15. On the 29th of November General Beauregard received in formation from his Signal Corps that the enemy's ordinary fleet had left Hilton Head, either for an expedition to some point on the coast or for the North. If the latter, the movement related

* When General Beauregard left Charleston for Weldon, in 1864, the work had not yet been paid for.

to Burnside's operations; if not, the intention of the enemy was yet to be discovered.

General Beauregard lost no time in apprising the War Depart ment of the facts, and, by special despatches, warned Generals Whiting, at Wilmington; Mercer, at Savannah; and Hagood, Walker, and Trapier, commanders of the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts of South Carolina. He also wrote the following letter to General Ripley:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., NffO. 29^, 1862.

" Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, Coindg. First Mil. Dist., Dcpt. S. C., Ga., and Fla.: "General, —I ani informed the enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. We must be prepared to meet him at all points. You will issue three days' provisions to movable troops, and sufficient ammunition. See that all troops are pro vided with haversacks. Collect cars enough to transport two regiments at a time on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and the Northeastern Rail road. No trains should be overloaded.

"My impression is that the enemy's demonstration is intended against Georgetown. If so, we may have to march also some troops from here. Make all necessary preparations. You will be put in command of all troops moving in that direction. You will please forward, by express, the enclosed note to General Trapier. Respectfully, your obdt. servt,,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Geul. Comdg."

The note referred to as addressed to General Trapier was in

these terms:

" CHARLESTON, Nov. 29$, 18G2. " Brigadier-General J. H. TRAPIER :

" General, —The enemy's fleet has left Hilton Head. Destination unknown,

but it may be for your district. Be prepared for their reception. See to the

provisions, ammunition, and haversacks of your troops. Reinforcements will

be sent to you from here in case of necessit}^ Keep your troops well in hand.

" Respectfully, your obdt. servt.,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gcnl. Comdg."

On the 30th General Walker telegraphed that he had nothing further to report about the enemy's fleet, and that all was quiet in his locality. General Mercer, in his despatch of the same day, said: " Nothing seen of the enemy's fleet in this district. Cars collected ordered to be discharged."

16. The idea of utilizing the gunboat-rams in other localities than the Charleston Harbor, without passing outside the bar, had occupied General Beanregard's mind for some time. On the 2d of December he issued an order to Major Harris, Chief-engineer, to cut a channel, twenty-five feet wide and thirteen feet deep at

high water, in the Wappoo Cut, from the Ashley to the Stono, so that the gunboat-rams might operate in either river, and retake and hold Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, which would enable us to reduce the force on James Island to a minimum.

Major Harris's instructions were to do the work " as quietly as possible, in order not to awaken the suspicions of the enemy's gunboats in the Stono, and afford us the opportunity of taking them, and of re-opening our inland water communications with Port Roval," or of obtaining "stronger engines for our iron gun-

*/ O O o O

boats and rams in Charleston."

17. On the following day General Cooper was telegraphed that the enemy's fleet had returned to Port Royal; and Major Pope was ordered to furnish certain guns, implements, and ammunition to Colonel Colcock, at Ocean Landing, and to General Walker, in the Third Military District.

18. The boom across the channel gave no satisfaction. General Beauregard determined to give up all work on it, and resort only to a rope obstruction, to be placed in its front. Major Cheves was instructed accordingly, and was also ordered to turn over to Captain Echols all materials collected for the boom, but to re main in charge of the torpedo constructions for the entrance of the harbor. He was thanked for the zeal and energy displayed by him in the discharge of his duties, in the face of so many difficulties.

19. An important order was also given to Major Harris in rela tion to General Raines's submarine batteries. The Engineers' Department was told to locate them below Simon Bluff, in the Wadmalaw; below Grimball's, in the Dawhee; and in the South Edisto, opposite Aiken's Mills; or at some proper place in the Pon Pon River. Major Harris was also instructed to construct a magazine at Summerville for the safe-keeping of ordnance stores in an emergency.

20. General Ripley was directed to attend to the armament of the two redoubts in rear of Fort Pemberton, and to transfer thither as soon as possible one 24-po under on siege-carriage from the cremaillere line, and one 24-pounder in barbette from Fort Moultrie or Castle Pinckney.

21. The battery at Church Flats was also ordered to be con verted at once into a small enclosed work, to hold two 12-pounder smooth-bore guns, an IS-pounder, and two G-pounder light pieces,

to be taken from different works indicated and placed in position on the land-front.

The foregoing synopsis is presented to the reader to show that General Beauregard's attention was turned to the minutest details of the service—details which he knew to be of great importance in all military operations; and it is a fact worthy of note that all orders given and executed in relation to any portion of his vast command emanated, directly or indirect! j r , from him alone. The epithet of "felix" so often applied to him during the war, and alluded to by Mr. Pollard, in " The Lost Cause," can be explained in no other way. It was due, not to his having been in reality more favored by chance — some would say "luck" — than any other commander, but mainly, if not altogether, because of his incessant toil and vigilance. "Experrectus" it is suggested, would have been more appropriate than "felix"

22. The following communication, forwarded to the War De partment by General Beauregard, is now submitted. It shows how well-founded was his complaint of the slowness of Major Childs's work at the Charleston Arsenal:

"CHARLESTON, Dee. IQth, 1802. " Genl. SAMUEL COOPER, Richmond, Va.:

" Guns are now being rifled and banded here, under my orders, at the rate of one per two and a half days, instead of thirty-five days, as heretofore. Can not a rifling and banding establishment be added to foundery at Savannah for guns there ? " G. T. BEAUREGARD."

23. Turning his thoughts towards the defence of that part of Florida included in his command, General Beauregard caused the following instructions to be written to General Cobb:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF S. C., GA., AND FLA., CHARLESTON, S. C., Dee. IQth, 1862.

" General, —Your communication of the 3d instant has been duly received and considered by the Commanding General, who instructs me to answer it as follows:

" Captain Moreno was at these headquarters some days ago, and received verbal instructions to this effect: The Chattahoochee is to be obstructed at Fort Gaincs, and a battery to be erected, to cover the obstructions, for two 32 and one 24 pounder pieces. At Rack Bluff, fifty-four miles above the junction with Flint River, another obstruction is to be established, with three batteries commanding it, one for three 32-poundcrs, one for two 24-pounders, and the third for two 18-pounder guns.

"At the 'Narrows,' at Fulton's Bend, on the Appalachicola, sixteen miles

II.—4:

below junction with the Flint River, other obstructions and a battery for one 24 and one 18 pounder gun are likewise to be constructed. In this way will be disposed the twelve pieces which Captain Moreno has available at present.

" The positions just named are all regarded as favorable for the end in view.

" Captain Moreno will be further instructed to examine Flint River, with a view to finding a good position (on the north bank, if possible) for a battery for three or five guns, and obstructions not to exceed five hundred yards dis tant from the work.

"Heavier guns will be procured, if possible.

" In relation to the suggested danger to be apprehended that the enemy may laud in force at St. Mark's, march via Tallahassee, or by a more direct route, to the left of that place, on the Appalachicola River, and thus turn the obstructions, it is the opinion of the Commanding General that the distance and character of the country to be traversed will be found highly unfavorable for such an attempt. To insure success or guard against serious disaster, the enemy would be obliged to move in larger force than he can bring to bear for such an enterprise at present, it is believed. * * *

" Any force landing at St. Mark's or Port Leon must necessarily have with it its own means of transportation; for as soon as a descent on the coast should be made in such force as to indicate such an expedition, nothing were easier than for you to cause the timely removal beyond the reach of the enemy of all the means of transportation of the planters in Middle Florida. In this way a delay would ensue, during which all the defensive resources of Middle Flor ida and of the adjoining sections of Georgia could be collected for a success ful resistance.

" Under these circumstances the Commanding General is mainly solicitous that such obstructions should be constructed in the Appalachicola and Chatta-hoochee rivers, with defensive works to cover them at points which cannot be turned by a force thrown up the Appalachicola by transports supported by gun-boats.

" The Commanding General regrets profoundly the utterly inadequate force under your command,* but sees at present no way for increasing it. You are authorized, however, in an emergency to call on the Governors of Florida and Georgia for any troops at their disposition.

"The General will be pleased for you to communicate your views and wishes freely and fully at all times, and will comply with your requirements to the utmost of his limited powers.

" There are certain companies of troops west of the Appalachicola, over which you are to exercise command. A copy of General Forney's letter on the subject will be transmitted to you.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff/'

* His effective force did not reach eight hundred men, with an extent of territory, from the Suwanee to the Choctawhatchce, of about one hundred and forty miles.

"P.S. — Since the forgoing was written Captain Moreno lias been tele graphed to construct the battery at the 'Narrows' for three guns instead of two, and to substitute two 32-pounders from Fort Gaines for the 18-pounder originally designed for the ' Narrows' work. " T. J., C. S."

24. On the 12th of December, General Beauregard informed the War Department, by telegram, that General Banks's fleet had left, suddenly, two days before, with about ten thousand men, diverging from its southern course and making directly for Cape Lookout. The information, General Beauregard said, could be relied upon.

The enemy had been making preparations for some time past for a descent along the Southern Atlantic coast, and all General Beauregard's disposable troops were held in readiness to move at once to any threatened point of his Department. To hold his own within its limits was all that he could reasonably hope to do. But, whatever may have been his expectations, he certainly had no idea that troops would be taken from him to reinforce neigh boring commands. Such was the case, however, as will appear by the following telegram :

"RICHMOND, VA.,Ztec. 13^, 1862. " General BEAUREGABD :

"General Lee has just telegraphed to General Smith* as follows: 'For Wilmington and the coast of North Carolina, draw reinforcements from North Carolina and General Beauregard.' Other intelligence induces General Smith to conjecture the purpose of the enemy to march, in conjunction with the force from the fleet to be lauded at Beaufort (N. C.), on the railroad, and then to assail Wilmington in reverse. It is recommended to you, in case of a tele gram confirmatory of such movements, to act on the suggestion of General Lee, and send reinforcements, if, and to the extent you think it can be done, without too greatly risking your command. Should communication between Wilmington and this city be broken, you will give to Wilmington special attention and such aid as you can spare. Of this order General Whiting will be notified. JAS. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

This telegram was far from explicit, and left upon General Beauregard the responsibility of following or not following its instructions. He determined, however, to give Generals Whiting and Smith all the assistance in his power, even at the risk of the enemy breaking through his coast-line, by a sudden coup de main

* General G. W. Smith, then commanding in South Virginia and North Carolina.

—an eventuality not altogether unlikely, owing to the great re sources in men and means of transportation at the disposal of the Federals. Immediate orders were issued to the district and sub-district commanders of the Department, and all possible diligence used to hurry on the transfer of the troops.*

On the 14-th this letter was written to General Whiting:

"General, —I send one of my volunteer aids, Colonel A. G. Rice, with a telegraphic cipher for use between us in cases of importance. You will please give him all necessary information relative to your present condition, future intentions, and present available means.

"I have ordered 5000 men and three light batteries (all excellent troops) to be held in readiness, under Brigadier-General Gist, to be sent to your as sistance whenever called for by you, if they can then be spared from here. Should the contingency contemplated by the War Department occur, and my presence be required b} r you, I will hasten to join you, although I have little doubt that you will be able to take good care of General Banks and his associates. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUKEGARD."

On the next day the following despatch was forwarded to the

War Department:

" CHARLESTON, S. C., Dec. 15t7i, 1862. " General S. COOPER, Richmond, Ya.:

" I am sending live thousand infantry and three batteries to Wilmington, to be returned as soon as practicable. All quiet here.

" G. T. BEAUREGARD."

The force of the enemy was greatly exaggerated, though it might with truth have been put down at twenty thousand men. His object was never well understood, nor was it at any time very well defined. lie certainly failed to accomplish what his move ments seemed to indicate as his purpose. General Beauregard's direct co-operation was desired by Generals Whiting and Smith. The latter was of opinion that, should Banks's forces unite with Foster's, as reported, more troops would be needed from General Beauregard, and that he could come over with them, as "all geo graphical lines" should then be considered as no longer existing. But General Smith's apprehensions were not realized. On the 18th, from Goldsboro', whither he thought the Carolina and Georgia troops should be sent, he forwarded this despatch:

" General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

" The enemy's army have gone to Newborn, moving in great haste."

* Sec telegrams, in Appendix.

And on the same day he also telegraphed as follows :

" General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

"The enemy burned the railroad bridge yesterday. They were in force more than twenty thousand. Retired during the night towards Wilmington, devastating the country as they go. I have not transportation sufficient for ammunition even. Will move as soon as possible. They have a large army, and I believe are aiming at Wilmington."

The reason for such "great haste" on the part of the enemy was not perceptible, as General Smith's forces did not exceed six thousand men, without cavalry, and exclusive of the troops sent by General Beauregard, which, owing to unavoidable delays from Wilmington, had not reached their destination in time. On the other hand, the danger apparently threatening General Whiting's Department was not a serious one ; and this expedition, from which so much was expected at the North, proved to be a com plete failure.

Less than three days after these events General Beauregard was informed, through Colonel Clinch, commanding in Southeast Georgia, that the enemy's gunboats had left St. Simon's Bay, on their way to Charleston, which, it was reported, would soon be attacked, by land and water. This news was in some degree con firmed by the following telegram from the Secretary of War:

"RICHMOND, Dec. 24tfi, 1862. " General BE Ar REGARD :

"Information from L. Heylinger, a friend to our cause in Nassau — with the assurance that it conies from New York by a trustworthy source — states that the attack on Charleston will be made, about the holidays, by four iron clads. This news has not got into the papers.

" JAS. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War."

The substance of the foregoing despatch being repeated the next day, General Beauregard began to prepare for the emergency.

As might have been expected, his first step was to recall his troops from North Carolina. He telegraphed General Whiting to that effect, and at the same time authorized him to select either a 42-pounder rifled gun or a 10-inch columbiad, which would be sent him from Richmond to Charleston, and to use it for the defence of Wilmington. General Whiting, in a letter dated December 31st,. thanked General Beauregard for his read iness to assist him, and took occasion to say, in his characteristic

manner, that, having served under him at the opening of the war, lie would ask nothing better than to continue doing so until the very end.

