from the interior to the Mississippi. * * * The country north of Red River is bare of supplies, and is at this season utterly impracticable for the operations of armies and the movement of troops. More than two hundred miles of des titution intervene between our supplies and the enemy's works on the Arkan sas. Near five hundred miles of desert separate our base on Red River from the productive region of Missouri," etc.

Sherman to follow the Confederate forces into Middle Tennessee; thus showing the correctness of General Hood's original plan, which, though badly executed, was, nevertheless, undoubtedly well conceived.

On the 20th of May, General Beauregard and his party arrived at the Pontchartrain end of the new canal and shell road, five miles in rear of New Orleans. There he was informed that crowds of people were anxiously awaiting his return to greet his passage through the city. Acting under the same impulse, and for the same reasons that led him to avoid all public demonstra tion in Mobile, he determined at once to reach his residence through the most retired streets. But he was only partially suc cessful in doing so, for even there, wherever he appeared, men, women, and children flocked out from their houses, waving their handkerchiefs and pressing around his horse to shake the General by the hand. He could find no words to say in response, but was most deeply moved by such a spontaneous outburst of sympathy and affection. And thus, as the sun was setting in the west, he finally came to his once happy home, left more than four years before, to find—as he feelingly said—a seat vacant that formerly was occupied by one who had never heard his footsteps at the door without hastening to welcome him to his own fireside.

CHAPTEE L.

Management of the Confederate Administration. — Importation of Arms.— Permitted under International Law. — Blockade Ineffective the First Year.—Federal Government Obtained all Arms Wanted from Abroad.— Failure of Confederate Government in that Respect.—Inefficiency of the Agent.—No Arms Forwarded during 1861.—Administration Occupied with Manufacturing Arms at Home.—Nitre Beds.—Purchase of a Navy.— Ten First-class Steamers Offered to the Confederate Government in May, 1861.— Offer Declined.—Attempts to Build Ironclads, and late Obtain-nient of a Few Ships.—Object not to Eaise the Blockade, but to Assail the Federal Mercantile Marine. — Efforts Inefficient. — Financial Opera tions.—Sale of Time Bonds in Europe Secured by Cotton, our True Re source.—$75,000,000 Offered to the Confederates in London and Paris for Time Bonds Secured by Cotton.—Administration Resorted to Constant Issue of Treasury Notes, not Redeemed.—Compulsory Funding in Bonds. —Destroyed Credit of Confederate States.—Diplomacy.—Consisted of Arguments about Rights and Dependence of England on American Cot ton.—Confederate Administration Made no Offer of Commercial Advan tages by Treaty.—Low Duties and Navigation Laws.—No Diplomacy.— Defence of Territory, Population, and Supplies.—Progressive Losses.— Effect on Public Opinion and Feeling.—Confederate Conscription, in stead of State Troops. — Impressment Makeshifts, instead of Efficiency in Commissary and Quartermaster Departments.—Causes Concurring to Produce a Disastrous End.—The South after the War.—Present Attitude in the Union.—The Future in Store.—Memory of the Late Struggle.

IN bringing this book to a close it may be pertinent and profit able to the reader in search of truth, to pass briefly in review the management of the Confederate government in several matters vitally affecting the issue of the cause. To do this it is necessary to note our success or failure in providing the ways and means of defence. These consisted : first, in the importation of arms and munitions of war from Europe; second, in the purchase of a navy ; third, in the financial operations of the government; fourth, in its diplomacy with foreign nations, especially England and France. As a result following the action of the administration in these particulars, it is important to observe the progressive failure of the government in defending the territory, population, and sup plies of the Southern States. With correct ideas on these subjects

GENERAL BEAUEEGAKD.

and a knowledge of public opinion and feeling concerning the management of Confederate affairs, the materials will be present for judging of the causes which led to the disastrous end. Thus is the web of fate woven. But, in touching upon these grave topics, which control military events and shape history, no more can be attempted here than a brief, if suggestive, outline.

1. It was patent to every man of intelligence in the country that arms, ammunition, accoutrements, soldiers' clothing, shoes, and blankets must be procured from Europe. The Confederate government was established in February, 1861. War was declared in the latter part of April. During three months there was not the slightest obstacle to the obtain merit of arms and munitions. And, after declaration of war, the laws of nations authorized the citizens of neutral powers to sell to belligerents articles contra band of war, and to supply gunpowder and every description of arms. These laws were specifically confirmed by decrees of the courts of England and of the United States. Neutrality and a recognition of the belligerent rights of the Confederate States were soon assured by England, France, and other nations of Eu rope. And the blockade attempted of the Southern seaports was, for six months, no more than nominal, and thereafter very im perfect, to say the least of it, up to the close of the war.

On the 1st of May, 1861, the British Minister at Washington was informed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, that he had sent agents to England, and that others would go to France, to purchase arms for the United States. This fact was communi cated to the British Foreign Office, which interposed no objec tion. The government of the United States managed to receive in safety all the warlike supplies which it induced British manu facturers and merchants to send, and its arsenals were replen ished from British sources. A reference to the bills of entry in the custom-houses of London and Liverpool shows that from May 1st, 1861, to December 31st, 1862, vast shipments of implements of war were made to the Northern States. The official custom house returns set forth that 311,000 rifles, 41,500 muskets, 26,500 flint guns, 49,982,000 percussion - caps, and 2250 swords were ex ported to the North. And from one-third to one-half as much more was shipped as " hardware."

Meantime, the head of the Confederate administration, elected on account of his acquaintance with military no less than civil af-II.—26

fairs, a graduate of West Point, distinguished as a colonel in the Mexican war, and afterwards Secretary of War, and familiar with the personnel of the United States army—a man who expressed his conviction that the North would certainly make war upon the South, and urged military preparations for defence—picked out Major Caleb Huse and sent him to England, as agent, to purchase arms. Major Huse was also a graduate of West Point, of the class of 1847, from Newburyport, Mass., and, since the war, has been, and still is, principal of a preparatory school at West Point, N. Y. He did not go abroad until after war was declared, and ran the blockade from the harbor of Charleston, with instructions to buy ten thousand (!) rifles.* On the 30th of December, 1861, he wrote: " Not able to send anything." It seems, however, to have been held by the Confederate administration that Major Huse displayed prodigious energy when he sent the information that he "had in a warehouse at St. Andrew's Wharf, Liverpool, 25,000 rifles, 2000 barrels of powder, 500,000 cartridges, 13,000 accoutre ments, 226 saddles, with blankets, socks, etc.;" these "guarded by government watchmen, and the wharfingers ordered not to ship or deliver without acquainting the Board of Customs." So much for the commercial caution and skill of this select agent, whose repute is assuredly that of an estimable citizen, but not that of an active, enterprising, and practical man. If there were other agents sent to Europe by the Confederate government to purchase and ship arms the fact has not been published. The competent agency of John Frazer& Co., of Liverpool, might have been obtained by the government, and that of Confederate officers, one or more, who furnished the Russian government with arras during the Crimean war of 1855, and had information of the available arms in Europe. But their knowledge and experience were not utilized. Most of the wholly insufficient supply of arms that was obtained came through the private enterprise of merchants shipping at their own risk, and w r ere sold to the government after landing. A large number were also acquired by capture on the fields of battle. While the timely importation of what we sorely needed from abroad received comparatively insignificant and inefficient atten tion, the energies and agents of the administration seemed chiefly occupied in the preparation, within the Confederate States, of

* See Chapter V., Vol. I.

nitre beds and other elaborate arrangements, whicli required time, and therefore accomplished little before the tide of war was fatally turned against us.

