■ 7-? 2787
Copyright, 1803, by WiLUAU M. Polk, M.D., LL.D.
CopyriKht, 1915, by William M. Polk, M.D., LL.D.
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NOTE TO VOLUME IL
The author has delayed the publication of this work that he might have access to the volumes of the " Official Records of the Civil War,"—so far as they relate to General Polk—in their completeness. This was necessary for the correction of errors of statement occurring" in nearly all histories of the war issued prior to the completion of the volumes dealing with the Atlanta campaign [1891], and in some of more recent date.
As an illustration, the author would refer particularly to the valuable work of that distinguished foreigner, the Comte de Paris, and also to Professor Coppee's " Life of General Thomasj"^ \ : - -. . ;
He begs leave to return his •especial thanks to Major George B. Davis, of the Board'of-Publication, and also to General Marcus J. Wright.; pi^Jkisr bureau, to whom every Confederate soldier owes a debt of gratitude.
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CONTENTS OF VOLUME n. CHAPTER I.
PAGE
The Stbuggle fob Missouri.—Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky 1
CHAPTER II.
The Battle of Belmont.—Interview with General Grant.— Death of Major Butler 33
CHAPTER III.
Columbus as a Stronghold.—General Bbaubegaed IN THE West.— Columbus Evacuated 62
CHAPTER IV.
The Battle of Shiloh.—The March to the Field. — Death op Albert Sidney Johnston.—The Charge of Cheatham's Division 86
CHAPTER V.
The Kentucky Campaign. — General Bragg in Command.— His Strategy.— Buell's Success.- The Battle of Perryville. —A Narrow Escape.— A Gallant Foe.—The Retreat 120
CHAPTER VI.
The Marriage of General John Morgan. — The Battle OF Stone River (Murfreesboro).— The Story OF THE Chaplains.— The Tullahoma Campaign .. 176
CHAPTER VII.
Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga.— A Fruitless Victory 233
vii
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vui CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11.
CHAPTER VIII.
PAGB
The Meridian Campaign. —^A Trap for Sooy Smith. — How He Evaded It. — The Failure op Sherman's Campaign 315
CHAPTER IX.
The Atlanta Campaign. — Polk at Resaca. — Covers Johnston's Retreat. — Baptism of General Johnston AND General Hood. — New Hope Church. — "Purity on a Field of Blood." — ^Thb Kenesaw Line. —DEAT^ 347
CHAPTER X.
Burial. — ^Tributes of His Miutary Associates. — Tributes of His Brothers In the Church. — Under THE Shadow of the Cross 383
PORTRAITS AND MAPS.
Leonidas Polk, Bishop op Louisiana Frontispiece
The March to Shiloh 94
Movements in the Kentucky Campaign 136
Battlefield of Perryvillb, Ky To face 151
Plan of the Battles on Stone River " 174
Leonidas Polk, Lieutenant-General " 233
Chickamauga Campaign 236
General Polk at Rock Spring Church 243
Battle of Chickamauga, September 18 To face 246
Battle of Chickamauga, September 19 " 250
Battle of Chickamauga, September 20 " 272
Battle of Chickamauga, September 20 " 280
Monument " 375
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CHAPTER I.
THE STRUGGLE FOR MISSOURI AND KENTUCKY. July to October, 1861.
Leonidafl Polk major-general in the Confederate army, assigned to command of Department No. 2, July 4,1861.— Its importance.—Tennessee troops.—General Gideon Pillow.—General ZoUicoffer.—Union feeling in East Tennessee.— Proposed invasion of Missouri.— Generals Hardee, MoCullough, and Price.—Battle of Wilson's Creek.—General Polk's command enlarged.—Plans for defense of Mississippi River.—Kentucky's neutrality.—Seizes Columbus, Kentucky.— Protest.— Answer. — Correspondence.— General Hardee ordered to the river.— General Jeff. Thompson.—General Polk's movements contribute greatly to Price's success in Missouri
On the 25th of June, 1861, Leonidas Polk was commissioned a major-general in the provisional army of the Confederate States, and on July 4 he was assigned to the command of Department No. 2, with headquarters at Memphis, Tenn. This department embraced the whole of what was known as West Tennessee; the town of Corinth^ Miss., with the adjacent country; a small strip of Alabama extending from the town of Waterloo on the west to that of Stevenson on the east; the coun* ties of the States of Mississippi and Arkansas adjacent to the Mississippi River; the riparian parishes of Louisiana north of the Bed River; and a section of the State of Arkansas, including the counties bordering the Mississippi and the districts lying to the north and east of the White and Black rivers. To the general in
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command of this department the Confederate Ck)vem-meut committed the defense of the Mississippi River.
General Polk was well aware that he had been assigned to the most important military position in the Confederacy. He felt sure that the southern States could withstand any force that might be brought against them from other directions; but he knew that their strength would be taxed to the utmost if the invading forces should advance from the Northwest by the way of the Mississippi. That the invasion would ultimately, if not immediately, be made on that line, he was fully persuaded, because, as the event proved, it was the line which good military judgment would select, and also because the people of the Northwest were already crying out against the closing of the Mississippi, which obstructed their commerce and depressed their industries, as well as offended their pride. He was not insensible to the honor which had been done him by the government in assigning him to the command of that department; but while he appreciated the confidence reposed in his judgment and capacity, he woidd have preferred that the Department of the Mississippi should be committed to General Albert Sidney Johnston or to General Lee. He made the strongest representations to President Davis that one of these accomplished soldiers should have that appointment; and, for reasons which were urged with great clearness and force, he expressed his belief that General Johnston should be preferred for that particular work. Unfortunately, the services of General Johnston were not immediately available, as that officer was then making his long journey overland from California, and the date of his expected arrival was uncertain. General Lee was needed in Virginia, and the support of General Joseph Johnston and General Beauregard was felt to be
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indispensable in view of the then impending attack on Richmond. President Davis therefore insisted that General Polk must accept command in the Department of the Mississippi^ at least until General Albert Sidney Johnston should arrive; and, relying, as we have seen, on the assurance that he should be relieved at the earliest time which should be consistent with the public safety, he assumed command on July 13, 1861.
The diiBculties with which he had to contend were very great. The militia of the State of Tennessee had not yet been transferred to the Confederate army, and the only troops which were legally under his authority were a few regiments at Corinth and some unarmed companies in Memphis and Vicksburg; but until a regular and legal transfer could be made, the Tennessee authorities consented that the State troops should serve under General Polk's orders. Within the limits of the Department there were about ten thousand men of this description, but, notwithstanding the most energetic efforts of their commander. General Pillow, many of them were without arms, and ordnance supplies of all sorts were still entirely inadequate. To these deficiencies General Polk first turned his attention, and, with the assistance of Captain Richard Hunt as ordnance officer, he soon had that branch of the service in working order. Commissariat supplies were more easily provided, as the crops were abundant; but the supply of money, or any substitute for money, was so insufficient that Polk was obliged to purchase many necessaries for the troops on the faith of his personal credit; and for some time the only money at his disposal for that purpose was obtained by discounting his personal notes of hand.
While on his way from Richmond to assume command of his department, General Polk passed through
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East Tennessee, and he availed himself of that oppor-tunity to investigate tlie condition of affairs there. Unlike the middle and westt^m portions of the State, the people of East Tennessee had been generally opposed to secession, and after the adoption of the Ordinance of Secession a majority of them showed a strong disposition to resist the union of their part of the State with the Confederacy. With few exceptions, the mountaineers of Kentucky and Western Virginia were in active sympathy with the Unionists of East Tennessee in their hostility to the Confederacy. The principal railroad connecting Polk's department with Virginia passed through the disaffected region; and it was therefore of the first importance that the administraticm of that district should be committed to competent hands. On reaching Nashville, therefore, he held a consultation with Governor Harris, after which he sent a telegraphic dispatch to the Confederate Government urging that no time should be lost in sending a sufficient force under a good commander into East Tennessee. Tlie officer whom General Polk recommended was General Zollicoffer, a man of quiet and reserved demeanor, under which, however, he concealed an abundance of real kindness and humanity. He was a man with whom no one of any rank would be likely to take a liberty, and yet there was not a soldier in his command who would have hesitated to approach him with a complaint of any real grievance, or who doubted that, if he did so, he would be heard with patience and treated with justice. Zollicoffer was a man of method, and his habits of order were speedily applied to the conduct of public affairs in the delicate position to which the government, at Gren-eral Polk's request, appointed him. He cared little for temporary popularity, and he was one of those men
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whose merits are best seen in times of trial and danger. He fell on the field of battle before he had had an opportunity to prove his military talents, but many of his contemporaries believed, and some of them still believe, that he was the ablest military commander whom the State of Tennessee at that time gave to the cause of the Confederacy. His appointment was a great relief to Gren-eral Polk, whose most pressing anxieties at that moment were connected with the condition of affairs in East Tennessee and in Missouri. Having provided for the former, he proceeded to Memphis with a sense of security, at least upon his right flank. He desired, however, that this security should be established by moral influences rather than by military force; and on his arrival at Memphis he lost no time in inviting a deputation of citizens belonging to the western part of the State to visit and confer with the leaders of the disaffected party in Eastern Tennessee. In a letter to the gentlemen whom he selected for this delicate mission, he wrote:
I am satisfied that many of our fellow-comitrymen in East Tennessee have, by the course of events, been forced into occupying a position in regard to the question pending between the North and the South which is hardly in keeping with their natural relations, and from which it is our duty, in a spirit of magnaniniity, to do what we can to relieve them. Without entering into the question at issue, I feel confident that, if they are assured by their southern fellow-countrymen of their disposition to treat them with kindness, and to respect their manly feelings, while they are making provision for the protection of our own Tennessee soil against invasion from the North, they will have no reason to feel aggrieved by the presence of troops in their midst. They must see that the pohcy of the United States Government is to overrun and subjugate us, and they also know that they are threatening to do this through the passes of the Tennessee Mountains.
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What are we to do, then f But one thing Ls left ns, and that is to place troops at all of those points at which we are most exposed. This, assuredly, in the face of the facts alluded to, should form no just ground for complaint on the part of any candid men of sense. It is upon every account desirable that no irritating language or any offensive bearing should be manifested by the troops toward the citizens of East Tennessee or elsewhere, and the conmianders will doubtless see that this is not done. Tour well-known character and position in relation to the public questions which have agitated us make it, in my opinion, a very proper office for you to perform, to go to our fellow-citizens of East Tennessee, and, with fraternal words and unfeigned kindness, to endeavor to advise them to waive their opposition to the decision of the majority of the voters of the State, and to become hereafter, as heretofore, with us a united band of brothers.
Neither Missouri nor Kentucky had been included in General Polk's department; and although he had received no specific orders concerning those States, it was understood that they were not to be entered by Confederate troops unless such a movement should be rendered necessary by some action of the Federal Government. In Kentucky the State authorities were still maintaining an attitude of neutrality, which for the present offered some slight guarantee of security in that quarter; but Missouri was practically in the hands of the Federal Government. Price had been driven with the State forces into the southwestern comer of Missouri, where he had formed a junction with the Confederate troops under McCullough. Polk saw that it was necessary to create a diversion in Price's favor, and, at the same time, to turn the attention of the Federals as much as possible away from the Mississippi River, in order to gain time to perfect his preparations for its defense. He therefore determined to threaten St. Louis from the direction of
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the Ironton Railroad. Hardee, who had just been assigned to the command of northern Arkansas, agreed to cooperate in the movement to the extent of his ability, and Pillow was ordered to occupy New Madrid on the Missouri shore, from which point he would have before him the most practicable road into the interior. While these preparations were in progress, the Governor of Missouri arrived at Memphis, on his way to Richmond, for the purpose of securing a prompt interference by the Confederates in the affairs of his State. He came directly from the camps of McCullough and Price; and Polk, fully accepting his account of their forces as authentic and reliable, agreed, in the terms of the following letter to the Confederate Secretary of War, to extend the scope of the campaign:
July 23.
The Governor of Tennessee is still waiting for infonnation he has been soHciting, as I understand him, from the War Department as to certain details, before he transfers iiis army.
In the mean time he consents to allow that army to be directed by me in certain operations I deem now exi>edient in Missouri. I have therefore directed General Pillow to detach from the force in the western district of Tennessee a column of 6000 troops of various arms, and to make a movement on Missouri through New Madrid. He will be joined, so soon as he lands, by 3000 Missourians, now posted near that place, and, as he goes forward, by other forces that are prepared to come to him. Governor Jackson arrived here yesterday while my preparations were in progress, and I shall find him willing, I think, instead of proceeding to Richmond, as he was intending, to return to Missouri, to aid in raising and concentrating his people. (Since writing the above the governor gives his consent to return to Missouri with our troops.) I am advised by General Hardee that he is at Pocahontas, and will soon have a column of 7000 men ready to
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cooperate with Pillow's column. There are abont 2500 Mis-sourians near him who will join him. Governor Jackson left McCullough's camp, on the Arkansas line, on tlie 12th. McCnllough's force consisted of 6000 men—Louisianians and troops from Arkansas. He was ezi>ecting every moment a Texas regiment and an additional Arkansas regiment. His force, I learn, is well distributed as to the different descriptions of arms. Near him is General Price, twelve miles distant, with a force of 12,000 Missourians, ready to cooperate with him. This column of 25,000 men I am in communication with. They wiU advance on the enemy's position (Springfield), where I learn General Lyon has concentrated the principal part of his force, say 10,000 or 12,000 men. In the mean time 1 shall, on Saturday next, direct the column of which I have spoken, under General Pillow, to cross the river to New Madrid, and take up the line of march into Missouri for Ironton. He will be joined by 3000 Missourians, now near New Madrid, very fairly armed and equipped, and by the time he is ready to move I shall send him two other regiments (Martin's and Bowen's), both of which are nearly ready for the field. With this force of 11,000, having as a part of its appointments three batteries complete, with two extra guns, he will find no difficulty in reaching the point indicated. At that point he will be joined by General Hardee, with a column of 7000, who will move about the same time from Pocahontas. They are directed to pass in behind Lyon^s force by land, or to proceed to St. Louis, seize it, and, taking possession of the boats at that point, to proceed up the river Missouri, raising the Missourians as they go, and, at such point as may appear most suitable, to detach a force to cut off Lyon's return from the West. Any supporting force that may become necessary I will draw from Arkansas, from whence 1 am promised 10,000 additional troops at an early day. I shall draw three of the regiments to go with Pillow from Union City, and shall order up the three Mississippi regiments, under General Clark, to replace them. General Clark's headquarters will be transferred to Union City. General Cheatham will accompany General Pillow.