Meanwhile, on the 27th, General Beauregard received the fol lowing telegram from Colonel "William Porcher Miles:

' ; Have appealed to President in vain for the two 7-inch guns. Says they belong to navy, and must go to Mobile, for floating-battery just finished and waiting for guns. Secretary of War did all he could for us."

General Beauregard was astonished, for the President knew— or believed, which amounted to the same thing—that Charleston was on the eve of an attack. On the other hand, he should have been aware that no real danger threatened Mobile at that time; and yet, in spite of repeated entreaties, he preferred acceding to the request of General Forney, as though (even admitting that both cities were equally menaced) Charleston were not of more importance than Mobile to the safety of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Delay of the Federal Attack on Charleston.—General Beauregard makes Ar rangements for Concentration of Troops by Eail.—His Letter to General Ripley.—His Desire to Test the Merits of the two Ironclad Rams.—Com modore Ingraham Adopts his Suggestion.—The Federal Fleet is Attacked on the llth.—The Palmetto State Disables the Merccdita, and gives Chase to two other Steamers.—The Chicora Sets Fire to a Propeller, Cripples the Quaker City, and Disables the Keystone State. —The whole Blockad ing Fleet Retires. — The Blockade of Charleston Harbor undoubtedly Raised.—General Pernberton's Error in Abandoning the Defences of the Stono.—Federal Gunboats run up the Stono.—General Beauregard Plans the Capture of the Isaac Smith. —Colonel Yates's Report.—Attack upon Genesis Point Battery.—Federal Monitor Crippled and Forced to With draw.—General Beauregard's Letter to General Ripley.—His Dread of a Night Attack on Sumter.—Second Attack on Fort McAllister.—Small Force in General Beauregard's Department.—He Demands Additional State Troops from Governor Bonham.—Preparation Made for the Im pending Attack on Charleston.

"CHRISTMAS WEEK" and the "holidays" had come, were gone, and the Federal attack on Charleston had not taken place. The rumors circulated were generally well-founded, but the prepara tions necessaiy for the accomplishment of so formidable a project consumed more time than had been anticipated. The delay was of advantage to General Beauregard, as it gave him additional time for the completion of his various arrangements.

Foreseeing the eventual necessity of a rapid concentration of troops by rail at any threatened points, in or out of his Depart ment, he caused an earnest request to be sent to the President of the Northeastern Railroad, for the adoption of more efficient measures on the line from Charleston to "Wilmington; he drew attention to the necessity of accumulating wood at various sta tions, and of increasing the personnel required for swift and un encumbered running, under any emergency.

The Georgia troops sent back to Savannah were ordered to Charleston, so as to be ready, if necessary, to go again to Wilming ton, where, it was reported on the 6th, the enemy might make

his first attempt. General Bonliam, who had succeeded the Honorable F. W. Pickens as Governor of South Carolina, was urged to make all timely preparations for the impending Fed eral expedition, should Charleston, and not Wilmington and Weldon, become the point of attack.

General Beauregard had long studied the problem of how best to deal with the Federal monitors, in the event of their forcing a passage into the harbor of Charleston. The following letter gives one of the conclusions at which he had arrived:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT, S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C.,Jan. 15^, 18G3. u Brig.-Genl. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military Disk, etc.:

"General, —The Commanding General wishes you to organize and train at least six boarding boat parties, with a view to attacking, at night, any of the enemy's ironclads that may succeed in penetrating the harbor. The men should be armed with revolvers, if practicable, and provided with blankets, with which to close all apertures; also with iron wedges and sledges, to stop the tower from revolving; with bottles of burning-fluid, to throw into tin 1 tower; with leather bags of powder, to throw into the smoke-stack; and with ladders of about ten feet in length, to storm the tower in case of need. The boats should be provided with muffled oars, with water-tight casks secured under the seats, to give buoyancy, in case of injury to the boats from any cause. The men should each, likewise, be furnished with a life-preserver. " For such a service it will be best to call for volunteers.

"Respectfully, " THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.''

The plan proposed and the details given for its execution might not have been successfully carried out, but the object in view was well worth the experiment. General Beauregard was of opinion that, in besieged places and while awaiting an attack, it is always judicious to keep the troops busy with or interested in some work or project, even should neither be of real importance. A spirit of cheerfulness is thus maintained, and no uneasiness or disaffection is allowed to grow among the men.

Another project upon which he was very much bent was, to induce Commodore In graham to test the efficiency of his two ironclad gunboat-rams, the Palmetto State and the Chicora, tho first under Captain Ilutledge, the second under Captain Tucker. There were also three small harbor steamers, the Governor Clinch, the Ettiwan, and the Chesterfield, which could be used as tenders in co-operation with the two former vessels. General Beauregard

advised a night attack by the Confederate rams against the wood en fleet of the enemy, and felt sure that the blockade might be raised, or, at any rate, that considerable damage could thus be effected.

Commodore Ingraham adopted the suggestion, and, having made all necessary preparations, on the 30th of January, at 11.30 P.M., left his anchorage on board the Palmetto State, in company with the Chicora, and steamed down to the bar; both vessels crossing it at about 4.30 A. M. on the 31st. The sea was

O

smooth, the weather propitious; and the Federal fleet, resting, as usual, in complete security, it realized the danger threatening only when the two Confederate rams were already in its midst. The Palmetto State boldly gave out her name, and, making for a steamer immediately ahead—the Mercedita —struck and fired into her before she well knew what had befallen her. Disabled, and reported to be in a sinking condition, she called for relief, and instantly surrendered. A second and a third steamer were successively chased by the Palmetto State, but, taking advantage of their superior speed, steered to the southward, and soon ran out of range. Meanwhile, the Chicora, after setting fire to a schoon er-rigged propeller, and engaging and crippling the Quaker City. ran into and fired a steamer supposed to be the Keystone State, forcing her to strike her flag. Say what the Federal reports may, it is none the less a fact that, before dawn of that day, the stampede of the blockaders was complete, and that, in the space of less than two hours' time, not a sail of the entire Federal fleet-was nearer than seven miles from its usual anchorage off the Charleston Harbor. After thus scattering and driving off their enemy, the two Confederate vessels quietly steamed towards the entrance of Beach Channel, where they finally anchored at 8.45 A.M. They remained there fully seven hours, waiting for the tide;* and it must have been at least 3.30 P.M. when they recrossed the bar on their return to the city. Up to that time not a blockader—still less the entire fleet—had given sign of an intention to venture back to its former position. And this continued to be the case during the whole day and night of January 31st.

This easy dispersion of the blockading squadron and the matc-

* Commodore Ingrahain's report to Mr. Mallory, February 3d, 18G3.

rial injury inflicted upon it show how wise was General Beaure-garcTs advice, and what might have been accomplished had a still bolder course and a less generous one been pursued by the flag-officer commanding. It would not be fair, however, to detract from the merits of an enterprise which, so far as it went, reflected honor on the officers and men engaged in it. It should not be forgotten that Commodore Ingraham had many serious obstacles to contend with: first, the weakness of the machinery of the two boats; second, their very heavy and objectionable draught; and, third, the fact that neither could be looked upon as altogether sea worthy. But, whatever may have been the causes that prevented a more brilliant result, the official statement, as made by General Beauregard, Commodore Ingraham, and the foreign consuls then on the spot, was true: the blockade of the port of Charleston, for the time being, had been raised, and the hostile fleet guard ing its outer harbor had been unquestionably dispersed.

The reader is aware that the outer works planned, commenced, and partially completed, in 1861, by General Beauregard, at the entrance of the Stono, had been abandoned by General Pember-ton for inner defences believed by him to afford better protec tion. He removed from Cole's Island, at the mouth of the Stono, eleven guns of large calibre which had protected the entrance. The river was immediately entered, and a permanent lodgment of Federal troops was made on the southeast end of James Isl and. This proved to be a serious error upon General Pember-ton's part. The enemy's gunboats, now unhindered, went up the Stono as near Fort Pemberton as safety permitted, and were thus enabled to fire their long-range rifled guns upon our camps on James and John's islands, thereby causing much annoyance to our troops, and occasionally killing a few men.

It had been ascertained that one of these Federal gunboats— the Isaac Smith, carrying nine heavy guns—was the most enter prising of them all; that she approached nearest to the fort, and, under the shelter of a high bluff, with banked fires, often re mained there the whole night, unconcerned as if afloat on Fed eral waters.

While the naval attack just described was being prepared Gen eral Beauregard determined to put a stop to the annoying and, thus far, unimpeded incursions of the Isaac Smith. lie called the Commander of the First Military District to a conference at De-

partment Headquarters, and it was there agreed that masked batteries should be immediately erected on the banks of the Stono at points carefully selected, which the Federal gunboat was known to pass, and especially near the spot where she had been often seen to lie at anchor. She was to be allowed to as cend the river unmolested as far as she might see fit to go, when our batteries were to open upon her suddenly at short range, and, thus cutting off her retreat, compel her to surrender to our forces. The execution of the plan and its general outlines, with such modifications as circumstances might render necessary, was intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, of the 1st South Carolina Artillery, stationed at Fort Snmter. We submit his official report, and thus acquaint the reader with the details of the engagement:

u HEADQUARTERS, SPECIAL EXPEDITION,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. 1st, 1863. " Captain TV. F. NANCE, A. A. G.:

"Captain, —I have the honor to report that, in obedience to instructions from District Headquarters, a secret expedition was organized for the purpose of attacking the enemy's gunboats in Stono River, consisting of the following troops : The siege-train, composed of Captain B. C. TVebb's company (A), and Lieutenant S. TV. Wilson, Jr., commanding Company B—commanded by Ma jor Charles Allston, Jr.; Captain F. C. Schultz's company (F),Palmetto Light Artillery Battalion; light battery, manned by Captain F. II. Harleston's com pany (D), 1st South Carolina Artillery (regulars); one Parrott gun, in charge of Lieutenant T. E. Gregg; 3d Howitzers (siege-train). Captain John C. Mitch ell's company (I), 1st South Carolina Artillery (regulars) ; Company H, Cap tain S. M. Roof; and Company I, Lieutenant M. Gunter commanding (20th Regiment South Carolina Volunteers), acted as sharp-shooters.

" On the afternoon of January 30th, at 4.30 o'clock, the enemy's gunboat, Isaac SmitJi, mounting one 80-pounder Parrott gnu and eight 8-inch heavy columbiads, came up the Stono River, passing our batteries (which were masked at Legare's Point Place and at Grimball's, on John's Island), and came to anchor a little above them. She was immediately fired upon from our guns posted at Grimball's, on John's Island, when she attempted to make good her escape, fighting our batteries (which had then opened) on John's Island as she passed. She succeeded in getting as far as Legare's Point Place, when she dropped anchor and unconditionally surrendered. TVe took prisoners her entire crew, consisting of eleven officers, one hundred and five men, and three negroes.

" The enemy's loss was twenty-five killed and wounded; on our side one man wounded (since died).

"Major Allston commanded the batteries at Grimball's, on John's Island; Captain Harleston those at Point Place. Captain Mitchell commanded the

GO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

sharp-shooters. Lieutenant Charles Inglesby, 1st South Carolina Artillery, acted as Adjutant.

" The officers and men under my command behaved with great coolness and bravery, lighting their guns without breastworks, entirely exposed to the enemy's fire within two or three hundred yards.

"The Smith has been towed up the Stono and put under the guns of Fort Pemberton.

" In closing my report, 1 will not omit to mention the very signal service rendered by the Stono scouts, and also by Captain John (B. L.) Walpole.

" The members of the Signal Corps detailed to accompany the expedition discharged their duties with great efficiency.

"I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JOSEPH A. YATES, Lieut.-Colonel comdg. expedition."

The Isaac Smith had been but slightly damaged. She was speedily repaired, and, being now named the /Stono, became a guard-boat in Charleston Harbor, under Captain "W. J. Hartstein, C. S. X., of whom mention has already been made in one of the early chapters of this work.

The enemy was unfortunate at this time in General Beauregard's Department. To the precipitate flight of his blockading fleet, and to his loss in the Stono, was added a third and more signifi cant reverse, which we are about briefly to describe.

In the early morning of the 1st of February appeared, opposite the battery at Genesis Point (Fort McAllister), in the Georgia District, a Federal ironclad "of the monitor class," accompanied by three gunboats and a mortar-boat. They steamed up to within about one thousand yards of the work, dropped anchor, and soon began a heavy cannonade. The armament of the Genesis Point battery consisted of one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pounder, five 32-pounders, and one 10-inch mortar. The chief aim of the iron clad (afterwards known to be the single-turreted monitor Mon-tault] was directed against the 8-inch columbiad, just abreast of which she had purposely taken position. She fired 11 and 15 inch shells. The parapet fronting the columbiad was breached, so as to leave the gun exposed; but the cannoneers remained at their post to the last, refusing to be relieved. The fight con tinued for more than four hours, and then suddenly ceased. The monitor slowly and silently retired, it was believed, in a dam aged condition. This was an encouraging result, and showed that ironclads might not be so formidable as they were thought, against sand-batteries.

Very little was known at that time of the capacity of the newly-built and so much talked-of Federal monitors and iron clads. Hence the importance of the result secured by this attack. General Beauregard had drawn his conclusions accordingly, and, in prevision of the danger threatening the works in front of Charleston, wrote the following letter to General Eipley :

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Feb. $th, 1863. " Brig.-Genl. R. S. EIPLEY, Commanding First Mil. Disk, Charleston, S. C.:

" General, —The recent attack of the enemy's ironclad monitor Montaul: on the battery at Genesis Point (the first day at about one mile, and the second at about eight hundred or one thousand yards) would seem to indicate that the enemy is not so confident of the invulnerability of this kind of naval vessels. But I consider also that the attack on Sumter, whenever it takes place, will probably be made at long range, with their heaviest guns and mortars. This being admitted, they will necessarily attack it where it is weakest— L <?., the gorge, southeast angle, and east face—taking their position close along the eastern shore of Morris Island, after silencing Battery Wagner. By adopting this plan their steamers, gunboats, etc., would be, moreover, farther removed from the batteries of Sullivan's Island.

" The enemy may also establish land rifled and mortar batteries on the sand hills along the sea-shore of Morris Island, at the distance of from one to two miles from Sumter, as was done in the reduction of Fort Pulaski last year. He might possibly send one or more monitors during the night to take a position in the small channel north of Cuinmings's Point, within close range, to batter down the gorge of Sumter and endeavor to blow up the magazines.