Of men willing to engage in the defence of their country Mr. Davis himself testifies there were many more than the govern ment could arm. There were very many out of the army who were anxious to enter it, but for whom the government had no arms. Three hundred and sixty thousand offered their services to the government before it moved from Montgomery, at the end of May, 1861. In 1862 accepted regiments were encamped at Rich mond which had been awaiting their arms for several months. The chief anxiety of General Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green was to procure arms and men. Half of his troops were imperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons during the autumn of 1861. Importunate cries went up to the government from the West for the supplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes. Here, there, everywhere, the difficulty of the Confederate administration was the want of arms. The first Secretary of War, General L. P. Walker, after vainly urging the importation of arms by the hundred thousand, resigned, because it was determined by the President not to put into camps of instruction, for the campaign of 1862, the large number of troops on which the Secretary insisted.

2. In the procurement of a navy the Confederate administra tion was not more successful. An appropriation of ten millions of dollars in bonds, invested in cotton, would have enabled the Government to obtain a sufficient number of first-class steam ships, to prevent a blockade; and such a proposition was actually made to it. When the East India Company surrendered to the Crown its control of British India it had for sale a fleet of swift and stout steamers, built for armament, to secure the Company's interests in the Indian seas, and for long voyages. These vessels, of great size and power (then recently built) were ten in number— four first-class, and six, for our purposes, scarcely inferior. They could have been bought in England at less than one-half the cost, and could have been equipped, manned, armed, and put on the coast of the United States within six months after the formation of the Confederate government*—that is, by August or Septem-

* See Chapter V., Vol. I.

ber, 1861—for $10,000,000, or covered by 40,000 bales of cotton. Tiie owners were willing to receive cotton or such other payment as might be convenient. Mr. Charles K. Prioleau, of the Liver pool branch of the house of John Frazer & Co., made this negoti ation of his own accord ;* and an aijent of the firm went from

' O

Charleston, S. C., to Montgomery with his proposition, that the Confederate government should buy these vessels on the terms mentioned. But the proposal was declined. This occurred about three months after the organization of the Confederate govern ment, and constitutes a strange commentary upon the predictions of a terrible war, and the anxiety of Mr. Davis to prepare for it. Mr. Prioleau is a man of high standing, socially and commer cially, and the correctness of his statements cannot be doubted.

The season of 1SGO was a fine one for cotton, and a large crop was made. The people of the Cotton States were prosperous and rich. There were very many who did not need their crops for their immediate support, and there were very many who had money for investment. Although a good deal of cotton was shipped abroad, as usual, a considerable amount was held in the interior, and it was freely at the disposal of the government in exchange for its bonds, payable at a distant day. Recognizing the importance of preventing the closure of the Southern ports, it was early proposed and urged by men of prominence to pur chase cotton with bonds of the Confederate States. Yice-Presi-dent Stephens suggested 2,000,000 bales of the crop of 1SGO, and 2.000,000 more from the crop of 1SG1. With this cotton, or any considerable part of it, either got out before the ports could be effectually closed by blockade, or in hand and pledged, a large number of the best steamers, ironclads or others, could have been bought, or contracted for and built, in Europe. This line of pol icy would have enabled the government to procure a number of ships by the end of 1861, and in no long time a navy vastly su perior to that of the United States. The blockade might have been prevented, and Northern shipping—which was the weak point of the North — might have been swept from the ocean; all the cotton we had to export might have been convoyed across the sea; all needed supplies might have been procured; the credit of the Confederate States might have been established, while that

* Sec Mr. Prioleau's letter to General Beauregaril, in Chapter V., Vol. I.

of the United States might have been crippled, by the prevention' of duties from imports and exports; and, by the development of such power and resources, the Confederate States might have secured the recognition of their established place among the inde pendent nations of the world. But the administration failed to discover the true policy, or had not the capacity and energy to carry it out. That which is highly practicable for some men is wholly impracticable for others. Hence, the successes and fail ures that checker life mark the difference between men of emi nent competence and those who bear the brand of signal incom petence on great occasions.

The blockade—at first a mere semblance—was allowed to grow gradually, and, by great and intelligent effort on the part of the North, became more efficient and real, although never perfect. Meanwhile, the Confederate administration expended its ener gies and resources, thus cramped, in a few partially successful attempts at building ironclads at the South, and had an agent in England to buy ships for the purpose of attacking Northern com merce on the seas. The frigate Merrimac* raised from the water

O

at Norfolk, was by March, 1862, converted into the ironclad ram Virginia, with a draught of twenty-two feet. She was not sea worthy, and was unable to drive the Federal fleet out of the shallow waters of Chesapeake Bay; and when the peninsula was evacuated she had to be burned, on Craney Island, within two months after her completion. The steam-ram Mississippi, at New Orleans, was not finished when that city fell. The Louisi ana, from defective machinery, was of little account. The North Carolina and the Raleigh, constructed at Wilmington, went to the bottom at the entrance of the Cape Fear River, without ac complishing anything. The Palmetto State and the Ohicora, at Charleston, had home-made machinery, none having been imported by the government. This was so inadequate that what was effect ed with the vessels hardly merits a special mention. There was— we might say—one exception : the Arkansas, saved from destruc tion by the forethought of General Beauregard, but whose short and glorious career was due to the intrepidity of her commander, his officers and crew, and not to her own strength and capacity. None of these Confederate vessels or ironclads were, in the strict sense of the word, seaworthy, and, beyond river and harbor de fence, none of them could render effectual service.