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As to the force on this side the river; Governor Harris is increasing it by fresh accessions, and it wiU in a few days be as strong as it was before we sent forward the five regiments you called for. I find, too, I could strengthen it very materially by drawing men from Kentucky and organizing them on the border, and I may add that every man we draw out of Kentucky relieves us from drawing by so much on Tennessee and the States south of us. I submit to the Department, therefore, whether faciUties—extra fttciUties—should not be placed at our disposal for drawing a force from Kentucky.
As to Bird's Point and Cairo, I know the exact force there to be about five thousand men, divided between the two places. I have also information that they are short of men in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, who could be spared now to give support to Cairo. Besides that, they are without arms. I have no apprehension, therefore, of any strong support being sent to that point while I am operating in Missouri, or that they could send in any force strong enough in my rear to be formidable. Added to that, my forces at Union City and Randolph will hold them in check. If, as I think, I can drive the enemy from Missouri with the force indicated, I will then enter Illinois and take Cairo in the rear on my return. With the prestige of your great success at Manassas, the spirits of our troops are high, and we trust we may count on favorable results.
On July 28 Greneral Pillow occupied New Madrid with a force of six thousand men, defectively organized, and so incompletely armed that several regiments were almost without a gun. These deficiencies were accepted as defects which might be speedily remedied, but other obstacles of a more serious nature were no\^ encountered. No sooner had the step been taken than General Polk began to see that there were serious if not insuperable difficulties in the way of an extended movement into Missouri at that time. The only forces under his own direct command were Pillow's column at New Madrid.
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Hardee and McCuUough were in command of independent departments, and reported directly to Richmond; and while they would no doubt have been permitted to move into Missouri, their orders looked only to defensive measures on their respective fronts. Hardee was willing to cooperate with Polk, but upon closer examination he found his resources so far short of what he had anticipated and felt to be necessary to success, that he was constrained to ask for more time. It was learned that Price's force was barely half as strong as Governor Jackson had reported; and McCullough, declaring that he had no confidence either in Price or in his army, which he described as a mob without a leader, positively declined to cooperate with them. In this state of affairs General Polk was compeUed to return, for the moment, to his original design. He therefore made the following report to the Secretary of War:
July 28. I had the honor of addressing you a few days ago, informing you of a movement I was contemplating on Missouri. I submitted a statement of what I understood to be the force which had been collected by Generals McCullough and Pearce, of Arkansas, General Price, of Missouri, and General Hardee. The information submitted was based, as far as the commands of the first three generals are concerned, on information I obtained from Governor Jackson, of Missouri, who came directly from their respective camps. The force under General Hardee I obtained from a letter from himself. My letter containing the plan of the campaign I submitted was written upon the supposition that this information was correct. Since dispatching that letter I have directed General Pillow to move a column of six tlionsand across the river to New Madrid. The details of the movement have been left to him, and the forces employed were exclusively those hitherto belonging to his command. Part were taken from Randolph and part from Union City. General Cheatham accompanied
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him, and I have ordered General Clark to move up from Corinth to Union City the two Mississippi regiments at that plaee, to replace those withdrawn, and himself to replace General Cheatham in the command of that post. I have not as yet heard from General Pillow the result of the movement beyond Randolph. The boats with troops from that point left there last night.
Since yesterday I have had to arrive at headquarters the gentleman who is the bearer of this, Colonel Little, adjutant-general of the forces of Missouri. He comes directly from General Price's camp. Prom him I learn that the force stated to be under the command of the respective generals above, as stated by Governor Jackson, is greatly exaggerated, to the extent, indeed, of one half. As a military man, he would, of course, be likety to be more accurate than the governor, and his position of adjutant would compel him to know the extent of his own immediate force. The governor, I do not doubt, was deceived, and withal not perhaps very critical as to details.
This abatement of the force disposable for the invasion of Missouri has caused me to pause in the execution of the plan indicated. I shall proceed to fortify my position at New Madrid with a view of making it a base of operations, and will move forward as soon as circumstances miay allow.
My opinion is, nevertheless, that now is the time to operate in Missouri, if we are to do anything toward setting her on her feet again; and I am also satisfied that the enemy in Yirgfinia will be content for some months to come with their experiences at Manassas, and that they will make no forward movement there very soon. That will set them free to act in the West, and they will most probably commence active operations in Missouri. In that event we must have additional troops, and I submit whether I be not authorized to coUect a force in Tennessee and from the States below sufficient to enable us to act vigorously in Missouri, while we maintain a strong position in front of Kentucky, ready for any contingency that may arise in that quarter. I shall fi.nd no difficulty in getting the force I need around me if I have the requisite authority.
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By the 7th of August General Hardee had organized a force of about 3000 men and moved up to Greenville in Missouri, reporting to General Polk that he was ready to cooperate with General Pillow in the movement into that State. Pillow was immediately directed to abandon New Madrid and to join Hardee; and General Polk notified McCullough of the movement, expressing the hope that he might now see his way clear to an advance of his troops with a view to the concentration of all the forces in Missouri according to the original plan.
While the miUtary situation was thus shaping itself in southeastern Missouri, General Lyon was concentrating his forces for an attack upon General Price, who lay to the south of Springfield, in the southwestern part of the State. Price had vainly endeavored to secure McCul-lough's aid in an attack upon the Federal forces; but upon the receipt of General Polk's dispatch McCullough consented to take command of all the troops to be engaged in the movement. General Lyon, however, did not wait for his approach, but advanced to meet him, and on August 10 fought the battle of Wilson's Creek, which resulted in a crushing defeat of the Federal anny and the death on the field of its gallant commander. Meanwhile, Pillow had thrown forward his cavalry to Benton, and his advance column of infantry had reached Sykeston; and as General I^olk was fully occupied in his special duty of preparing for the defense of the river, the details of the after-conduct of the campaign were necessarily left to Hardee and Pillow. These generals found it difficult to agree on a plan of operations. Pillow urged a combined attack on the forces at Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point, opposite Cairo, preparatory to an advance upon St. Louis; while General Hardee, declining this movement, urged a concentration in front
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of Ironton, the capture of that point, and then an advance into the interior of the State, with the expectation of cooperation from Price and McCullough. The latter was unquestionably the proper movement, and Creneral Polk again ordered Pillow to move out and join Hardee in front of Ironton. Before this junction was effected, however, (Jeneral Hardee, who doubted harmony of action with Gtener^ Pillow, whom he ranked, wrote to Polk on August 20: "I do not see much prospect of striking a blow. I apprehend that we are all too weak, combined, to march on St. Louis; ^ but he added, " I am ready and anxious to attempt anything which may afford the prospect of success." This dispatch, together with the more detailed statements of Colonel Borland, who came as General Hardee's envoy, and was empowered to speak for him, satisfied Polk that Hardee, although prepared for the movement, was reaUy opposed to a further advance at that time, because he had little confidence in the voluntary cooperation of the several commands upon which success depended. Hardee was not within Polk's military jurisdiction j he had shown from the first a ready willingness to aid in the campaign to the full extent of his ability; and Polk felt that, under the existing circumstances, Hardee's judgment as to his own movements must be final. Meanwhile, in spite of the victory at Wilson's Creek, General McCullough reported that he was in no condition to advance, or even to repel an attack of the enemy if it should be made, and that he would therefore be compelled to fall back upon Arkansas. Thus, by the end of August the campaign which Polk had projected for the relief of Missouri came to an end. His own opinion of the cause of its failure was expressed in a letter which he wrote to Mr. Davis on August 29:
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I have now had ample opportunity to judge of the field yon have assigned me, as well as of the fields around me which have been assigned to other officers as theaters for defensive operations, and I am well satisfied, from the workings of the existing arrangements, that a change is necessary.
For these operations to be directed wisely, harmoniously, and successfully, they should be combined from west to east across the Mississippi Valley, and placed under the direction of one head; and that head should have large discretionary powers. Such a position is one of great responsibility, involving and requiring large experience and extensive military knowledge, and I know of no one so well equal to the task as our friend General Albert Sidney Johnston. Such an appointment would cover all the commands of the generals now operathig in fields nearest the enemy in the West, and would give universal satisfaction. Indeed, actual experience shows that aU the generals now in the western fields, having separate commands, operate to great disadvantage, in consequence of the want of a single head.
I am informed our friend General Johnston is daily expected. I beg very respectfully, but earnestly, to urge upon you the expediency of this appointment. The success of our campaign in this valley may depend upon such an arrangement, and I know of no man who has the capacity to fill the position, who could be had, but General Johnston.
The reply to this communication was an order, dated September 2, extending Polk's command so as to em-brace the State of Arkansas and all military operations in the State of Missouri, and with this order came the following letter from the President:
Richmond, Va., September 2,1861.
My dear General: The order assigning you to the command of all operations of the three columns west of the Mississippi, is designed to give a single head to the campaign for the defense of Arkansas and the relief of Missouri.
Unity was a foreseen necessity, and that constituted a
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sufficient reason for non-compliance with the numerous applications made to me to give to one of your brigadiers the same rank which you hold.
I regret to learn that you find an unwillingness to volunteer for the war. You know the disadvantage of the constant repetition of the scenes of sickness and sorrow attendant upon the encampments of raw troops. The efficiency of seasoned and instructed troops can alone ensure success to our army. The enemy are profiting by their first lessons. Would that our people would learn from their example.
The great difficulty is to supply arms; we can get more men for the war than we can arm and equip, so that we cannot afford to arm men for shorter terms. If troops offer to you for twelve months, armed and equipped, you can accept them for that term } but first you would do well to explain to them that it were better for them and for the cause in which we are engaged, that they should enter for the war. You must have a more cordial cooperation of the three columns, and to this end employ any one who disturbs the harmony of joint action upon some service near to your headquarters and under your more immediate supervision.
Get all the troops you can raise with their hunting-rifles; they will make your best skirmishers if properly organized and commanded. If General Pillow be necessary with the batteries for river defense, you have, in General Cheatham, a brave and zealous officer who will lead a column and fully cooperate with any other commander with whom he may happen to do duty, and whose rank will entitle him to command the whole. Keep me better advised of your forces and purposes. It is only when forewarned that I can meet your wishes or your wants. In proportion as our means are small, so do we need to have long notice.
I have been quite sick, and have not before attempted to write a letter since my convalescence.
May God have you in his keeping, and bless your efforts with all deserved success. Sincerely your friend,
Jeffebson Davis. Majob-Genebal L. Polk.
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The opportunity for an aggressive movement into Missouri had by this time passed. To meet the advance of General Pillow and General Hardee, General Fremont had collected a considerable force at Cairo and the adjacent posts of Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point. Several gunboats had been added to the Federal force, so that, as the Confederates were without a single boat, this force was in a position to make a descent upon the river at any moment.
Island No. 10 had been occupied for about two weeks, but the demands upon the Ordnance Department, first for Pillow's movement and next for Zollicoffer's new department in East Tennessee, had left only six guns to be placed in position at that point. Fort Pillow was better prepared, but it could have offered only a feeble resistance to a combined attack by water and land. If General Polk had had at his disposal but 5000 of the troops which were then being sent to Virginia, or which were held on the coast by States whose safety depended upon the strengthening of his line of defense, he would have been able vigorously to prosecute the campaign in Missouri without jeopardizing his position on the river, and without risk to the important interests of his department in the direction of Kentucky. His correspondence shows that he was keenly alive to the possibilities of the situation and to their importance to the Confederacy. In a dispatch dated July 28 he had urged the necessity of reinforcements, but they were not sent. In these circumstances it was evident that he must now devote his entire energies to the defense of the Mississippi, and, for the present, to that alone.
Even during the abortive movement int^ Missouri he had been deeply engaged in the study of the problems connected with the defenses of the river above Mem-
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phis; and the most perplexing of them was that of securing heavy guns for the works which it would be necessary to construct. Fort Pillow had been partly built before he took command, and although General Polk was not wholly satisfied with its location, its com: pletion was pressed with all possible speed. Island No. 10 was occupied about the middle of August; but it was evident to General Polk that the State authorities of Kentucky would be imable to maintain a position of neutrality, and that their inability or unwillingness to keep the Federal troops out of that State would very soon make it iipperatively necessary to the safety of his own position that he should occupy certain strategic points within the borders of Kentucky. He was anxious, if possible, to occupy Paducah, but Columbus he was determined to secure at all hazards. In preparation for the occupation of Columbus, Clark's command was moved up from Corinth to Union City on the Kentucky border; and on August 26—the very day on which he suspended Pillow's advance toward Ironton—General Polk suggested to Hardee that he should move his force over to New Madrid and there unite the two commands, in order that they might be in readiness for the contem-{>lated movement up the river. Hardee, however, had fsiUen back toward Arkansas, and was too far distant to (cooperate with him just then. For Polk's especial work Colmnbus was more important than Paducah; for at Columbus, as he clearly saw, he must establish his first line of defense, his second being at Island No. 10, and his third at Fort Pillow. The position of Island No. 10 made it in some respects the strongest of the three; but the high bluffs of Columbus gave a better command of the river. He determined, therefore, that Columbus must be occupied, and that all the resources of military
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science and ordnance should be applied to make it formidable. Prom the time when this plan was first matured until he was ordered, more than half a year later, to evacuate Columbus, there was not a day on which he was not actively engaged in some detail of its execution. The attempted neutrality of Kentucky was one of the embarrassments of the military situation in the West. As soon as war between the States was seen to be inevitable, the authorities of Kentucky proclaimed that their Commonwealth would observe a strict neutrality between the contending secticms; and in a feeble way they began the formation of a " State Guard" for the maintenance of a neutrality which was as rational and feasible as the neutrality of wheat betwixt the upper and nether millstones. For the Federal Government to resi)ect the neutrality of Kentucky would have been to recognize and concede tlie right of secession in the more southern State; for the assertion by a single State of the right to repudiate its federal obligations while pretending to retain its place in the Union, was the most exti-eme and the most offensive — as it was certainly the most illogical — form in which the right of absolute State sovereignty, and with it the right of secession, could be expressed. It was manifest from the first that no such neutrality could be maintained, and its proclamation caused a nearly equal embarrassment to both sides. The Unionist leaders of Kentucky feared that an "invasion" of the State by Federal forces, in defiance of their proclamation, would drive it openly and ofl&cially into the arms of the South; and the Confederate authorities, hampered by the doctrine of State rights, were reluctant to invade a State which declared that it was not at war with them. Meanwhile General Polk was left by the Bichmond government without instructions concerning
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the extent to which Kentucky's neutrality must be respected ; and seeing that the responsibility in the premises rested upon him, he soon made up his mind that he would respect the neutrality of Kentucky just so long as it should be consistent with the safety of his command, and no longer. With this view, as we have seen, he placed a force on the border to be in readiness to take instant action when the necessity which he anticipated should occur. It came sooner than he expected. On August 28 General Fremont assigned General Grant to the command of the Federal troops in southetist Missouri, to operate against the force which General Polk had been endeavoring to push into that part of the State. In the letter in which General Fremont assigned General Grant to that duty, he added that, in connection with the operations in southeast Missouri, his intention was to occupy Columbus, Ky. With that end in view, a land and naval force was dispatched, under Colonel Wagner, to occupy and hold the town of Belmont on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, and, having effected a landing on September 2, it remained there awaiting further orders.