"That mode of attack, being the one most to be apprehended, should be guarded against as well as our limited means will permit—first, by transferring as many heavy rifled guns as can be spared from the other faces of the fort to the gorge-angle and face already referred to ; and the Brooke's rifled gun now on its way here from Richmond must likewise be put there, substituting in its place at Fort Johnson the 10-inch now expected from that city, so locating it as to fire towards Morris Island when required; secondly, a strong field-work should be thrown up as soon as sufficient labor can be procured on Cummings's Point, open in the gorge towards Fort Sumter, to act besides as a kind of traverse to this work from the fire of the batteries located by the ene my along the sea-shore of Morris Island. The Cuinmings's Point Battery should be armed with the heaviest and longest ranged guns we may be able to obtain for that purpose.

" The introduction of heavy rifled guns and ironclad steamers in the attack of masonry forts has greatly changed the condition of the problem applicable to Fort Sumter when it was built; and we must now use the few and imper fect means at our command to increase its defensive features as far as practi cable. The Chief-Engineers of this Department and of the State will be ordered

to report to you at once, to confer with you, so as to carry out the views ex pressed by me in this letter.

"Major Harris, Chief-Engineer, has received my instructions relative to locating some of 'Rain's torpedoes' about Cummings's Point and within the harbor, independently of the electrical torpedoes under the charge of Mr. Waklron. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comclg."

What General Beanregard apprehended most, however, was a night attack by the Federal monitors and ironclads. During a dark night nothing could prevent them from taking a position sufficiently near Fort Suinter, and there opening lire upon it, with almost certain impunity. By repeating the manoeuvre several nights in succession they might eventually batter clown the walls of the fort and dismount most of its guns, or blow up its mag azines. It was evident that Sumter, being a large object, could be seen well enough to be fired at with approximate precision even at night; while the monitors, being small, and lying low in the water, would hardly be discernible from the fort, and, if made to change their positions after each discharge, might render im possible any accuracy of aim on the part of our gunners, who would be left with nothing else to guide them but the flash of the enemy's pieces. And General Beanregard was of opinion that, by establishing floating lights of different colors at the entrance of the various channels leading into the inner harbor, and by frequent soundings, rendered easy by most excellent coast-survey maps in the possession of the Federal commanders, the plan of attack just described could have been carried out with no serious difficulty, and to the advantage of the enemy, especially if undertaken while the tides were stationary, or nearly so. Fortunately, however. Ad miral Dupont, and the other naval commanders having charge of the hostile fleet, did not adopt this very simple mode of attack, against which the guns of Sumter, and of the works around the harbor, would have been almost powerless.

It was with a view to guard against this danger that the follow ing communication was addressed to Commodore Ingraham:

"CHARLESTON, S. C., March 1st, 1863.

" Sir, —The movements of the enemy in Port Royal Harbor yesterday looked suspicions, and have the appearance of an early movement of some sort. Thus forewarned, it will appear assuredly the part of prudence to be on the watch. I must therefore request that the Confederate steamer Stono should take her

position as a guard-boat, in advance of the forts, as far as practicable to-night, and thereafter every night, for the present.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

Thinking also of the reinforcements he might have to order from General Walker's district, he, on the same day, instructed the President of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad to keep in readiness, at Pocotaligo Station, "a train of cars capable of cany-ing a thousand men. On the 2d General Walker was written to, and advised as to the course he should pursue to protect the trestle-work across the Savannah River and hold the railroad line to Charleston. "All your movements," he was told, "must look to the final defence of Charleston, where I shall concentrate all my troops when required."

The enemy had evidently some design to accomplish up the Ogeechee River, for, on the 28th of February, he again attacked Fort McAllister, with an ironclad, three gunboats, and a mortar-boat. The engagement was another disappointment to the naval officer commanding, as, after two hours' cannonading, which only resulted in the crippling of the Confederate steamer Rattlesnake, then aground a short distance off, the attacking vessels "ceased firing and dropped down the river."* The attempt was renewed on the 3d of March by three of the enemy's monitors — the Mon-tauk being one of them — and was kept up for more than seven hours, but without damaging our battery, which, upon inspec tion by Major Harris, after the engagement, was found " in good condition in every respect." f Alluding to this affair, General Eeauregard, from Charleston, March 4th, 1863, forwarded the following telegram to General Cooper :

" Fort McAllister has again repulsed enemy's attack. Ironclads retired at 8 P. M. yesterday ; mortar-boats shelled until 6 o'clock this morning. All dam ages repaired during night; 8-inch columbiads mounted, and fort good as ever. No casualties reported. Result is encouraging. Enemy's vessels still in sight.

Reduced as were General Beauregard's forces at that time, he was nevertheless called upon to reinforce other points of his De partment. His letter of March 4th to Major II. C. Guerin, Chief

* See Captain G. W. Anderson's report, in Appendix. t See also, in Appendix, Major Harris's report.

of Subsistence, through Captain John M. Otey, A. A. G., showed '* that the aggregate, present and absent, of the troops in the State of South Carolina was 25,000." Major Guerin was directed to make his estimates accordingly, "adding lift} 7 per cent, for emer gencies, and 3000 negroes." * It was to guard against the appre hended result of such numerical weakness that General Beaureo-ard

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had demanded additional State troops of Governor Bonliam, who declined to accede to his request, on the ground that, should he do so, the planting interests of the State might be materially dam aged. In his reply to the Governor, General Beau regard said lie k - was alive to the sacrifices and hardships which a call on the militia would entail," but considered that the occasion justified him in requiring the presence of " every arms-bearing man " the State could raise. Ilis letter ended thus:

; ' In other words, my command is much smaller than the force under Gen eral Lee, a year ago, in this State, when the hostile force at Port Royal was not more than half the one now concentrated in that vicinity.

"With what resources I have I shall make the best battle I can, conscious that I have done all I could to enlarge those resources in all practicable ways."

In order to prevent night reconnoissances on Morris and Sul livan's islands, General Beauregard now ordered the Commander of the First Military District to patrol the beaches of those two islands with cavalry, to be sent for that purpose from the main land, and to see to it that Morris Island, which, he thought was the more exposed to hostile incursions, should be specially guarded in that way.f And, with the fixed determination to give no respite to the enemy, wherever he could be attacked with apparent hope of success, he assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Yates to the command of another expedition against Federal steamers which were attempt ing to do in Winyaw Bay what the Isaac Smith had previously done in the Stono. General Beauregard was also very anxious to try there the merit of Captain Lee's torpedo-boats, which he was having prepared for that purpose.

The more threatening the movements of the enemy appeared, the more active were General Beauregard's preparations to meet his attack. On the 23d he instructed the Commander of the First Military District, first, to confer with Commodore Ingraham in

* See letter, in Appendix. t See Appendix.

relation to a proposed night-attack on the monitors by the small boat flotilla, now thoroughly manned and ready for effective work ; second, to get a sufficient supply of wood and coal for the steamer Stono, should she be returned to the land-forces by the !N"avy De partment; third, vigilantly to guard the "New Bridge" across the Ashley against accidental or intentional destruction by fire. On the same day Major Harris was directed to complete at once the obstructions on the Wappoo Cut; to visit Battery Wall, at White Point, and determine whether or not it was strong enough to resist such projectiles as the enemy might be provided with, should he attempt to push into Charleston Harbor. He was also requested to inspect the bridge over Rantowles Creek, and, if necessary, to repair it without loss of time.

Yery shortly afterwards (on the 29th) General Beauregard or dered his Chief Quartermaster to have ready for use whatever roll ing-stock might be required to transport rapidly to Charleston, by the Northeastern Railroad, say 6000 men, and, by the Savan nah and Charleston Railroad, about 10,000. lie was preparing all the means in his power to give the enemy as warm a reception as circumstances would 'allow. And, as usual with him, no detail, however insignificant in appearance, was neglected. He really saw to everything, and gave, himself, verbally or otherwise, all the instructions necessary to the full execution of his orders.

On the 31st the following instructions were forwarded to Brig adier-Generals Ilagood and Walker:

" All heavy baggage must be removed to some secure place for storage.

" The troops must be held in light marching order, ready for any emergency and movements of the utmost celerity.

" The planters must be warned of the impendency of invasion, and advised to remove their negroes to some more secure localities."

And on the same day the following letter was addressed to General Mercer, commanding the District of Georgia:

" I am instructed to direct you to organize and hold ready, in light marching order, a command of at least 2500 men, including three light batteries, to move on this place (Charleston), via Augusta, if necessary, at a moment's notice.

" The cars need not be held in depot at present, but the presidents of rail roads interested must be duly advised of the possible exigency.

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff." II.—5

CHAPTER XXX.

General Beauregard Orders the Cummings's Point Battery to be Strengthened. — Citadel Cadets Assigned to the New Bridge Defences. — The Ironclads Cross the Bar on the 5th. — Admiral Dnpont Makes his Attack on the 7th. •— Order in which the Ships came up. — Their Armament. — Admiral Du-pont's Plan of Battle.—Fort Sumter the Chief Object of Attack.—Its Re duction Supposed to be Inevitable.—Commanders of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and the various Batteries Engaged. — How they were Armed. —• Number of Guns Employed by the Confederates.—Cautious Approach of the Monitors. — Fort Moultrie opens Fire on them. — Fort Sumter does likewise.—Description of the Fight.—Fort Sumter Cripples the Ifcw Iron sides. — The Passaic Withdraws from the Fight. — Two more Ironclads forced to Retire. — The Kcokuk engages Fort Sumter.—She is badly Dam aged. — Importance of the Defeat inflicted on the Enemy.—The Keokuk Sinks near Morris Island on the 8th.—On the 12th the Monitors steam, and are towed Southward. — Condition of Sumter after the Attack. — Ex hibit of Shots fired on both Sides. — Fleet keeps Outside of Line of Torpe does and Rope Obstructions. — General Beauregard's Efforts to Organize an Attack on the Monitors with Torpedo-boats. — His Letter to Lieutenant Webb, C. S. N.—His Plan Foiled by the Withdrawal of the Fleet,— Letter to General Cooper. — Failure to Complete Torpedo-rams and Gunboats.

BEING still apprehensive that the enemy's monitors might take a position in " main ship channel," as near the shore as prudence would admit, and attempt to batter down the southeast angle and gorge-wall of Fort Sumter—for that was its most vulnerable part —General Beauregard, on the 4th of April, ordered the Com mander of the First Military District to add a 10-inch columbiad, or a 42-pounder rifled gun, to the Cummings's Point Battery, the object being to keep the Federal ironclads as far off as pos sible and, at the same time, increase the efficiency of that impor tant work. The sequel proved the wisdom of this precaution.

The day following, the Commanders of the First District and of James Island were given specific instructions as to the rein forcements, and guns and mortars were called for and received from Georgia. The Citadel Cadets, of Charleston, were anxious to take part in their country's defence, and their services having been accepted, they were assigned to the works protecting the

" New Bridge/' on the Ashley River. The 2500 men from Savan nah had arrived, and the Chief of Subsistence was ordered to make proper provision for them.

The storm was evidently approaching. Its premonitory signs, as reported by the Signal Corps, were—first, the increase of the enemy's force in the Stono and the North Edisto; second, the unusual activity visible among the vessels composing the fleet. In fact, during 1 the evening of the 5th, the ironclads, including

O O / C3

the frigate New Ironsides and eight monitors, had actually crossed the bar, and anchored in the main ship channel. Though out of range as yet, they had not before approached so near. There was but one conclusion to draw: the long-delayed and anxiously expected attack was now about to take place.

At last, on the 7th of April, a little after 2 P. M., the monitors advanced for action. It was with a feeling akin to relief that officers and men stepped into their positions, at the different bat teries and pieces assigned them. The long roll was beaten. There would have been loud cheering, had not discipline and strict or ders prevented. By order of the Commandant at Suinter three flags, the garrison, regimental, and Palmetto flags, were hoisted; the band played "Dixie," and thirteen guns were fired, to salute the ensisrns that floated liijjh in the air, as if to sav, " We are

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ready!"

Admiral Dupont's ships came up in the following order: four monitors — the Weehawken, the Passaic, the Montauk,i\\Q Pa-tapsco; then the New Ironsides, as flag-ship; then the CatskiU, the Nantucket, the Naliant, and, bringing up the rear, the double-turreted monitor Keokuk. They were commanded by experi enced and gallant officers of the United States Navy. Their ar mament, including that of the New Ironsides, consisted of thirty-three guns "of the heaviest calibre ever used in war, to wit, 15 and 11 inch Dahlgren guns, and 8-irich rifled pieces." The steam ers Canandaiyua, Housatonic, UnadUla, WissaJdclcon, and Huron constituted the reserve, and were kept outside the bar.

It may be of interest to submit an extract from the plan of at tack and order of battle, adopted by the Admiral and distributed to the various commandants who took part in the engagement:

" * * * The squadron will pass up the main ship channel "without return ing the fire of the batteries on Morris Island, unless signal should be made to commence action.

G8 MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

" The ships will open fire on Fort Sumter when within easy range, and will take up a position to the northward and westward of that fortification, en gaging its left or northeast face at a distance of from one thousand to eight hundred yards, firing low, and aiming at the centre embrasures.

u The commanding officers will instruct their officers and men to carefully avoid wasting a shot, and will enjoin upon them the necessity of precision rather than rapidity of fire.

" Each ship will be prepared to render every assistance possible to vessels that may require it.

" The special code of signals prepared for the ironclad vessels will be used in action.

" After the reduction of Fort Sumter * it is probable the next point of attack will be the batteries on Morris Island. * * *

" F. S. DUPONT, Rear-Admiral, Comdg. South Atlantic Blockading Squadron."

From the order given above it is manifest that there was not only hope, but a feeling of certainty, on the part of Admiral Dupont that the fleet would succeed in reducing Fort Sumter, and against that work alone was to be hurled the combined fury of his attacking squadron. This Confederate stronghold was doomed. The Admiral was to attack it, necessarily reduce it, and then destroy or capture the other works around the harbor. How his turreted monitors went about the accomplishment of their object will be farther shown, as we proceed with the nar rative of the engagement of the 7th, characterized at the time by a Northern correspondent who witnessed the scene as " sublimely terrific."

Let us now see what works we had with which to confront the formidable armada, so carefully and expensively prepared by the North, for the capture of Charleston. We mention only those that were engaged against the fleet.