The agent of the Confederate government in Europe for the obtainment of ships was Captain J. D. Bullock. How late he went is not known. On the 24th of August, 1862, he got the Alabama afloat, under the famous Semmes—not to raise the block ade, but to assail the mercantile marine of the North. And up to that period the Alabama and the Florida had been the only ships of any consequence secured. The latter commenced her career from Mobile Harbor, under Captain Maffit. The Sumter and the Jeff. Davis, two frail, indifferent craft, extemporized for cruising from merchant-ships in Southern ports, had already closed their brief careers. The Nashville, a coasting steamer, made a voyage across the ocean in 1863, under Captain Pegram, and was run ashore on the coast of Georgia, to save her from capture. In 1864 the Shcnandoah was bought in England, and placed under command of Captain Waddell; the Georgia, under Cap tain Maury. The Tallahassee and the Chickamauga —blockade-running screw-propellers had run into Wilmington — were also bought, and sent out with the Confederate flag, under Captains Wood and Wilkinson respectively, in 1864. What was done by the Confederate government to raise the blockade, on the one hand, and to sweep the commerce of the North from the ocean, on the other, was accomplished, almost exclusively, by the few ships mentioned. Such were the tardy and feeble efforts made, which show the extent of the failure to procure a navy. Mean while, we had naval officers of superior ability — one admiral, twelve captains, thirty commanders, and one hundred and twelve lieutenants — all ready and anxious for service. The principal officers had belonged to the navy of the United States common to both sections before the war, and among them were men of world-wide renown.

3. In regard to the financial operations of the Confederate gov ernment, it was believed by many that Treasury notes, payable for all public debts, except duties, could be used to the amount of from §100,000,000 to, possibly, $200,000,000. But, beyond that limit, it was unquestionable that such issues must exceed the necessities of business and bring about want of confidence, specu lation, and depreciation. At best Treasury notes were simply a form of credit, based upon income or funds derivable from cer tain sources. And it was obvious that for the actual means of carrying on the government and meeting the requirements of a

great war we were necessarily dependent upon three resources: duties on imports and on exports; direct taxation; and the sale of bonds for money, or for cotton, which, in the markets of the world, commanded gold.

With a blockade interfering to prevent imports and exports it was plain that duties would yield but little revenue; and so long as such a state of things continued to exist that source must be of small avail.

With a blockade the marketing of the staple products of the country was also interrupted; and when, besides this, our people were urged to plant less cotton and to grow food crops, it was manifest that direct taxation would prove, not merely onerous, but, in the emergencies of the government, utterly inadequate.

The practical resource of the Confederacy, therefore, consisted in the sale of bonds, payable in ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years.

The people of the South were earnest and patriotic in their efforts permanently to establish their government; and, so far as they had means available for investment in bonds, they were willing to invest their money and their cotton. Their private re sources were far ampler than those of their ancestors in 1776 and in 1812, when the blockade was complete; and they were able to make such investments to sustain the government. But, for the pressing exigencies of a great war, it was evident that the Confederate government must obtain means through large loans on time from bankers abroad, as is commonly done.

The sale of bonds abroad depended on the security offered. The Confederate government, newly set up, was involved in a struggle of vast proportions. Capitalists are proverbially cau tious, and it could not be expected that the moneyed men of Europe would lend the large amounts needed upon the bare stake of the success of the Confederate States in achieving indepen dence. But the people of the South raised cotton in large amounts, which, in the markets of the world, was equivalent to specie, and there was a general willingness to transfer a large portion of it to the Confederate government in exchange for bonds bearing 8 per cent, interest, and payable at a distant day. With this cotton, from the crops of 1860, 1861, and 1862, to sell or to pledge in Europe, funds necessary to carry on the war effectively, and to keep up the credit of the country, could have been obtained. And, using cotton as a tangible collateral seen-

rity, the Confederate government might have arranged to get the benefit of an advance of price.

It should not be forgotten that, in the summer of 1862, the British consul at Charleston, Mr. Bunch, made this official state ment concerning the efficiency of the blockade: "Authoritative accounts and commercial letters, submitted to me by my govern ment, prove that any vessel in Europe destined for a Southern port could be insured, with her cargo, at a premium of 7, 10, 15 per cent." And to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the practicability of this policy and the financial failure of the ad ministration, a single additional fact may be cited. As late as March, 1S63, when the Treasury notes of the Confederate govern ment were worth but twenty-five cents on the dollar, a loan of §15,000,000 was asked on Confederate bonds, secured by cotton, to be delivered at Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, or ISTew Orleans, or within ten miles of a railroad or stream navigable to the ocean. The applications in London and in Paris to take the loan exceeded $75,000,000; and it stood in the London mar ket at 5 per cent, premium. For this fact Mr. Davis is our authority.

The United States, during the war, had no such substantial basis on which to issue currency or to negotiate loans on time bonds. Their credit rested solely on their progress and prospec tive success in reducing the South by force of arms. And the helplessness manifested by the Confederate administration in util izing its superior advantages in financial position gave strength and potency to the efforts of the Northern government, which borrowed, from time to time, all that it required.

That the Confederate government should purchase, with its bonds, the cotton in the South, and ship it or pledge its delivery, as above suggested, was proposed and pressed in the early days of its organization. But the policy was neither appreciated nor acted upon.

The customs collected up to August 1st, 1S62, amounted to only $1,437,400. And the people had been harassed by a direct tax, from which, to that date, only $10,539,910.70 had been realized; $15,000,000 were raised on bonds, secured by a duty on the exportation of cotton of one-eighth of a cent per pound; and $22,613,346.61 were raised on 8.20 bonds. A resort to the issue of Treasury notes and call certificates to the amount

GENERAL BEAUREGAED.

425

of $218,106,116.61 covers nearly all the financial operations ef fected up to the date mentioned.

The permanent constitution of the Confederate States went into effect on the 22d of February, 1862; and in this constitution it was provided that Congress should appropriate no mone} 7 from the Treasury except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, taken by yeas and nays, unless it were asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of departments, and submitted to Congress by the President. Therefore, unless the Executive asked for appro priations for any purpose, it was hardly possible to pass them, and, if passed, they were subject to the President's veto. So that the administration, and not Congress, was chiefly responsible for the financial operations.

By December, 1863, the currency put out by the Confederate government amounted to over §600,000,000, or much more than threefold the sum required by the business of the country.

The scale of depreciation was as follows:

CONFEDERATE CURRENCY.

October, 18G1 $1.00

November, 1861 1.10

December, 1861 1.16

January, 1862 1.20

February, 1862 1.30

March, 1862 1.50

April, 1862 1.55

May, 1862 1.50

June, 1862 1.50

July, 1862 1.50

August, 1862 1.50

September, 1862 2.00

October, 1862 2.00

November, 1862 2.50

December, 1862 2.50

January, 1863 3.00

February, 1863 3.00

March, 1863 4.00

April, 1863 5.00

May, 1863 1.50

June, 1863, 6.50

July, 1863 9.00

at par. below

August, 1863 §14.00

September, 1863 14.00

October, 1863 14.00

November, 1863 15.00

December, 1863 20.00

January, 1864 21.00

February, 1864 21.00

March, 1864 23.00

April, 1864 20.00

May, 1864 19.00

June, 1864 10.00

July, 1864 21.00

August, 1864 23.00

September, 1864 25.00

October, 1864 26.00

November, 1864 39.00

December, 1864 49.00

January, 1865 50.00

February, 1865 56.00

March, 1865 60.00

April, 1865 100.00

b. par.