In the mean time General Polk had moved Pillow back to New Madrid, and on learning of the Federal occupation of Belmont he directed Pillow to move on Columbus. On the 3d of September the troops were pushed forward from Union City, and on the 4th he occupied Columbus with his combined forces, anticipating General Grant's movement by a little more than twenty-four hours. That officer had been unable to effect his combinations as rapidly as the occasion demanded, and he had been so completely misinformed of the movements of Polk's force, that, on the 4th—that is, on the day when Columbus was entered by the Confederates—Grant was en-
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gaged in preparations to seize it on the night of the 5th.i
It had been Polk's design to occupy Paducah as well as Columbus. This purpose, however, he felt himself obliged to forego, in view of the ease and rapidity with which the Federal troops could be concentrated for an attack on either place. Their gunboats and other means of river ti*ansport, both on the Ohio and on the Mississippi, gave them advantages for massing their forces at either point, with which Polk knew that, even on the shortest lines at his disposal, he could not cope. Meanwhile the Federal authorities, finding that their own designs had been anticipated and forestalled, converted the Confederate occupation of Columbus into an excuse for the seizure of Paducah and the occupation of the Kentucky shore opposite Cairo. There is nothing to be said agauist the right of the Union army to occupy those places in Kentucky, and it was doubtless expedient to offer some excuse for the Federal breach of Kentucky's neutrality; but the excuse which was alleged was utterly false. Paducah was not seized because the Confederates had occupied Columbus; Fremont's instructions to Grant show that the Federals had fuUy resolved to occupy both Columbus and Paducah in accordance with plans that had been made, and in pursuance of orders that had been given, before the Confederate occupation of Columbus had taken place. But the tenderness with which the Federal Government affected to treat Kentucky's neutrality was undoubtedly judicious, and was fully rewarded by the material aid subsequently received from the leaders of the Union cause in that State, as soon afterward appeared in the correspondence between them and the Confederates.
1 '* Official Records, War of BebelUon/' Series I, toI. iii, pp. 612, 617, 618.
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When it was known at Richmond that the Confederate forces had invaded Kentucky, the Secretary of War instantly ordered Polk to withdraw them. The Governor of Tennessee also urged him to retire without delay. Polk, however, referred the matter to Mr. Davis, and firmly declared his intention, unless otherwise positively ordered, to hold the position which he had gained. When the question was submitted to Mr. Davis, his reply was, " The necessity justifies the action.'' Nevertheless, the mihtary situation was still so intricately involved with questions wholly political, and everything affecting the doctrine of State sovereignty was regarded as of such fundamental importance that some considerable time elapsed and much correspondence passed before Polk was fully sustained by the Confederate authorities.
As soon as time permitted, General Polk wrote, under date of September 8, to Mr. MagofJn, the Governor of Kentucky:
I should have dispatched you immediately, as the troops under my command took possession of this position, the very few words I addressed to the people here; but my duties since that time so preoccupied me that I have but now the first leisure moment to communicate with you. It would be sufficient for me to inform you (as my short address here will do) that I had information on which I could rely, that the Federal forces intended and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need not describe to you the danger resulting to West Tennessee from such occupation. My responsibility could not permit me quietly to lose to the command entrusted to me so important a position. In evidence of the acciuracy of the information I possessed, I will state that, as the Confederate troops approached this place, the Federal troops were found in formidable numbers in position upon the opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus. The citizens of
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the town had fled with terror, and not a word of assurance, or safety, or protection had been addressed to them.
Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been informed by highly responsible citizens of your State that certain representatives of the Federal Government are setting up complaints of my act of occupying it, and are making it a pretext for seizing other positions. Upon this proceeding I have no comment to make ; but I am prex>ared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter or occupy any point of Kentucky in the future.
No sooner was this letter forwarded than the following communication was received from the chairman of a committee appointed by the State legislature (September 9):
I have the honor to enclose herewith a resolution of the Senate of Kentucky, adopted by that body upon the reception of inteUigence of the military occupation of Hickman, Chalk Bank, and Columbus by the Confederate troops under your command. I need not say that the people of Kentucky are profoundly astonished that such an act should have been committed by the Confederates, and especially that they should have been the first to do so with an equipped and regularly organized army.
The people of Kentucky having with great unanimity determined upon a position of neutrality in the unhappy war now being waged, and which they had tried in vain to prevent, had hoped that one place at least in this great nation might remain iminvaded by passion, and through whose good offices something might be done to end the war, or at least to mitigate its horrors; or, if this were not possible, that she might be left to choose her destiny without disturbance from any quarter.
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In obedience to the thrice-repeated will of the people, as expressed at the polls, and in their name, I ask you to withdraw your forces from the soil of Kentucky.
I will say, in conclusion, that all the people of the State await, in deep suspense, your action in the premises. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, etc.,
John M. Johnson,
Cluxirman of Committee.
To this, General Polk, nnder the same date, replied :
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, conveying to me a copy of a resolution of the Senate of Kentucky, under which a committee (of which you are chairman) was raised ^' for the purpose of considering the reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by Confederate troops, and that they take into consideration the reported occupation of Paducah and other points in Kentucky by the Federal authorities, and report thereon" j also, that they be " directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal forces, and report in writing at as early a day as practicable.^
From the terms of the resolution it appears your office as committeemen was restricted merely to collecting the facts in reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and Federal forces, and to report thereon in writing at as early a day as possible. In answer to these resolutions I have respectfully to say that, so far as the Confederate forces are concerned, the facts are plain and shortly stated. The government which they represent, recognizing as a fundamental principle the right of sovereign States to take such a position as they choose in regard to their relations with other States, was compelled by that principle to concede to Kentucky the right to assume the position of neutrality which she has chosen in the passing struggle. This it has done on all occasions and without an exception. The cases alluded to by His Excellency, Governor Magoffin, in his recent
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message as '^ raids,^ I presume, are the cases of the steamers "Cheney" and "Orr." The former was the unauthorized and unrecognized act of certain citizens of Alabama, and the latter the act of certain citizens of Tennessee and others, and was an act of reprisal. They cannot, therefore, be charged in any sense as acts of the Confederate Government.
The first and only instance in which the neutrality of Kentucky has been disregarded is that in which the troops under my command, and by my direction, took possession of the place I now hold, and so much of the territory between it and the Tennessee line as was necessary for me to pass over in order to reach it. This act finds abundant justification in the history of the concessions granted to the Federal Government by Kentucky ever since the war began, notwithstanding the position of neutrality which she has assumed and the firmness with which she has proclaimed her intention to maintain it. That history shows the following among other facts: In January the House of Representatives of Kentucky passed anti-coercion resolutions — only four dissenting. The governor, in May, issued his neutrality proclamation. The address of the Union Central Committee, including Mr. James Speed, Mr. Prentice, and other prominent Union men, in April, proclaimed neutrality as a policy of Kentucky, and claimed that an attempt to coerce the South should induce Kentucky to make common cause with her and take part in the contest on her side " without coimting the cost." The Union speakers and papers, with few exceptions, claimed, up to the last election, that the Union vote was strict neutrality and peace. These facts and events gave assurance of the integrity of the avowed purpose of your State, and we were content with the position she assumed.
Since the election, however, she has allowed the seizure in her ports (Paducah) of property of citizens of the Confederate States; she has by her members in the Congress of the United States voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war against the Confederate States; she has allowed the Federal Government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of building armed boats for the in-
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vasion of the soathem States; she is permitting to be enlisted in her territory troops, not only of her own citizens, but the citizens of other States, for the purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare against the Confederate States. At Camp Robinson, in the county of Garrard, there are now ten thousand troops, if the newspapers can be relied upon, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois are mustered with Kentuckians into the service of the United States, and armed by that government for the avowed purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that government for their subjugation. Notwithstanding all these and other facts of a similar character, the Confederate States have continued to respect the attitude which Kentucky has assumed as a neutral, and forborne from reprisals, in the hope that Kentucky would yet enforce respect for her position on the part of the Government of the United States* Our patient expectation has been disappointed, and it was only when we perceived that this continued indifference to our rights and our safety was about to culminate in the seizure of an important part of her territory by the United States forces for offensive operations against the Confederate States, that a regard for self-preservation demanded of us to seize it in advance. We are here, therefore, not by choice, but of necessity; and, as I have had the honor to say in the communication addressed to His Excellency, Governor Magoffin, a copy of which is herewith enclosed and submitted as a part of my reply, so I now repeat, in answer to your request, that I am prepared to agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter oe occupy any part of Kentucky for the future.
In view of the facts submitted, I cannot but think the world at large will find it difficult to appreciate the "profound astonishment'^ with which you say the people of
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26 KENTUCKY'S FEAR OF THE N'ORTH. [1861
Kentucky received the inteUigenoe of the ocoapatLon of this phice.
I have the honor to be, respectfully,
Tour obedient servant, etc.,
Leonidas Polk, Mqjar-Generai Commanding,
A second commnnication was received, on September 13, from a committee of citizens representing the element in the State which favored a union with the Confederate States. This letter, together with the correspondence with the legislature, Polk forwarded to Mr. Davis, making the following conmient upon the communication from the citizens:
Columbus, September 14,1861. His Excellencyy Jefferson Davis, President, etc,: Ehiclosed 1 send you a letter from two distinguished gentlemen of Kentucky which will explain itself. My own opinion is, they overrate the importance of the seizure on the public mind of Kentucky. This is, as I regard it, from other sources of information. They both agree that the course Kentucky has pursued deprives her of the right to protest, and, so far as the protection of Tennessee is concerned, the seizure in a military point of view was a necessity. Both deplore the effect on what they think its political influence. I believe, if we could have found a respectable pretext, it would have been better to have seized this place some months ago, as I am convinced we had more friends then in Kentucky than we have had since, and every hour's delay made against us. Kentucky was fast melting away under the influence of the Lincoln Government. If we make the stand now, and do it vigorously, we shall find we have more allies in the State than we shall ever have at any future day; and if our arms should be successful in a few battles, the State wiU soon abandon the position which fear of the power of the Federal Government alone constrains her now to maintain. Give us armies, with
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more commanders, and we cannot but belieye that the State will rally strongly to our support for their emancipation. I have the honor to remain, respectfuUy,
Tour obedient servant,
L. Polk, Major-General Commanding.
The Governor of Kentucky, in obedience to a resolution of the legislature, now issued a proclamation ordering the Confederate troops from the State. This action Polk promptly communicated to Mr. Davis, and received the following reply, dated September 13: "I desire to treat Kentucky with all possible respect; your occupation of Kentucky, being necessary as a defensive measure, will, of course, be limited by the existence of such ne(;essity." At the same time Mr. Davis referred the question to the decision of General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had now arrived and had been assigned to the command in the West.
On September 15 President Davis wrote to General Polk:
Tour correspondence with the committee and the Governor of Kentucky has been considered and approved. Governor Harris and others have represented to me that the occupation of Columbus and Hickman would work political detriment to our cause in Kentucky. It is true that the solution of the problem requires the consideration of other than the military elements involved in it ; but we cannot permit the indeterminate quantities, the political elements, to control our action in cases of military necessity. Such I regard your occupation of Columbus to be; and your offer to evacuate, upon a reasonable assurance that it would not be occupied and other places continue to be held by the enemy, furnishes all that could be required of respect for the declared neutrality on the part of Kentucky.
Tour wish for General A. S. Johnston to command the
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operations in the West has been fulfilled. He is now, I suppose, at Nashville, and you will soon have the aid of his presence with the army.
I am g^tified that the people of Columbus recognized in you a defender of their rights, and made common cause with you. This alone would suffice to prove that we have adhered to our declared abstinence from any policy of conquest. I feel deeply anxious as to the course of Kentucky, and sincerely trust your expectations will be realized in relation to the people of the section in which you now are.
The question was finally settled by General Johnston, who, after a conference with Governor Harris, and a full consideration of all the facts of the situation, wrote as follows to the President:
Nashville, Tenn., September 16,1861.
His Excellency J Jefferson Davis: I am satisfied that the pohtical bearing of the question presented for my decision has been decided by the Legislature of Kentucky.
The Legislature of Kentucky has required the prompt removal of all Confederate forces from her soil, and the Governor of Kentucky has issued his proclamation to that effect. The troops will not be withdrawn. It is not possible to withdraw them now from Columbus in the west, and from Cumberland Ford in the east, without opening the frontiers of Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy, and this is regarded as essential to our present line of defense as well as to any future operations. So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once.