First among them was Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Ehett, with Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates, commanding the par apet guns, and Major Ormsby Blanding, in charge of the casemate batteries. The garrison consisted of seven companies of the First South Carolina Artillery (Regulars), under Captains D. G. Flem ing, F. II. Harleston, J. C. King, J. C. Mitchel, J. E. Macbeth, W. IT. Peronnean, and C. W. Parker. The guns brought into action were: two 7-inch Brookes, four 10-inch columbiads, two

* The italics are ours.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD. (59

9-inch Dalilgrens, four 8-inch columbiads, four 8-inch navy guns, seven banded and rifled 42-pounders, one banded and rifled 32-pounder, thirteen smooth-bore 32-pounders, and seven 10-inch sea-coast mortars—in all, forty-four guns and mortars.

Next in importance was Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, assisted by Major T. M. Baker, with five companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), commanded by Captains T. A. Huguenin, R. Press Smith, B. S. Burnett, C. H. Elvers, and Lieutenant E. A. Erwin. The guns engaged were: nine 8-inch columbiads, five rifled and banded 32-pounders, five smooth-bore 32-pounders, and two 10-inch mortars—in all, twenty-one guns and mortars.

Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island, was under Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, with three companies of the 1st South Carolina Infantry (Regulars), Captains R. de Treville, Warren Adams, and W. Tabourn. The guns it used against the fleet were five 10-inch and one 8-inch columbiad—six guns.

Battery Beauregard was under Captain J. A. Sitgreaves, 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars), with two companies, one from Fort Sumter, the other from Fort Moultrie. The first was commanded by Lieutenant W. E. Erwin, the second by Captain J. H. Warley. The guns engaged were one 8-inch columbiad and two 32-pounders, rifled.

Battery Wagner was under Major C. K. Huger, with two com panies belonging to the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). One gun was engaged—a 32-pounder, rifled.

At Cummings's Point Battery, Lieutenant II. R. Lesesne com manded, with a detachment of the 1st South Carolina Artillery (Regulars). The guns engaged were one 10-inch columbiad and one 8-inch Dahlgren—two guns.

Thus, it will appear that sixty-seven guns were actually used in the engagement, and not more than nine mortars, making an ag gregate of seventy-six, instead of the three hundred, three hundred and fifty, or four hundred, erroneously reported by Northern cor respondents and other writers concerning the events now occupy ing our attention. " There were not three hundred guns mounted in all the defences of Charleston, and the guns of the second and third circles of fire were not engaged." So states an ex-member of Admiral Dahlgren's staff in a work, well written and, as a whole, remarkably fair, entitled "Leaves from a Lawyer's Life,

Afloat and Ashore." * And it is but fair to add that this state ment is entirely correct-Captain P. A. Mitchell, with a few companies from the 20th South Carolina Infantry, had been placed on Sullivan's Island, to prevent an assault by land, should any be attempted; and Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan, of the 21st South Carolina, had been charged with the same duty on Morris Island.

General Beauregard had also requested Commodore Ingraham to join in the movement, with the two gunboat-rams Palmetto State and Chicora, should circumstances allow it. The Commo dore and Commanders Tucker and Rutledge readily prepared to do so, and took up their position accordingly. Neither vessel, however, participated in the engagement.

Sullivan's Island, constituting the second subdivision of the First Military District of South Carolina, was, at that time, under Brigadier-General J. II. Trapier, lately withdrawn from George town for that purpose by order of General Beauregard. Colonel Lawrence M. Keitt was the Commandant of the post, and had stationed himself at Battery Bee, where he remained during the fight. Morris Island, the third subdivision, was under Colonel R. F. Graham. Brigadier-General Gist had charge of the first sub division, composed of James Island and St. Andrew's Parish. lie was at Fort Johnson, with his staff, in order to be as near as pos sible to the scene of action, and take part in it, if necessary. Brig adier-General Hipley, whose command included the three subdivi sions just referred to, had selected the recognized post of danger —Fort Sumter—for his headquarters during the engagement. lie was in Charleston, however, at the beginning of the attack; and when, a few minutes later, he hurried off, with the declared inten tion of going to the fort, the concentration of fire against it was already such as to induce him to change his course and land at Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island, where he remained until the fight was over.

Steadily, but slowly and cautiously, did the monitors advance. Their commanders had been warned that rope obstructions, con nected with torpedoes containing heavy charges of powder, were thrown across the channel into which they must steer their way.

* Charles Copley, late Judge-Advocate of the South Atlantic blockading squadron.

It was said by Northern correspondents, and officially repeated by Mr. Seward, that the Weehawken, their leading vessel, at the outset "fell into these entanglements," and that the others, fear ing a like mishap, sheered off at once, and did not occupy the position they had been originally ordered to take. This report is erroneous and needs correction, for, as will be seen, none of the ironclads ever reached the Confederate line of obstructions. Another cause must, therefore, be assigned for the slow advance of the Weehawken, arid for the new and safer position selected on that day by the attacking fleet. The following communica tion, forwarded, six months later, by General Beauregard to Gen eral Cooper, relative to the reasons alleged at Washington for the failure of this grand expedition against Charleston, confirms the foregoing statement. The reader will, no doubt, read it with interest, as a part of the history of this period of the war:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Oct. 15th, 18G3. "General SAMUEL COOPER, Arljt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Va.:

" General, —In a published circular (No. 89) of the State Department at Washington, signed by Mr. William H. Seward, and addressed to the diplo matic agents of this Government abroad, I notice a statement relative to the defeat of the enemy's ironclad fleet in the attack on Fort Sumter, on the 7th of April last, so contrary to the facts of the case, that I feel called upon, as Commander of this Military Department, most emphatically to deny the truth of that version, which is as follows: 'An attack by the fleet, on the 7th of April last, upon the forts and batteries which defend the harbor (of Charles ton) failed because the rope obstructions in the channel fouled the screws of the ironclads, and compelled them to return, after passing through the fire of the batteries. These vessels bore the fire of the forts, although some defects of construction were revealed by the injuries they received. The crews passed through an unexampled cannonade with singular impunity. Not a life was lost on board a monitor. 11

"From the enclosed reports of Brigadier-General R. S. Hipley, Colonel William Butler, and Colonel Alfred Rhett, who commanded at that period respectively this Military District, the batteries on Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter, it will be seen that—

" 1st, No ironclad came nearer than about six hundred yards of the rope obstructions except the disabled Keoltult, which dropped in, to about three hundred yards, before it could get again under way, but in a sinking con dition ; consequently, the propellers of the ironclads never could have be come entangled in the rope obstructions.

" 2d. The ironclads never passed through the fire of the batteries, for they never approached nearer than from eleven hundred to thirteen hundred yards

of the outer batteries, except the Keokuft, which came up to about nine hun dred yards, and was sunk. None of the ironclads came within range of the heaviest batteries in Fort Sumter and on Sullivan's Island, which the}' would have been compelled to do in entering the harbor.

"3d. The fleet did not escape without material injury, for one of the num ber, the Keokuk, was sunk, and its armament is now in position for the defence of Charleston in our own batteries. Another monitor had to be sent to New York for extensive repairs, and several others were sent to Port Royal, also for repairs.

"4th. Not a life may have been lost in the ironclads, but, on examination of the wreck of the Kcokuk, its hull was found penetrated, and the 11-inch round-shots and 7-inch rifled bolts had made clean holes through its turrets. Several U. S. flags, three officer's swords, pistols, etc., a quantity of bloody clothes and blankets, were found on board.

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGAHD, Gcnl. Comdg."

At three o'clock r. M., and as soon as the leading ironclad had apparently come within range, the Commander at Monltric, be lieving that the enemy's object was to run by Sumter, ordered fire to be opened. This explains how the first shot on the assaulting squadron came from Fort Moultric. The vessel fired at kept on her course until she approached to within about fourteen hundred yards of Sumter, when she opened upon it with two guns, but without any result. Colonel Rhett, on the parapet, waited some two or three minutes, and then replied, firing by battery. Fort Moultrio and batteries Bee and Beauregard did likewise. The other monitors steamed up to their respective positions, and the action soon became general. Sumter was evidently the chief object of the attack. Five turreted ironclads, formed in line of battle, were now pouring a continuous fire upon it, and only sending an occasional shot at Fort Moultrie and batteries Bee

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and Beauregard. It was a grand, an impressive, and at the same time a terrible spectacle. There seemed to be a hail-storm of shot and shell, ploughing up the waters of the bay, apparently submerging each monitor of the fleet, and shattering the massive walls of the grim fortress that stood sentry over the old city.

About three-quarters of an hour after the report of the first gun was heard the New Ironsides advanced to within some sev-teen hundred yards of Fort Sumter and opened upon it. This immediately drew on that frigate (Admiral Dupont's flag-ship) the concentrated fire of Forts Sumter and Moultrie and of all the batteries. It was more than she could stand, as became evident

by the hurried manner in which she withdrew out of effective range. The Passaic had already left the contest, visibly crip pled; and the other monitors, which had "slowly passed in front of the fort in an ellipse," one of them at a distance of a thousand yards, found themselves exposed to the crushing missiles aimed with deliberate accuracy by our well-trained and intrepid artiller ists. Two of these vessels were now compelled to retire, as the Passable and the Ironsides had previously done.

At five minutes past four o'clock P.M. the double-turreted mon itor Keokuk gallantly advanced, alone, within nine hundred yards of the batteries of Sumter, and one thousand of those of Moultrie. The fate of her consorts had not deterred her from this attempt, but she soon repented her defiant act; for the guns of our first circle of fire were now directed against her, and she soon aban doned the fight, worsted, and unable to endure the ordeal to which she had been subjected. Colonel Rhett thus refers to this inci dent in his official report:

" She received our undivided attention, and the effect of our fire was soon apparent. The wrougbt-iron bolts from a 7-inch Brooke gun were plainly seen to penetrate her turret and hull, and she retired in forty minutes, riddled and apparently almost disabled."

After being under the fire of our forts and batteries for two hours and twenty-five minutes, at distances varying from nine hundred to seventeen hundred yards, the whole ironclad fleet finally withdrew, and anchored beyond the range of our guns. The battle was fought. The day was ours.

In his report, already referred to, Colonel Rhett says :

" The enemy's fire was mostly ricochet, and not very accurate ; most of their shot passed over the fort, and several to the right and left. The greater por tion of their shots were from thirteen to fourteen hundred yards distant, which appeared to be the extent of their effective range; some shots were from a greater distance, and did not reach the fort at all. * * * With regard to the conduct of the garrison, it is impossible for me to draw any distinction. Of ficers and men were alike animated with the same spirit, and I cannot speak in too high terms of their coolness and gallantry throughout the action. All acted as though they were engaged in practice, and the minutest particulars of drill and military etiquette were preserved."

General Trapier, in his report, says :

" It is due to the garrison of Fort Moultrie and their soldierly and accom plished commander, Colonel Butler, that I should not close this report without

bearing testimony to the admirable skill, coolness, and deliberation with which they served their guns. They went—all, men as w T ell as officers—to their work cheerfully and with alacrity, showing that their hearts were in it. There was enthusiasm, but no excitement. They lost no time in loading their guns, but never fired hastily or without aim."

Of the other works on Sullivan's Island engaged with the ene my on that memorable day he says:

"The reports of Colonel Keitt, Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins, and Captain Sitgreaves give me every reason to believe the garrisons of batteries Bee and Beauregard acquitted themselves equally well, and are equally entitled to the thanks and gratitude of their commander and their country."

General Ripley confirmed the above in the following words:

" The action was purely of artillery—forts and batteries against the ironclad vessels of the enemy—other means of defence, obstructions and torpedoes, not haying come into play. Fort Sumter was the principal object of the attack, and to that garrison, under its gallant commander, Colonel Alfred Rhett, ably seconded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Yates and Major Ormsby Blanding, and all the officers and men, special credit is due for sustaining the shock, and, with their powerful armament, contributing principally to the repulse. The garrison of Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, seconded by Major Baker and the other officers and soldiers, upheld the historic reputation of that fort, and contributed their full share to the result. The powerful bat teries of Battery Bee were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, and were served with great effect. Battery Wagner, under Major C. K. Huger; Cummings's Point Battery, under Lieutenant Lesesne; and Battery Beaure gard, under Captain Sitgreaves, all did their duty with devotion and zeal.*

General Beauregard, in his official communication to the War Department, dated Charleston, May 24th, 1863, recapitulates as follows the salient features of Admiral Dupont's attack:

"The action lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes; but the chief dam age is reported by the enemy to have been done in thirty minutes. The Keo-kuk did not come nearer than nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter. She was destroyed. The New Ironsides could not stand the fire at the range of a mile. Four of her consorts, monitors, were disabled at the distance of not less than thirteen hundred yards. They had only reached the gorge of the harbor, never within it, and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions, which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort, as far as they could be provided. The heaviest batteries had not been employed ; therefore it may be accepted, as shown, that these vaunted

* From Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley's official report, dated April 13th, 18G3, to be found in "Record of the Rebellion," vol. x. (Doc.), pp. 520-522.

monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all, are not invul nerable or invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance, properly placed and skilfully handled; in reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships.

"On this occasion the monitors operated under the most favorable circum stances. The day was calm; and the water, consequently, was as stable as that of a river. Their guns were fired with deliberation, doubtless by trained artillerists. According to the enemy's statements the fleet fired one hundred and fifty-one shots, eight of which were ascribed to the New Ironsides, three to the Keokiik, and but nine to the Passaic, which was so badh T damaged. Not more than thirty-four shots took effect on the walls of Fort Sumter—a broad mark—which, with the number of discharges, suggests that the monitor ar rangement, as yet, is not convenient for accuracy or celerity of fire.

"Fort Moultrie and other batteries were not touched in a way to be con sidered, while in return they threw one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine shots. At the same time Fort Sumter discharged eight hundred and ten shots; making the total number of shots fired two thousand two hundred and nine, of which the enemy reports that five hundred and twenty struck the different vessels—a most satisfactory accuracy, when the smallness of the target is considered. This precision was due, not only to the discipline and practice of the garrisons engaged, but in no slight degree to an invention of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, 1st Regiment South Carolina Artillery, Avhieh had been applied to many of our best guns, and which shall, as fast as possible, be arranged for all the heavy ordnance in the Department. By this felicitous device our guns were easily held trained upon the monitors, although the latter were constantly in movement, and this with but five men at the heaviest pieces. The reports of the Engineers (herewith) will show the precise extent of the damage inflicted on Fort Sumter. It is sufficient for me to say, that at the time the enemy quit these waters the work was capable of resisting as formidable an attack as the one we had just foiled.