The administration relied mainly on the issue of Treasury notes and call certificates, which it could not redeem, and then on the

compulsory funding of these in bonds. The result of this finan ciering was constant embarrassment, followed by a steady decline of credit. Only $11,000,000 were due abroad when the Confed erate government went down. The true resource of the country was neglected, and very little money was obtained in Europe.

4. The diplomacy of the Confederate administration consisted of arguments as to rights, and appeals to precedent. The argu ments set forth the origin, construction, and federal character of the government of the United States under its Constitution, supplemented by the right claimed by all free people, under the Declaration of Independence, to alter or abolish their forms of government, and to institute such new governments "as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." These were expected to justify the secession of the Southern States, and the formation of the new republican government of the Confed erate States. On this presentation of the case appeals were made to the monarchical governments of Europe—not at all in love with republicanism—to recognize the independence of the Confed erate States, at whatever cost, as a matter of moral sentiment. It was further insisted, with confidence, that " cotton is king," and that the nations of Europe were dependent on the South, with its annual crops of cotton. England, especially, with her eight mill ions of factory hands, could not afford to have our ports closed, and must, of necessity, recognize our separate existence and raise the blockade. At the same time it was persistently sought to keep the Confederate States commercially independent of all the na tions of Europe, and to confer no advantages in trade. The fact seems to have been wholly lost sight of by the administration that England had large interests in the cotton culture of her East Indian Empire; that the ruin of the Confederate States and the depression of rival cotton production would stimulate and promote British independence of American cotton; and that, unless compensatory and overbalancing interests in trade were tendered, England might seek commercial freedom by non-inter vention.

The efforts of the Northern States to preserve the Union were not inspired by love of the Southern people. The value of the Union to them was in the great interests developed through the powers of the general government, exercised by the Northern majority and involving Northern prosperity. The war was waged

against the South by the North to retain the enormous benefits derivable through discriminating and prohibitory tariffs, exclusive navigation laws, and unequal and profligate appropriations from the common treasury.

The people of the South had long struggled for ad valorem duties laid for revenue, and against duties discriminating for the benefit of classes at the North. In 1833 the Union was nearly dissolved on the ground of the unconstitutionally, inequality, and oppression of such taxes. And, in framing the Confederate con stitution, it was carefully provided that "no duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations shall be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry, and all duties, imports, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States."

It should be remembered that, during eighteen months, the question of African slavery was no obstacle to foreign relations. The United States government had declared, in despatches sent to its ambassadors abroad, that the war was made to save the Union only, and to maintain all the rights and institutions of the States unchanged. The United States Congress announced to the Confederate States and to the world the same policy. Thus did the United States government stand before the foreign pow ers, no less than before the South, as the supporter of African slavery, until September 22d, 1862. Then, as a war measure to cripple the South and assist the North in keeping the seceded States in the Union, President Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Emancipation. When this was done the time for the Confeder ate States to establish friendly relations with foreign nations had passed.

The fact should not be overlooked that the great Conservative party of England—which, to a considerable extent, represented the land-holding and agricultural interests of the country, formerly led by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, and latterly by the Earl of Derby and Mr. Disraeli—sympathized deeply with the conservative attitude of the people of the Confederate States. Although not in power during the war, the Tory party was strong and vigorous. It retired from control of the govern ment, Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli resigning in June, 1859, on account of the question between Austria and Italy, and it came into office again, succeeding the Palmerstori-Eussell Administra tion, in June, 1866. The parties were nearly balanced, and any

blunder on the part of one placed the other in almost immediate power.

Soon after the government was organized the Confederate Congress unanimously voted the appointment of commissioners, to be sent to Europe to negotiate for a recognition and, in the event of war, possibly, for assistance. The Constitution ordained that the President " shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Congress concur; and he shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Congress, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, etc." Thus was the treaty-making power vested in the President; and Congress had no au thority to instruct the commissioners or to shape their negotiations.

Statesmen of the South expected that the commissioners would be sent as plenipotentiaries, instructed to propose, as conditions of our recognition and alliance, to England, France, and other nations that the Confederate States, for twenty years, would lay no higher duties on their productions imported than, say, 20 per cent, ad valorem; that for the same period no tonnage duties would be laid on their shipping, entering or leaving our ports, except what should be sufficient to keep in repair our harbors and rivers; that the coast navigation between ports of the Confederate States, during this time, should be free to them, subject only to police regulations; that upon the productions and tonnage of all nations refusing to recognize our independence there should be imposed a discriminating duty of, say, 10 per cent, additional; and that, if necessary—but not otherwise—the Confederate States government should make a league, offensive and defensive, with special guarantees—for instance, a guarantee to Great Britain of British America.

The tender of such treaties would have offered immense ad vantages to England and to France. With their great capital, and cheaper and more skilful labor, low duties for twenty years, with a discrimination of 10 per cent, against their competitors for the markets of the Confederate States, would have enabled them to furnish our supplies at enormous profits; and a tariff of 20 per cent, ad valorem would, according to experience, have yielded to our government the largest obtainable revenue, with out in any way oppressing our people. The lucrative carrying trade of the Confederate States on the high seas, and the coast-

ing trade, hardly less remunerative, would have been chiefly theirs, with less cost to our people.

Would the Palmerston- Russell ministry have ventured to de cline such a proffer of mutual benefits, and to persist in the policy of non-intervention? If it had, then the subject would have been taken straight into Parliament, with almost a cer-

O

tainty that the Whig ministry would have been speedily voted down, and the Conservative administration of Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli placed in power. And there can be little doubt that that administration would promptly have entered into such a treaty. Even the Whig Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, openly expressed the opinion that the dissolution of the American Union would be permanent, and the Confederate States success ful. John Bright, the Quaker Radical, and Richard Cobden, the Independent Liberal of the Manchester School of politics, then supporting the Whig administration, represented manufacturing constituencies, and were noted advocates of free-trade and low duties. It is more than likely that, in view of such benefits, their prejudices against the South and partialities for the North would have been nullified and overridden by the calls of unmis takable and gigantic interest to the people of England. The Emperor of the French, Louis Napoleon, was friendly in feeling to the South, and would gladly have joined England in such a programme. Without such inducements he proposed a medi ation in October, 1862.

Under the action of the Confederate Congress the President ap pointed commissioners to Europe, with the Hon. William L. Yan-cey at the head of the commission, to go to England. But the instructions given him were not such as the past policy and polit ical position occupied by the South naturally suggested; not such as Mr. Yancey expected; not such as the Secretary of State, the Hon. Robert Toornbs, advocated; and not such as other leading Southern statesmen deemed of vital importance to the cause. In stead of seeking to use the power of laying duties and passing navi gation laws, to conciliate the support of foreign nations; instead of using the treaty-making power, which was paramount to the legislative, to obtain the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States, the President gave no authority to the com missioners to make commercial treaties, or to agree to confer spe cial trade or navigation interests. The commission went without

powers. It had nothing to propose and, therefore, nothing to treat about. The administration seemed to have no compre hension of the importance of appealing to the interests of for eign nations for the establishment of our independence. In ad dition to abstract disquisition it appeared to rely chiefly on com pelling England by her dependence touching the supply of cotton for her manufactories. If there was really superior sa gacity in forecasting the magnitude of the struggle in which the South was involved—which has been claimed, but which plain facts go far to refute—then the only explanation of this un expected and ultimately fatal policy, on the part of President Davis, appears to have been the entertainment of a design by him to foster manufacturing classes in the Confederate States, and, for that purpose, to hold in the hands of the government the power of discrimination in laying duties on foreign com modities to the utmost extent practicable, and free from com mittals by treaties. This idea has support from the course of the administration in regard to the obtainment of arms and munitions of war, and the procurement of a navy.