Throughout this anxious time, though the efforts which were made to induce Mr. Davis to order the Confederate forces to evacuate Columbus caused Polk no little uneasiness, he did not allow it to retard his operations in strengthening his position. Military works
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were begun on the very day of the occupation, and they were pi-essed on without intermission and with all possible speed. On September 14, exercising the authority conferred on him by the order of September 2,^ he ordered Hardee to the Mississippi River near New Madrid, so that he might be at hand for any movement that might be necessary. Paducah still occupied his thoughts, and in a dispatch of the same date to President Davis he wrote: ** I hear the Federalists have about 8000 infantry and 1500 cavalry at Paducah. I moved Cheatham's brigade and Stevens's regiment out to-day to Mayflekl, to protect my right flank. It is of the highest importance that we should have a large reinforcement now to press the enemy before he has time to fortify. He has laid out extensive works around Paducah, and is meaning evidently to make it his base. C. P. Smith is in command." Writing his wife, September 18, Polk said: "We should have had more force than we had, but the course of things has been such as to have taken an undue proportion of the force of the Mississippi Valley to the east." Again, on September 25, he wrote her: "You have seen why I came here. I shall use this as a starting-point for going farther, as my opinion is that a forward movement is the one for our cause." But more troops could not be had. Men were plentiful, for the enthusiasm of war was upon the people j but arms could not be procured. Zollicoffer was moving into Kentucky on the east, and needed help; in central Kentucky there was an urgent demand for troops to meet the movements of the Federal forces there; Hardee's march was therefore continued to Bowling Green, and Polk had to content himself with the possession of Columbus.
1 <' Official Records, War of Rebellion,'' toL ill, p. 702.
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Google ^^
The disappointments of the situation in Kentucky, however, were in a measure relieved by the cheering news which soon came from Price. While General Polk had been occupied with affairs in .Kentucky, the army of the State of Missouri, which he had tried so hard to aid, had not been idle. In the southeastern portion of that State there was a small force of cavalry under General Jeff. Thompson, which kept the Federal forces about Bird's Point in a constant state of annoyance, and as a source of infonnation concerning the movements of Uie enemy in tliat quarter was of much service to the garrison at Columbus. But events of great importance had occurred in other portions of Missouri, w^hich gratified Polk all the more by the assurance that, after all, his movements had been of some service to tlie Confederates of that State. The advance of his troops into east Missouri, and afterward into Kentucky, had caused the witlidrawal of most of the Federal forces to the Mississippi River, and Price, taking advantage of this diversion, had invaded the Stat« and swept ever^'^thing before him up to the Missouri River. General Polk had shared his scanty supply of war material with that gallant little army; he was still ready to aid it to the extent of his ability; and on October 11 he had the pleasure of receiving the following dispatch from General Price:
Headquarters, Missouri State Forces,
Lexington, Mo., September 24,1861.
General: I have the honor to enclose herewith a i*equiBition
for three million of musket percussion-caps that I much need,
and which General Harding informs me you have kindly
offered to furnish.
I am happy to inform you that I have with my army successfully reached the Missouri River, defeating the enemy where-ever they opposed my progress and capturing this place with
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scarcely any loss. It is quite a prize to us, f or, besides about 3000 prisoners, we have taken more than a million dollars' worth of arms, ammunition, and other property most valuable to us at present. My present force consists of upwards of 20,000 men, and daily increasing. I have not yet fully decided on my future movements, which must depend much on those of the enemy, but they will have reference to an early movement on St. Louis. Any suggestions or information from you will be thankfully received, and it wiU afford me the greatest pleasure to cooperate with you in any operations you may undertake. I am, general.
With sentiments of much respect and esteem,
Sterling Priob, Mojor-Oeneral Commanding, To Major-General L. Polk, C. S. A., • Memphis, Tbkn.
The movements of the Missouri State forces of which this letter tells culminated in one of the most successful campaigns of the year; but the ultimate result was of small consequence to the Confederacy, because it was made too late to influence the political status of the State, its entire machinery being then in the hands of those who were in active sympathy with the Federal Government.
This would have been prevented by the campaign planned and urged by General Polk, because at that time the friends of the Confederacy in Missouri were suflSciently numerous and active to secure the State. The bearing of such an accession upon the fortunes of the Confederacy, especially in this quarter, is readily seen by referring to the documents and correspondence of that date dealing with the subject. The matter of special importance in this memoir, however, is General Polk's attitude in this crisis.
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He arrived in Memphis on July 13, and on the 23d, in a letter to the Secretary of War, he outlined a campaign which the record shows was not only feasible, but would have been carried out had General Polk been empowered to direct the forces, which in two weeks from the date of this letter could have been put in motion in Missouri.
These facts, together with the remaining events chronicled in this chapter, show not only the comprehensive readiness of the man in his new position, but also the facility with which he grasped the situations confronting him; and the directness with which he moved upon them justified the estimate of his abilities which the assignment to so important a command implied.
To indicate his connectioii with the erents of which this volume treats, the writer will say here, that he served as an artillery officer first, in McOown's division at Columbus, I^ew Madrid, and Island No. 10, then in Clark's division at Shiloh and Corinth, and later in Cheatham's division during the Kentucky campaign, and at Stone Biver. During the Tulla-homa, Chickamauga, Meridian, and Atlanta campaigns, he served on the staff of General Polk. In the subsequent operations of the Army in Tennessee, he served as adjutant to the artillery regiment of Stewart's corps. At the outbreak of the Civil War (then aged sixteen) he was a cadet at the Military Institute of Virginia (Lexington), from which, with one hundred and fifty cadets, he was detached for the purpose of drilling the Virginia troops. This service was performed under the direction of Major Thomas J. Jackson (Stonewall). Later the writer was assigned to similar duty with the Tennessee troops under General Zoliooffer.
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CHAPTER n.
BELMONT. October to December, 1861.
General Albert Sidney Johnston aesumes command of Department No. 2. — The difficulties of the position.— Polk's estimate of Johnston.—General Polk commands the river defenses.— General Fremont orders Generals Grant and Smith to make a demonstration against Columbus.— General Grant steams down the Mississippi and disembarks flye miles above Belmont.— General Polk sends General Pillow to relief of camp at Bel> mont. —The battle.—27th Illinois Regiment.—Numbers engaged on either side.—General Pillow.—Battles of Belmont and Shiloh compared. —Exchange of prisoners.—Correspondence between General Polk and General Grant.—Letter to Mrs. Polk.—Accident to General Polk and death of Captain Keiter and Lieutenant Snowden.—Meeting of the Confederate and Union generals.—The toast to Washington.—Cheatham's way to a settlement of the war.—The narrative of General Sumner's daughter.—^A dinner with President Davis.—The death of Major Butler.
On September 15 General Albert Sidney Johnston assumed command of the Confederate forces in the West, including all which were then operating in Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky. The appointment of this able soldier gave universal satisfaction, and no one rejoiced more than Polk at this accession to the fortunes of the Confederacy. He had known Johnston from boyhood; they had been room-mates at West Point, and in the intimacy of a life-long friendship each of them had learned to know and trust the abilities and qualities of the other. Though they had been separated for many years, Polk had never lost sight of his friend.
33
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34 DIFFICULTIES OF BIVER DEFENSE. [1861
On his return from Europe in 1831, he bronght with him an onyx-cameo head of Washington, which he sent to Johnston with this message: ^' I could find nothing so appropriate as a present for you, for I have never known any one whose character so closely I'esembled Washington's in all respects as your own." Many years later, during the war with Mexico, Bishop Polk asked his kinsman, Mr. Polk, then President of the United States, to reappoint Johnston to the s^ime position which he had resigned some time before, or else to give him a command in one of the new regiments then being raised. Polk's faith in his friend never faltered; and he was among the first, if not the very fii-st, to nominate Johnston for appointment to the chief command in the West. No one better knew the difficulties of that position, and he nominated Johnston because he knew them. He had himself looked over the field j he had estimated its difficulties, and he saw that they were greater than at any other part of the Confederate frontier. The front to be covered extended from Virginia to Kansas. It was intersected by three great rivers, all leading into the Y^ry heart of the Confederacy, all communicating with each other, and their communications were in the hands of the Federals. Forts might be built upon them, but where were the heavy guns with which to arm the forts ? After all his efforts, Polk had been able to obtain hardly enough for the defense of one river. The rapidly increasing river craft of the Union navy could pass freely from one stream to the others, and upon two of the three Johnston had not a single gim afloat to oppose them. His feeble fleet on the Mississippi could do little more than guard the navigation of the river below Columbus, and that small fleet might be called at any time to the defense of New Orleans. Worst of all, there was no visible prospect of
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improvement. Men could be had, and river craft might be built, but there were no guns with which to arm them. Again, while the main body of the Confederate troops were engaged in defending the Mississippi and other rivers, a part must be in Missouri fighting for that State and the protection of Arkansas; and East Tennessee must be held as if it were an enemy's country. The only means of communication between these widely separated flanks were common country dirt-roads on the west of the Mississippi, and east of it roads of the same sort, with one complete and one incomplete line of railroad, both deficient in rolling-stock. The enemy, on the other hand, had but two vital points, Cairo and St. Louis, along his entire line, and from one end of that line to the other he had a continuous water communication, navigable at all times, commanded by his gunboats, and floating a fleet of transports which were equal to the carrying, within a week's time, of 50,000 men from one end of his front to the other. Granting that the enemy might have no more men than Johnston, Polk saw that the odds against the Confederates were far heavier in that quarter than elsewhere. But he had confidence in Johnston's ability to make the best of the situation that was possible to human wisdom, and he never faltered in that belief. After the fall of Fort Henry and Port Donelson, when disaster swept over the whole department, he felt drawn to Johnston even more closely than before, and he looked forwai-d with undiminished confidence to a day when his friend should be released from his defensive position, and, massing his troops for an attack, should move against the enemy and exhibit to the world a military genius which Polk firmly believed to be of the very highest order. "The currents of these two lives that had so nearly
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touched toward their sources, and afterward had parted so widely, moved thereafter with a common purpose to a common end." ^
On September 21, when Johnston rearranged his department, he assigned Polk to the command of the first division, charging him specially with the defense of the Mississippi River. Concerning this assignment General Johnston's biographer has said: " It was no small consideration to feel that he [Genei-al Johnston] had in so responsible a position a friend to whose loytilty of heart and native chivalry he could trust entirely, and one who, if long unused to arms, was yet by virtue of early training and a bold, aggressive spirit every inch a soldier. . . . Henceforth General Polk was the right-arm of his commander."'^ The defenses of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers were at first included in this division, but Polk had reason to know that the defense of the Mississippi would now more than sufficiently tax the capacity of any one commander, and he desired to be left free to concentrate his energies upon that work. On the Tennessee the constniction of works at Fort Henry had been for some weeks under the supervision of an efficient officer, Colonel Heiman, and were fairly well advanced; but the works on the Cumberland, called Fort Donelson, were in a much less satisfactory state of progress. The extension and speedy completion of both fort«s was of instant importance, and required the undivided attention of an able general officer. Therefore, on October 31, Polk wrote to Johnston:
I beg leave to call the attention of the commanding general to the importance of having some commander of large
1 Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, by Colonel WiUiam Preston Johnston, p. 318.
2 nnd,, p. 322.
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experience and military efficiency put in charge of the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Of the great importance of these channels of communication I need not speak. If they should be occupied and held by the enemy, they must necessarily prove of the most serious inconvenience to our army in Kentucky. 1 would suggest the propriety of having Colonel Tilghman put in charge of those defenses. The space between General Buckner (at Bowling Green) and myself is now very feebly occupied.
Polk's reluctance to assume the defense of the three rivers may have been caused in part by his intention to retire from the army, because, within a week after this dispatch to Johnston, he forwarded his resignation to Mr. Davis. The history of his repeated efforts to be relieved from militaiy service has already been given, and it is sufficient to observe here that while his resignation was pending he could not but be reluctant to undertake new duties or to enter into new combinations the practical responsibilities of which he would not feel free to tlirow upon his successor. But this feeling of honorable prudence never deterred him from any service that was necessary to the good of the service; and so long as he should be in the army, his high sense of the duty made him ready and willing not only to obey the orders but to be amenable to tlie simplest desire of his superior.^
The time was rapidly approaching when General Polk would be actively and personally engjiged in conflict with the enemy. On the first day of November, 1861, General Fremont ordered General Grant at Cairo, and General C. F. Smith at Paducah, to hold their commands in readiness for a demonstration upon Columbus, the object of which was to cover an effort to drive General Jeff. Thompson from southeast Missouri, and at the same time
1 See Appendix jto Chapter II.
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38 MOVEMENTS OF GRANT AND SMITH, [1861
to check the sending of reinforcements to Price. On the 4th and 6th Grant moved Colonels Oglesby, Wallace, and Plummer in the direction of the town of Sykeston, Mo., ordered the garrison at Fort Holt, opposite Cairo, to advance in the direction of Columbus, and early in the morning of the 7th, with a force of about 3500 men of all arms, convoyed by the gunboats "Lexington'' and " Tyler,'' he steamed down the Mississippi River toward the same objective point Smith, meanwhile, from the direction of Paducah, threw forward his column of 2000 men.
The mobilization of these various commands, about 12,000 men in all, was duly reported to Polk, and with the report came rumors of the enemy's designs. Polk, however, found it difficult to believe that so extensive a movement was really directed against Thompson, whose entire force numbered not more than 1500 men, and was then encamped far down toward Arkansas; and he found it still more difficult to believe that it was intended to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Price, as no Confederate ti'oops from that direction either were, or were likely to be, in motion to join Price. On the other hand, he had for some weeks had reason to expect a determined effort on Grant's part to dislodge him from Columbus, and he inferred that the expected attack was now at hand.
The force at his disposal, including the garrison of Columbus, was then about 10,000 men of all arms. At Belmont, opposite Columbus, he had established a camp of observation, which was then occupied by one regiment of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. In order to command the approaches to this position by the batteries on the high ground at Columbus, the trees had been felled for some distance
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along the west bank, and the fallen timber had been bo placed as to form an abattis capable of obstructing the advance of an enemy. This camp Grant decided to attack.
Accordingly, at about eight o'clock on the morning of the 7th, he disembarked his force on the Missouri shore, some five miles above Belmont, ordering the gunboats to drop below and engage the batteries at Columbus. Then, quickly forming his column, he pushed for the Confederate camp.