" For the casualties of the day (so slight) I must refer you to the reports herewith. Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men, in all the works engaged, for their spirit, gallantry, and discipline, which, indeed, I had a right to expect, from the high soldierly condition into which those garrisons had been brought by their officers. My expectations were fully realized; and the country, as well as the State of South Carolina, may well be proud of the men who first met and vanquished the iron-mailed, terribly-armed armada, so confidently prepared, and sent forth by the enemy to certain and easy victory."

This was not the first defeat the enemy had suffered since the opening of the war, but it was undoubtedly one of the most sig nificant, and produced a feeling of most profound depression at the North. The preparations for this naval attack, by means of supposed invulnerable and invincible engines of war, "such as the hands of man had never yet put afloat," had been made with

no less prodigality than care, and upon them centred the anxious attention of both sections of the country. It was the conviction of the Xorth that no opposing force could resist such an expedi tion. Fort Sumter must inevitably fall, and Charleston likewise. Sharing in this belief, the Federal Government was convinced that the fears of Mr. Adams, United States Minister to England, to the effect that the current of opinion, in both Houses of Parlia ment, was then leaning towards "recognition of the insurgents,"

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would be quieted by such a victory, and the power, authority, and resources of the United States clearly demonstrated to the world. Hence the disappointment at the repulse of Admiral Dnpont's fleet. The ISTorthern press was extremely bitter on the subject; so much so that efforts were made to conceal the extent of the defeat, by speaking of the movement in front of Charleston as having been a "simple reconnaissance" not an attack. But the facts of the case were soon spread abroad. It was known that, thirty minutes after the action commenced, Admiral Dupont be came "convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston with the force under his command," and that all his officers were of a like opinion. He had even declared that "a renewal of the attack on Charleston would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of this (the South Carolina) coast." * The revulsion of feeling in the JS'orth was complete, and exaggerated hope was changed into despondenc} r , openly ex pressed. The Xew York Herald characterized the repulse of the monitors, " though almost bloodless, as one of our most discour aging disasters." The Baltimore American denounced it as " a shameful abandonment of the siege."

" When day dawned on the morning of the 8th," says General Ripley, in his report, " the enemy's fleet was discovered in the same position as noticed on the previous evening. About nine cTclock the Keokiik, which had been evidently the most damaged in the action, went down, about three and one-half miles from Fort Sumter and three-fourths of a mile from Morris Island. The remainder of the fleet were repairing damages. Preparations for repuls ing a renewed attack were progressed with, in accordance with the instruc tions of the Commanding General, who visited Fort Sumter on that day. * * * Towards evening of the 9th a raft, apparently for removing torpedoes or

* The reports of Admiral Dupont and of his officers accompanying Secre tary Welles's Report for the year 1863, appear, in substance, in the second volume of Boynton.

obstructions, was towed inside of the bar. Nothing of importance occurred during the 10th.

" On the llth there were indications that the attacking fleet was about to withdraw; and on the 12th, at high-water, the Ironsides crossed the bar and took up her position with the blockading fleet; and the monitors steamed and were towed to the southward, leaving only the sunken Keokuk as a mon ument of their attack and discomfiture. "

It appeared, on a close examination of Fort Suinter after the engagement, that the injuries inflicted on it were not of a charac ter to impair its efficiency, though "fifty-five missiles—shot, shell, and fragments " *—as shown by the Engineers' reports, struck, at divers places, the walls and parapets of the work. " The effect of impact of the heavy shot sent by the enemy against the fort * * * was found to have been much less than had been antici pated." f

The following is an exhibit of the number of rounds fired by the enemy on the Tth of April, and the number of shots received by each ironclad, as copied from United States journals:

R'ds

Fired.

New Ironsides 8

Catskill 25

Keokuk 3

Montauk 26

Nantucket 15

Passaic 0

Nahant 24

Weekawkeu... .. 2G

Shots Rec'd.

New Ironsides 65

Keokuk 90

Weehawken 60

Montauk 20

Passaic 58

Nantucket 51

Catskill 51

Patapsco 45

Patapsco 18 Nahant 80

Total 154 | Total 520

THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff.

This was the real cause—there existed no other—of Admiral Dupont's failure to carry out his programme against Fort Sumter and the other defensive works in Charleston Harbor. The " tor pedoes" and the "rope obstructions," so much spoken of, had nothing whatever to do with it; though we readily admit that "the enemy's evident and just dread of torpedoes, as evinced in his preparations for their explosion by the Devil, or torpedo-

* Major Echols's report. See Appendix.

f General Ripley's report, " Rebellion Record," vol. x., p. 520 (Doc.).

searcher," * was no insignificant factor in his unwillingness to en-

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gage the Confederate batteries at closer quarters. It only remains to be said, however, that, had all the ironclad vessels of Admiral Dupont's attacking fleet adopted the course followed by the Keo-l-zu~k) and steered nearer to the walls of Stimter, in all probabil ity they would have shared the ill fate of Commander Rhinds's double-tilrreted monitor. All would have been not merely crip pled but destroyed.

The presence of the monitors in the outer harbor after the action, without even a timber guard or fender around them, led General Beauregard to believe that a fine opportunity was now offered him to test the efficiency of the spar torpedo-boats he had held in readiness for some such purpose. On the 10th he had a conference on the subject with two of the naval officers then in Charleston. lie found them perfectly willing, and even anxious, to carry out his plan. Accordingly, on the following day he addressed the subjoined letter to Lieutenant Webb—one of the two officers above referred to—whose gallantry and daring were already established:

"Dear Sir, —Upon further reflection, after the discussion yesterday with Captain Tucker and yourself, I think it would be preferable to attack each of the enemy's seven ironclads (six monitors and the Ironsides), now inside of the outer bar, with at least two of your spar-torpedo row-boats, instead of the number (six in all) already ngreed upon. I believe it to be as easy to surprise, at the same time, all the ironclads as a part of them.

"If you permit me I will give you here my general views upon the ex pedition.

"About dark, on the first calm night (the sooner the better), I would ren dezvous all my boats at the mouth of the creek, in rear of Cummings's Point, Morris Island. There I would await the proper hours of the night, which should not be too late, in order to take advantage of the present condition of the moon. I would then coast quietly along the beach of Morris Island to a point nearest the enemy's present position, where General Ilipley shall station a picket, to communicate with you, and to show proper lights imme diately after your attack, to guide the return of your boats. Having arrived at the point of the beach designated, I would form line of attack, putting also my torpedoes in position, and would give orders that my boats should attack, by twos, any monitor or the Ironsides they should encounter on their way out, answering to the enemy's hail, 'Boats on secret expedition,' or merely 'Con trabands.'

"After the attack each boat should make for the nearest point of the

* Report of Major Harris, Chief-Engineer. See Appendix.

shore, where, if necessary, to save itself from pursuit, it can be stranded; otherwise, it will return to the rendezvous at Cummings's Point. Care should be taken to have a proper understanding with commanding officers of the batteries in that vicinity, so as not to be tired into.

" I feel convinced that, with nerve and proper precautions on the part of your boats' crews, and with the protection of a kind Providence, not one of the enemy's monitors, so much boasted of by them, would live to see the next morning's sun.

" Please submit this letter to Captain Tucker, and assure him that what ever assistance I can give for this expedition, the success of which must con tribute so materially to the safety of this city, will be freely and heartily furnished. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gcnl. Comdg."

But, " as ill-luck would have it," says General Beauregard, the very night (April 12th) on which the attack was to have been made some of the monitors were sent to Port Royal for repairs, and the others to the Xorth Edisto. The Ironsides was still with the blockaders, however, and, as General Beauregard looked upon her as "our most dangerous antagonist," he determined to strike her a blow—destroy her, if possible—and so raise the blockade, on that occasion, as to forbid all denial of the fact. Captain Tucker was again ready to execute General Beauregard's plan, which had assumed much larger proportions than heretofore, when, at the eleventh hour, as it were, a telegram was received from the Navy Department, at Richmond, ordering back to that city the officers and men of the "special expedition" who had been sent to aid in the defence of Charleston, and under whose charge—our own iron clad boats joining in—was to have been placed that hazardous but, at the same time, very tempting enterprise. General Beaure gard did all he could to retain their services, but without success.

He had also, and for the third or fourth time, appealed to the War Department for the completion of the " marine torpedo-ram" so often referred to in a preceding chapter. To General Cooper, on the 22d of April, he wrote as follows:

"* * * It will be remembered that the work was undertaken with the understanding that the sum of fifty thousand dollars would be supplied by the State of South Carolina, and such material as the Navy Department had available. The money has been received, and is exhausted. Some materials have been furnished by the Navy Department, but, thus far, the substantial assistance of iron-plating has been denied, and hence the progress in the work has been incommensurate with its importance, and very fur behind what I was led to expect when I was induced to undertake the construction.

" Meantime the great value of the invention has been demonstrated so as to secure general conviction; and Captain Tucker, commanding Confederate States naval forces afloat on this station, declares, unhesitatingly, that this one machine of war, if finished, would be more effective as a means of defence and offence than nearly all the ironclads here afloat and building—a fact of which I am and have been fully assured. Had it been finished and afloat when the enemy's ironclads entered this outer harbor several weeks ago, but few of them, probably, would have escaped. Be that as it may, I trust the Department will have the matter inquired into—that is, the relative value, as war engines, of the 'Lee torpedo-ram,' and of the ironclad rams Cliicora and Palmetto State, and others of the same class now building in this harbor, to the absorption of all the material and mechanical resources of this section of the country.

" I cannot express to the War Department in too strong terms my sense of the importance of the question involved, and of its intimate connection with the most effective defence of this position. I do not desire to impose my views, but feel it my duty to urge an immediate investigation, by a mixed board of competent officers, to determine w r hether it be best for the ends in view to continue to appropriate all the material, and employ all the mechani cal labor of the country, in the construction of vessels that are forced to play so unimportant and passive a part as that which Captain Tucker, C. S. N., their commander, officially declares to me must be theirs in the future, as in the past. * * *

" The Engineer in charge estimates that it will take twenty thousand dol lars to pay off existing obligations for workmanship and material, and to complete the vessel, with the exception of floating her.

" The plating can only be furnished by the naval authorities, who have control of the rolling-mills and all suitable iron; and unless they will agree to divert from the vessels of the class they are building enough plating for the completion of the ram, I may as well give up further hope.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

But all efforts were unavailing. The War Department, no less than the Navy Department, remained, in appearance, as incred ulous as ever. No reasoning, no inducement, could awaken suffi cient interest in cither to disturb the " masterly inactivity " which was proverbially the bent of both, from the beginning to the end of the war.

picture0

CHAPTER XXXI.

Troops Withdrawn from General Beauregard and Sent to North Carolina and to General Johnston.—The Secretary of War orders 5000 more to Yicks-burg.—General Beauregard's Letter to Mr. Seddon.—Plan of the Cam paign to Redeem Tennessee aud Kentucky Submitted to General John ston, after the Battle of Chancellorsville, and after Richmond's Safety is Assured.—Enemy makes a Demonstration in Third Military District.— General Gillmore Assumes Command of Federal Forces.—General Beau-regard Instructed by the War Department to Repair to Mobile with Part of his Troops.—His Letter to General Cooper.—Colonel Simonton Recom mends a Battery at Grimbairs.—General Beauregard's Reasons for Object ing to it.—Call for Additional Heavy Guns.—Remonstrance to General Gillmore as to Depredations of his Troops.—General Beauregard's Letter to the Mayor of Charleston.—The Enemy's Movements on Folly Island.— Preparations for the Attack.—Orders to that Effect.—The Assault takes Place on the 10th of July: is Renewed on the llth and 18th.—Repulse of the Enemy.—General Beauregard Strengthens his Inner Circle of For tifications.—His Letter to Governor Bonham.—Instructions to General Ripley and other Officers.—Letter to Captain Tucker.—Additional Orders Issued.—Mr. Seddon's Request for Information Concerning the Enemy's Descent on Morris Island.—General Beauregard's Reply.

No sooner had the enemy been foiled in his naval attack on Fort Sumter (April 7th) than the depletion of General Beaure gard's active forces was begun. Cooke's and Clingman's com mands were returned to North Carolina; and, early in May, two brigades of infantry, numbering more than 5000 men, with two batteries of light artillery, were sent, by order of the War Depart ment, to reinforce General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mis sissippi. Again, on the 10th of May, a telegram was received from the Secretary of War, directing that 5000 more men should be hurried to the assistance of General Pemberton, at Yicksburg. This injudicious measure, the execution of which would have left General Beauregard with hardly any troops in his Department, stung him to an earnest remonstrance, as is shown by the follow ing letter: II.—G

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., May llth, 1863. " lion. J. A. SEDDON, Secretary of War, Richmond :

"/Sir,—This morning, as clearly as it could be done in the space of a tele gram, I sought to lay before you the military condition in which this Depart ment would be left, after the execution of your orders of yesterday, directing me to send another division of 5000 men out of it to Lieutenant-General Pemberton.

"In view, however, of the grave consequences that may follow, I deem it not only in place, but my duty, to lay before the War Department, in precise terms, my views touching the removal, at this juncture, of so large a force.

"As soon as the enemy had withdrawn his ironclad ships from before this harbor, and materially reduced his land-forces in this immediate vicinity, on the requisition of the Commanding General in North Carolina, I returned Cooke's brigade of North Carolina troops to Wilmington, and sent Cling-man's brigade there, in exchange for Evans's.

"A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson, Miss., two brigades, under Brigadier-Generals Gist and W. II. T. Walker, the former com manding South Carolina, and the latter Georgia, regiments—somewhat over 5000 infantry in all, and two light batteries of the best class in the Department.

"Your orders have been based, apparently, on the conviction that the troops of the enemy, assembled in this Department for operations against Charleston, have been mainly withdrawn and diverted to other expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi. This conviction I regret that I cannot share, as I am satisfied, from the reports of District Commanders, and from other reasons, that there has been really but little reduction of the command of Major-General Hunter.