When the Confederate commission presented itself in London it was received by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and interviews were held between them. But Mr. Yancey, as we have seen, was powerless. lie had nothing to propose or to treat about. So when the minister of the United States, Mr. C. F. Adams, on the 12th of June, 1861, expressed the "great dissatisfaction" of his government, coupled with a threat to retaliate, if such in terviews continued, the British Minister, having ascertained that it was the policy of the Confederate government to use the com mercial dependence of England to obtain compulsory recognition, and to make no treaties conferring advantages in trade or com merce, cut short further official intercourse. Not until November, 1SG1, were Messrs. Mason, Slidell, Mann, and Eost sent over to Europe. And they, too, had only arguments to offer concerning legal rights and precedents unacceptable to monarchies; and they accomplished nothing. Our attempts at diplomacy were an egre gious failure. In the language of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, in the Confederate Senate, from 1802 to 18G5 —the Hon. James L. Orr—"the Confederate States had no diplo macy."

In defending the territory, population, and supply resources of

the Southern States the success or failure of the Confederate administration may be judged by a brief presentment of cardinal points. By the devoted courage and unsurpassed endurance of our volunteers, accepted in insufficient numbers, ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-armed, but led by officers of ability, brilliant victories had been achieved over the invading forces of the North; and drawn battles, hardly less distinguished, had been fought against heavy odds. But, although the armies of the United States had received terrible repulses on various occasions, they certainly made consid erable progress in occupying important portions and positions of the Confederacy. In 1861 were fought the battles of Bethel, June 10th ; Manassas, July 21st; Ball's Bluff, October 21st—in Virginia; and in Missouri the battles of Springfield, August 10th ; Lexington, September 21st; Belmont, November 7th. In 1862 the battle of Seven Pines, May 31st; Port Republic, June 8th; the seven days' battles near Richmond, at the end of June; Ce dar Run, July 19th; second Manassas, July 29th, 30th, 31st—in Virginia; followed by Boonsboro' and Sharpsburg, on the 14th and 17th of September. In the West there were fought the bat tle of Elkhorn, in Arkansas, March 5th ; Fort Henry and Port Donelson, Tennessee, on the 5th and 16th of February; and Shi-loh, in North Mississippi, on the 6th and 7th of April. The Con federate States lost the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina, No vember 7th, 1861; Norfolk, with its Navy Yard, May, 1862; and also Pensacola—these constituting the finest ports on the South ern coast. Of the cities, St. Louis and Louisville were lost in 1861; Nashville, in February, 1862 ; New Orleans, in April; Galveston, in May; Memphis, in June. Besides these, the Mississippi River was lost, and also the three States of Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee, whose young men, generally, were with the Confeder acy in feeling, and—if they had had encouragement and timely assistance—would have recruited the Southern armies with thou sands of brave soldiers. These states were all the more impor tant on account of their large production of grain crops, meat, horses, and mules; and their loss w r as a series of severe blows to the Confederacy. The prime causes of these disasters may be noted in what has heretofore been pointed out.

It is notable that before September, 1862, public opinion con cerning the management of Confederate affairs had undergone a decided change, and that grave doubts respecting the competency

of the Executive to guide the destinies of the South were enter tained by many who had the opportunity of knowing what was done and what was omitted.

Fearing the result of such a feeling, Congress—which, upon the formation of the government, had never resorted to secret ses sions except on very important occasions—began to transact no small amount of its business with closed doors; and secret ses sions, heretofore the exception, now became almost the prevailing rule. There doubtless were circumstances under which it was eminently right to keep the North from knowing what took place in the legislative halls of the South. In war secrecy is often an element of success. But on many other occasions, and when there was no necessity to conceal anything from our enemies, the peo ple of the Confederate States were kept in ignorance of their own affairs, and of the views and opinions of their representatives. Thus was the formation of public opinion restricted, if not alto gether obstructed, and criticism on the conduct of the business of the people, in a degree, suppressed; thus was the power of the government gradually brought into the hands of the President, who was already possessed of enormous patronage, not to speak of the veto power. The people were cut oif from the opportunity of finding a remedy for errors, no matter how gross and vital they might be. But there were results so patent that they could not be withheld from sight; and in some of these the public could not help perceiving a mismanagement which could only lead to disaster.

In the war of 1S12 with England, and in the Mexican war of 184:6, the general government called upon the states for troops needed in addition to the regular army; and the state authorities organized, officered, and sent forth their respective quotas. Dur ing the late war the Federal government again called upon the governors of the states for the soldiers required, and received them, officered, at their hands. But the President of the Con federate States, after declining to accept the services of thousands upon thousands of volunteers tendered, and after opposing bills offered in Congress, in January, 1862, authorizing him to call for troops from the states, to the number of fifty thousand and up ward, as late as March, 18G2, drove Congress, on the plea of neces sity, to pass an act of conscription, which set aside the authority of the states, and gave the Executive power to conscribe the peo-

pie and appoint the officers. This arbitrary and unwarranted step, taken without the least foresight or sagacity—wholly unnecessary and unpopular — did not strengthen the administration or the cause with the people of the South. To this was afterwards add ed unjust impressments of private property for the use of the gov ernment—makeshifts odious to a free people, and resorted to, in a great measure, to assist the notorious incompetency of many appointees of the administration—most conspicuous among whom was the well-known and proverbially inefficient Commissary-Gen eral of the Confederate States.

As events rolled on, foreshadowing the inevitable effects of per sistently recurring causes, anxiety and distrust of the Confederate government, which the Executive head had all but absorbed and jealously controlled, pervaded the minds of all intelligent men who were informed and were not blinded by partiality or warped by personal interest. And the dreaded result at last came. The weight of numbers—though not that weight alone; the prestige of reputed constituted Federal authority abroad—though not that prestige alone; but, concurring with these, want of sagacity, inef ficiency, improvidence, and narrow-mindedness on the part of the administration ; egotism and illiberality ; culpable loss of time and of opportunity—these, altogether and combined, brought on the annihilation of the hope of Southern independence.