Polk meanwhile had sent (General McCowan with a force of infantry and artillery up the east bank of the river, and, learning that the enemy had landed on the west shore, he dispatehed General Pillow with four regiments to the aid of the camp. Thus Pillow was provided with a force of 2700 men, of all arms, and little inferior in numbers to that which was about to attack him; but Polk, being anxious that he should have all the men he deemed necessary, sent him another regiment of 500 men, which landed on the Missouri shore at 10.30 A.M., just as the battle began. The opposing forces were virtually equal, and the engagement became general a few minutes before eleven o'clock. Grant, with his line well extended, bore down upon the Confederate position, and, though stubbornly resisted, he gradually fought his way forward, driving the Confederates to the river bank and capturing their camp.
Polk had been deterred in the first instance from sending a larger force to meet Grant's attack by the reports made by his scouts of the movements of the transports upon the river, and of the position and numbers of the columns advancing from Fort Holt and Paducah, which tended to show that the landing upon the opposite bank of the river was a mere feint, while the
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real design was an attack upon Columbus. Nevertheless, he had placed at Belmont a force fully equal to that of Grant; and now, finding that this force was being defeated, and learning at the same time that no enemy upon the Kentucky shore was near enough seriously to threaten his position, he promptly moved over to Belmont with additional reinforcements, attacked Grant on the flank and rear, drove him from the field, and pursued him to his transports. After the Confederates had been driven to the river bank, the heavy guns upon the high ground at Columbus were able to rake the Federal position, and contributed materially to Grant^s discomfiture. These batteries had an opportunity in this action to test their fire upon gunboats, and the ease with which they repulsed two attacks which the boats attempted argued well for the efficiency of their service. In closing his report of this battle, General Polk said:
On landing I was met by General Pillow and General Cheatham, whom I directed, with the regiments of General Cheatham^s command and portions of others, to press the enemy to his boats. This order was executed with alacrity and in double-quick time. The route over which we passed was strewn with the dead and wounded of the conflicts of Colonel Marks and General Cheatham, already alluded to, and with arms, knapsacks, overcoats, etc. On arriving at the point where his transports lay, I ordered the coliunn, headed by the 154th Regiment of Tennessee Volunteers, under cover of a field thickly set with com, to be deployed along the river bank within easy range of the boats. This being accomplished, a heavy fire was opened upon them simultaneously, riddling them with balls, and, as we had reason to believe, with heavy loss to the enemy. Under this gaUing fire he cut liis lines and retreated from the shore, many of his soldiers being driven overboard by the rush of those behind them. Our fire was returned by heavy cannonading from his gun-
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boats, whioh discharged upon otir lines showers of grape, canister, and sheU, as they retired with their convoy in the direction of Cairo.
Polk was mistaken in condnding that all the Federal force had re-embarked. In the confosion of the retreat, the 27th Illinois Regiment, under Colonel N. B. Buford, one of Polk's old West Point friends, had been separated from the rest of the command; finding itself abandoned, it made its way northward by a road that lay some little distance from the river, and, reaching the river at a point above that at which General Grant had so precipitately taken to his boats, succeeded, at about dark, in getting on board a transport without molestation. The absence of the Confederate cavalry and the confusion of the pursuit alone prevented the discovery and capture of this force.
The battle of Belmont was long and severe. Beginning at half-past ten o'clock in the morning, it did not end until sunset. The losses on both sides showed the character of the fighting. The Confederate loss was 642 killed, wounded, and missing. That of the Federals must be placed at about 600. Their dead and nearly all their wounded were left upon the field. General Pillow reports that he buried 295 of them, and that, under a flag of truce, the Federals were similarly engaged "a good part of the day." (General Grant states that he carried 175 prisoners from the field; and General Polk, that after a liberal exchange, by which he recovered all of his own men, he had stiU 100 prisoners in his hands. The substantial fruits of victory were therefore with the Confederates; and the Congress at Richmond, in acknowledgment of the fact, passed resolutions commending Polk, his oflBcers, and the troops under his command, for the service rendered.
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The chief objects of General Grant's attack, as stated by himself; had been, first, to assist a movement against Thompson's command, and second, to break up the camp at Belmont. If this be so, he failed in both; for the camp was continued, and the disaster to his command compelled him to recall the troops which had been sent after Thomp< son. He carried off two cannon and a number of sick and wounded Confederates whom he found in their camp j but he fled the fields virtually abandoning one of his regiments, leaving his dead and wounded, a large preponderance of prisoners, a stand of his colors, one thousand stand of arms, and the caissons of his battery, in the hands of the Confederates. His fight, however, had been a gallant one, and at one time the entire Confederate line was swept before his onset. He has estimated his force at 3114 men, while the commander of his 1st Brigade states it was 3500. The discrepancy is, no doubt, accounted for by the fact that five companies were left to guard the transports, thus leaving, for the actual engagement, the number of troops stated by himself. When the battle began. General Pillow had in line 2500 men, exclusive of a squadron of cavalry and a battery, and by eleven o'clock he was joined by Walker's regiment, numbering about 500, thus giving the Confederates a force fully equal to that of their antagonists j and yet they were driven in much confusion from their position. To account for this, several reasons were assigned: the correct one is that the Confederates were at a disadvantage owing to the exposed position in which their line was formed.^ The evidence shows that most of the line of battle, especially the center, was placed in an exposed position in an open field, with a heavy wood
1 See reports of snbordJnates, " Official Records, War of RebeUiaa," roL ill, pp. 320, 331, 362.
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aboat eighty yards distant in its front. Under the cover of this wood the Federal force moved forward its line, and, halting at the timber's edge, raked the field with its fire. The Confederates had been on the ground for several weeks, and the advantageous positions should liave been familiar to them. The force sent over to aid in opposing Grant was on the ground quite long enough before the battle began to have foimd out a better position on which to form, and it stood in line of battle one hour before the Federal attack was made. There were several positions at hand any one of which would have been better. This was especially the case with the ground in the rear of the abattis of felled trees.^ It is diflficult to account for this error of formation without taking into consideration the characteristics of General Pillow, the officer commanding upon the field. Pillow was a man of unhmited personal courage, and upon this occasion, * the first in this war in which he had had an opportimity to come to blows with his enemy, he no doubt mentally invested his soldiers with the same capacity for resistance that he felt within himself, overlooking the fact that they were fresh levies and that it was their first engagement. Be this as it may, he soon found that he was unable to hold his position, and therefore attempted to dislodge the concealed foe by a series of gallant charges. These proved of no avail, and after losing heavily he had to give way. In the mean time he must have inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, for it required the pressure of but two additional regiments, which arrived about twelve o'clock, and numbered together but 1000 men, to drive Grant from the field. The force which won the battle of Belmont was, then, about 400C' men. It is true that an additional reinforcement of two
1 <'Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. iii, pp. 340-342.
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regiments of about 500 men each was sent across the river, but they arrived after the Federal force had been defeated, and took part only in the pursuit.
In short, it may be said that the battle was fought by 3114 Federals against 4000 Confederates, the result being a victory for the latter; and that subsequently the Confederates were reinforced by 1000 men, with whom they took up the pursuit, thus bringing their total upon the field to 5000 of all arms. In comparing tliis engagement with other battles of the war, the points of resemblance between it and that of Shiloh, fought six months later and upon a more extended scale, must strike every observer. If Shiloh was a defeat for the Confederates, then by a similar chain of occurrences and conclusions Grant was defeated at Belmont. We commend this suggestion to the writers who have claimed Belmont as a Federal victoiy.
In the following letter, written to Mrs. Polk November 12, the general speaks of the battle and describes a painful accident by which he nearly lost his life:
Columbus, Ky., November 12,1861. My beloved Wife: I write you a letter with my own hand that you may see I am safe notwithstanding the battle through which we passed on the 7th, and the terrific explosion yesterday of the Dahlgren gun carrying a 128-pound shot. I was standing within ten feet of the gun at the moment of the explosion. The captain of the company to which the squad of men serving the gun belonged was killed on the spot; so were the captain of the gun squad and five others, one of these being one of my aids, Lieutenant Snowden. Two of the men were blown into the river, a hundred feet below. Their bodies have not been recovered. My clothes were torn to pieces, and I was UteraUy covered with dust and fragments of the wreck. I was only injured by the stunning effect of the concussion. (It was about this time yesterday.)
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This letter, written from his bed, pays less attention to the accident than its gravity warranted; the reason lay in his somewhat bruised condition, a part of it being a ruptured ear drum. A more extended account of the catastrophe from the man who, next to General Polk, knew more about it than any one left alive, is now given. General E. W. Rucker, one of the picturesque characters of the war, one of General Forrest's most able brigade commanders, distinguished for ability and unyielding courage in the many combats he conducted or shared, writes: "I was Lieutenant of Engineers, W. D. Pickett was Captain of Engineers. I was principally occupied in mounting heavy artillery; as an instance, I built the little fort and mounted therein the big gun." It rendered good service in the battle of the 7th, at the close of which it had been left charged*: whether any effort had been made to draw the charge does not appear, at any rate four days after the battle, General Polk making a general inspection and accompanied by Lieutenant Snowden of the Engineers, stopped at the gun to compliment the Captain of the Battery (Captain Keiter) on his good work. The Captain asked permission to fire the charge. Knowing no reason to the contrary, General Polk assented. He then took position on the parapet with Pickett on his left and Rucker on his right. "We three had been standing there but a little while when Captain Keiter with his men, about fifteen as I remember, came up and saluted General Polk, and said he was ready, and asked the General if he would not st^p to the windward a little in order to better observe the effect of the shot, which was intended to go up the river; we were to see about where it would fall in the water: the gun was considerably elevated. I remember distinctly General Polk's
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reply. He said, *WelI, if it goes any distance I will be able to see it. If you are ready go ahead.' Captain Keiter stepped to the rear and gave the command *Fire.' The gunner pulling the lanyard, the gun immediately exploded and was broken all to pieces. Almost at the same instant a magazine which was built in the parapet on the right side exploded also. There were several hundred pounds of powder or more which exploded. General Polk and I were hurled about twenty-five or thirty feet back, and fell together. Where Colonel Pickett fell I do not know. As I picked myself up I felt someone by my side. I touched him and inquired, 'Who is this?' and the answer came, 'General Polk.' It was as dark as midnight, or appeared so, the smoke and dust having gotten into our eyes and hair and clothes. I wanted to help the General and took hold of him to try to help him up, but he said, 'Let me alone a little while.' The General was so disabled that he was carried away to his quarters and he didn't get out again for some weeks. Colonel Pickett was disabled, I think for four or five days or a week. I got up immediately and went about after the shock, which didn't last but a few minutes. The General, Pickett and I were the only ones left to tell the tale. Captain Keiter, about nine of his company, and Lieutenant Snowden were immediately kiUed."
The nature of the accident cast gloom over the entire camp. Both Keiter and Snowden were exceptional officers and popular with the army. Snowden's genial youthfulness together with his ability had won the more than kindly regard of General Polk, as well as that of his associates. Enquiry showed that the uncertain action of the cast iron of that day was responsible for the disaster. Contuiuing, the letter returns to the events of the battle.
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As to the battle of the 7ih, I telegraphed you I was well, as was Hamilton, and both unharmed. It was a sharp affair, and, I suppose, for the force engaged, as fierce as any contest of the war. At the outset they had the best of it, and I was really afraid they were going to balance accounts with us for the Leesburg affair. You will remember the field was on the other side of the river, and I had to throw my forces over on steamers. I was at a great disadvantage in the face of a well-served battery, but I shoved the regiments over and followed them. My own batteries were turned upon them from this side, and especially my large favorite from the top of the hill, whose fate I deplore. They soon started from their position and began to retire. The regiments held in reserve by me now supported a flank movement, which I had ordered to be made by Colonel Marks of the llth Louisiana. The rout became complete. I pressed them hard. For several miles the ground was strewn with their dead, ammunition, knapsacks, and guns, of which latter we got about 1000. We continued our pursuit to their boats, which took them up the river. My own impression is their loss in killed, wounded, and missing cannot faU short of 1000 to 1200. Ours amount to a fraction over 600. They acknowledge their defeat. I will send you their account of the matter. As to the accounts of the affair you find in our papers, they are about as correct as such things generally are.
In this same letter he describes a pleasant meeting with Colonel Buford:
I and others of my oficers have spent pretty much the whole day in my boat on the river with Buford (Col. N. B. Buford, 27th Illinois) and his officers, discussing the principles of exchange, and other matters connected with the war. He is as good a fellow as ever lived, and most devotedly my friend; a true Christian, a true soldier, and a gentleman, every inch of him. He said it did him good to come down and talk with me, and he hoped it might be the means of peace, and so on. I was very plain and clear in my position, as you may know, bat very kind.
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After completing my exchange^ I had stiU about one hundred of their prisoners in my keeping, and among them fifteen or twenty of his regiment. These he was very anxious I should let him take back. He urged me in every way, even on the score of our friendship; but I could not yield, especially to such a plea, which would have subjected me to the charge of subordinating individual preference to public duty. He admitted it, and was obliged to leave without them, but we had a very pleasant day. I went up with him nearly to Cairo. He wanted me to go and spend the night with him; so you see how much we have done on this line toward ameliorating the severities of this unfortunate and wretched state of things.
In another letter to Mrs. Polk, dated November 15, he says:
Since the accident, I have been up the river on two occasions to meet flags of truce; once to meet Grant, and to-day to meet my friend Buford. My interview with General Grant was, on the whole, satisfactory. It was about an exchange of prisoners. He looked rather grave, I thought^ hke a man who was not at his ease. We talked pleasantly, and I succeeded in getting a smile out of him and then got on well enough. 1 discussed the principles on which 1 thought the war should be conducted; denounced all barbarity, vandalism, plundering, and all that, and got him to say that he would join in putting it down. I was favorably impressed with him; he is undoubtedly a man of much force. We have now exchanged five or six flags, and he grows more civil and respectful every time.
It was at one of these conferences, after the business of the flag of truce had been dispatched, and the party had adjourned to partake of a simple luncheon provided by the Confederates, that the gallant Buford, raising his glass, proposed a toast to "George Washington, the Father of his Country." Polk, with a merry twinkle in
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his eye, quickly added, " And the first Rebel!" The Federal officers joined with excellent humor in the laughter which followed this sally, and gracefully drank the amended toast.