"General Walker, commanding at Pocotaligo, reports that, on yesterday, the outposts of the enemy in his front had been much increased in strength. General Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrook's Island, with at least 2500 infantry. They arc erecting fortifications at that point, as also on Folly Island, which is likewise still occupied in force.

"Five of the monitors remain in the North Edisto, with some twenty gun boats and transports. With these and the transports still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which I am unable to doubt are still at the dispo sition of the enemy, he may renew the attack by land and water on Charles ton at any moment. Acting on the offensive, and commanding the time of attack, he could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and sooner than my command could possibly be reinforced from any quarter out of the Department.

" To meet or resist any land attack there would be available, in the First Military District:

Infantry 1,547

Heavy and light artillery 2,905

Cavalry 903

Total effective force 5,355

Line of Savannah Railroad, Second and Third Military Districts.

Infantry 751

Heavy and light artillery 772

Cavalry 2,094

Total 3,617

Li District of Georgia.

Infantry 1,631

Heavy and light artillery 2,539

Cavalry 1,821

Total 5,991

" That is—

Total of infantry 3,929

" " artillery 6,216

" " cavalry 4,878

Total effectives 15,023

" This force, if concentrated at cither Charleston or Savannah for a certain period, could, doubtless, make a stout defence; but if kept distributed in occupation of the important points, districts, and positions now held from Georgetown, S. C., to Florida, would offer but feeble resistance to any serious attack of the enemy.

"If it be the irrevocable determination of the War Department that this command shall be thus reduced, I can but make such disposition of the remnant of my forces as may appear best calculated to conceal my weakness. With my cavalry I shall make a show of occupation of the Second and Third Military Districts, and the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; but it must not be lost sight of that my communications with Savannah can be cut by the enemy, without the use of a large force, whenever he may choose to attempt it; and when that is done he will get possession of a large extent of rich rice lands and large stores of rice, not yet brought to market, which would be a heavy loss. Furthermore, it were then but a simple and easy military operation for a column—not a large one—to penetrate to Branchville, not more than thirty-five miles distant from Pocotaligo, and thus entirely interrupt 1113' communications with the interior, as a glance at the map will show.

" The sickly season on this coast will begin in about six weeks; then a small reduction of the infantry might take place. It was so late as the 16th of June last year that the enemy made his attack at Sccessionville, on James Island— so nearly successful—and which, with success, would have placed Charleston at his mercy, despite the harbor defences.

" It is proper to add here that the day before your order to detach the last division was received I had organized and put in motion an expedition against the enemy, on Seabrook Island, in support of a naval operation, the object of which is to destroy the ironclads, with the torpedo-boat contrivance of Captain Lee. The naval expedition, under Lieutenant Parker, supported by some troops, will nevertheless be attempted ; but I was reluctantly obliged to recall the infantry with which I hoped to effect the surprise and capture

of the enemy on land, in the confusion which, it was hoped, would result from the attack with torpedoes.

"I must respectfully ask your attention to the paper herewith, marked 'A,' exhibiting the force, of all arms, that \vill be left me after the execution of your orders, and that in the Department this time last year.

"You will perceive that I shall be left with 12,004 men, of all arms less than at the same period last year, when the force of the enemy w r as less threat ening in his positions than now; that my infantry force for the same duty was C4G2, leaving the lines on James Island virtually without infantry support, and open to seizure, and resulting in the inevitable fall of Charleston.

" In conclusion, I must observe that the troops in the works cannot be with drawn from their guns and concentrated for defence of any threatened point. They are already at a minimum force for the proper service of the batteries, and to withdraw them, here or at Savannah, involves the surrender of the work so abandoned, and, in ultimate effect, the failure of the whole defence.

'• Finally, it may as well be considered that the enemy will be speedily ac quainted with the extent of these reductions, and that he will act accordingly. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAU-REGARD, Geul. Comdg."

The War Department was thus fortunately checked in the sui cidal course it was then about to follow; and the reduced force under General Beauregard, so evidently inadequate in view of the menacing attitude of the enemy at and around Charleston, was left to him.

General Beauregard's incessant labors did not prevent him from turning his attention to the military operations in other parts of the Confederacy, and notably in the West, where he thought that General Joseph E. Johnston, then at Jackson, Mississippi, by con centrating his own and other forces not actively engaged at the time, could inaugurate a vigorous and successful campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky. His views to that effect are contained in the following letter, which will, doubtless, be read with inter est. The strategy preferred by the President was to send Gen eral Lee on his ruinous invasion of Pennsylvania:""

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C. AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., May loth, 18G3. " General Jos. E. JOHNSTON, Comdg., etc., Jackson, Miss.:

" Dear General, —I am sure you will appreciate the motives which induce me to oiler for your consideration the following general views on the coming

* At a Lee memorial meeting, held at Richmond, November 3d, 1870, Mr. Davis assumed the responsibility for that campaign and relieved General Lee.

summer campaign, \vliich, if they coincide with your own, might be, if not already done, submitted by you to the War Department.

" Certainly the surest way to relieve the State of Mississippi and the Valley of the Mississippi from the presence of the enemy's army is suddenly and boldly to take the offensive in Tennessee and Kentucky, for which purpose all available forces (from other commands held strictly on the defensive) should be concentrated under you, and the forces now in Tennessee, being reinforced by 25,000 or 30,000 men, at the most favorable strategic point for the offensive, Rosecrans could be suddenly attacked, and would be either to tally destroyed or the remnant of his forces would be speedily driven beyond the Ohio. A force of at least 10,000 men in Tennessee, and 20,000 in Ken tucky, would, doubtless, then be raised, and, with about 20,000 of the rein forcements received from Virginia and elsewhere, could be left to hold those two States. The rest of the army, say about 60,000 or 70,000 men, should cross the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, to Columbus or Fort Pillow, so as to command the Mississippi River, and thus cut off Grant's communica tions with the North. The latter officer (should he have delayed thus long his retreat north of these two points) would then find himself in a very criti cal condition—that is, compelled to fight his way through a victorious army equal to his own in strength, on its own selected battle-field, in position to be reinforced for the occasion from the forces left in Kentucky—and the result could not be doubtful for an instant. As a matter of course, advantage would be taken of the low stage of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to obstruct thoroughly their navigation and fortify their banks strongly, at the point where they come close together, known as the 'Neck.' Immediate ly after the destruction of Grant's army, sufficient forces could be thrown from the army in Mississippi into Louisiana, in aid of Kirby Smith, and into Mis souri to the assistance of Price, or from Kentucky into Virginia, to reinforce the troops left there, should they be hard - pressed; but that is not to be dreaded, considering the terrible lesson the enemy has just had at Chancel lors ville, and that a large portion of his army is to be disbanded during the present month, to be replaced, if at all, by new Yankee recruits.

" Meanwhile a sufficient number of Captain F. D. Lee's torpedo-rams could be constructed in England, and the navigation of the Mississippi River re sumed, thereby enabling us to retake New Orleans and capture Banks's army.

" Wishing you success in your Department, I remain,

4i Yours very truly, G. T. BEAUREGARD."

Let this plan be contrasted with the disastrous strategy of the campaign into Pennsylvania, terminating in the fatal battle of Gettysburg. The battle of Cliancellorsville had secured for some time the safety of Richmond. The people of the North were tired of the war. and, until this invasion, the Northern army could not be recruited. The Governors of some States, notably Governor Seymour, of New York, had refused more troops. Longstreet, with thirty thousand men of the Army of

SO MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

Northern Virginia, sent to the West, might have successfully aided in recovering Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Mississippi River, and in saving the Confederacy.

On the 1st of June the Chief Quartermaster was informed that all the troops in South Carolina for whom estimates of provisions should be made—that is to say, all troops present, effectives and non-effectives — amounted to ten thousand. Thus was General Beauregard stripped of all his movable forces, and he had hence forth to strengthen one point by uncovering another, whenever he wished to reinforce any position in his Department.

At that time the enemy, no doubt aware of the weakened con dition of General Beauregard's command, began making demon strations in the Third Military District (General Walker's), towards " Green Pond." Immediate steps were taken to foil his purpose, as may be seen by the various orders and telegrams sent to Gen eral Eipley and to the Chief Quartermaster of the Department.* The timely and judicious dispositions made for the emergency, and the rapid transfer of troops from different parts of the First Military District to the endangered point, showed conclusively that, notwithstanding the many difficulties in his way, General Beauregard maintained serenity of mind. lie knew he could count, not only upon the energy and efficiency of his subordinate commanders, but upon the discipline and indomitable spirit of the men under them; and they, too, knew how worthy he was of the confidence reposed in him.

The enemy advanced as far as the Coinbahee Ferry, burnt the pontoon bridge at that place and the houses on the river-side, and moved up, as if determined to march into the interior. The Fed eral forces employed on this expedition were mostly colored troops, drawn from General Saxton's command at Beaufort. After pil laging and burning, as they were wont to do, they carried off with them numbers of negro slaves from the adjoining plantations, but went no farther, and withdrew precipitately, without committing additional damage on their way back; nor did they interfere with or cut the line of communication between Charleston and Savan nah, a little farther on.

A few days later, on the 12th of June, General Gillmore super seded General Hunter, and assumed command of "the Depart-

* See Appendix.

ment of the South." The Federal forces were then in possession of "Folly Island, north of the Stono; Seabrook Island, on the North Edisto ; St. Helena Island, Port Koyal Island, Hilton Head Island, Tybce Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossabaw Island, Fort Clinch, and Amelia Island, and the city of St. Augustine." * It was fort unate that, shortly afterwards, the new Commanding General, in whose daring and engineering ability the North greatly relied, preferred making his attack by Morris Island, instead of on the broad and weak front of James Island, where he might have pen etrated our long, attenuated lines, and taken Charleston in flank and rear. Nothing, then, could have prevented Sumter from fall ing, for there can be no doubt that General Gillmore would have

O3

immediately increased the armament at and around Fort Johnson, and have thus completely commanded the interior harbor. The possession of Charleston and of all the South Carolina sea-coast would have followed as a necessary sequence.

About the middle of June a full and comprehensive letter was forwarded to the War Department by General Beauregard, in answer to a communication from Richmond, dated the 10th, ad vising him that Northern papers reported the reduction of Gen eral Hunter's forces by sending part of them to the Gulf, in which event he was instructed to proceed to Mobile, with such troops as he could spare from his lines, and use his best endeavors to avert the threatened danger at that point. This was an ad ditional cause of anxiety to General Beauregard, for there seemed to be no end to the determination of the Government to with draw troops from his Department. NTV, more: just at that time General D. II. Hill, commanding in Southeastern Virginia and North Carolina, had also applied for assistance, to guard against an attack which he thought was then threatening him, via New-

O O ?

bern—assistance which, under the circumstances, it was necessary to deny him. We here give General Beauregard's letter. It pre sented the matter in so strong a light, that the War Department refrained from issuing any order to carry out its first intention:

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., June 15th, 1863. u General SAMUEL COOPER, A. and I. Genl., Richmond, Va.:

" General, —Your letter of the 10th was duly received and partially answered

* "Engineer and Artillery Preparations against Charleston," by General Q. A. Gillmore, p. 18.

by my telegram of the 13th instant. It is now my place to reply by mail at some length.

"I am advised in the letter in question that'Northern papers report the re duction of Hunter's forces by sending troops to the Gulf—in which event ] am instructed to proceed to Mobile,' with such force as I can properly with draw from my defensive line, to resist an attack, if one should be designed on that place;' but if the purpose of the enemy be to send his reinforcements to the Mississippi, I am to go on and ' co-operate with General Johnston in that quarter.'

" While I shall be glad to contribute my mite to the defence of any part of the Confederate States, and assuredly must be solicitous for the defence of Mobile and the Mississippi Valley, yet, with my view of the situation in this quarter, repeatedly expressed, I cannot now properly withdraw, without a direct order, more than a regiment of cavalry from this Department.

" The troops left in this Department at this time (see Field Return of 13th inst.) are 19,863 —that is, 6488 nominal infantry, 7329 heavy and light artil lery, and 6046 cavalry. This force is stationed as follows : for the garrisons of the works in Charleston Harbor and the defensive lines commanding the imme diate approaches to the city, 2606 infantry—of which some four or six compa nies are actually necessarily doing heavy artillery service in batteries on Sulli van's Island and elsewhere—3767 heavy and light artillery, and 1171 cavalry.

"In the works and lines around Savannah are 1888 nominal infantry, 229.> heavy and light artillery, and 1738 cavalry, leaving 984 infantry, 847 light artillery, and 2244 cavalry to hold the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad; and 1010 infantry, 420 light artillery, and 893 cavalry in Florida— now so important for its supplies of subsistence.

" Thus, it will be seen, the force in the Department is already at the mini mum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savannah, constant ly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's ironclads. The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defence. Reduce the command on James Island, and the enemy may readily penetrate, by such a coup de main as was attempted last year, at the weakened point. James Island would then fall, and, despite our harbor defences, the City of Charleston would be thrown open to bombard ment. It is not safe to leave less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumtcr to be taken in reverse and demolished.

"The defective lines of defence adopted and constructed on James Island, after the unfortunate abandonment, last year, of Cole's Island, have made a force of about 11,000 men essential to guard and hold that island against a serious land attack; whereas, had Cole's Island (at the mouth of the Stono; been held, 2500 men would not only have defended James Island, but the enemy would have been excluded from the Stono, and unable to occupy and fortify Folly Island and threaten Morris Island, as is now the case.

"Late Northern papers say Admiral Dupont has been relieved in command of the fleet on this coast by Admiral Footc, an officer whose operations in the West evinced much activity and an enterprising spirit. And, even were con-

siderable reductions made in the enemy's forces, the valuable coast districts would still be left a prey to such destructive raids as devastated the Coinbahee some days ago. Thus far, however, I can see no evidences of reduction. Gen eral Hunter was at Hilton Head on the 8th instant; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore, and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folly, one on Seabrook's Island, and the balance on the islands about Port Royal. One of the monitors is at Hilton Head, and five are still in the North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats or transports diminished, or at any time recently been increased, as must have been the case had a material re moval of troops taken place.

" While, therefore, I would not on my own responsibility further deplete the force in this Department, of course I shall promptly carry out any orders which the War Department may deem proper to give. As for myself, my earnest desire is to be useful to the utmost extent of my capacities, in any posi tion or command to which it may please the President to assign me; but if left to my own personal preferences, I would desire service in the field, for which I consider myself best fitted by my taste and studies.