At the close of hostilities between the two contending sections the picture was a dark one. Civil strife, whatever be its cause, whatever its purpose, carries with it ruin, and is followed by cruel remembrances. During nearly six years after the furling of the Confederate battle-flag there was added to the mortification of defeat for the South the disheartening reality of humiliation and distinctive oppression. Power and the sense of victory achieved are not always accompanied by conciliation, justice, and generos ity. Yet the South was earnest in laying down her arms, and accepted the result of the war with a brave arid honest spirit. Time, the great soother of all human woes, has begun and is advancing with its work of pacification and obliteration. It is now a fact that the Southern States are as faithful supporters of Federal government as any of the Northern States of the Union.

Notwithstanding the cloud that has darkened its political hori zon, a great future lies before the whole American republic. Gradually emerging from her ruin, and without slaverv, the South II.—27

434: MILITARY OPERATIONS OF GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

possesses her peculiar agricultural advantages, and is becoming both manufacturing and commercial in character. In the days of renewed prosperity to come this book may aid in recalling to mind and to honor the patriot soldiers and the statesmen who made every sacrifice in what they conscientiously believed to be the defence of constitutional liberty. Among these will be num bered General Gr. T. Beauregard.

APPENDICES TO VOL. II.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVI.

RICHMOND, Sept. Wth, 1862. To Genl. BEAUKEGARD :

Special Orders, No. 22, dated August 29th, assign you to the command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia—headquarters, Charleston. It was, through inadvertence, mailed to your address at Elation Springs.

S. COOPER, A. and I. Genl.

MOBILE, Sept. 11th, 1862. Genl. S. COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

I leave to-day for Charleston. Please forward there copies of orders and instructions. None received vet from Bladon. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

61 BROADWAY, N. Y., July 22d, 1882.

Dear General, — I am unable at this time to answer your note of 18th in stant more specially than to state that when I was Chief of the Staff of your forces, charged with the defence of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, from the autumn of 1862 to the spring of 1864, I discovered in the archives of my office a document left behind hy Major-General Pembertou, whom you immediately succeeded in command in that quarter, in October, 1862, which embraced a recommendation from that officer of the abandonment, as untenable, of the whole outer or immediate coast-line of defences. Upon this point my recollection is distinct. The exact details of the system of de fence which General Pembertou recommended to ho substituted for the one abandoned I cannot venture to give from memory. It remains to be said that the document referred to bore an adverse endorsement from the hand of Mr. Davis, so far at least as any immediate execution of the proposed plan was con cerned ; and, as well as I recollect, a further endorsement of like character on the part of General Lee. The dates of these papers I do not recollect.

Yours, very truly, THOMAS JORDAN.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

RICHMOND, VA., Sept. 17th, 1862. Special Orders, No. 128 :

* * * XVI. Major-General J. C. Pemberton, on being relieved in command of

the Department of South Carolina and Georgia by General Beauregard, will repair to this city arid report for further orders. * * *

By command of Secretary of War. JOHN WITHERS, Assist. Adjt.-Genl.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sc2)t. 2AtJi, 1862. Special Orders, No. 178 :

I. Major-General J. C. Pemberton is relieved from duty in this Department, and will proceed to obey paragraph xvi., Special Orders, No. 128, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, Richmond, Va., September 17th, 18C2. * * *

By command of Genl. Beauregard. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 23d, 18C2. Geul. PEMBERTON :

In view of your exact knowledge of the requirements of the Department, I have to request that you will furnish me, before leaving, with au estimate of the minimum forces, of all arms, which you may regard as essential for a successful defence of—first, Charleston and its dependencies; second, the Dis trict of South Carolina; third, Savannah and its dependencies; fourth, the District of Georgia.

You will also oblige me by having prepared a statement showing the present location of all the troops of different arms in the whole Department.

Respectfully, General, your obdt. scrvt., G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General Bcaurcgard's Inspection of the Defences of Charleston and Savannah.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 24/7*, 18(52.

September Wth. —I inspected, with General Commanding Pembcrton and Brig adier-General Jordan, my Chief of Staff", and Colonels Gonzales, Chief of Artil lery, and Lay, C. S. Inspector-General, four new sand-batteries, en barlettc, near the west end of Sullivan's Island, bearing 011 the floating boom which is being laid across the channel to Fort Sumter. These batteries are not yet finished, and only two 10-inch columbiads arc in position, one not being serviceable yet. The magazines are not yet constructed. The boom is composed of railroad iron, strongly linked together with heavy iron bands, and is protected and buoyed up by pieces of timber of the length of the bars, bound together by iron rings. The bars are four feet under water, and the whole is anchored every sixth sec tion with an anchor. About one-fourth of this boom is laid. It has been tested, I am informed, by running against it a loaded vessel towed by a steamboat, but it; resisted well, parting the tow-line, a two-inch hawser. I am told it will all bo completed in a week or ten days. It is proposed, also, to lay another one about one hundred yards in rear of this one, if sufficient chains and anchors can be had; also a rope obstruction about the same distance in front of the other, the object of which is to entangle the propellers of the enemy's steamers while under the fire of the heavy guns of the fort. The armament of the four sand-batteries is to consist of seven 10-inch columbiads, one 8-inch columbiad, and two 42-pounder rifled guns. Fort Sumter has forty - six heavy guns (above 'i2-pounders), and Fort Moultrie nine heavy guns, bearing at once on these ob-

structious. There will, besides, be two strong gunboats, armed each with four gnus, to assist in their defence. I ain informed they will be finished in one month. They are considered by me perfectly indispensable in the defence of this harbor.

We thus visited the Neck Battery, on Morris Island, erected to defend the ap proach to Fort Sumter. It is not yet entirely completed, requiring about two weeks longer to finish it. Its gorge ought to be entirely closed, to prevent sur prise. A few rifled guns ought also to be put to bear on the main channel.

On returning I inspected the small work (Fort Ripley) now being built on cribs in the bay, about half-way between Castle Piuckuey and Fort Johnson. It is intended for five heavy guns en Mrlette, and is nearly ready for its arma ment. Its foundation ought to be protected outside to the high-water mark with debris. A series of these small works in shallow water nearer to the en trance of the harbor would be very advantageous.

I did not visit Castle Pinckuey, the armament of which is nine 24-poimders and one 24-pounder, rifled, as I am acquainted already with this work, and consider it nearly worthless, capable of exerting but little influence on the defence of Charleston.

September 17/7*.—I inspected this day, with General Pemberton and Colonels Gonzales and Lay, the defensive lines on James Island from the Wappoo to near Secessionville—a distance of about five miles. They consist of a system efforts, redoubts, redans, and crcmaillercs, not very properly arranged and located, with the exception of Fort Pemberton, on the Stouo, and of some of the redoubts. A simpler system might, I think, have been originally devised, requiring a smaller number of men to defend it. However, the present one ought to answer our purpose, with a proper force of about one and a half men to the running yard of development. Each redoubt and redan has at least one heavy gun now in position. The lines between Dill's Creek and the Wappoo are not yet entirely completed, requiring about fifteen days more. Fort Pemberton is a strong work, and has an armament of twenty guns of various calibres. There are two batteries on the Ashley River to defend it and the entrance into Dill's Creek and the Wappoo. For want of guns they are still unprovided with their armament, except the one at Lav/ton's, which has four guns (32-pounders) of little use.