On another occasion, General Cheatham, who was an ardent devotee of the turf, discovered symptoms of a like weakness in General Grant; and after conversing for some time upon official matters, the conversation drifted to the subject of horses. The congenial topic was pursued to tlie satisfaction of both parties, until it ended in a gravely humorous suggestion from Cheatham to Grant that, as fighting was so troublesome a business, they might do weU to settle the vexing questions about which the sections were at war by a grand international horse-race on the Missouri shoi*e! Grant laughingly answered that he wished it might be so.
The following correspondence between Polk and Grant will show the endeavors of the former to culti-vat-e the amenities of war and to relax its rigorous demands so far as was compatible with the interests of the service.
General Polk to General Grant
Headquabtebs, 1st Division, Western Department, Columbus, Ky., October 14,1861. To the Commanding Officer at Cairo and Bird*s Point:
1 have in my camp a number of prisoners of the Federal army, and am informed there are prisoners belonging to the Missomi State troops in yours. I propose an exchange of these prisoners, and for that purpose send Captain Polk of the 'Artillery, and Lieutenant Smith of the Infantry, both of the Confederate army, with a flag of truce, to deliver to you this communication and to know your pleasxu*6.
The principles recognized in the exchange of prisoners effected on the 3d of September between Brigadier-General Pillow of the Confederate army and Colonel Wallace of the
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United States army are those I propose as a basis of that now contemplated. Respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Leonidas Polk, Major^General Commanding,
General Grant to General Polk.
Headquarters, District S. E. Missouri, Cairo, October 14,1861. General: Yours of this date is just received. In regard to the exchange of prisoners, I recognize no southern Confederacy myself, but will communicate with higher authority for their views. Should I not be sustained, I will find means of communicating with you. Respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Brigadier-General Commanding. To Major-Gbnbral Polk, Columbus, Ky.
After the battle of Belmont the following correspondence was exchanged between Generals Grant and Polk:
General Grant to General Polk.
Cairo, III., November 8,1861. General Commanding Forces^ Columbus, Ky.
Sir: In the skirmish of yesterday, in which both parties have behaved with so much gallantry, many unfortunate men were left upon the field of battle whom it was impossible to provide for.
I now send, in the interest of humanity, to have these unfortunates collected and medical attendance secured them.
Colonel Webster, Chief of Engineers, District Southeast Missouri, goes bearer of this, and will express to you my views upon the course that should be pursued under circumstances such as those of yesterday.
I am, sir, very respectfully.
Your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Brigadier-General,
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General Polk to Gefieral Grant,
HEADgUABTERSy IST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Columbus, Ky., November 8,1861. Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, U. S. A,:
I have received your note in regard to your wounded and killed left on the battlefield after yesterday's engagement.
The lateness of the hour at which my troops returned to the principal scene of the action prevented my bestowing the care upon your wounded which I desired. Such attentions as were practicable were shown them, and measures were taken at an early hour this morning to have them all brought into my hospitals. Provision was also made for taking care of your dead. The permission you desire under your flag of ti'uce is granted with pleasure, under such restrictions as the exigencies of our service may require.
In your note you say nothing of an exchange of prisoners, though you send me a private message as to your wiUingness to release certain wounded men and some invalids, taken from our list of sick in camp, and expect in return a corresponding list of prisoners. My own feeHngs would prompt me to waive again the unimportant affectation of declining to recognize these States as belligerents; but my government requires aU prisoners to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary of War. I have dispatched him to know if the case of the severely wounded by me would form an exception.
I have the honor to be
Your obedient servant,
L. Polk, Major-General, C, S. A.
General Grant to General PoJk,
Cairo, III., November 10,1861. Maiar-Generdl Polk, commanding at Columbus, Ky,
General: It grieves me to have to trouble you again with a flag of truce, but Mrs. Colonel Dougherty, whose husband is a prisoner with you, is very anxious to join him under such restrictions as you may impose, and I understand that some
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of your officers expressed the opinion that no objections would be interposed.
I will be most happy to reciprocate in a similar manner at any time you may request it. I am, general, very respectfully,
Tour obedient servant,
U. S. Grant, Brigadier'General^ U.S.A.
GenercU Polk to Getieral Grant.
Headquarters, 1st Division, Western Department, C. S. A. Brigadier-General U. S. Grant.
Sir: I am in receipt of your letter under cover of your flag of truce, asking for Mrs. Dougherty the privilege of joining her husband, who was unfortunately wounded in the affair of the 7th.
It gives me great pleasure to grant her the opportunity of rendering such grateful service, and 1 hope through her attentions the colonel may speedily be restored to such a condition of health as is compatible with the loss he is obliged to sustain.
Reciprocating your expressions of a readiness to interchange kind offices, I remain, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
L. Polk, Major-General Commanding.
Though General Polk's first battle had resulted in a victory for which he and his officers and men received the public thanks of the Confederate Congress, and though he had never stood higher, nor perhaps so high, in the esteem and confidence of his fellow-citizens, his anxiety to be relieved from military service was greater than ever. It was at this time that he received President Davis's letter declining, for the present, to accept his resignation j and, in the hope of release at a future but
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not distant day, he wrote to Mrs. Polk, under date of November 25, as follows:
I am in receipt of your letters informing me that you are comfortably settled in Nashville and satisfied with your location. I hope you and our dear children may have a pleasant winter, or one as much so as in the nature of things is practicable. I often think of you and long for the time to come when I can feel free to be among you, quietly settled, with nothing pressing upon me, so that I could enjoy your society again. This I trust may yet be our privilege, and that too at no very distant day. I am as busy a man as there is on the face of the earth, I dare say. From the time I get up in the morning until I go to bed at night, it is work, work, work, and has been so now for four months. How I manage to stand it, and have as good health as I do have (for I never had better in all my life), b a wonder unto many. But I take everything very quietly and am very patient. I think I have learned something of that virtue by my army experience. I hope, too, that in that respect I have done some good by example.
And again he wrote:
It is Christmas Day I A day on which angels sang *' Glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and good will toward men,'' and oh! how my heart yearns to join in the same song, if our enemies would let us. Indeed, I may say with truth, I can and do feel the full force of the sentiment of the song toward them. Notwithstanding the warlike purposes in their hearts, I feel no unkindness toward them or toward any living being, and would bless and pray for them if they would let me. But we trust now as ever that the Lord will deliver us out of their hands, and that with a great dehver-ance, and give them a better mind.
We now give an extract from a sketch of General Polk by Mrs. Margaret Sumner McLean, daughter of the late General Sumner, U. S. A., and wife of Colonel
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Eugene E. McLean, formerly captain of the Ist Infantry, U. S. A., and, during the war, of the Confederate army, a portion of the time being attached to the staff of General Polk.
It would be matter of pleasure if our pen could do justice to this brief and faithful chronicle—this picture from life by a gifted woman endowed with rare power of observation and insight into charact/er. We commend it to our readers.
When I caU to mind my recollections of General Polk, and remember the change that has taken place in my feelings and judgment from the day I saw him first, as the newly appointed bishop-general, for whom I felt some repugnance, till that last moment when he lay in his coffin,—" done to death" for a cause in which he believed and hallowed,—I seem to have been living two lives. But out of it all there grows stronger and stronger the conviction that such a man never hved and died in vain. Somewhere in this world, in the hearts of those who knew and loved him, must his memory ever evoke images of self-sacrifice, generosity, clear conceptions of right and wrong, a soul undimmed by sordid considerations, a genial manner that must have an ennobling effect.
For myself, his acquaintance was something more than a liberal education; it was an appreciative sympathy in the darkest hour of my hfe; a wise counsel that was as sorely needed as it was freely given. But these reminiscences ought to tell all this, and more, if at all true to him.
The first time I saw General Polk was in Richmond, at the beginning of the war, when the ** Spottswood House " was the Executive Mansion of the Confederacy, and I was one of the party that niet daily at dinner in what was known as the President's dining-room, where we met, from time to time, the distinguished men who came to the capital, and whom Mr. Davis was in the habit of entertainiuf? at these informal dinners. On this occasion he introduced General Polk to the party, with a playful remark to the effect Jhat life was said
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to be only a circle^ and his friend was handsomely iUustrat-ing it. I did not understand the application, not remembering, in the rush of events, the history of General Polk, or connecting him in my mind with the Bishop of Louisiana who had graduated at West Point; and when we were called on by Mr. Davis to pledge the new general, I turned, as I raised my glass, and said to my neighbor, '' What is it all about?"
*' The bishop, you know."
And as it dawned upon me, I showed such a revulsion of feeling that Mrs. Davis, hurriedly, but with the kindness that always characterized her where I was concerned, sent me a scrap of paper with the words," Don't look so disapprobative." All kinds of revolutionary things were happening in those days, and I was constantly being called on to adjust myself to new positions for which my earlier associations had entirely unfitted me,—such as seeing in society private soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the best families,—and I had learned the necessity before I had appreciated the reasons. So, in this case, I felt grateful to Mrs. Davis, ate my dinner, listened to all that was said, with a running commentary in my own mind not in the least complimentary to either the bishop or the general, though I often told him in after days that in my most prejudiced moments I acknowledged he looked every inch a soldier. And when I met his genial smile, and the least deprecatory expression, which I never saw afterward, it required something of an effort to be true to my principles.
General Polk was never tormented by doubts as to the propriety of his course. Having once made up his mind, he was not the man to look back; but, as be said, it was a new atmosphere, "fresh." I would suggest, "We generally temper it for churchmen," when he would laugh and rub his hands, saying, "Oh, that's too bad! that's too bad!" I see the twinkle in his eye now, and love to remember that in his gay moments, as in his more serious ones, he fulfilled my ideal of the Christian gentleman.
I did not see General Polk after he left Richmond until I
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met him in Columbus, under circumstances as different as could well be conceived, but which forever established his claims to my highest respect and admiration. He was at the time in command of the largest army in the West, and guarded the Mississippi at that point so effectually that after the repulse at Belmont the Federal troops never made another attempt to carry that point. We arrived in Columbus, or near it, at the very moment the battle of Belmont was being fought; Belmont being on the opposite or western bank of the river, and held, as we supposed, by Confederate troops. A shot across the bow of our boat, followed quickly by others, told a different tale, and the spy-glasses soon revealed the " blue-coats " at the guns. Only for a short time, however. The Confederates regained their position, General Polk having in person, at the head of his reinforcements, decided the fate of the day in favor of the Confederates, forcing General Grant to retire, leaving his wounded on the field. No sooner had our boat rounded to at the Columbus wharf, than an officer of General Polk's staff jumped on board, with orders that the boat proceed, without an instant's delay, to the opposite (Belmont) side of the river. There was no time for any one to disembark, and I found myself, in a few moments, in the midst of the horrors of war. The boat was needed to transport the prisoners, the dying, and the dead. And what a procession it was! So little in unison with the golden glow of the setting sun that bathed every near and distant object in a soft and tender light! Prisoners, mostly Germans, looking sulky; wounded of both armies, meeting the same treatment, and bearing their sufferings with the same stoicism; and, lastly, the dead Confederates, about thirty in number— those few who had friends to caro for their mortal remains. Down they came, one by one, wrapped each in his blanket, and laid side by side, with their faces uncovered. I had always heard that persons dying from gunshot wounds bore peaceful expressions; but of that whole group, I saw only one young man whose face I can even now recall with anything but terror. He looked as if he might indeed be sleeping his last sleep, while the others were disfigured and distorted by the
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^t.55] A SOLDIER'S BEATH'-BED. S7
passions of the last moment, and one man bad his band raised and clenched as if defying death itself. The whole scene was like some terrible nightmare. I seemed to be in a dream from which I oonld not awake till I found myself at General Polk's headquarters—a large frame-house entirely deserted and desolate enough, but in harmony with all I had seen and felt. As I was standing on the porch in the gray of the evening, not a li^ht in or about the house, a rapid, irregular firing and shouting announced the return of the victors. Some one advised me to go in, saying, " Victorious troops are always dangerous, and Columbus will be as unsafe as Belmont for the next hour or two." Just at this moment an old black woman appeared and said to me, '' There is a gentleman dying in one of the rooms." I went in without a moment's thought or fear, and saw Major Edward Butler,^ of Louisiana, mortally wounded, but retaining his consciousness and anxious to see G-eneral Polk. I sat down beside him. It seemed hours, though really it was not very long, before the general and staff returned full of exultation.
Thfibt old house was vivified. It was alive with martial spirit. It needed not the surroundings of ordinary comfort and convenience. It was the most glorious place I ever was in, and lit up with its own fire even the death-bed of that gallant man, who seemed to draw new life from it. His eye flashed with more than mortal brightness. His voice took a new ring, and when General Polk came into the room and bowed his head over that low pallet, the two men seemed to exchange characters: on General Polk's countenance was the pain and suffering; on Major Butler's the triumph, as he said, " General Polk, I want you to bear witness that I died in the line of my duty. I did not recklessly go in advance of my men till it became necessary; and my only regret is, that I cannot live to be of some service to my country." The general was entirely overcome j he could only grasp the hand of the dying man, and say in broken tones, ''I will make
i He was the son of Colonel E. G. W. Butler, of LouiaLana, the godson and ward of General Andrew Jackson.
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it my duty to fulfill your wishes; your father shall know all." After a few moments' silence, more eloquent than prayer, he softly left the room, saying to me, with a deep sigh, ''Ah! this is the other side of war''; while Major Butler said, '' There goes one of the noblest men God ever made." After some hours, during which we had faint 'hopes that Major Butler might be saved, it became evident that he could last but a few minutes longer, and General Polk was sent for. In the early dawn of the morning he came into the room, stood by the bed, took Major Butler's hand in his own, and, as the spirit winged its flight, raised his hand and invoked the blessing of Almighty God on that departing soul. There were some men in that room who had never before been impressed with the reality of a blessing, and who told me afterward they could never forget the power that seemed to emanate from the presence and words of the general. From that moment I never had any doubts as to the bishop-general being the right man in the right place. I dwell the more on this episode, and all it taught me and others, because to many the only vulnerable point in General Polk's whole career was his exchange of the miter for the sword, and because I would hope to ^ow how, in his life, he was as conscientiously true to the one as to the other. To my mind he elevated both.