"I shall observe closely the movements of the enemy at Hilton Head, with a view to ascertaining whether any material reduction of his force has taken or is taking place, which will be promptly reported for the information of the War Department.

" I shall also ask General Maury (at Mobile) to keep me advised of the movements of the enemy in his front, and of the means of defence at his disposition, and shall communicate with General Johnston.

" I beg to inquire whether, if I go to Mobile, it will form a part of my pres ent Department, or will I be relieved from this command and fall under the orders of General Johnston ?

"I repeat it, my chief desire is to be useful, and if desired by the War De partment, I will cheerfully repair at once, temporarily, to Mobile, examine the works and means of defence there, and advise with General Maury touching them. I have the honor to be, General, your obclt. servt.,

U G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg.''

To this no reply came from Richmond; but General Beau re gard was not sent to Mobile, nor were additional troops with drawn just then from his lines, to reinforce other parts of the Confederacy. The fact is, the apprehension of the Government as to a threatened movement on Mobile or on the Mississippi River (we refer to June 10th, 18G3) was justified by no trust worthy information, and only exemplified once more the inju dicious interference of the Administration with generals in the field or at the head of Departments upon matters about which it could have no positive knowledge. General Maury, who had been written to by General Beauregard concerning the fears entertained about his command,in his answer of the 20th said:

•' I have taken the best means in my power to procure early information of the enemy's movements, with reinforcements, up the Mississippi. I cannot hear of any. I am satisfied none have gone in that river, unless within the past two or three days. I can perceive no indications of an attack from any forces near here.

" I believe that for two weeks New Orleans has been left entirely without means of defence, and is so now."

The defective lines of James Island had always been a matter of great concern to General Beauregard; especially was this the case now that his forces were so mucli reduced by the drafts made on him for the assistance of Generals Johnston and Pem-berton, in Mississippi. It was about this time (June 23d) that a communication from Colonel Simonton, commanding part of the lines on James Island, recommending a ten-gun battery at Dr. Thomas Grimball's, on the Stono, was received at Department Headquarters. It had been approved and forwarded by the Commander of the First Military District. General Beauregard felt compelled, nevertheless, to decline acceding to the suggest ion made, as will be shown by the official answer sent to General Ilipley, and through him to Colonel Simonton :

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., June 23^, 18G3. " General R. S. RIPLEY, Comdg. First Mil. Dist., etc., etc.:

"General, — I am instructed to communicate for your information the following indorsement of the Commanding General on the communication of Colonel Simonton of the 9th, and of Captain F. D. Blake of the Gth in stant :

u 'The project of a small batter} 7 ", armed with ten guns, at Grimball's, on the Stouo,' cannot be approved for these reasons:

u 1st. It would not prevent the passage up the river of monitors by day, and of gunboats and even transports by night.

" 2d. It would not prevent the landing of troops at Battery Island and at Legare's, via Folly River Creek, which could then take in rear the isolated battery at Grimball's.

'' 3d. It could then be silenced in a few hours by batteries on the opposite shore of the Stono, assisted by monitors and gunboats in the river.

''' I have had for some time in contemplation a dispersive line from Le-gare's to Grimball's, with a strong work at the latter, a battery at the former, and a system of lines in rear of Battery Island. I would have, also, at the latter point an outwork for infantry, to prevent its occupation by the enemy; but the want of labor and the hope of regaining possession of Coles Island have delayed the execution of that project.

"' When Coles Island was abandoned the work at Battery Island should

have been strengthened, and its armament increased in quantity and quality; obstructions should also have been put in the river under the guns of the work, and a battery at Legare ? s should have been located to guard the ap proach via Folly River Creek. This short line of works would have dis pensed entirely with the long, weak, and expensive system adopted for the defence of James Island.'

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

On the 27th General Beauregard again called on the War De partment for heavy guns, and asked leave to borrow two Brooke 32-pounders, intended for Vicksburg, and lying idle on the wharf at Mobile. From the fact that General Gillmore was then in com mand of the Federal troops around Charleston he inferred that another and a more serious attack would soon be made. A force of some six regiments, he stated, was in possession of Folly Island, under Brigadier-General Yogdes, an officer of the old service, of known abilit} 7 , who had been stationed at Fort Moultrie before the war, and had already figured against General Bragg at Pen-sacola in its beginning.

On the 4th of July a long and elaborate communication, relative to the laws of civilized warfare, was addressed by General Beau-regard to General Gillmore, with a view to prevent the useless destruction of the property of non-combatants, which had seemed to be the practice of his predecessor.

The paper we here refer to* produced very little effect on General Gillmore. He continued the system of depredations denounced by his adversary, which subsequently called from the latter a telegram to Colonel William Porcher Miles, Chairman of the Military Committee in the Lower House of Congress, suggest ing that henceforth no quarter should be given to such depre dators, erroneously called " prisoners of war." This telegram created a sensation when first published, after the war. Its real purport was evidently misunderstood. It contained no explana tion of the reasons governing General Beauregard, nor did it show that, on more than one occasion previously, the subject had been thoroughly discussed between himself and Colonel Miles. And it is but just to remark, that General Beauregard's treatment of prisoners throughout the war showed how kindly disposed he was

* See Appendix.

towards them, especially as regards surgeons and ministers of the Gospel, whom he refused, both at Manassas and Shiloh, to keep as prisoners. We must say, however, that his views in that respect were never reciprocated by the Federal commanders opposed to him, and he was therefore compelled, though reluctantly, to treat Federal surgeons and Federal ministers as ours were treated bv .the enemy—in other words, to look upon them in the light of ordinary prisoners of war.

The following incidents corroborate what is here alleged of General Beau regard's feelings in regard to prisoners:

1. After the capture of part of the Federal naval party which attacked Fort Stmiter on the night of September 8th, the officers and men who fell into our hands on that occasion — one hundred and seventeen — made petition to the Commanding General for clothing, blankets, and shoes. Their application was sent, under flag of truce,* to Admiral Dahlgren, with a message informing him and likewise General Gillmore (for some few of the latter's troops were also held as prisoners) that General Beauregard would glad ly distribute to all of them any supplies that might be forwarded from the enemy's lines. Admiral Dahlgren took advantage at once of the privilege thus afforded him to help his men; but not so with General Gillmore, who abstained from even acknowledsr-

' £">

ing the courtesy extended to him.

2. The other incident referred to is explained by the following letter of General Beauregard to Colonel Branch, dated Charleston. July 18th, 1SG3:

" Colonel, — I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the IGth inst., proposing that the portion of Morris Island now occupied by the enemy, after it shall have been retaken, might be held and fortified by ex posing our prisoners to the enemy's fire.

"In reply the Commanding General directs me to say, that it is not consid ered in accordance with the usages of war to use prisoners as a means of de fence or protection. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

We now submit a letter to the lion. Charles Macbeth, the Mayor of Charleston, dated July Oth, which needs no comment:

" Sir, —The papers herewith will show you that an attack is impending on the Morris Island outworks, so necessary to the defence of the city. An indis-

* See, in Appendix, extract from Major Elliott's journal at Fort Sumtcr.

pensable battery, in case of an attack by land on that island, remains unfin ished, adequate labor not having been supplied by the State authorities. Can not labor be furnished in the emergency from the class of free negroes in this city, as on occasion in Virginia, and also from the slaves of the vicinage ? Material results may be achieved, even at this late hour, by the application of a sufficient labor force, energetically handled.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Coindg."

On the 6th, 7th, Sth, and 9th of July considerable activity pre vailed among the Federal forces on Folly Island. The foregoing letter shows that General Beauregard was aware of it. Captain Charles Haskell, on the night of the Sth, had gone over to the island with a party of scouts, and had ascertained the presence, near the creeks leading to it, of a number of the enemy's barges which had been collected there. During that same night the chopping of wood on Folly Island had been distinctly heard by our men, and the next morning revealed to them the existence of several light works, heretofore screened by the trees and underbrush just cut in their immediate front. General Beauregard had full knowl edge of the erection of these works. As early as May the 10th, in a telegram forwarded to the War Department, he said:

; ' Enemy in force on Folly Island, actively erecting batteries yesterday." :!:

These evidences of an immediate attack induced General Beau-regard to have all the infantry forces on the south end of Morris Island kept under arms during the whole night of the 9th. lie also caused the following orders to be issued:

1. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 9M, 1803. " Lieut.-Colonel D. B. HARRIS, Chief-Engineer, etc., etc.:

"Colonel, —The Commanding General directs me to call your attention to the urgent necessity for immediately obstructing this harbor, to every possi ble extent, with rope contrivances for that purpose, as already directed, both verbally and in writing. He wishes Major Echols and yourself to give your special attention to this work, and to the multiplication of this style of ob structions by every possible means.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

* See General Beaurcgard's Report of the Defence of Morris Island, which forms the subject of the next chapter.

2. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., Jane 9th, 1863. " Major HUTSON LEE, Chief Quartermaster, etc., etc.:

"Major, —The Commanding General directs that you have held in readi ness, at Pocotaligo and Adams Run, transportation to bring six hundred men from the former and five hundred from the latter place to this city at once. The trains will be furnished the Commanding Officers of the Second and Third Districts with as little delay as possible.

"I have the honor to be, Major, very respectfully, your obdt. servant,

" JNO. F. O'BRIEN, A. A. G."

3. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA..

CHARLESTON, S. C.. July 9th, 18G3. " Colonel A. J. GONZALES, Chief of Artillery, etc., etc.:

" Colonel. —The Commanding General directs that 3^011 hold the siege-train in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

"I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obdt. servant,

" CLIFTON II. SMITH, A. A. G."

4. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 10th, 18G3. " Colonel A. J. GONZALES, Chief of Artillery, etc., etc.:

" Colonel, — You will repair forthwith to inspect the heavy batteries on James Island, commencing with Fort Pemberton, to determine, on consulta tion with their Commanding Officers, what are their most pressing wants; and if they can be supplied, you will inform these Headquarters by courier.

"You will determine, also, whether in any conflict of the enemy's gunboats with the works on James Island the siege-train, or any part thereof, can be used to advantage.

"Meanwhile, the siege-train should be sent to the most available position on James Island. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

5. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 10th, 18G3. " Major HUTSON LEE, Chief Quartermaster, etc., etc.:

" Major. — A brigade (Clingman's) is to be sent here from Wilmington. Make every possible exertion to provide for its rapid transportation. Leave nothing undone in your power to accelerate the movement, both from Wil mington to Florence, and thence here. Time is incalculably precious. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff/'

6. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July llth, 18G3. " Brig.-Gencral R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military Dist, etc., etc.:

"General, —I am instructed to inform you of the expected arrival of ten companies from Savannah and one brigade from Wilmington, N. C., and to

direct that the necessary arrangements shall be made for their reception and disposition. A despatch from General Mercer, just received, states that seventy-five artillerists and one 10-inch mortar, complete, left Savannah last night. The other four mortars, will soon follow. These five mortars should be distributed between Sumter, Batteries Gregg (Cummings's Point) and Wagner, as you may think best, informing these Headquarters of the dispo sition you may make of them.

" The Commanding General further directs the obstruction of the little creek on the flank of Battery "Wagner, about one hundred yards above, to prevent boat expeditions from turning that point at night.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Stan?'

The foregoing orders and instructions, and others of a similar nat ure, which it is unnecessary to mention here, show General Beau-regard's continued preparations for the attack of the enemy, which took place on the 10th of July, on the south end of Morris Island. It was renewed the next day on Battery Wagner, and was signally repulsed, with a heavy loss to the Federals. They again advanced on the 18th, with ample preparations and a much greater force, but were once more terribly defeated, as will appear hereafter in General Beau regard's official report. Colonel Ivhett, in accord ance with instructions, had opened fire with all the available guns of Sumter, the shot and shell passing over Battery Wagner, and falling into the attacking column, especially the reserves; thus harassing their advance and preventing them from rendering any material assistance.

Encouraged by the failure of these repeated assaults upon Wagner, but fearing the eventual reduction of that work and the result which must ensue for Battery Gregg and Fort Sumter, General Beauregard determined to modify and increase his inner circle of fire on Sullivan's and James Islands, and to erect a work on Shell Point—James Island—wherewith to sweep the front of Battery Wagner, and assist in checking the further progress of the enemy on Morris Island.

To this end he gave specific instructions to General Eipley and to Colonel Harris, his Chief-Engineer,* and again applied to Gov ernor Bonham for slave-labor to carry out his plans. His letter on the subject read as follows:

See Appendix.

«)G MILITARY OPERATIONS OF

" HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 13th, 1863. " To his Excellency M. L. BONIIAM, etc., etc.:

"'/S/r,—You are aware of the inability of the State authorities, under the operation of the law, to meet my requisitions for slave-labor, and you can readily trace some of the consequences in the events of the past week. How ever, is there no course by which the defects of the law can, to some extent, be repaired, even at this late day ?

"Believing that there must be a remedy in the patriotism and intelligence of the planters of South Carolina, I shall invoke your executive proclamation to them, in this exigent hour, to send their negroes, with spades and shovels, to this city, without an instant of delay or hesitation, to the extent of three thousand effective laborers. This can be but an inappreciable subtraction from the labor resources of the people at this or any time. Each negro should be provided with at least three days' subsistence. The people of each district or neighborhood should select some overseer or manager for their negroes, who shall go and remain with them while they are employed. "Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gcnl. Comdg."

On the 14th General Ripley received the following instruc tions, which were carried out without delay. They show the ex treme vigilance exercised by the General Commanding, and how careful he was to prepare against any new movement of the enemy:

•' The General Commanding is of the belief that some of the mortars now in Fort Sumter may be transferred with advantage to Sullivan's Island, and wishes you to consider and give your views upon the matter.

" A covered way should be made between Fort Moultrie and Battery Bee, carefully secured from enfilade from the sand-hills on east end of Sullivan's Island.

"The gate-way in gorge of Fort Sumter must be closed, and an outlet arranged through one of the casemates in the southwest face.

" It should be determined w T hether the gorge-wall of Fort Sumter may not be materially strengthened, by means of bales of cotton, with sand packed in the intervals, and all kept wet and incombustible by means of tubes and hose from the tcrrc-plcin.