September 18th. —I inspected this day, accompanied by the same officers as on the 17th inst., Forts Moultrie and Snmter, which were found to bo in fine order and condition, considering the repairs in progress at the latter. The armament of the first consists of thirty-eight guns of various calibres, from 24-pounders to 8-iuch columbiads, and the garrison of about 300 effective men. The armament of the second work consists of seventy-nine guns of various calibres, from 32-pounders to 10-inch colninbiads, and seven 10-inch mortars, and the garrison of about 352 effective men. The barracks in the latter work are being reduced iu height, to protect them from the enemy's shots. The small steam-engine for making fresh water is in rather an exposed position. It ought to be removed to a safer place or be properly protected. Battery Beauregard, across Sullivan's Island, in ad vance of Fort Moultrie, to defend the approach from the east ; is armed with five guns.

The work at the eastern extremity of the island, to defend the interior ap proach by water to the rear and west of Long Island, is a redoubt, armed with eight guns—two 32-pounders, the rest small guns.

I am informed by Major-Geueral Pemberton that all the above works are suf ficiently garrisoned. My conclusion is, that when the above works contemplated for the defence of this harbor, especially the obstructions and gunboats, arc completed, and those works are properly armed with the heaviest guns, the enemy's vessels and gunboats will find it very difficult, if not next to impos sible, to penetrate far enough to injure or take Charleston. Until then the city will not be properly protected.

September 19th. —I inspected this day, with the same officers, the works at Seces-siouville, which are irregular and but poorly constructed. A force of about 200 men is still at work upon them, increasing and strengthening them. The posi tion is naturally a strong one, being surrounded with low marshes and a wide creek, except on one side, where there is a very narrow strip of level ground, along which the Abolitionists made their attack, which amounted to a surprise, and yet they were defeated by one-fifth their number. 1 do not, however, see the necessity or advantage of holding in force this advanced position. A strong picket would be sufficient. The armament of this work consists of two 8-iuch naval guns, one 18-ponnder, howitzer, six 32-pouuders, one 32-pounder rifle, two 24-pounder rifles, and two 10-inch mortars.

September 20th. —I left this day at 9.30 A.M. for Savannah, on a tour of inspec tion, with General Pembertou and Colonel Gouzales. Stopped at Eantowle's Station to inspect works there. An open battery, with four guns (two 24-pound-ers and two 12-pounders), a strong and good position, commanding roads from Savannah and Church Flats, on Stono, three miles off, where there is also a bat tery of three guns (two 32-pounders and one rifled 12-ponnder) to command an obstruction and prevent a landing from John's Island and the passage by water up Church Flats, in which case troops at Adams's Run, nine or ten miles off—a central and healthy point—would have to support that battery or fall back on the one at Rantowle's. The right flank of the latter should be extended, or a detached redan constructed towards the prairie or marshes in the direction of Wallace's, where there is also a battery of two guns (one 32-pounder and one rifled 6-pounder), occupying a strong, isolated position, to flank battery at the station, and two bridges across Rantowle's Creek—a branch of the Stono—be low Church Flats. This river must be examined from the latter point to the Wappoo Cut, to determine if there are any landing-places by which the works

at the overflow could be turned. There are two enclosed field works miles

from Charleston, commanding the road from Savannah to the long or new bridge across the Ashley. They appear to be well located, provided they cannot be turned on the right or left towards the Wappoo, which must be inquired into, if they are manned.

September 2lst. —I inspected this day the defences of Savannah, with the same officers, and General Mercer commanding. They are not yet completed, but are progressing rapidly. Those on the river, I am informed, are finished, Fort Boggs excepted. which'has, however, its armament—sixteen guns—in position. The

line of lunettes and redans around the city are about half finished, I should judge. These works are rather too close to each other, and unnecessarily strong in profile. There are about 1400 men (negroes) at work upon them. The ob structions—piling and cribwork filled in with stones and bricks—about one mile below Fort Jackson and its batteries, are nearly completed, requiring about ten or fifteen days longer to finish them. They will then obstruct very thoroughly, I think, the navigation of the river. They will, however, require to be watched and repaired constantly, owing to the effect of the current on the bottom between the cribs.

The outer line of defences, consisting of detached works or batteries, at Thun derbolt and other points, armed with heavy guns, were not visited for want of time, but I am informed by General Pemberton that they are completed, well armed, anil, with a proper garrison, could not be taken by the enemy, if well defended. By their advantageous position they cannot bo turned. He places great reliance on them. An additional work at Coffee Bluff, on the Ogeechee, to be constructed, in the opinion of the Chief-Engineer of the Georgia District, Captain McCready. This must be looked into.

Upon the whole, I consider Savannah thoroughly defended from a naval attack, and when its line of laud defences Avill bo completed, with a proper garrison of about 15,000 men, may be considered impregnable until the enemy shall bring against it an overwhelming force, •which, it is not probable they will ever attempt, as the result, if favorable, will not compensate them for the ex pense and trouble.

September 24M.—I inspected this day, with Colonel Gonzales, the line of works on the Neck to defend the city of Charleston from land attack from the north. It is a continuous bastion line of strong profile and elaborately constructed, but badly located, I believe, not being well adapted to the ground. It is command ed to a certain extent by woods in front, and can bo enfiladed and taken in reverse by gunboats on the Cooper and Ashley rivers, particularly from the last. No traverses have been constructed. They are absolutely required. Even then this line could hardly be held successfully against a fleet of gunboats in each of said rivers. The two batteries at the Half-moon Battery are not finished ; they are intended for five and three guns each, to command the Cooper River and Town Creek. The distance to the former is too great. A much better position could be found, I think, on the opposite side of the river, at Hobcaw Bluffs, but obstructions would also bo required. The profile of the parapet of those batter ies is too great, especially of the first one. Adaptation of "means to an end" has not always been consulted in the works around this city and Savannah. Much unnecessary work has been bestowed upon many of them.

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Geul. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 1st, 1862. Capt. \V. II. ECIIOLS, Chief-Engineer:

I am instructed to furnish you with the following extract from a communica tion, dated 30th ult., from Dr. J. R. Cheves, in charge of outer obstructions :

" In consequence of the great deficiency of iron and the large demand for it in mooring the boom, it is proposed, at the suggestion of his Excellency Gov ernor Pickcns, to use granite rocks of three or four tons weight, there being much of this at Columbia, and the transportation of the same being represented to me as quite practicable."

It is the wish of the General Commanding to be informed of your views as to the feasibility, at this time, of getting the granite here and in position.