The next incident I remember was going on a steamer, under a flag of truce, to make arrangements for the exchange of prisoners,—a trip suggested by the general, who, in the midst of the many duties and excitements following a successful battle, found time to think that a change of scene would be grateful to me after the terrible sights of the day before; and he said, " You must go on the boat and see that your Yankee friends get good terms." It was one of General Polk's characteristics that he carried no personal feelings into the war. He was actuated solely by a sense of duty, and used, while in Columbus, to meet the United States officers under flags of truce, and, if report spoke truly, forget for the time that they were enemies. I remember a captious article in a Memphis paper on such an interview, and the general's
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remark when urged to reply to it,—"My whole life must speak for me.^' He bad more unconscious grandeur of thought and action than almost any person I ever met; more of the tone that gives luster to character, like the enamel entering into the creation of the potter's hand, and imparting to the original substance and its accidental coloring a new value and brilliancy.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER H.
In the preceding chapter it is stated that when General Johnston took command in the West, General Polk was especially entrusted with the defense of the Mississippi River, and that for a time he was also charged with the defenses of the Tennessee and the Cumberland. After the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, General Johnston requested him to furnish a report of his connection with that work. In compliance with this request,. General Polk wrote:
Hbadquartbrs, Fibst Corps, Abut of thb Mississippi, Corinth, Miss., April 1, 1862.
Oeneral: In conformity with your order to report to you on the de-feudes of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at the time of my taking command in the West, I have to say that those defenses were at the time not included in my command, nor were they until after you assumed charge of the Western Department. My command, up to that time, was limited on the north and east by the Tennessee River.
Shortly after you took command of the Western Department, Lieutenant Dixon, of the Corps of Engineers, was instructed by you to make an examinatioD 'of the works at Forts Henry and Donelson, and to report upon them. These instructions were complied with, and he reported that the former fort, which was nearly completed, was built not at the most favorable position, but that it was a strong work; and instead of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it should be completed, and the other works constructed on the highlands just above the fort on the opposite side of the river. Measures for the accomplishment of this work were adopted as the means at our disposal would allow. A negro force, oflfercMi by the planters on the Tennessee in North Alabama, was employed on the work, and efforts were made to push it to completion as fast as the means at command would allow. Lieutenant Dixon also made a similar reconnaissance on the Cumberland, and gave it as his opinion that although a better position might have been chosen for the fortifications of the river, yet, under the circumstances then surrounding our command, it would be better to retain and strengthen the
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positioii chosen. He accordingly made surveyB for additional outworks, and the serylce of a cons^lderable slave force was obtained to construct them. This work was continued and kept under the supervision of Lieutenant Dixon. Lieutenant Dixon also advised the placing of obstructions in the Cumberland at a certain point below, where there was shoal water, so as to afford protection to the operatives engaged on the fortifications against the enemy's gunboats. This was done, and it operated as a check to the navigation so long as the water continued low.
You are aware that efforts were made to obtain heavy ordnance to arm these forts; but as we had to rely on supplies from the Atlantic sea-coast they came slowly, and it became necessary to divert a number of pieces intended for Columbus to the service of those forts.
The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers in question was the want of an adequate force,— a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerists. They were applied for by you, and also by me; and the appeal was made earnestly to every quarter whence relief might be hoped for. Why it was not furnished, others must say. I believe the chief reason, so far as infantry was concerned, was the want of arms. As to experienced artillerists, they were not in the country, or, at least, to be spared from other points.
When General Tilghraan was made abrigadier^general, he was assigned by you to the command of the defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland. It was at the time when the operations of the enemy had begun to be active on those rivers, and the difficulty of communicating as rapidly as the exigencies of the service required, through the circuitous route to Columbus, made it expedient for him to place himself in direct communication with the general headquarters.
Nevertheless, all the support I could give him, in answer to his calls, was afforded.
He received from Columbus a detachment of artillery officers, as instructors of his troops in that arm, on two several occasions, and all the infantry at my command that could be spared from the defenses of Columbus.
The importance of gunboats as an element of power in our military operations was frequently brought to the attention of the government.
One transport boat, the " Eastport,'' was ordered to be purchased and converted into a gunboat on the Tennessee River; but it was, unfortunately, too late to bo of any service.
Respectfully your obedient servant.
L. Polk, Major-Oeneral Commanding.
To GEMBBAii A. S. Johnston, Commanding Army of the Mississippi, Corinth, Miss.
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CHAPTER in.
COLUMBUS. January to March, 1862.
Columbus after the battle of Belmont— Efforts of Johnston and Polk to obtain reinforcements.—General Polk to Mr. Davis on operations in Missouri.— General Polk sends batteries to General Price and regiments to General Johnston.— General Polk*s appeal to Governor Pettus of Mississippi and to the authorities of Tennessee.— General Polk again urges the acceptance of his resignation.—Arrival of General Beauregard.— State of General Beauregard*s health.—Generals Polk, Stewart, Hal-leck, Cullom, and Admiral Footers views as to the strength of Columbus. — General Beauregard entertains a different opinion.—Evacuation of Columbus ordered.— General Polk wishes to hold it— Letters to Mrs. Polk.—Extract from oificial report
The winter at Columbus was one of wat<.»hful suspense. The Union troops, as predicted by General Polk, intended to make their next important movement at some point in the West, with a view of opening the Mississippi River.
With an extensive frontier to defend, and an adequate force at no single point, it may be readily conceived that throughout the line there was an anxious feeling, (general Johnston made every appeal in his power, both to Confederate and State authorities, for aid. General Polk, on his part, in harmony with Johnston's views, spared no effort, official or individual, to arouse the national and local authorities to a sense of the importance of successfully meeting the anticipated advance. At his request General Alcorn went to Jackson to see
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Governor Pettus of Mississippi; General Cheatham to Nashville to confer with Governor Harris of Tennessee; and Mr. N. R. Jennings to Richmond, on a mission to President Davis. Each of these delegates carried information of the expected movement, and each was instructed to urge the sending of reinforcements and to say that it was of the utmost importance that the South should put forward its strength at once in Kentucky. In the meanwhile General Polk continued his efforts to make Columbus a stronghold, and was doing all that was possible, with the limited means at his disposal, to put Island No. 10, New Madrid (in connection with the island), and Fort Pillow in a state of defense.
Solicitous to have the Federals in Missouri held in check by the Confederate forces there, in order to keep them from the left flank of his own line. General Polk also sent a messenger to Price and McCullough to know their plans and the state of their forces. On January 3,1862, he wrote to President Davis:
I gave General Price to understand that I regarded energetic action on his part, in keeping the enemy employed in Missouri, of the highest importance to the defense of my present position, and that I hoped he would leave no effort unmade to keep himself in the field during the winter. In my letter to him I expressed the opinion that if the Confederate Government could help Missouri from the east, it must be through Columbus, and I was not without hope of yet aiding in the emancipation of St. Louis through this route.
So long as the Federal forces imder Halleck are kept employed by Price in Missouri, they cannot cooperate with Buell against Johnston, nor be concentrated against me on my right or left flank. I hope, therefore, we shall not fail to occupy him fully with all the resources at our command. I have sent General Price several batteries; troops I have none to spare.
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As a part of the history of this period, we here give Price's answer to Polk; it was not at hand, however, when Polk wrote Mr. Davis. The letter really relates specially to a suggestion from Polk that a combined naval and land attack might be made upon Cairo and St. Louis before the enemy's flotilla was ready. See Correspondence with Admiral Hollins and Colonel Bowen, War Records Office:
Head Quarters, Mo., State Guard, Springfield, December 23d, 1861.
General: I acknowledge with very great pleasure the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst. It was handed to me yesterday, by Mr. Burton, who also gave me^the information, which you desired him to communicate to me. I fully agree with you that it is all important that we should be kept advised (so far as may be safe or expedient) of each other's position, strength and plans, & shall be glad to aid you in the accomplishment of that object. Your plans, as made known to me by Mr. Burton, meet my full concurrenpe, & I promise you my earnest cooperation in the execution of them.
There are two main obstacles in the Way of the successful prosecution of the war in this State, one of which ought to have been long since overcome, & the other of which ought never to have existed, & the present existence of both of which is due mainly, if not altogether to the Conduct of Genl. McCulloch.
1st The fact that the great majority of those who desire to take up arms on the part of the South, are prevented from doing so by the enemy's occupation of the State, which closes to them every avenue of approach to my army, and
2d The dissatisfaction which General McCulloch's constant refusal to cooperate with us has engendered in the minds of the people of Missouri, & which lead them to doubt whether the Confederate Government really S3anpathizes with, and desires to aid, them.
The most populous and the truest counties of the State lie upon, or north of the Missouri River. Had Genl. McCulloch, in response to my urgent entreaties accompanied me to that
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River, immediately after the Battle of Springfield, we could have easily maintained our position there, until my Army (which was in fact augmented from less than 6,000, to more than 16,000 men during the few. days we lay there) would have been increased to at least 50,000, and four-fifths of the State would have fallen without a struggle into our possession. As it was, however, I was soon threatened by overwhelming numbers, & compelled to fall back again to the Southern border of the State; & thousands of those who had flocked to my standard, feeling that they had been betrayed and abandoned by the Confederate Government returned to their homes, discontented and disheartened.
Again, after the late retreat of the enemy from the Southwest, I begged Genl. McCulloch to accompany me to the Missouri, & he again refused to do so. I started thither with my own Army, & reached the Osage just as the time of service of three-fourths of my men was expiring. Nearly every one of them had left his home, months before, without an hour's notice, and leaving their families unprotected and unprovided for. A severe winter was at hand. The men were themselves badly clad, & not one of them had ever received a dime in payment of his services. Many of them insisted upon going home for a few weeks to procure clothing for themselves <fe to make some provision for the comfort of their families, which were exposed not only to the severity of a Missouri winter, but to the fury of an enemy, whose barbarity cannot be described. I could not refuse their reasonable request, & my army became so small that it would have been highly perilous for me to have crossed the Osage, threatened as I was from Kansas, from Sadalia, & from Rolla. Knowing, however, that thousands of the people on the Northern side of the Missouri would come to me even at this season, if I could but open the way for them, I sent a detachment of 1,100 men to Lexington, which after remaining only a part of one day, gathered together about 2,500 recruits, and escorted them in safety to me, at Osceola. Could the detachment have remained on the River only a few days longer the number of recruits would have been indefinitely
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increased, but the enemy having gotten insight into the movement concentrated their forces against it, & compelled it to return. There are many counties, north of the River in which organized companies of from 500 to 1,500 are now ready to join & are only awaiting an opportunity to do so.
Appreciating as I do the great importance of this movement in the direction of the Missouri, I wrote to Genl. McCulloch again on the 6th inst. begging him to cooperate with me in it. I received a reply a few days ago, written on the 14th inst. at Ft. Smith, by Col. Mcintosh, who commands the Division in the absence of the Genl. He says that it is impossible for him to grant my request, because he has been compelled to send three Regiments into the Indian Territory, & was expecting to send others for the defense of Memphis, & because also of the want of clothing for his troops & of "the great distance to be travelled in the depth of winter over the bleak prairies of Missouri." With the cooperation of those troops I could not only have advanced to the River, & recruited my army to any desirable extent, but could have destroyed the Rail Roads of which the enemy have always had possession, and which give them an immense advantage over us; & this being done we could have easily driven the enemy into St. Louis before the opening of Spring; & while accomplishing this we would have created a powerful diversion in favor of our armies in Ky. My troops and the people knew these facts & the knowledge of their existence, creates as I before said the greatest dissatisfaction with & distrust of, the Confederate Government. Thb feeling grows daily, & will do us uncal-culable harm if it be not speedily quieted. There is not at this lime a single Confederate Soldier in the State, nor does there seem to be any likelihood that one will come into it, during the winter; whilst there are at least 50,000 troops in it, from Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana & Ohio. How long can we be expected to carry on this unequal contest, almost completely isolated as we are from the Southern States, & surrounded on three sides by hostile States, & especially when it is taken into consideration that we have not
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a single dollar with which to conduct the war. Something must be done, & that speedily. I have abandoned all hope of getting the cooperation of Genl. McCulloch. Your kind letter comes therefore most seasonably and doubly welcome. We may yet make this winter Campaign result in the dehverance of Missouri; or at least in great good to our cause. I will have at least twenty thousand men under my command in a very short time, & will gladly unite with you in a movement upon St. Louis, as suggested by you. If you will mature your plans & communicate them to me, you will be seconded in the execution of them not only by myself, but by every man in my Army, & whether we succeed in the main object or not we will accomplish a great deal. Our people will see that the Govt, really desires to assist them; their way to the Army will, at the same time, be opened to them by th'e withdrawal of the enemy's forces from the rest of the State for the protection of St. Louis; & they will come to us from every quarter by hundreds & by thousands. I am informed too that there are over 6,000 men in St. Louis ready to spring to arms at the first gleam of hope. I do therefore hope that you will find it expedient to undertake the execution of your bold, & well conceived plan. You will have my hearty cooperation. The bearer, Mr. Burton will inform you more particularly of the strength of my Army.
If this letter is read in connection with the " Fight for Missouri" written by Colonel Thomas L. Snead, General Price's Chief of Staff, an excellent picture of affairs in Missouri during 1861 can be had, so far as they were controlled by the State forces, known as the State Guard, and by the Confederate forces controlled by General McCuUough. There was at no time cordial co-operation between these two and it was not always easy to say just where the blame lay. It is plain, however, that just before and after the battle of Springfield the Confederate Government lacked boldness in its measures for the support of its friends in Missouri.
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In response to a call for men from General Johnston, General Polk wrote on December 30:
I have sent forward to you all of the infantry of Bowen's command, as also Reynolds^s and Campbeirs regiments. I have also ordered forward Hudson's and Beltzhoover's batteries. These, I suppose (for it has been very difficult to get accurate returns), would make the force about 5000; I wish I could make it 10,000.