•' Two 10-inch columbiads have been ordered here from Savannah. " Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

The reader is referred to the Appendix for other orders and instructions relating to this period of the defence of Charleston, which must he omitted from the text, notwithstanding their im portance. Among them are—

1. The order reducing the force on Morris Island to one strict ly sufficient " for the defence," so as not to expose, needlessly, too many of our men to the enemy's batteries, then in process of con struction on the island; and also as to relieving the command at least once in forty-eight hours by fresh troops.

2. The order that rice-casks and other casks should be furnished the troops on Morris Island, for the construction of "rat-holes;" and that hulks, as well as other obstructions, should be stink in the creeks west of the same island, and north of Sullivan's.

3. The order increasing the batteries on James Island and bear ing on Black Island, by at least twenty guns, on siege-carriages. The work to be pushed forward, night and day, as also the work at Shell Point, " so soon as the force of negro labor may be sufficient."

4. The order requiring Colonel Rhett, at Sumter, to keep sev eral of his guns loaded and carefully trained at night, so as to command the creeks near Battery Wagner, and Marsh and Shell Point Batteries. A part of this order was the following com mand addressed to the Commanders of Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner: "Should events oblige us to abandon these works, not one heavy gun must be left in serviceable condition, to be turned against our own works."

5. The order increasing the garrison on Sullivan's Island, to prevent the possibility of a night attack; relieving the troops at Battery Wagner every three days, instead of every forty-eight hours, as heretofore; sending an 8-inch columbiad or a rifled 32-pounder, to replace the gun exploded at Wagner; the injunc tion being to mount it that very night, "on account of its moral effect on the garrison."

We now ask attention to a communication sent by General Beauregard to Captain Tucker, commanding " Confederate States naval forces afloat," at Charleston, and asking his active co-opera tion in the defence of Fort Sumter and Morris Island. It bore date July 18th, and was in these terms:

" Captain, —I believe it my duty to acquaint you with the fact that I con sider it of the utmost importance to the defence of the works at the entrance of the harbor that some effort should be made to sink either the Ironsides or one of the monitors now attacking the works on Morris Island, not only because of the diminution thus effected in the enemy's means of offence, but because of the great moral effect that would inevitably result from such an occurrence.

II.—T

" The stake is manifestly a great one, worthy of a small risk. For its ac complishment, one vessel, such as the Juno, provided with the spar-torpedo, with two or three officers and a few men, it is believed, would be as effective, at night, for the end in view as a flotilla of vessels, so arranged, of the same class.

" If, however, the results of your experiments are sufficiently adverse to the prospect of success with the contrivance, I must beg to be advised of the fact, to the end that I may not permit the expectation of assistance to enter further into my plans of defence; but if, on the other hand, the experiments remain satisfactory, permit me to say, the time is rapidly passing away when that assistance can be of any avail or value.

" One monitor destroyed now will have greater moral and material effect, I believe, than two sunk at a later stage in our defence.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Gcnl. Comdg."

This urgent appeal would have met with a ready response from the commander to whom it was made, for he was not only will ing but anxious to take an active part in the contest about to be renewed with increased vigor by the two opposing forces. He was compelled to remain passive, however, and to admit his impo-tency to be of any assistance, owing to the excessive draught of his ironclads, their want of motive power, and consequently of speed, and the short range of their guns, which could not be sufficiently elevated, on account of the small size of the port holes. This was the substance of Commander Tucker's an swer. It left General Beauregard entirely powerless to contend against the enemy's turreted fleet, and led him to consider the pos sible necessity, erelong, of withdrawing our forces from Morris Island. He therefore instructed General Kipley to prepare suita ble means of transportation, by boats, barges, and flats, to be col lected with as little delay as possible, and held in readiness in the immediate vicinity of Fort Johnson.

The following orders to the Commander of the First Military District, and many others already produced, show the minuteness of the instructions given him by the Commanding General, who planned and caused to be erected most if not all the works adopted for the protection of the city and harbor of Charleston :

1. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July l&th, 18G3. " Brig.-Gencral II. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc.. etc.:

' ; General, —The General Commanding desires that the Shell Point Battery shall be occupied to-night, and placed, as far as practicable, in condition for

work, with the exact range of Battery "Wagner established for the emergency of an assault to-night, for which you must be prepared.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

2. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July IMh, 1863. " Brig.-Geueral R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc.:

" General, —The Commanding General desires the following re-arrangement of certain guns on James Island, to provide for the armament of the new bat teries in the direction of Secessionville from Legare's Point. Transfer to Le-gare's Point, with all their implements and ammunition, one 12-pounder rifled gun, and one 8-inch sea-coast howitzer, now at Royal's; one 20 and one 10 pounder Parrott gun of the Georgia Siege Train; one 12-pounder rifled bronze gun of Company A, S. C. Siege Train; one 24-pounder smooth-bore, now on eastern lines, and mounted on a siege-carriage; and one 24-pounder rifled siege gun, and one 4-inch Blakely, both of which are at present in the hands of the Chief of Ordnance.

"Captain Gregory, Corps of Engineers, after consultation with the Chief of Artillery, will designate the location of these guns.

"The 12-pounder rifle and 8-inch sea-coast howitzer at Royal's will be replaced by two 24-poundcrs (smooth-bore) siege guns, now in charge of Colonel Waddy. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

3. "HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 20^, 1863. " Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc.:

" General, —The Commanding General has been advised that the enemy opened fire to-day from behind Black Island on the workmen engaged on the Legare Point batteries, and succeeded in interrupting the labor thereon.

" In view of this, it is his wish that the guns intended for those works should be placed in position immediately, and fire opened from the batteries as soon as practicable.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff."

4. " HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT S. C., GA., AND FLA.,

CHARLESTON, S. C., July 20^, 1863. " Brig.-General R. S. RIPLEY, etc., etc., etc.:

" General, —The batteries from Shell Point to Fort Johnson being nearly completed, and some of the guns in position, it becomes necessary to guard them strongly at night with infantry. The same must be done with regard to the new line of batteries from Legare's Point towards the extremity of the eastern lines on James Island. Everything must be put in readiness for all those batteries to open at a moment's notice.

" The accumulation last night of the enemy's barges, with armed men, among

the fleet would seem to indicate one of two things: either to reinforce his troops on Morris Island, for another attack, by landing a strong party between Battery Wagner and Gregg, or to make an attempt on Sullivan's Island. The renewal of the shelling to-day with such vigor would incline me to believe that the first will be attempted; but prudence commands that we should guard against both; hence, I beg that you should adopt all the necessary measures to further these designs.

" Respectfully, your obedient servant,

" G. T. BEAUREGARD, Genl. Comdg."

Meanwhile, the Secretary of War, the Hon. Mr. Seddon, through whose agency chiefly the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida had been so materially weakened by successive trans fers of its troops to other points of the Confederacy, was now apparently in a state of great trepidation about the enemy's lodg ment on the southern end of Morris Island. A letter of " search ing inquiry" was forwarded by him to General Beauregard, about that time, requesting immediate information on the subject. Its tone was unfriendly. It exhibited a determination on the part of its author to blame, and even to condemn, before being officially informed of the facts of the case.

General Beauregard was too much absorbed by the occupations of the moment to write out a full statement of these stirring

O

events; and, furthermore, none of his subordinate commanders had had time to send in their respective reports. He merely gave a brief account of the descent of the Federal forces on Morris Isl and, and of the reasons of its success. From his answer we quote the following passage:

' ; A full report will be made as soon as subordinate officers shall have placed these Headquarters in official possession of the facts connected with their operations, and until then I must ask the patience of the Department, especially since the service and thoughts of all here are really necessary for the effectual discharge of the momentous duties intrusted to us." *

"We close the present chapter with General Beauregard's in structions to Colonel Harris, dated July 20th, 1863:

" Colonel, — The Commanding General directs me to inform you that lie wishes the rope obstructions to go on, and desires that they be laid between Castle Pinckney and Fort Ilipley.

" lie also wishes you to make an inspection of Fort Moultric, to sec if the glacis does not require to be raised, for the better protection of the brick

* See Appendix.

scarp-wall. You will likewise see if Shell Point Battery does not require to be embrasured, and if it is necessary to make a covered way thence to Fort Johnson.

" The General wishes to know if mining wires cannot be established from Battery Gregg to Fort Sumter, and from the latter to Fort Moultrie, or if safety-fuses may not be prepared.

"Finally, he directs that you make a report on the Raine's torpedoes, which have been placed in front of Battery Wagner.

" I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

" JNO. F. O'BRIEN, Major and A. A. G."

The nature of the subject, and the desire to do full justice to it, have induced repetitions of orders and telegrams in this and the following chapter. The interest of the narrative will not be impaired, however, by such a course. For those who are desirous of obtaining a correct knowledge of these events details of evi dence are essential.

CHAPTER XXXII.

General Beauregard's Report of the Operations on Morris Island in July, Au gust, and September.—Number of Effective Troops in the Department on the 7th of April, 1863.—Troops in the First Military District on the 10th of July.—War Department Advised of the Threatening Nature of the En emy's Preparations. — Withdrawal of Troops from the Department.—Pro test of General Beauregard. —Mr. Seddon's Telegram of the 9th of May. —He is Informed on the 10th of the Erection of the Enemy's Batteries on Folly Island. — General Beauregard's Letter of the llth of May. — Insuffi ciency of his Forces to Resist the Enemy's Movements.—President Davis Asks Reinforcements for General Johnston.—General Beauregard's An swer. — Different Routes of Approach for Attacking Charleston.—Route by Morris Island the least Injurious.—Want of Labor and Transportation a Serious Drawback to the Defence. — Inadequate Number of Negroes Furnished. — Attack on the South End of Morris Island.—The Enemy Car ries the Position.—Want of Labor to Fortify, and of Infantry Support, the Cause of Lodgment.—Strong Demonstration against James Island by Way of the Stono. — The Enemy Assaults Battery Wagner on the llth.—Is Re pulsed with Loss.—General Beauregard again Appeals for Negro Labor. —On the Morning of the 16th General Hagood Attacks the Enemy on James Island, and Drives him Back. — The Enemy's Concentration on Little Folly and Morris Islands.—Nine Hundred Shot and Shell Fired at Wagner on the 18th.—The Enemy again Assaults that Night.—His Re pulse Disastrous. — Number of his Dead Buried in Front of Wagner.— Heroic Conduct of the Garrison.—General Beauregard Orders Morris Isl and to be Held at any Cost.—Gorge-wall of Sumter Strengthened.—Flag of Truce from General Gillmore.—James Island Batteries not to Open Fire until their Completion. — No Material Damage Done to Wagner up to the 24th. — General Beauregard Anxiously Waiting for Heavy Guns from Richmond. — Partial Disarmament of Sumter Carried on at Night.—Five Hundred and Ninety-nine Shot Fired at our Different Batteries, on the 30th, in less than Three Hours.—Works not Seriously Harmed.—Interior Harbor Defences Advancing Rapidly.—Enemy Advances his Trenches.— Is Annoyed by Fire from Sumter, Gregg, Wagner, and James Island Bat teries. — General Beauregard on Morris Island. — Sand-bags in Sumter; Covered Way between Batteries Wagner and Gregg.—Effective Force on Morris Island.—The Enemy's Advanced Works on the 10th of August at Six Hundred Yards from Wagner.—The Armament of Sumter Reduced to Thirty-eight Guns and Two Mortars.—Terrific Bombardment.—Weight of Projectiles thrown against the Fort from Thirty to Three Hundred

Pounds.—All its Guns Rendered Unserviceable.—Gorge-wall and North west Face greatly Damaged.—The First Bombardment Over.—The Fire on Sumter Slackens on the 24th.—Removal of Ammunition and Ordnance Stores.—Not a Gun in Working Order at Sumter.—The Enemy's Flag Abreast of South Angle of Wagner.—Preparations for Evacuation.—Gen eral Beauregard's Orders to that effect.—Troops Withdrawn on the Night of the 6th of September.—Colonel Keitt in Command at the Time.—Suc cess of the Movement.—Correspondence between Generals Beauregard and Gillmore concerning the Exchange of Prisoners and the Demand of Surrender.—Defence of Sumter and Wagner.

GEXEEAL BEAUREGAED'S official report of the defence of Morris Island, from July 10th to September 7th, 1863, contains so full a narrative of this memorable event that it is deemed advisable to insert it here, without alteration or curtailment. This remarkable paper will thus become the chief, if not the exclusive, subject of the present chapter. Xo pen could more truthfully describe the momentous incidents of that part of the siege of Charleston, and no authority could be of greater weight, in the eyes of the public, than General Beauregard's. All the more will this be the case, inasmuch as not one of his main averments will fail to be substan tiated by undeniable proof:

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF N. C. AND So. YA., IN THE FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG, VA.,

September 18th, 18G4. " To General SAMUEL COOPER, Adjt. and Insp.-Genl., Richmond, Ya.:

" General, —I have the honor to enclose herewith my report of operations on Morris Island, S. C., during the months of July, August, and September, 1863, M'hich was commenced soon after the events referred to, but could not be finished, revised, and corrected until the present moment.

"The report has been made more in detail than otherwise would have been done in order to refute certain charges contained in a letter of the Hon. James A. Seddou, Secretary of War, of August, 18G3, to the Hon. Wm. Porcher Miles, M. C., from South Carolina, and volunteer aid on my staff. I doubt not that, after the perusal of this report, the Hon. the Secretary of War will admit that he did me unintentional injustice in the following paragraph of his letter, containing the charges alluded to ; to wit:

"<###! ] iav c no disposition to criticise military operations or point out errors or omissions which cannot longer be avoided or remedied, but you compel me, in self-defence, to advert to the true cause of the lodgment made by the enemy on Morris Island. According to my conception, it was not the want of infantry force at the command of that Department, but, as I have before supposed was universally ad mitted, the want of adequate defence at the lower end of the island, known long to be the external gate of the city, and the establishment by the enemy, without the knowledge of the military authorities, of powerful land batteries on Folly Island,

screened and concealed, until fully prepared to open upon us with all the effect of surprise, by the woods which had been allowed to remain unfelled on that island. That these, and not the want of men, were the true causes of the possession effected by the enemy, is shown by their inability to improve their success by the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg. It is no pleasure to me to refer to these causes of disaster, but, under the implications of your letter, I could not say less.'