Respectfully, your obdt. servt., THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Sept. 30/7*, 1862. Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Geul., Richmond. Va,:

General, —In view of the probable inefficiency of the boom to prevent a fleet of steamers from passing the works defending the entrance of tins harbor, it becomes as urgent as it is indispensable to increase the heavy armament of the works intended to command the archorage in the harbor, and the entrances into the Ashley and Cooper rivers, to the utmost possible extent. Hence I have the honor to request that I may be furnished, as soon as practicable, in addition to calls for ordnance already made on the Department, with twenty 10-inch colnmbiads, five banded rifled 42-pounders, and five banded rifled 32-ponnders— or, fifteen of the first quality, ten of the second, and five or more of the third. A greater number of each quality could be advantageously located, if they could be obtained.

I shall submit Avithin a day or two for the information of the War Depart ment a detailed report, showing the exact defensive condition of this harbor at present, and the extreme necessity for the additional heavy ordnance now called for. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. P>EAUREGARD, Gcill. Coilldg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 2<7, 18C2. Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., C. S. A., Richmond, Va,:

General, —Should the Ordnance Department be otherwise unable to furnish me with the heavy guns essential for the proper armament of the defensive works in Charleston Harbor, I beg leave to suggest that some of those now in position at Over Bluff, on the Tombigbee River, and at Choctaw Bluff, on the Alabama River, may be prudently removed and sent here, unless they shall be necessary for the immediate defence of Mobile Bay. They cannot be required in their present positions until those rivers shall have been again swoollen— that is, in the latter part of the coming winter, or early part of the following spring, by which time other guns may be provided in their stead.

I cannot place before the War Department in too strong language the vital importance to us—if the harbor is to be retained—of increasing the armament of heavy guns to the greatest possible extent, as soon as practicable, in all possible ways. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Coindg.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXVJ.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862. Capt. W. H. ECHOLS, Chief-Engineer :

The Commanding General instructs me to direct as follows : You will examine Hobcaw Bluffs, on Cooper River, in vicinity of Mount Pleasant, to determine whether or not it will afford a good position for a bat tery of five or six guns, to command the channel of the river.

It must be also ascertained whether that channel can bo effectively ob structed with the means and appliances at our disposition. You will likewise make a thorough examination of both sides of Stono River, from Church Flats to Wappoo Cut, to ascertain whether the enemy can effect a passage of the Stono between those two points to turn the works in that vicinity. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

LAKE CITY, FLA., Oct. 2d, 1862. Genl. S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl.:

I am hard-pressed on the St. John's River; 3000 men reported by the com manding officer at St. John's Bluff as having lauded at Mayport Mills. The enemy engaged our batteries, and were repuised. Please send me one regiment of infantry as soon as possible. I asked for a regiment some ten days since, but have not heard from you on the subject.

Jos. FINEGAN, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS PROV. FORCES, DEPT. EAST AND MIDDLE FLA.,

JACKSONVILLE, FLA., Oct. 3d, 1862. Genl. S. COOPER :

On my arrival on the river last night I found that the post at St. John's Bluff had been evacuated. The enemy had made a lauding some five miles in the rear of the battery, but in what force I am unable to say. As at present ad vised, I think we had sufficient force to hold the place, and that its abandon ment by Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkins, the commanding officer, was a gross military blunder that may require investigation.

Jos. FINEGAN, Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND GA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 3d, 1862. Governor F. II. PICKENS :

Dear Sir, —To be properly prepared for any emergency it is my opinion that there should be timely, that is, immediate, preparations made at oue or more places outside the limits of this city, of buildings and sheds, and of provision depots, for the reception of the women and children in the event of a bombard ment.

As I understand, it is the wish of the people and Government that the city shall be defended to the last extremity; hence I desire to be, in all respects, ready to make its defence equal to that of Saragossa. To that end I ask your co-operation in providing proper and ample places of refuge for all uou-comba-

tants, when it shall be necessary for that class to leave. Otherwise my embar rassment must be great. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUIIEGARD, Geiil. Comdg.

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. '3d, 1862. Hon. W. P. MILES, M.C., Richmond, Ya.:

My dear Colonel, —Your favor of the 30th nit. has just been received. I thank you for your exertions relative to those heavy guns ordered or called for for the new batteries on the west end of Sullivan's Island. I have lately made another call on the War Department for thirty or more heavy guns (10-inch and rifled 42-pounders and 32-pounders), as urgent and indispensable, having reasons to believe that the boom now being laid might not answer to check the passage of three or four ironclads moving in echelon rapidly against it; hence the ne cessity of more heavy guns. * * *

I am endeavoring to introduce gradually my system of managing men and things, and hope, if the enemy will give me time, to be prepared to give him a very warm reception whenever he will come here.

With kindest regards to all inquiring friends,

I remain, in haste, yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, YA., Oct. 3d, 18G2. Genl. BEAUREGARD, Charleston, S. C.:

General Fiiicgan telegraphs from Lake City, Florida, that 3000 Federals are landing at Mayport Mills, at the mouth of the St. John's River. He has re pulsed three naval attacks on the batteries at St. John's Bluff, eighteen or twenty miles from Mayport, but is not strong enough to resist the threatened land attack.

He says that two regiments of infantry from the coast of Georgia sent to him for a few days will save the St. John's River, and perhaps East Florida. Send the assistance required as speedily as required. Answer by telegraph.

G. W. RANDOLPH, Secy, of War.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MIL. DIST., S. C.,

McPlIERSONVILLE, Oct. 3d, 18G2.

Brig.-Genl. T. JORDAN, Asst. Adjt.-Genl. and Chief of Staff, Charleston, S. C.:

Sir, —I have the honor to enclose a letter written to Major-General Pemberton, on the subject of an increase of force in this district, which is applicable now as then. In consequence of the evident weakness of the points to which I referred General Pemberton ordered one battalion of sharp-shooters to Graharnville, and one to this post. He informed me that this was the only reinforcements he could spare.

Since then my force has been reduced by two pieces of artillery, taken from Hardeeville, and the battalion of sharp-shooters from this post. The battery of Captain Stephen Elliott consisted of only four effective pieces, all of which I considered necessary at this point. The seven companies infantry posted at Hardeeville are part of the flank and rear defence of Savannah, and could not with safety be diminished, especially as the companies are much reduced. When

the enemy makes the attempt to cut the railroad, in my opinion it will be at some point between. Grahamville and the bridge over the Combahee River. It is the line most accessible and farthest removed from succor. There is reported by my pickets an increase of the force of the enemy on the south side of Coosa River. On account of the peculiar topography of (he country between the Coosaw-hatchie and Combahee rivers, the cavalry will have to operate on foot to avail themselves of the natural and artificial positions of defence. There are very few points at which it would be practicable or advisable to operate mounted. I should have bayonets for a stubborn resistance. I would inform the General Commanding that I have had a secure boat-bridge built over the Salkahatchie River, five miles north of where the railroad crosses. This gives me a safe line of retreat and concentration towards Walterborough, should the railroad be taken.