I am informed General McCullough's force in Arkansas is 10,000 strong, and is in winter quarters. It is certain now that no movement will be made by the enemy in southwestern Missouri until spring. I beg leave respectfully to submit that in that case this force might, with great—very great—advantage, be employed in southeastern Missouri during the emergency immediately before us, and therefore ask that it may be ordered to the defense of New Madrid and the region round about. The forces there have all disbanded, and I have no reason to hope they can again be enlisted in any short time. This leaves me to provide force for the defense of New Madrid, and my resources for that purpose are very limited. I have had a fort constructed there, and armed it strongly with heavy guns. I have placed for its defense two Arkansas regiments under Colonel Gantt, and these imperfectly armed j but that side of the river should have a much stronger force, and I know not where it is to come from, if not from McCullough's force.
General Johnston fully appreciated the importance of bringing McCuUough^s force over to the Mississippi River at New Madrid, and he applied for half of it j but a threatened movement of Federals from southwest Mis. souri seemed to require that all of it should be Irft to protect Arkansas. If 10,000 men, or even 5000, could have been placed at New Madrid, and a like force brought up from the Gulf coast, where it was not then needed, it is permissible to believe that the disasters so soon to fall
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npon the Kentucky line might have been avoided. But the influence of individual States (in accord with an exaggerated application of the doctrine of " State rights ") hampered the general government by insisting, in answer to local clamor, upon the retention of troops at points in no way vital to the common cause. For this reason concentration was prevented. The error was soon realized, but it was then too late to rectify it.
In the autumn of 1861 Major-General Halleck was assigned to the command of the Federal armies in the . West, and under his direction, with the special supervision of Mr. Lincoln, the greatest efforts were made to open in the coming spring an active campaign on both sides of the Mississippi. Tn southwest Missouri a column under General Curtis was gathering to move into Arkansas; at St. Louis and Cairo two others were foi-m-ing—one under General Grant, anotlier under General Pope—to operate down the Mississippi, or the Tennessee and Cuml)erland, as future developments might prove best. General Buell at the same time was organizing his forces for a movement upon General Hai-dee at Bowling Green, and upon Crittenden in tlie eastern part of the Statue. The first of these operations Buell himself directed; the second he committed to General George H. Thomas. By the middle of Febniary these several corps, aggregating hardly less than 100,000 men, were ready for the march. To oppose them, General Johnston must.ered about 55,000 in all at the several points upon his widely extended line. •
General Polk had organized an efficient secret service which kept him informed of the preparations in his front, and in a series of letters laid his information before the proper officials. On January 12 he wrote to President Davis:
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His flotilla is composed of the gfonboats, mortar-boats, and transports enumerated in the accompanying slip; this is taken from one of their own publications, and Verified substantially by other information. This flotilla is to be supported by a land force; of the number composing this force we have no certain information, but we have reason to believe it will reach from 30,000 to 50,000. Since taking possession of this place in September, I have been actively engaged in putting it into as complete a condition of defense as the means at my disposal would allow. These means have been far less than I desired. The work, however, is one of decided strength, and it will offer a stem resistance to any attack that may be made upon it. I regret to say that my force is much below what is required for the work before it. Within the last fortnight, under a call from General Johnston, I felt obliged to send him between 4000 and 5000 men, which I could not weU spare. I have called upon the governors of the States helow us for aid. The aid has not been furnished as the necessities of my position demand. We shall, however, make the best defense our circumstances tciU allow.
Of the cliaracter of these defenses no one was better fitted to speak than General A. P. Stewart, who commanded the river batteries. In a letter to the writer he says:
On the occupation of Columbus, where General Polk assumed command in person, he applied himself diligently to preparations for defense. Extensive works were oonstructed on the bluff and ridge above the town, numerous batteries lined the river-bank at the foot of the bluff, the approaches from below were guarded by defensive works, and the channel of the river protected by a system of torpedoes. A force was camped across the river to clear away the timber from the west bank, in order to expose the ground to the fire from the forts and batteries. The wisdom of this precaution was demonstrated on the 7th of November, the day on which the battle of Bebnont occurred. During the winter,
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preparations for defense were continued. Magazines were constructed and stored with ammunition, storehouses filled with provisions, the works were improved and extended, the troops drilled, every practicable means adopted to render the place as strong as possible and capable of standing a siege or assault by any force the enemy could bring against it.
In a letter written early in January General Polk expresses himself as pleased with the condition of the w^orks at Columbus:
We are still quiet here. I am employed in making more and more difficult the task to take this place, and feel I am, in a good measure, accomplishing it. I have now, mounted and in position, all round my works, 140 cannon of various calibers, and they look not a little formidable. Besides this I am paving the bottom of the river with submarine batteries, to say nothing of a heavy chain across the river. I am planting mines out in the roads also, so that if they make their appearance, we will not fail to give them a warm reception.
Early in January General Halleck reached the conclusion that the special object for which General Polk labored had been accomplished, for he wrote General McClellan on January 20:
** Columbus cannot be taken without an immense siege-train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses j they are very strong. But it can be tiu'ned, paralyzed, and forced to surrender.'' ^
In accordance with the idea suggested in this dispatch a movement upon Forts Henry and Donelson was decided upon. It was to cover his preparations for this advance that General Halleck, on January 6, directed General Grant to make a demonstration against Columbus. Gen-
1 "Ofttcial Records, War of Rebellion." vol. vlU, p. 509.
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end Buell at the same time was requested to aid by a simultaneous advance toward Bowling Green. On January 14 Grant moved from Cairo to the Kentucky shore with a force of 8000 men, and at the same time pushed out from Paducah a column of 5000. Advancing the main body to within fifteen miles of C.\)lumbus, he halted and sent out reconnoitering parties. Some such movement had been considered a possibility as part of the spring campaign, and in December Johnston had suggested to Polk that, in case the enemy should attempt to penetrate into Tennessee by passing between Columbus and the Tennessee River, he might withdraw from his j)ost force enough to oppose their march. Subsequently, however, to meet the threatened movement upon Bowling Green, he had withdrawn 5000 men from Polk; these, as has been said, were sent about two weeks before Grant's movement. This left Polk but 12,800 men, and he saw that even if Grant continued his march toward Tennessee as had been suggested, the necessity of keeping a good gaiTison in tlie works at Columbus, to meet any sudden descent of the large flotilla them at Cairo, would leave him too small a force to do more than operate on the enemy's flank and rear. He sent out his cavalry with two regiments of infantry as a force of observation, and waited for further developments of the enemy's design.
Pending these developments, he wrote to Johnston, January 17:
In view of tbe paramomit importance of holding this position, which is the key to the whole Mississippi Valley, it has appeared to me that my first duty was to make everything bend to the accomplishment of that object. This will require me to take no risk that may involve its loss.
In view, then, of the smallness of my force, I see nothing
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left me but to strengthen my position and await his coming, making only such diversions as may be attempted with safety, and throwing the responsibility of taking care of such force as we cannot dispose of on the War Department and the people of the States around us generally. It is an alternative I should gladly have avoided, but the inadequacy of the force at my disposal leaves me none other. The soundness of the position in my judgment cannot be disputed, especially as I have provisions enough in store within my Hues to last a force of 25,000 men 120 days. I have resolved, therefore, to stand a siege, and look to the general government for such aid as the War Department and the country may afford me.
The enemy, however, soon satisfied with the demonstration, withdrew to their original positions in order to complete the preparations for the advance upon the real objective points, Ports Henry and Donelson.
General Polk now made a second attempt to resign from the army. He had never ceased to hope for the time when he might retire, and, learning that General Beauregard had been ordered to Columbus, he wrote President Davis, presenting his resignation. The following was written to his wife, on January 31:
It is very cold here,—the weather bad, and all military operations stopped. You see Beauregard has been ordered here; that suits me very well, as it will furnish the ground of my insisting on Davis's allowing me now to retire, which I have done by letter by Hamilton and sent it to Richmond. But this is a secret I presume he cannot now decline. I am resolutely prepared to do my duty, whatever may be the result; with God's blessing, I hope I shall be faithful to whatever issue awaits me.
Mr. Davis declined to accept the resignation. Fort Henry had fallen, and Port Donelson was closely invested, and now, more than ever, every man was needed.
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In the face of disaster General Polk could not withdraw; the reasons which impelled him to enter the army at the beginning of the conflict were now even more pressing. He therefore again accepted the President's refusal, and moved on in the discharge of duties he had hoped to resign into the hands of the distinguished officer the government had sent to his aid. Here is a letter to Mrs. Polk, begun on February 15, in which he teUs something of his plan to cooperate in the defense of Fort Donelson:
I see they have had hard fighting at Fort Donelson the last four days, and that our troops have held their own thus far very decisively. This is cause of great congratulation certainly, and I hope Johnston may be able to give that column all the aid it needs. I send out toward Paducah to-morrow a strong column under the direction of General Cheatham, for the purpose of checking reinforcements to the enemy at Donelson. The weather is wretched for such a march, and the roads worse: but it is necessary, and must be done. I shall also make a demonstration on Bird's Point.
Sunday, 16th. I have just received a dispatch from General Johnston instructing me to withhold the movement on Paducah. General Beaiu*egard is expected to-morrow; he is unwell at Jackson. His staff is here. I have thus far fulfilled my mission, by general consent, which was to hold the Mississippi River against all comers. I have strongly fortified my position so as to make the enemy stand at a respectful distance. I am now ready to turn over my stewardship to General Beauregard, and hope he may take good care of it in the future as I have in the past. I shall, of course, give him my frank and most generous support.
In the latter part of January General Beauregard had been ordered to report to General Johnston for assignment to duty at Columbus. He arrived at Jackson, Tenn., about the middle of February, but, being too ill
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to proceed to Columbus, he requested Oeneral Polk to visit him at Jackson. The fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the declared purpose of the Federals to push their forces up the Tennessee River, thus turning Columbus on the right, made the further occupation of the position a serious question. General Beauregard had sent his chief of staff, Colonel Jordan, and his engineer officer, Captain Harris, to Columbus, and they had made such reports to him concerning the nature of the works that he was inclined to doubt their efficiency. This, together with the necessity he was under to gather as large a force as possible with which to meet the enemy's movement up the Tennessee, seemed to convince him that Columbus should be evacuated and the defense of the river made at Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow. These points he considered not only more defensible than Columbus, but defensible with a smaller force, which would enable him to take, for field operations, a part of the command then holding the river, to use in conjunction with the troops he was gathering along the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. When, in the conference at Jackson, General Beauregard unfolded these views to General Polk, Polk was not disposed to yield a ready assent to all of them. He recognized the necessity for gathering a force for field operations.* It was indeed exactly what he and every other prominent officer in the department had for six months been urging upon the'authorities. He, however, questioned the advisability, even for this purpose, of giving up Colimibus. The works had been accepted and approved by Colonel Gilmer, the chief engineer of the department, an officer
1 For abstract of monthly return of Polk's force, January and February, 1862, see " Official Records, War of Bebellion,'' vol. yii, pp. 853, 912.
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who subsequently became the head of the Corps of Engineers in the Confedeitusy; and they also met with the approval of General Johnston. General Beauregard himself was, it is true, an able engineer; it was that very fact which had caused the government to order him to Columbus to take charge of the work hitherto consigned to Polk; but Beauregard had neither been to Columbus, nor had he seen the works. He was a sick man relying upon the judgment of others, and Polk, looking to Beauregard himself, was reluctant to accept the opinions of his staff officers as final upon so vital a question, and he held this opinion, even though ready to accord proper weight to the judgment and experience of the officei-s in question. In spite of any strategical fault which might be committed in an attempt to hold it, and Mrith a full recognition of the possibility of ultimate capture, Polk urged upon Beauregard that, just at that time, the moral effect of a determined stand at Columbus would be of great service to the Confederate arms. Admitting the correctness of some of the criticisms passed upon the works, there was yet time to correct the alleged serious defects. In fact, he maintained that the labor and time needed to transfer the guns and stores and put the former into position at Island No. 10 would be greater than that needed for the proposed alteration.^ As to the force that would be
1 The objection raised was chiefly against a portion of the works provided for defense upon the land side. A criticism based upon the presence of wooden warehouses inside the forts was founded upon a misconception of the actual condition present
There were ample earth-covered mafi^ajEines within the fort for the storing of all supplies needed for a siege. The buildings in question had been erected for temporary use early in the occupation, and had been continued merely because they afforded a convenient depot for all the troops on the heights. There was no intention to keep them as permanent depots, and in twenty-four hours all could have been demolished.
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needed, General Polk was willing to undertake to hold Columbus with six or seven thousand men, or with even a smaller number, if General Beauregard would consent, —counting, of course, upon the ability of that officer to give some occupation to the enemy, then on the Tennessee River in his rear.
Writing to a member of his family fropi Jackson, on February 16, he said: "As I was the first of our general officers to enter Kentucky, it seems as if I am to be the last to leave it. I went there to stay, and I feel it my duty to do what I went for."
It is more than probable that General Polk's attitude up<m this question caused General Beauregard to present to the government the alternative of attempting to hold Columbus with a reduced garrison. Be that as it may, on February 18 he sent Greneral Cooper the following dispatch:
(Confidential.)
Jackson, Tenn., February 18,1862.
Columbus with present defensive resources must meet the fate of Fort Donelson with the loss of the entire army, as all ways of retreat by rail or river can be cut off by the enemy's superior force from Tennessee River—a hazard contrary to the art of war. Therefore should now decide whether to bold Columbus to the last extremity, with its garrison [say tbirty-five hundred (3500) men], withdrawing other forces for subsequent use; or the evacuation of the place, and new defensive position taken. My health is too feeble to authorize me to assume command, but I shall advise with General Polk.
[Signed] G. T. Beaubegabd.
General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va,
It is idle to speculate now upon the advantages or disadvantages resulting from the abandonment of Colum-
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bus, and the subject would not be touched upon here were it not that General Beauregard, without ever making a personal inspection of the position, committed his judgment to others, and upon their report assumed it to be indefensible and condemned it in favor of Island No. 10. It is sometimes a wise thing to take into consideration our enemy's estimate of our positions. This was the main key to General Grant's success, for he never lent ear to his own fears without intuitively balancing them with what he felt must be those of his opponent. Columbus, in the exaggerated language then prevalent in that section, had been dubbed by the enemy the "Gibraltar of the West." General Halleck, whose words have already been quoted, wrote on the 20th of January: " Columbus cannot be taken without an immense siege-train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses; they are very strong." In confirmation of this opinion Qi^neral Cul-lom, his chief of staff and an accomplished engineer, wrote after the evacuation had been made: