" Though rising from a sick-bed to go upon the expedition, I could not resist landing to examine the works, which are of immense strength, consisting of tier upon tier of batteries on the river front, and a strong parapet and ditch covered by a thick abattis on the land side."'

Admiral Poote, who was conducting the naval expedition, wrote on the same date:

" The works are of very great strength, consisting of formidable tiers of batteries on the water side, and on the land side surrounded by a ditch and abattis." ^

Such, in fact, was the enem)r's estimate of the strength of Columbus that they had no intention of attempting

1 '' Official BecordB, War of Rebellion/' vol. yil, p. 437. s Ibid,, p. 436.

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then to reduce it by a direct attack. Having turned it on the right by way of the Tennessee, they were at the time of the evacuation moving to turn it on the left by way of New Madrid. They quickly captured this point, and in so doing placed Island No. 10, the point occupied in place of Columbus, in precisely the same position in which they intended to place the latter position. But there was a difference: Columbus was prepared for just such an emergency, the enemy were afraid of it, and its garrison had confidence in it; whereas the new line had to be hastily occupied and armed, all in the face of an advancing and thorouglily prepared enemy. Herein lies the chief cause of the poor showing which the Confederate forces made in the operations at Island No. 10 and New Madrid, as well as for the complaints of unreadiness on that line which General Beauregard's biographer felt called upon to make.

The 7000 men drawn from Columbus held Island No. 10 about one month. The same force could have done as well — and better — at Columbus. Those who were then on the Mississippi, and who took part in the defense, could plainly see that the effect of the evacuation upon the Confederate troops was disheai*tening, and to this extent demoralizing. There appeared to be a feeling among the men that if they could not make a successful stand in a position upon which they had spent so much time and labor, and upon which they had come to rely even to the extent of a willingness to withstand a siege in it, there was small chance of their being able to acquit themselves creditably in this hastily assumed position. As nothing could have happened at Columbus which could have been worse than the fate which soon overtook them at Island No. 10, many of these men always regretted that the issue had not been tried

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as General Polk had intended to make it. Retreat and disaster seemed the order of the day everywhere; but this would have been one bold stand in the midst of the ruins of Johnston's line—an example of much importance just then, when every effort was needed to inspire tlie people and collect a force with which to meet tlie victorious Federal armies. Good or bad, Columbus should have been held.

General Polk assented to Beauregard's plan, but not until he had returned to Columbus, and then— tvom aU that can be gathered—more through the desire to render his commander an effective and hearty support than from a conviction of the correctness of all that commander's views. Beauregard's statement that Polk consented to the evacuation because he was con\dnced by Beauregard and his officers of tlie weakness of the works, is an error, and is disproved by what Polk wrote to the Prt»si-dent of the Confederacy on the 11th of March. In speaking of the evacuation Polk said: " I had been there [Columbus] just six months, had a small force always under my command, had made the post well-nigh impregnable, a solid banier, shutting out the enenay from the Mississippi Valley by the river."

The necessity comj)elling its abandonment was a trying one, but Polk uttered no criticism; on the contrary, he went on to describe what was being done to offset the loss of Columbus in words that showed a frank support of all that his superior ordered. On the 20th of February he received orders to evacuate the position. The manner of its accomplishment is given in the following letter and in his official report. Writing to Mrs. Polk on the 2d of March, he says:

This is my last day and hour in Columbus j the evacuation has been complete, and all are gone except myself and staff.

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Never was anything done with greater celerity, or so completely ; for we left virtually nothing to our enemy but the works. Those I sadly regret.

Columbus has filled the measure of its mission. It commanded and protected the valley of the Mississippi; we would have continued there with our small garrison had the center and right wing been able to stand.

It was a military necessity which brought me here ) it is a military necessity which takes me away. I leave under the exactions of necessity and the orders of the Secretaiy of War.

And his official report says:

In five days we moved the accumulations of six months, taking with us all our commissary and quartermaster stores, an amount sufficient to supply my whole command for eight months, all our powder and other ammunition and ordnance stores (excepting a few shot and gun-carriages), and every heavy gun in the forts. Two 32-pounders in a remote earth work were the only available guns left, and these, with three or four small and indifferent carronades similarly situated, were spiked and rendered useless.

The whole number of pieces of artillery comprising our armament was one hundred and forty.^

With the evacuation of Columbufi,^ General Polk's connection with the river defenses virtually ceased, but, owing to General Beauregard's continued illness, repoils

1 ''Oi&cial Records, War of Rebellion,'* voL vii, p. 437.

2 The evacuation of Columbus wa«, in fact, the most successfully conducted evacuation of so extensively fortified a position made during the Civil War. It is true the enemy was not in front of the works, but their gunboats were so placed as easily to command them. This, together with the proximity of General Pope's force, then moving to the attack on New Madrid, made rapid action a necessity. The work was not only rapid, but thorough. TUs is shown, not only by the official report, but by the fact that the critics in our own lines—who, Just then, were very active —could pick no flaw. The ordnance stores, torpedoes, and anchors reported by the enemy as found in the works were insiguiflcant in quantity, and all save the few anchors were too badly damaged to warrant removal.

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were made to him from time to time as to the condition of affairs on the river. These were transmitted to department headquarters, and such suggestions as were received were transmitted to General McCown at Madi'id Bend. General Polk's plan, as we have seen, had been to make three lines of defense: Columbus, Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow. Columbus was given up; the other two remained. Both were strong positions. For contending with gimboat^ the hills at Fort Pillow rendered the fire of the guns more effective, while the isolation of Island No. 10 was thought to render it easier of defense with a small force. Each had its special advantages. Captain Grey, of the Engineer Corps, had charge of the construction of works at the Island. Captain Montgomery Lynch was the ranking engineer at Fort Pillow. Both of these officers were most faithful in the discharge of their duties, and did everything that the resources at their disposal permitted. AU of the guns being needed at Columbus, or on the Tennessee and Cimiber-land rivers, but few were in position, either upon the Island or at Fort Pillow, until after the evacuation of Columbus. But as early as November 30 Captain Lynch reported the work imder his charge as about completed, and said that he considered it, with its complement of guns, a very strong position.

The defense of the river was entrusted to General McCown, aided by General A. P. Stewart and General Marshall Walker. All these officers had been educated at West Point, and all, excepting Stewart, had recently been officers in the army of the United States. McCown had served in the artillery, and, being the only general officer of the division having any such special training, he was chosen to conduct the defenses at Island No. 10 and New Madrid. On February 27 he occupied those

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places with his command. The works at New Madrid—a well-constructed fort and some field-works—being sufficient for the force detailed to hold that post, McCown devoted himself principally to the works at Island No. 10, so that by March 10, the day the enemy began tlie bombardment, he had fifty-two heavy guns in position, with a force at his disposal nimibering about 8000 men. The story of the defense and capture of these posts is beyond the scope of this work, however, as General Polk no longer had any connection with them.

During the winter of 1860-61 General Polk's family had been living in Nashville. But the retreat of the Confederate forces from Bowling Green induced them to anticipate the evacuation of Nashville by removing to New Orleans, their old home. His letters to Mrs. Polk allude to that subject, and at the same time enable us to follow his own movements. On the 10th of March he writes:

Now that you have decided on something definite for yourself and the family, my mind is easy, and is the more so because I think that New Orleans, as 1 have said, is the very best place in the whole land for you. There is but one thing I wish you to do, and that is to be most rigidly economicaL You know the means of hving that you have, and must, all of yon, live accordingly. You can set a good example in that respect to our people, and so be doing a high religious duty. If I can in any way help you by sending you anything, let me know.

Beauregard has at last assumed command, and, as you may suppose, it has lightened my burden. I enclose a copy of his address. He has divided his army, which he calls the Army of the Mississippi, into two grand divisions—the first under my command, the second under command of General Bragg. We have been together in Jackson for a number of days, arranging a program for our approaching campaign.

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Bragg's army is coining up from Pensacola, and we are hoping to have Johnston's from Middle Tennessee to join us. If you look on the map, you will see the shortest line from the Tennessee River to Memphis is from about Savannah. It is at that point the enemy is landing his army, which he took up some days ago in sixty transports. I think there will be an effort on the part of the enemy to pass from Savannah to Memphis — which will, of course, be opposed, and must bring on a-collision in less than ten days. The point at which we are concentrating is near Bethel, on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. We are all in good spirits, and feel confident of the final issue. The enemy has just now begpin to enter upon the really serious difficulties attendant upon an effort at conquest. He is-leaving his own country and entering upon ours.

Meek is at New Madrid. He is engaged in holding the river against the descending Yankee army. It is the present point of interest in the West. They were fighting there all day yesterday, though with small loss on our side as yet. My medical director. Dr. Bell, I am sorry to say, had both legs shot off below the knee. Write us at Jackson.

On the 14th of March he writes from Humboldt:

Here I am, a second time about the last man left in my present encampment. My command has all gone before me to Bethel and Corinth, and I am attending to the closing of the few things left. I have been here since the evacuation of Columbus. We have assorted and sent forward to the homes of the soldiers and officers all extra baggage; have cut down everything to the standard of " future wants," and are now ready to take the field for the spring campaign.

The enemy has gone up in large force to Pittsburg and Eastport, and we are concentrating to meet him in front of one or the other as he shall choose. My command. General Bragg's, and General Johnston's will concentrate for that purpose, and I think we are likely to be allowed to get ready for him before he makes his appearance. There is a feeling

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of confident expectation that he cannot succeed in that collision, but must fail signally. It is our business, under God, to see that he does so.

Meok has' been under veiy heavy fire at New Madrid, and has escaped; but he escaped, I hear, narrowly. I have not heard many particulars, but have no doubt the boy did his duty. He is a fine fellow. He has gone with his command down to Fort Pillow, the army which was at Madrid having retired thither. You will be pleased to hear we are holding our own at Island No. 10 and Madrid Bend. That place has been strongly fortified. They have been shelling it for the last three days, but have made no impression whatever upon it. I do not believe they can carry it with the gunboats. alone, and for the present they can use nothing else. For myself I do not feel downhearted in the least. I think there will be a way found by which we can carry our point.

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CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLES OP SHZLOH AND CORINTH. March to June, 1862.

General Beauregard officially assumes command of First Division of the Western Department, March 5,1862.—Troops now sent from the South.— Murmiirings of the soldiers at the delay.— Confederates concentrate at Corinth.— General Bragg's double office.—Faulty assign-

<»ment of the troops.—Forces at ShUoh.—Delays.— Positions of the opposing forces.—Tardiness of General Bragg's corps.—Cheatham*s rapid advance. — Faulty arrangement of troops in the line of battle.

— Confederate council of war before Shiloh.—General Beauregard wishes to retire the army.—General Johnston and General Polk oppose it.— General Johnston's estimate of General Polk.—General Polk's official report of the battle.— Death of Albert Sidney Johnston.

— General Beauregard's order to retire.—The charge of Cheatham's division.— General Bragg's estimate of General Beauregard.—Letter to Mrs. Polk describing Shiloh.—Corinth.—The Confederate army at Tupelo.

On the 5th of March, 1862, General Beauregard formally assumed command of the First Division of the Western Department. He placed General Polk in com-Tnand of the forces that had b(»en withdrawn from the river defenses, ordering him to take a position tempo-ranly at Humboldt. Meanwhile, the reinforcements that (renerals Johnston and Polk had vainly begged for all winter began to arrive, the men being withdrawn from the southern coast defenses, where, for months, there had been no real need for their presence. By the middle of March 23,000 of these troops had arrived,

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drawn chiefly from Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans. Their coming at this late date gave food for bitter comments as to the indifference or incompetency of some of the directing powers.

"Why," said the troops already on the line, "could not this help have come in January ? Have we not been begging for it, pleading for it— have not the very disasters that have befallen us been foretold as certain to come in the absence of the very troops now at hand? Has anything of real importance occurred where these soldiers have been posted, to keep them so long from us?"i

These and other questions were forced upon the men, who, in addition to their misfortunes, now found themselves the targets for the ready abuse that was rained upon them from all sides. The position of the general officers was doubly trying, because they could offer no explanation that would not reflect upon the authorities. Their only course was silence, and this they carefully maintained.

General Bragg was placed in command of the newly arrived troops and was ordered to concentrate them about Corinth. The occupation of this place was an evident and absolute necessity, as it was the most important railroad center in the department, and from its proximity to the Tennessee River was exposed to easy capture.

By the 25th of March General Johnston succeeded in placing at this point the forces he had brought out of Kentucky, leaving a division under Breckinridge near

1 There is abuodant reason to believe that the fault lay at the door of the State governments rather than at that of the general government, each State clamoring for troops to protect what it regarded as its particularly exposed point.

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Bumsville, to the east of Corinth, to watch the enemy's left flank. In the meantime the Federal army had taken up a position at Pittsburg Landing and the town of Savannah on the Tennessee River. The obvious intention of the enemy to concentrate in front of Corinth induced Beauregard to order Polk to unite with the main army at that point. He was instructed, however, to leave one of his divisions, under General Cheatham, at Bethel Station on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, some twenty-four miles north of Corinth. This was rendered necessary by some attempts that had been made by a division of the Federal army to destroy the railroad at that point. At the same time General Cheatham's command, while so posted, was in the best position from which to watch the enemy's right flank. These instructions were executed at about the same time that General Johnston reached Corinth. All tlie Confederate forces of the department except those upon the Mississippi River were thus, in the last week of March, assembled at and about Corinth. The accumulations of commissary, quartermaster's, and ordnance stores and field transportation, made during the winter by Polk's foresight and activity, were now distributed to the entire army wherever needed, and thus proved most timely and acceptable, for many of the newly arrived commands were sorely in want.

The army was now tlirown into four corps, and styled "The Army of Mississippi." General Johnstcm was announced as commander-in-chief, and General Beauregard as second in command, tlie latter being charged especially with all matters of organization and discipline, together with the preparation of tlie details of the intended movement against the enemy. General Bnigg was made chief of the staff of the army. The combina-

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tion, in their respective positions, of these three men, gave to this army perhaps the strongest leadership that could have been found for it within the limits of the Confederacy. But the strength of the combination lay in maintaining the relative positions of its component parts. Had that been possible, a brilUant career would have been assured the Army of Mississippi. But it was not possible. The head was soon cut off, and first one and then the other member essayed to take his place. Each in turn failed, while that splendid army gave its best and most loyal efforts to sustain them. There is not a sadder story of this war than the history of .this army, struggling heroically, not only to overcome its enemies, but to bear up under the misfortunes of its leadership, which, beginning amidst the terrible sacrifice at Shiloh, for nearly two years hung over it, ruled it, and finally crushed it at Missionary Ridge.

The four corps were assigned respectively to Polk, Bragg, Hardee, and Breckinridge — General Bragg, in addition to his duties as chief of the staff, undertaking those of a corps commander. The preponderating influence of this distinguished officer at this time was most natural, as it was in keeping with the reputation for gallantry and efficiency which he had so honorably made for himself, during the war with Mexico, and recenfly in the administration of affairs at Pensacola. He had the confidence of the people second only to General Beauregard. The appearance of his command bore evidence to the masterful manner in which he had organized and drilled it, so when it was learned that he not only assumed the double duty of chief of staff and corps commander, but was to include in his corps more than a third of the army,— double the force assigned to Hardee, and more than double that given t/O Breckin-

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ridge,—every one prepared to accept it, though they might doubt its wisdom. As a f act^ it was a clumsy arrangement, and soon proved a serious embarrassment.^

On the night of April 2 General Polk received a dispatch from General Cheatham, reporting that Lew Wallace's division of the Federal army had appeared in his front at Bethel Station. This communication he at once sent to General Beauregard. That officer, believing from its contents that the enemy had divided his forces to carry out the expected incursion against Bethel, forwarded the dispatch to General Johnston with the endorsement:

" Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing."

Johnston, for several days, had been impatient to advance, and had only been withheld by the necessity of organizing the troops he had gathered about him. That night, therefore, it was determined to move at once, and, if possible, attack the enemy on the morning of the 5th. Orders were accordingly issued to the corps commanders " to hold their troops in hand, ready to advance upon the enemy in the morning by six o'clock " (the Sd).^ As

1 There are two statements of the forces engaged at Shiloh. One made by General Beauregard on April 23, 1862^ states that —

Polk's effective total was (4 brigades) 9,136

Bragg's " *' " (Bbrigades) 13,589

Hardee's" " " (Sbrigades) 6,789

Breckinridge's " " (3 brigades) 6,439

(See '* Official Records, War of Rebellion,'' vol. z, pt i. p. 396.)

On June 30,1862, General Bragg rendered an elaborate report of the forces engaged at Shiloh, thus:

Polk's effective total (4 brigades) 9,422

Bragg's " " (6brigade8) 15,529

Hardee's " " (Sbrigades) 4,855

Breckinridge's '* (3 brigades) 6,894

{Ibid., p. 398.)

8 " Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. z, pt i, p. 398.

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has already been stated, Cheatham's divisioa, oontainmg one half the effective force of Polk's corps, was near Bethel Station, twenty-four miles north from Corinth, watching the enemy. Thus Polk^ had but one division, consisting of two brigades, some 4500 men all told, to prepare for the march. This was quickly done, and at the appointed hour he reported to General Beauregard through his aide, Lieutenant Richmond, that his command was ready to march. But the larger commands were not in readiness; the preparations of Bragg's command, the largest of aU, were, proportionately, least advanced. In consequence of this Polk received orders to remain as he was until further instructed. During the forenoon he was ordered to report at General Beauregard's headquarters. There he met Bragg and Hardee; and General Beauregard communicated to them, orally, the details of the projected movement. Bragg was to press the concentration of his troops at Monterey, while Polk and Hardee were to continue in readiness for the movement as originally ordered for 6 a.m. ; these two were to move by the same road, with Hardee in front, and Polk following at the proper interval. It was, it seems, intended that Hardee should begin his march at twelve o'clock, noon, but, owing to some misunderstanding, he did not receive explicit instructions to march until about 3 p.m.

Owing to these delays, Polk's column, although ready since six o'clock that morning, did not clear itself of its encampment much before dark. It camped, however, nine miles from Corinth that night; and the next day moved on close in reai* of Hardee's corps.*

1 Referring to " The Military Operations of General Beanregard," by Colonel Roman, we find in voL i, p. 275, the following statement conoeming these events: " At the hour prescribed in the preparatory

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The position of the Federal forces at this time was the following: Camped on the west bank of the Tennessee, at Pittsburg Landing, was an army under the command of General Grant. Another army, under General Buell, was moving rapidly through Middle Tennessee to unite with it, and on the day the Confederate army moved out of Corinth the head of this column was nearing Savannah, on the east bank of the Tennessee, eight miles north of Pittsburg Landing. Pittsburg Landing itself was about twenty-five miles northeast of Corinth, and lay between two streams. Owl and Lick creeks, which flowed into the Tennessee River, the one about two miles above the Landing, the other the same distance below. Two and a half miles west of the Landing

circular to the corps commanders, which had been sent out that morning, viz., about ten o'clock, the troops were all under arms in Corintfay apparently ready for the march. Meanwhile, owing to the many more urgent occupations of the adjutant-generars office, copies of the preceding general orders'^ (Special Orders No. 8) ''had not been prepared for distribution that day, as the corps commanders were to begin the march pursuant to the verbal order and instructions which General Beauregard in the presence of General Johnston had g^iven them individually as to the initial movements from Corinth. The march, nevertheless, did not begin at the time directed, chiefly through the misap. prehension of the commander of the First Corps, who, instead of moving forward upon the full verbal instructions he had received, held his corps under arms, and with its trains blocked the way of the..other troops.** The writer then goes on to say that as soon as this unfortunate delay was brought to General Beauregard's knowledge he dispatched an order to the First Corps to clear the way at once, which was done.

The answer to this statement is as follows:

1st. The hour fixed in the preparatory circular (the only one issued) was 6 A.M., not 10 a.m. (''Official Records, War of Rebellion,'' vol. x, pt. ii, p. 383.)

2d. The verbal instructions were not considered sufficient, because General Bragg, the chief of staff of the army, who was present when they were given, supplemented them by a written order to General Hardee, who was to lead the advance. This order specified no hour, but said, " Move as soon as practicable." (/Md., p. 387.)

3d. The First Corps had nothing to do with the initiation of the advance,

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was Shiloh Church, around which most of Grant's army was encamped. Five miles farther west was Mickey's House, which marked the crossing of important roads leading to Corinth. The hamlet of Monterey was situated upon one of these roads about half way between Corinth and the Landing.

The country between Corinth and the river was gently undulating, and, in the main, thickly covered with forest trees and dense undergrowth. The roads were the common coimtry highways, difficult to an army even in dry weather, and apt to become almost impassable to an army after such prolonged rains as now began to fall.

Of tlie two roads connecting Corinth and the Landing, one passed from the town of Corinth on the north, and, making a gradual curve to the east, ran past Mick-

as that duty was explicitly assigned to the Third Corps, General Hardee. Therefore, ha<l it moved forward *^ upon the full verhal iustruotions,'* it would simply have disarranged the order of march as prescribed in the written instructions (Special Orders No. 8). Its commander had verbal instructions which were in accord with the written instructions, and they directed him to foUow, not initiate, the movement (find., pt. i, p. 393.)

4th. The First Corps did not block the way of the other troops, because but half of the corps (two brigades) was at Corinth, and that half was posted two miles to the north of the town, in fields and open woods; and neither that half nor its trains moved into the road until Hardee's corps had passed their encampment.

Bragg's corps was to be assembled at Monterey, twelve miles northeast from Corinth, and such of his troops as were about Corinth moved out by a road which left^ the town on the east, while the road ui>on which the First Corps was camped and marched left the town on the north. The two lines of march being distinctly sei>arate, and neither corps being in the town, it was impossible for one to interfere with the other. (See Special Orders No. 8, *• Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. i, p. 272; or, " Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. x, pt. i, p. 393.) Breckinridge's command had no relation to the movement out of Corinth, other than to conform to it from the direction of Buma-ville. The same statement applies to Cheatham's command, except that its movement was from the direction of Bethel toward Polk's line of march, meeting him many miles out of Corinth.

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TOPOGBAPHY OF THE COUNTRY.

[1862

ey's House to reach its terminus at the river. This was the JBark or Ridge road. The other left Corinth on the east, ran through Monterey, and joined the Ridge road about a mile and a half beyond Mickey's. From this road at Monterey two roads led northward, one to Savannah, the other to Purdy; both of which intersected the Ridge road, the first at Mickey's House, the second some two or three miles nearer Corinth. In this way the two main roads nuining between the positions of the hostile armies were freely connected throughout their entire length.

picture0

® Micke/» Cross Roads.

® Shiloh Church.

The order directing the march specified that Hardee's corps should move by the Ridge or Bark road to the outposts of the enemy, and there form in line of battle. Bragg's corps, after being assembled at Monterey, was

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to pass over to the Ridge road — one division by way of the Savannah road, the other by way of that to Purdy. Having reached the Ridge road, the corps was to follow Hardee's movement to within one thousand yards of his position, and there form its line of battle. These two lines were to be so placed as to fill the ground between Owl and Lick creeks, the streams being relied upon principally to cover the flanks of the Confederate army. Breckinridge was directed to concentrate his command at Monterey as soon as Bragg's command was out of the way, and then to march toward the Landing by the most available route. Polk was ordered to follow Hardee's line of march to Mickey's with Clark's division of his corps. His remaining division, Cheatham's, was directed to hold its position at Bethel, if attacked ) otherwise it was to assemble at Purdy and join its companion division on the march. As the movements of this portion of Polk's command were contingent upon the attitude of the enemy, it was clearly understood that he had no control over its march until after it should unite with Clark's division. It was also directed that, while he was to march immediately in rear of Hardee for a time, he was to allow the division of Bragg's corps which moved from Monterey by the Purdj road to pass to his front when it reached the route along which he was marching—the Ridge road. The orders with which Polk moved out of Corinth directed that he should halt at Mickey's and mass his troops as a reserve; but on the march he was directed to remain at Mickey's only long enough to permit Bragg's corps to pass to his front (the whole of this corps having been thrown upon the Savannah road, and not divided between the Purdy and Savannah roads as intended); that then he should follow and form his line in rear of and parallel to the

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left half of Bragg's line. Polkas movements were thus subordinated to those of Hardee and Bragg throughout the entire march.^ Breckinridge, after leaving Monterey, was ordered to move up and form behind Bragg's right, in extension of the position to be taken by Polk.

Hardee pressed forward, closely followed by Polk, until the crossing of the road from Monterey to Purdy was reached; there he halted to allow Bragg's second division to pass to his front. After waiting three hours, he received the following dispatch from General Bragg:

Monterey^ 10 a.m., 4th. My dear General: Ciroomstances have . . .^ my second division from the Purdy road. Both my divisions will move from here, then, direct to Mickey^s on the Savannah road. I give you this information that you may not wait for my troops at the crossing of the Purdy and Ridge roads. General Breckinridge has not arrived from BomsviUe, and, I fear, bad roads may delay him much. His command, forming the reserve, must necessarily control our movements to some extent. Let me hear from you by the courier, at Mickey's. Yours most respectfully and truly,

Braxton Bragg. Major-General Polk:.

General Polk therefore continued his march to Mickey's, where he halted in column west of the roads' crossing, well out of Bragg's way, as directed.^ The head of Bragg's large column, moving that morning from Monterey, only six miles distant, could do no more than reach Mickey's that evening.* During the night he made every

1 " Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. x, pt. i, pp. 392-394.

2 One word — bo Injured by lire as to be illegible.

8 This position placed him out of the line of Bragg^s march, which entered the road at Mickey's and continued thence to the east. See Bragg to Polk, 10 A.M., 4th.

4 Ckneral Bragg's official report says that Polk's corps camped in rear

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endeavor to close it up, and in part succeeded, so that both commands, each upon the road on which it had marched during the day, rested before the morning in the vicinity of Mickey's. General Bragg's entire corps, however, was much behind the point it had been expected U) reach; and the hope that both it and Hardee's corps would be in line of battle that evening was not fulfilled. The reason for the extraordinarily short march made by ji^his corps is given in part in the following note:

Generals Johnston and Beauregard: I reached here at 8.30, ahead of my rear division. Bad roads, insufficient transportation badly managed, and the usual delay of a first move of new troops, have caused the delay. My first division is at Mickey^s; and the ignorance of the guide for the second, as well as the reports I receive from the people here, induce me to order my second division to move on the same road as the first. I am also influenced to do this from the information I have of General Hardee's advance. I will send a courier to notify General Polk of my change. Nothing heard yet from General Breckinridge. I have sent a messenger to communicate with him and shall await a reply, as it is important for me to see him, imder your instructions-of this morning. These delays wiU render it necessary to hold General Hardee in check untU we can be ready in the rear, I shaU take the liberty of sending this information to him and direct him to hold up until he hears of my force being in position.

Braxton Bragg, Major-General.

Monterey, 10 a.m., April 4,1862.

Had Hardee been permitted to press on, undoubtedly he would have performed his part of the program for that day, and would have been in line of battle by dark.

of his corps that night This is an error, as is shown by the reports of his subordinates, and as is known to the writer, who, after twelye o'clock that night, found the heads of both corps at Mickey's, and Bragg's rear division marching on the road between Monterey and Mickey's. See "Official Records, War of RebelUon," voL x, pt i, p. 464.

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But Bragg was forced to hold him back because of the slowness of his own movements, so that the army, instead of being in position for an attack on the 5th, was not likely to be in position before the 6th.

The orders for the 5th were that the entire army should move at 3 a.m. and take position as quickly as possible. Every one was ready. But during the night torrents of rain fell, so flooding the ravines and streams that Hai'dee found he could not move until dawn^^ Then he pressed forward, and by ten o^dock began his formation. Bragg followed, and, finding that Hardee's line could not cover aU tlie ground between Owl and Lick creeks, he threw forward his first brigade to the right, and completed the formation of the first line. Meanwhile, he was establishing the second line of battle with his own corps, but his troops came up so slowly that it was nearly five o'clock in the afternoon before he could get them into position. And yet the distance from his encampment at Mickey's to his line of battle was not more than two miles and a half. The same slowness which characterized his movements on the 3d and 4th was thus continued on the 5th. At dawn of that day the head of Polk's column stood at the fork of the roads at Mickey's, ready to move up to its position the moment Bragg's command could be passed to his front. The first division filed past by eleven o'clock, but the second was not prompt in following; consequently it was two o'clock before Polk's command, headed by the battery to which the writer was attached, could begin its march, and four o'clock before he could begin his formation.^ His second division, Cheatham's,

1 He began it before General Bragg's was completed. See official reports of General Polk and (General Clark, ''Official Records, War of Rebellion/' vol. x, pt. i, pp. 406, 414.

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now came up and took its position, having marched from Purdy that morning, a distance but little less than that wHieh had been covered on the march from Corinth. Breckinridge's command appeared at about the same time, and, moving into position upon General Polk's right, completed the line of battle. But it was now six o'clock in the afternoon, too late to attack that day.

This rapid march of Cheatham's division — a considerable portion of it over roads that had been badly cut up by Clark's division and Hardee's corps — showed what . might have been done toward beginning the attack on the 5th as was intended, had Genend Bragg been able to place his corps as he was ordered, and, as the writer believes, made every effort to do.

Hardee reached Mickey's House on the morning of the 4th. Pittsburg Landing was only eight miles away, and the point at which he. was to form his line of battle not moi-e than four miles at farthest. He was moving on to take position that afternoon, when Greneral Bragg stopped him in order that he might catch up. Bragg should, at that hour, have been beyond Mickey's, and had he been, his line would have been formed under the cover of Hardee by 9 a.m. With one coi-ps already in line to cover the formation of the others, no rainstorm would have checked the alignment of the remainder of the army on that morning. The darkness and the swollen streams which next morning checked the advance of Hardee's corps did so merely because the army did not know what it might stumble upon. Once in line and the battle begun, it is safe to say that Cheatham's and Breckinridge's forces would have been available by noon.

The failure to begin the attack on the 5th was a deep disappointment to every one. To General Beauregard it was not only an annoyance but a source of apprehension.

4

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100 BEAUREGARD'S DISAPPOINTMENT. [1862

He feared that the movement had been discovered by the en«my, so that, instead of surprising them in their camp, as he had hoped would be done, they would be found fully prepared.

While Polk was arranging his line he received a message that General Beauregard desired to see him. Biding forward, he found Beauregard in conversation with General Bragg. General Polk says of this interview :^ "By this time it was near 4 p.m., and on arriving I was informed that General Beauregard desired to see me immediately. I rode forward at once to his headquarters, where I found General Bragg and himself in conversation. He said, with some feeling, ^ I am very much disappointed at the delay which has occurred in getting the troops into position.'''

General Polk replied, " So am I, sir; but so far as I am concerned, my orders are to form on another line [Generjil Bragg's], and that line must first be established before I can form upon it." He continued: " I reached Mickey's at nightfall yesterday, whence I could not move because of the troops [General Bragg's] which were before me, until 2 p.m. to-day. I then promptly followed the column in front of me, and have been in position to form upon it so soon as its line was established." 2

1 " Offloiia Records, War of RebeUion," toI. x, pt. i, p. 407.

3 In this connection it is interesting to introduce an extract from a letter written by Qeneral Thomas Jordan (Beauregard's chief of staff) which appeared in the New Orleans Picayune^ June 5, 1887. It is singularly corroborative of the view taken by Polk concerning the origin of the complaint which was directed toward himself. Writing of the movement of the army from Corinth^ after saying that to Hardee was assigned the initiation of the march, GknenJ Jordan says:

^'Folk's corps necessarily followed Hardee's, because there was no other road for it to take. As for marching in the manner indicated in General Johnston's dispatch to Mr. Davis, of April 3, by three separate

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This of course was a sufficient answer, and one which could not be gainsaid. General Beauregard, however, went on to say that " he regretted the delay exceedingly, as it would make it necessary to forego the attack altogether ; that our success depended upon our surprising the enemy; that this was now impossible and we must fall back to Corinth."

This opinion was not shared by General Polk, however, as win appear when we narrate all the circumstances of this intei-view, which through the arrival of General Johnston was transformed into an impromptu council of war.

In most of the narratives of the battle of Shiloh — of Confederate origin — there are accounts of a council of war held during the afternoon or evening preceding the battle, at which the question of abandoning the campaign was the subject of discussion. This is the council which was brought about accidentally, as the direct outgrowth of General Beauregard's concluding remarks to General Polk. "He" (General Beauregard) "said he

<»luniiis, an examination of the maps extant of the period will suflSce to show that such an order of movement was out of the question, as (Jso that the plan of Beauregard was the one of all others most likely to assure the least confusion with the greatest possible celerity, whether with raw or seasoned troops. That is, to give the longest line of march to Hardee and his corps, who — commander and troops—were most ac^ customed to marching, to be followed on that same route by the troops that were to constitute the reserve, and also the next best trained to marching, while assigning to the troops (Bragg's) that were least accustomed to marching and to serve with each other, and to their commander, the shortest line of march to the common objective, a precaution justified by events; for, aft«r all, it was Bragg*s corps, as can be shown, that had the most delay and difficulty in getting upon the ground. And it might not be difficult to find reason in the record for the supposition that, had Bragg given the attention of himself and of his very large staff, somewhat more than seems to have been done, to the acceleration of the movement of his own corps and less to retarding Hardee's, and needlessly awaiting Breckinridge's movement, it had

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'regretted the delay exceedingly, ajs it would make it necessary to forego the attack altogether; that our success depended upon our surprising the enemy; that this was now impossible, and we must f idl back to Corinth.'" When this remark was made, none of the general officers of the army were present except Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk, but at its conclusion General Johnston ix)de up and asked what was the matter. Beauregard then repeated what he was saying to Polk. Polk, in writing of this interview in his official report, after relating in substance all that has been said, continues:

General Johnston remarked that this would never do, and proceeded to assign reasons for that opinion. He then asked what I thought of it. I replied that my troops were in as good condition as they had ever been, that they were eager for battle, that to retire now would operate injuriously upon them, and I thought we ought to attack.

General Breckinridge, whose troops were in the rear and by this time had arrived upon the ground, here joined us, and after some discussion it was decided to postpone further movement untU the following day, and to make the attack at daybreak.

been bettor. At all events, Hardee's corps, though dilatory in starting, yet, when set in motion, reached Mickey's 'on the morning of April 4, early enough to have advanced and taken that afternoon the order of battle prescribed for him, had not Bragg seen fit to interpose to direct him to * hold up' in the quarter of Mickey's to await the movements of his own corps." (See " Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. x, pt. ii, p. 391.) ** Polk's corps, it is proper to say, or rather Clark's division [Cheatham had no relation to the mattor.—^W. M. P.] seems to have been moved with as little delay as might be expected, and not to have been at aU responsible for the delay of Bragg's troops, as I heard General Bragg sharply complain to General Beauregard in the afternoon of the 5th of April — a report made with such circumstantiality at the time as to induce the latter to speak to General Polk of the belatement and of its grave consequences, with the feeling and in effect the words recited by that officer in his official report of the battle (September, 1862), addressed to General Samuel Cooper."

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This, in brief, was the council before Shiloh which has become historic. Its details have been elaborated by some, but the essential facts are as stated by General Polk. How far General Polk's attitude went in enabling General Johnston to maintain his position, no one can say positively; but the following extract from a letter written by General William Preston of Kentucky, General Johnston's aide-de-camp, points to a very positive influence :

The divisions of Generals Polk and Breckinridge came up, and a consultation was held by General Johnston with his chief officers. He informed me that some one or more doubted the propriety of attacking General Grant's forces, on account of the delay, and considered it best to withdraw to Corinth.

It was then about four o'clock, and after a short while General Johnston came near and directed Colonel Jordan, serving as chief of staff, to prepare to write orders. In the meanwhile he spoke to me with more than his usual anima-tion, and informed me that he would attack the enemy at or before the earliest dawn. He then in the course of our short conversation spoke in very complimentary terms of General Polk, and said,*** Polk is a tme soldier and friend." The impression left on my mind was that of strong approval and pleasure at General Polk's course in the consultation, and a gratifying concurrence of opinion.

The amoiint of detail .of the advance of the army from Corinth and the formation of the line of battle here given has been rendered necessary by the many statements which from time to time have been published concerning this movement,— statements which have not gone to the bottom of the difficulties then besetting the army. The heavy rains undoubtedly caused delays. But they were not all. The faulty subdivision

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of the army gave Bragg such a large preponderance of the force that his command was unwieldy. He had to move three times as many men as Polk, and more than twice as many as Hardee, and, moreover, there were scarcely two regiments in liis corps that had ever niarclied a day. Hardee's men had marched from Bowling Green, Polk's from Columbus, and both had had some experience in marches at the beginning of their careers in Missouri. When to these odds against him was added the heaviest route, it is easy to see why, from the first, General Bragg was always behind. Polk and Hjirdee, with their relatively small forces, moved along the ridges, while Bi'agg struggled through the lowlands, and, beyond Monterey, through the swamps and sunken grounds of Lick Creek. But the plans for arraying the forces were as unfortunate as the arrangements for bringing them up had been. Two of the corps were extended over the entire line of battle, one behind the other, each in a single line except at one point upon the right flank, where one brigade from Bragg's corps filled out Hardee's line. The third, or reserve, line was formed as the second should have been; that is, with a corps upon each side of the central road. Here, again, the preponderance of Bragg's numbers was an embarrassment, and, no doubt, was the cause of the error in formation. He had six brigades; if he had been given four, and the other two assigned one to Hardee and one to Breckinridge, each corps would* have had an equal number. With one corps deployed to cover the front, as was perhaps necessary in view of the circumstances of the approach, the remaining three, each with its own reserves, might have been so placed in a second and third line as to have covered the ground and yet have been able to maintain their organization in the battle. As it

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was, before the battle of the. first day had been half fought the entire army was disjointed, Hardee's, Bragg's, and Polk's corps being mixed up in a conglomerate mass. When one of these officers had to concentrate a force for an assault upon a difficult point, he had to gather men from almost every corps in the army. Conflicting orders were thus of necessity often given, and so it came about that, instead of the army being continuously projected in heavy masses upon the Federal divisions, its behavior was much like that of a balking team of horses: as one command went forward, the other was standing still. This defect was in part corrected by an arrangement made between Generals Bi*agg and Polk, by which Polk took command of the center, and Bragg the right, General Hardee directing the troops upon the left. But it was twelve o'clock before the corps commanders had gotten into positions from which they could hope to accomplish anything definite, and then only by an arrangement which ignored the lines of the commands assigned them for the battle.

Approaching the events of the battle, it is believed that the purposes of this work will be fully served by simply gi\ang extracts from General Polk's official report. This seems all the more appropriate because of the many full accounts which already have been presented by most of the leading actore, or by their biographers. As an introduction, however, to this narrative, we will say that throughout the battle General Polk showed that disposition to personally supervise important matters so characteristic of the man. He held a position well up against his line, arranging and placing commands as the hotly contested points in his front demanded, and on four occa^sions, placing himself at the head of his troops, he led them in desperate

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charges against their gallant foes. In the second of these assaults his faithful orderly was killed at his side. General Polk felt on this field that the fate of the Confederacy hung almost in the balance, and he saw that nothing short of complete victory would answer the pressing needs of the South. He therefore, in common with the other corps commanders, assumed positions which under different conditions might better have been left to subordinates. Although the result was a crushing blow to their cause, yet the feeling of mutual reliance, sympathy, and fellowship between General Polk and his troops which was gained on that fiercely contested field was never afterward shaken, but went with both and upheld both in the trying scenes that were to come thereafter.

The substance of General Polk's report of the part taken by his corps in the battle is as follows:

At the api>ointed hour of the morning of the 6th my troops were moved forward, and so soon as they were freed from an obstruction formed by a thicket of underbrush, they were formed in column of brigades and pressed onward to the support of the second line. General Clark's division was in front. We had not proceeded far before the first line, under General Hardee, was under fire throughout its length, and the second, under General Bragg, was also engaged.

The first order received by me was from General Johnston, who had ridden to the front to watch the opening operations, and who, as commander-in-chief, seemed deeply impressed with the responsibilities of his position. It was observed that he entered upon his work with the ardor and enei^^ of a true soldier, and the vigor with which he pressed forward his troops gave assurance that his persistent determination would close the day with a glorious victory. The order was to send him a brigade to the right for the support of the line of General Bragg, then hotly engaged. The

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brigade of Btnart, of Clark's diyision, was immediately dispatched to him, and was led by him in person to the point requiring sapi>ort. I was then ordered by Beauregard to send one of the brigades of my rear division to the support of Bragg's left, which was pressed by the enemy. Orders were given to that effect to Cheatham, who took charge of the brigade in person, and executed the movement promptly. My two remaining brigades were held in hand till I received orders to move them directly to the front to the support of General Bragg's center. These were Bussell's, of Clark's division, which was directed by that ofiftcer, and Bushrod Johnson's, of Cheatham's division. They moved forward at once, and were both very soon warmly engaged with the enemy.

The resistance at this point was as stubborn as at any other on the field. The forces of the enemy to which we were opposed were understood to be those of General Sherman, supported by the command of General McClemand. They fought with determined courage, and contested every inch of ground. Here it was that the gallant Blythe, colonel of the Mississippi regiment bearing his own name, fell under my eye, pierced through the heart while charging a battery. It was here that (Bushrod) Johnson, while leading his brigade, also fell—it was feared—mortally wounded, and Clark, while cheering his command amidst a shower of shot and shell, was struck down and so severely wounded in the shoulder as to disable him from further service and compel him to turn over a command he had taken into the fight with such distinguished gallantry. And here also fell many officers of lesser grade, among them the gallant Captain Marshall T. Polk of Polk's battery (who lost a leg), as well as a large number of men, who sealed their devotion to our cause with their blood. We nevertheless drove the enemy before us, and dislodged him from his strong position, and captured two of his batteries.

After these successes the enemy retired in the direction of the river, and while they were being pressed I sought out Bragg, to whose support I had been ordered, and asked him

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where he would have my command. He replied: " If you will take care of the center, I will go to the right.'' It was understood that General Hardee was attending to the left. I accepted the arrangement and took charge of the operations in that part of the general line for the rest of the day. It was fought by three of my brigades only,—Stewart's, Job ason's (afterward Preston Smith's), and Russell's. My fourth brigade, that of Colonel Maney, under the command of General Cheatham, was on the right with Bragg and Breckinridge. These brigades, with occasionally a regiment of some other corps, which became detached, were fully employed in the field assigned me. They fought over the same ground three times, as the fortunes of the day varied, always with steadiness—a single instance only excepted, and that only for a moment—and with occasional instances of brilliant courage. . . .

About three o'clock intelligence reached me that the commander-in-chief. General Johnston, had fallen. He fell in discharge of his duty, leading and directing his troops. His loss was deeply felt. It was an event which deprived the army of his clear, practical judgment and determined character, and himself of an opportunity he had courted for vindicating his claims to the confidence of his countrymen against the inconsiderate and unjust reproaches which had been heaped upon him.

The moral influence of his presence had nevertheless already been impressed upon the army, and an impulse given to its action which the news of his death increased instead of abated. The operations of the day had now become so far developed as to foreshadow the result with a good degree of certainty, and it was a melancholy fate to be cut off when victory seemed hastening to perch upon his standard. He was a true soldier, high-toned, eminently honorable and just, considerate of the rights and feelings of others, magnanimous and brave. His military capacity was also of a high order, and his devotion to the cause of the South unsurpassed by that of any of her noble sons who bad offered up their lives on her altar. I knew him well from childhood,— none knew

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him better,—and I take pleasure in laying on his tomb as a parting offering this testimonial of my appreciation of his character as a soldier, a patriot, and a man.

The enemy in our front was gradually and successively driven from his position and forced from tlie field back on the river-bank. About 5 p.m. my line attacked the enemy's troops, the last that were left upon the field, in an encampment on my right. The attack was made in front and flank; the resistance was sharp but short. The enemy, perceiving he was flanked and his position completely turned, hoisted a white flag and surrendered. It proved to be the commands of Generals Prentiss and William L. Wallace. The latter, who commanded the left of their line, was killed by the troops of Bragg, who was pressing him at the same time from that quarter. The former yielded to the attack of my troops on their right, and delivered his sword, with his command, to Russell, one of my brigade commanders, who turned him over to me. The prisoners turned over were about two thousand. They were placed in charge of Lieutenant Richmond, my aide-de-camp, and with a detachment of cavalry sent to the rear.

I take pleasure in saying that in this part of the operations of my troops they were aided by the Crescent Regiment of Louisiana, M. L. Smith. This command was composed chiefly of young men from the city of New Orleans, and belonged to Bragg's Corps. It had been posted on the left wing in the early part of the day to hold an important position, where it was detained and did not reach the field until a late hour. On arriving it came to the point at which I was commanding and reported to me for orders. The conduct of this regiment during the whole afternoon was distinguished for its gallantry, both before and after the capture of the command of Prentiss, in which it actively participated.

Immediately after the surrender I ordered Colonel Lindsay, in command of one of the regiments of cavalry belonging to my corps, to take command of all the cavalry at hand and pursue such of the enemy as were fleeing. He detached Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of his own regiment on that service

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no THE ORDER TO RETIRE. [1862

immediately, while he proceeded to collect and take charge of other commands. Miller dashed forward and intercepted a battery within one hundred and fifty yards of the river,— the Second Michigan,— and captured it before it could unlim-ber and open fire. It was a six-gun battery, complete in all its equipments, and was captured, men, horses, and guns. A portion of this cavalry rode to the river and watered their horses.

By this time the troops under my command were joined by those of Bragg and Breckinridge and my fourth brigade, under Cheatham, from the right. The field was clear. The rest of the forces of the enemy were driven to the river and under its bank. We had one hour or more of daylight still left, were within from one hundred and fifty to four hundred yards of the enemy's position, and nothing seemed wanting to complete the most brilliant victory of the war but to press forward and make a vigorous assault on the demoralized remnant of his forces.

At this juncture his gunboats dropped down the river, near the landing where his troops were collected, and opened a tremendous cannonade of shot and shell over the bank in the direction from which our forces were approaching. The height of the plain on which we were, above the level of the water, was about one hundred feet, so that it was necessary to give great elevation to his guns to enable him to fire over the bank. The consequence was that shot could take effect only at points remote from the river's edge. They were comparatively harmless to our troops nearest the bank, and became increasingly so to us as we <hrew near the enemy and placed him between us and his boats.

Here the impression arose that our forces were waging an unequal contest—that they were exhausted and suffering from a murderous fire, and by an order from the commanding general they were withdrawn from the field.

One of my divisions, that of General Clark, consisting of Stewart's and Russell's brigades, now under the command of General Stewart, bivouacked on the ground with the rest of the troops, and were among the first to engage the enemy on the following morning.

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They were actively engaged during the day, and sustained the reputation they had won the day before. The other division, under Cheatham^ a brigade of which was separated from me at an early hour on the 6thy fought throughout the day with the skill and courage which always distinguishes that gallant officer, and was moved by him to his camp of the night before. They were taken there to obtain rations and to prepare for the work of the following day. Hearing they had gone thither, I informed General Beauregard I should follow them, to ensure their being on the ground at an early hour in the morning. This I did, and gave orders that night in x>erson to Cheatham to be ready to move at daylight.^

Before daylight I dispatched my aide-de-camp. Lieutenant Richmond, to put them in motion. Their march was stopped for some time to arrest a stampede which came from the front. They then moved under the command of Cheatham to the field. I sent forward a staff-officer to Beauregard to inform him of their approach, and was directed to post them in the rear of Shiloh Church and hold them until further orders. It was not long before an order from the commanding general was re-

1 At the time that Polk made this report of the position of his second division, and of his intention toward it, the feeling at army headquarters was one of confidence in an achieved victory. General Beauregard had then telegraphed to Richmond: "We this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittoburg, and after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks to the Almighty, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position.'' This feeling accounts for the fact that Polk was not ordered to march the command back that night It had gone there without his knowledge, having been separated from him by the order to fall back, given from army headquarters direct to division, brigade, and regiment commanders during the engagement. The confusion amongst all the commands growing out of this unfortunate order was so great that Polk, after placing his first division in position, felt it to be best that he should go in person in order to secure the return of the second by dawn. As will be seen from all the reports, it arrived in ample time to accomplish everything demanded by the situation. Nothing suffered by its absence. On the contrary, it was about the only division that stood intact on the battlefield the next day, which no doubt accounts for the fact that of all the commands assembled by Cfeneral Beauregard that morning, Cheatham's division rendered the best sustained service.

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ceived to move these troops to the support of the line in my front. They were formed in Une of battle and moved forward half a mile to the position held by General Breckinridge. Finding he was able to hold his position without assistance, they were moved by the left flank, past Shiloh Church, to form on the left of our line. Here they were formed under the supervision of General Cheatham immediately in front of a very large force of the army, now pressing vigorously to turn our left flank.

They engaged the enemy as soon as they were formed, and fought him for four hours,— one of the most desperately contested conflicts of the battle. The enemy was driven gradually from his position, and though reinforced several times during the engagement he could make no impression on that part of our line. During this engagement the command of General Cheatham was reinforced by a Louisiana brigade under Gibson, and by the Thirty-third Tennessee under Campbell, and the Twenty-seventh Tennessee under Love; all of whom did admirable service, and the last-named of whom fell mortally wounded. This force maintained the position it had held for so many hours up to half-past two o'clock, the time at which orders were received from the commanding general to withdraw the troops from the field. I gave orders accordingly, and the command was retired slowly and in good order in the direction of our camp, the enemy making no advance whatever.

In the operations of this morning as well as of the day before, those of my troops who acted under the immediate orders of General Cheatham bore themselves with conspicuous gallantry. One charge particularly, which was made under the eye of the commander-in-chief and his staff, drew forth expressions of the most unqualified applause.

General Polk suppressed his own part in this charge, but General Beauregard, in his " Military Operations" (vol. i, p. 313), is more explicit. He says:

Just about the time (10.30 a.m.) when General McCook was assuming the offensive with his whole division, and was

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near pushing through the gap between General Breckinridge's left and General Bragg's right, caused by the absence of General Polk with one of his divisions, the latter arrived on the field. . . . Dashing forward with drawn sword, at the head of Cheatham's fine division, he soon formed his line of battle at the point where his presence was so much needed, and, with unsurpassed vigor, moved on against a force at least double his own, making one of the most brilliant charges of infantry made on either day of the battle. He drove back the opposing column in confusion, and thus compensated for the tardiness of his appearance on the field. ^

Referring again to the official report prepared by General Polk, we find that, while dealing with details mostly personal to his own command, it throws a strong light upon the battle as a whole, and, read in conjunction with the other official reports, it establishes the faithfulness and ability with which the interests entrusted to his charge were administered. It shows that the troops which were moved with the greatest celerity belonged to his corps; that his corps maintained its organization throughout the battle better than its companions ; that it lost in killed and wounded nearly one third of its number; that at the close of the battle it had but nineteen men "missing" out of a total of 9422 taken into action; that the surrender of General Prentiss's conmiand (the largest body of prisoners taken) was

1 General Beauregard, in his "Military Operations," vol. i, p. 313, states that he knew nothing of the whereabouts of General Polk and Cheatham's division on the morning of the 7th until 10.30 o'clock, when Polk led the command into position on Breckinridge's left, as stated in the report This is met by Polk's statement, as already given above; and, from the movements which he executed under Beauregard's direction prior to going into action at 10.30, it is obvious that he reported some time before this hour. For a corroboration of Polk's account of the position and movements of the division, the reader is referred to the report of its immediate commander, General Cheatham. See *' Of&dal Records, War of Rebellion," vol. x, pt. i, p. 440.

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made to one of its brigade commanders under Polk's immediate eye; and that of the fourteen pieces of artillery captured from the enemy and brought from the field, thirteen were carried off by this corps.*

The following letter, written to Mrs. Polk a few days after the battle (April 10), may be of interest here:

I wrote to a long letter the other day, the second I

have written her since the war began, thoiigh I beheve she did not receive the first.

1 am thankful to say that the protecting hand of God was over me and around me, and I experienced no harm during either of the two days of the battle, although I was in the thickest of the storm during both days. All glory and honor be unto His holy Name for my protection and defense, for it was He who did it. It was He who "covered my head in the day of battle."

I cannot describe the field. It was one of great carnage, and as it was the second battle I had been in—the other being a bloody one also—I felt somewhat more accustomed to it. This one was on a lai^er scale, and a magnificent afifair. I beheve, from what I know and hear, you will have no reason to be ashamed of your husband or yomr sons. But of this—especially of the former—I will leave you to hear from others. Your sons^ both behaved admirably. I was proud of them; the older was everywhere he was called on to be, and as my aide-de-camp rendered most important service. The younger served the guns of his battery very

1 For the want of horses, many having been killed, nine pieces of inferior artillery were abandoned, leaving a total gain of but four.

s There were sixteen descendants of Robert Polk in the Confederate army, and a number in the Federal army, at the battle of Shiloh. General Polk had but two sons, the two mentioned in the letter to his wife. The elder, Alexander Hamilton, who served as captain and aide-decamp, died in 1873 as the result of a sunstroke received during the campaign in Kentucky in September, 1862. The younger, then a second lieutenant of artillery, was attached to Bankhead's Battery of Idght Artillery, and is the author of this memoir.

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gallantly, and I am truly thankful to say they both escaped unhurt. The enemy was badly whipped the first day, and we ought, from the advantage gained, to have captured his whole force. We would have done so if we had had an hour more of daylight.

The battle of the day following was a drawn fight. We left them, and they did not follow us. The first prisoners captured, I believe, were those which fell into my hands, and the number was large.

The army is now refreshing itself for another attack, and we think on the next occasion our troops will behave better than on the last. As for details of the battle you have plenty in the newspapers.

The battle of Shiloh has been a favorite theme with many writers, both because of its importance and of the many controversial questions which immediately sprang up in both camps. They all, however, cent<)r about the management of the opposing armies by their respective commanders. Upon the side of the Federals the important issue has been the condition of General Grant's army at the close of the battle of tlie 6th. According to his own account and that of his friends, it was at that time in position to offer an effective resistance to the Confederates. According to General Buell's account General Grant's army on that evening was in the main a demoralized, helpless mass of fugitives. One thing is certain, however: it had been beaten from all its positions, and was then confronted by a victorious enemy, who was conscious of its advantage and was able to l)re88 it. This is shown in nearly all the reports which htjve been made by the officers who were at the front, and in some excellent notes which have appeared in the "Century Magazine" (1885).

The question at issue upon the side of the Confeder-atiOS relates to the order to retire given by General Beau-

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regard an hour or more before dark on the 6th, and while the opposing armies were in the relative positions as stated just above. The corps commanders and nearly all the subordinate commanders who wrote upon the subject concur in saying that there was abundant daylight for fighting, and that their commands were either advancing or preparing to advance upon the Federal position when the order to retire was received. On the other hand, General Beauregard and his friends, while a(H».epting in the main the statements of General Grant and his friends as to the condition of the Federal army, fail to give like credence to the statements of the Confederate commanders as to the condition of their own forces, and claim that the Confederate army was so worn out and disorganized by its efforts that a further continuance of the battle would have resulted in its defeat tliat day.

The writc^r will not attempt to analyze these conflicting statements, as it would carry him beyond the province of his work, but he will sfiy this much: his position gave him ample occasion to discover that, upon the propriety or necessity for the order to retire on the afternoon of the 6th, the verdict of General Beauregard's army was against him.* It was always believed, from the advantage gained, that the whole of Grant's army ought to have been captured, and had General Beauregard shown less ability and gallantry in extricating his army from its perilous position on the 7th, that one order would have robbed him of its confidence. As it was, though defeated, the army still looked to him with trust,

^ The writer receiyed the orders just as he had heen placed tn charge of the light battery (2d Michigan) captured from the enemy by the cavalry after the surrender of General Prentiss. It was a six-gun battery, and was captured and turned over entire — men, horses, and guns.

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and it is pleasant to believe that, had his health permitted him to remain in command, the faults of Shiloh would have been atoned in better results upon fields yet to come.

The opportunity was to be denied him, however; ill health continued to hamper him, and finally led to his displacement in favor of General Bragg. This is set forth accurately in the following paragraph in a letter from General Bragg, who in all things was nearest to General Beauregard at that time:

General Beauregard has never been physically eqnal to the labors of his position since I joined him in March (2d) last, and has often said to me he could not get on with its labors without the cordial and earnest assistance I gave him. Our intercourse was daily, free, imrestraiaed, and as harmonious as if we had been brothers." ^

The defeat at Shiloh was succeeded by weary disheartening weeks, first of camp life and then of unavailing skirmishing against the steadily advancing Federal line. The arrival of General Van Dom's corps (some 17,000 men) infused fresh spirit into the army for a time, but the enlistment period of large numbers of the soldiers was expiring. Corinth was fast proving itself a most unhealthy location, so that disease and desertion conspired to thin the Confederate ranks to a degree which made further resistance to the largely superior Federal force unavailing. Two attempts were made to bring on a general engagement. These failing, General Beauregard withdrew his army to Tupelo in Mississippi. The following letter enables us to keep in view the subject of this memoir:

1 ''MUltary Operations, General Beauregard," vol. 1, p. 592.~ Bragg toPorsyth-

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Headquabtebs 1st Corps, Abmy of thb Mississippi, Jime 3,1862.

My dear Daughter: I send Meok down to see yoa and to spend a few days with you, as well for your sake as for his. He will tell you all the news of the army and of me. We have deemed it advisable, after having kept the enemy employed six weeks in digging and embanking all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth, and just when he had spent millions of dollars, and lost thousands of men by the climate and water, and when he had just got ready to open his heavy batteries,—to bid him good-morning and invite him down a little farther South.

How he hkes it we have not heard. We like the change very much, as it gives us a delightful woodland for our camps and fine, pure, spring freestone water and plenty of fresh beef. I have a delightful camp myself, and wish you could look in on me and see how comfortable I am. My health is, thank our Heavenly Father, very good, and, except that I am separated from my family and grieved with the disturbed state of the country, I am as happy as I generally am, and you know that is not miserable. . . .

This cheerful letter was scarcely justified by the conditions then being forced upon tie people in that quarter of the Confederacy, but it serves \o illustrate as well as any other produced in this book General Polk's un-varpng attitude toward even his own family in all questions of state policy or army movement. If matters were not all right, they soon would be. In his entire private correspondence during the war but one exception occurs, and that came just after the defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, where in writing Bishop Elliott a confidential letter he said:

As to the army as it stands, we have no fear; but it is not strong enough. It must be increased. We have the men, and they should be put into the ranks. To accomplish this more

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vigor is required in the Administration. Its action is not decided enough. But the indication which I think most significant is the tendency ncm fnantfesHng itself in different States among the people to let doum. This most be looked to.

At this time no such tendency had shown itself, as was being proved in the readiness with which the people surrendered their property to the army, or submitted to its loss where its destruction was deemed necessary as a part of the war policy. This was particularly noticeable along the Mississippi River, where large quantities of cotton were being burned by the government to prevent the possibility of it being disposed of to buyers outside the Confederate lines, who were offering the enormous prices which that staple commanded during this period of scarcity.

General Polk was one of the heaviest losers by this act of destruction. In fact, it dealt the finishing blow to what remained of his fortune; and as the above letter was written but a few days after he had heard of his loss, it becomes an index of the man's spirit, not only in the face of public disaster but of private calamity as welL

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CHAPTER V.

THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN.

June 21 to November, 1862.

General Beauregard relieved from command.—Appointment of General Bragg as commander-in-«hief.— A promising outlook.— General Buell's advance toward Chattanooga.—Reinforcements for General Kirby Smith. — General Van Dom opposed to General Grant.— General Bragg determines on an oifensive campaign.— Movement against Cumberland Gap.—The Army of Mississippi advances into Middle Tennessee.-Movements in Kentucky.—General Kirby Smith defeats General Nelson at Richmond.— Confederate enthusiasm.- General Buell*s position at Bowling Green.— Importance of Louisville.— Capture of Mumfords-ville.— General Bragg's discomfiture. — General Buell enters Louisville.-Rearrangement of the campaign.—Endeavors to form Confederate government in Kentucky.—Favorable conditions for a campaign.—General Bragg's plans.— General Polk's dilemma.— Conflicting situations and orders.—General Buell outgenerals General Bragg.— Situation before Perryville.—General Bragg's plans.—General Hardee's letter.— Battle of Perry ville.— Spirit of the Confederate troops.— Confederate retreat to Harrodsburg.-Peats of gallantry at Perry-ville.— Heroism of Lieutenant-Colonel Parsons.— General Polk*s naiv row escape.—Tlie Confederates abandon Kentucky.—General Bragg resumes command of the Army of Mississippi.-Polk ordered to Richmond.— Interview with the President.—Appendix.

On the 21st of June the arniy was surprised by the announcement that General Beauregard had been relieved from the command, and that General Bragg was appointed in his stead. The event had been fore-

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shadowed, however, by what was known concerning the state of Beauregard's health, and, while many regretted the change, all hailed the new chief as the commander who was to reverse the line of disasters that had recently so heavily pressed upon them. General Bragg began his administration with vigor, and it was soon whispered about that a movement upon the enemy was in the near future. As commander of the Army of Mississippi he had been most (conspicuous in fighting the demoralization which fell upon the troops after the failure at Shiloh. The laxness which marked many commands had yielded to his stem discipline, and the administration of the general affairs of his force was such that without exaggeration it may be said that it had become as efficient a body of men as any of equal size within the limits of the contending armies. Federal and Confederate.

Having proved his ability as an organizer, General Bragg was now to test himself upon the higher field of grand tactics and strategy.

The first element of a commander's success is the confidence of his army, and this General Bragg then possessed to the fullest extent. It possessed the army from the highest to the lowest, and, eagerly awaiting his commands, all held themselves ready to do his bidding. General Polk, it is well to say, fully shared this feeling. Witnessing, as he did, the admirable results of the efforts toward improving the condition of the army, he was prepared to find in General Bragg all that was claimed for him as tlie future director of the fortunes of the Confederacy in that quarter of the field.

In the latter part of July, General Kirby Smith, the commander of the Department of East Tennessee, informed General Bragg that General Buell was pressing

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him in the direction of Chattanooga, and asked for assistance. He also proposed that General Bragg should transfer his army to his department, and initiate from there an offensive campaign into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, offering to place himself and his entire command under Greneral Bragg's direction for that purpose. This proposition and offer was submitted to the government at Richmond, which in turn approved the step. Finding that the enemy in West Tennessee was disposed to remain quiet. General Bragg accepted General Smith's proposal, and transferred to the threatened point Mc-Cown's division of General Van Dorn's command, and later four divisions of the Army of Mississippi, leaving in Mississippi General Van Dorn and the troops originally brought by that officer from the Trans-Mississippi Department. General Breckinridge's division of Kentucky troops, which a short time before had been detached from the Army of Mississippi for operations in east Louisiana, was left to replace McCown's division. This proved an unfortunate exchange, as was shown by the absence of General Breckinridge and his men from Kentucky at a time when their influence was needed for the furtherance of General Bragg's plans.

General Van Dorn was assigned the duty of watching, and, if need be, operating against, General Grant, the Federal commander in West Tennessee. He was also charged with the defenses of the Mississippi River at Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

The Army of Mississippi arrived at Chattanooga early in August, and was there reorganized. Two corps were formed, which were designated as the right and left wings of the army. General Polk, who had been acting as second in command, was assigned the right wing, while the left was assigned to General Hardee.

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The division commanders for the right were Generals Cheatham and Withers; for the left, Generals Buekner and Patton Anderson. The cavalry of the army consisted of the brigades of Generals John Morgan and Forrest, and Colonel Wheeler. Morgan had been operating in central Kentucky for some weeks, and Forrest was then performing a similar service in Middle Tennessee. Wheeler remained with the army.

Finding that General Bueirs advance upon Chattanooga had been suspended, and learning through For-i*est that his force was scattered throughout Middle Tennessee, apparently for the object of fortifying and holding the more important positions, General Bragg determined to inaugurate the campaign at once. Plans had been carefully considered by the government, General Kirby Smith, and himself, and it was finally concluded that the movement should be directed against General Buell's left and rear, with the view of regaining not only Middle Tennessee, but as much of centi*al and eastern Kentucky as might be possible.

The Federal forces which had to be considered in this campaign were practically the disjointed segments of General Halleck's former command, viz., Grant and Rosc-crans in West Tennessee, Buell in Middle Tennessee, and Wright in central and eastern Kentucky.

In the main the Federal forces were scattered along the railroad lines in the separate military districts which they proposed to hold, but their supply of rail and river transportation was sufiicient to permit proper concentration in case of need. The only isolated command was the garrison at Cumberland Gap under General George Morgan. This position was well fortified, however, and in addition was supplied with food and ammunition sufficient for a siege.

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In making his dispositions General Bragg opposed Van Dom to Generals Grant and Rosecrans in West Tennessee; General Kirby Smith, together with Humphrey Marshall's sinall command in southwest Virginia, he opposed to the forces of General Wright in central Kentucky and at Cumberland Gap; while with his own immediate command, the Army of Mississippi, he undertook the operations against General Buell. General Van Dom was now ordered to move upon Grant so as to prevent the sending of reinforcements to Buell or Wright General Smith was directed at the same time to move upon Cumberland Gap, capture it if possible, but, if not possible, to leave a force to watch it, and with the remainder of his command pass to its rear, unite with Marshall (already ordered to move forward), and march into central Kentucky. The line marked out for his immediate command was an advance into Middle Tennessee by way of Sparta, under cover of the east-em slope of the Cumberland Mountains. He intended to engage Buell south of the Cumberland River if i)ossible; but if such a course should prove impracticable it was the intention to move directly north, enter Kentucky, unite with Smith, and then fight the decisive battle for the possession of the State.

This combined movement was earnestly supported by all General Bragg's officers, and was cordially approved by the government. The dispositions which he made were comprehensive, and but for the intervals separating the columns they were as complete as the circumstances permitted.

Thus was inaugurated the most extensive, and, had it been successful, far-reaching campaign ever attempted by any Confederate commander. It appealed to the enthusiasm of the people as well as to that of the sol-

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diers, because it was a practical answer to all that the former in its anxiety was urging upon the government, and was in the direct line of what the anny felt to be possible.

Late in August the Army of Mississippi crossed the Tennessee River at Cliattanooga, and on the 28th took up its line of march across the Cumberland Mountains to Sparta in Middle Tennessee. It then numbered 31,500 men of all ai-ms, including the commands of Wheeler and Forrest.

Meanwhile General Buell, gathering at Murfreesboro some 30,000 men, prepared to offer an active resistance.

The opposing forces, as then constituted, were almost equal, but the advantages of concentration and clearness of purpose were with General Bittgg. General Buell, now on the defensive, had not penetrated his opponents designs sufficiently to enable lum to determine definitely the direction of his blow, but he kept well between his enemy and Nashville.

Halting at Sparta a day or two, General Bragg carefully studied the situation. Had his information shown that Buell would remain at Murfreesboro, no doubt he would have moved upon him at once; but Forrest, whose statements were rarely misleading, reported the enemy as abandoning that position and concentrating at Nashville.

Knowing that Nashville had been well fortified, and that it contained abundant provisions for an army, General Bragg wisely decided to relinquish for the present his design upon Middle Tennessee, and, instead, to push boldly into Kentucky, where General Smith had already secured a good foothold. In adopting this course he did not fail, however, to provide for the occupation of Middle Tennessee. General Samuel Jones, the

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commander at Chattanooga, was instructed, with such few troops as he could gather together, to advance along the raih*oad toward NashvilLe as far as might be prudent ; and at a later period, when in Kentucky, Greneral Bragg sent Forrest, with two regiments, to the same region. It was hoped that General Van Dorn would be able to cooperate with this force. But his defeat, to be mentioned so(m, rendered this impossible.

General Kirby Smith, as has been said, had already crossed tlie mountains near (Cumberland Gap, whence, leaving Stevenson's division to watch Morgan, whom he found too strong to be attacked in position, he had advanced rapidly into Kentucky. General Nelson, commanding the central district of Kentu(^ky, hastily gathering some 10,000 troops, attempted to check his progress at Riehm(md; but Smith, with a force of about 5000 well-organized and comparatively seasoned troops, promptly attficked, and after a severe c«mflict routed his opponent, wounded him, and captured 5000 of his men, ^fdih all of his trains and most of his artillery. Allowing his enemy no time to recuperate, General Smith pursued vigorously, and speedily made himself master of central Kentucky. Concentrating his forces at Lexington, he occupied the enemy by threatening Louisville and Cincinnati, while he awaited further developments.

The news of General Smith's success reached General Bragg's army al>out the time it left Sparta, and it served to quicken an enthusiasm already at a high pitch. Forrest now reported the Federal troops evacuating Nashville and moving north to Bowling Green, or perhaps Louisville, which was interpreted as a virtual abandonment of Middle Tennessee in order that General Buell might better secure and hold his communications with his base at Louisville. It appeared evident that there

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was to be a race between the opposing forces for the vantage-ground in Kentucky, and, discerning more cleai-ly the "objects of the campaign, the soldiers entered upon it with the greatest ardor; even the lazy and sometimes obstreperous teamsters caught the infection, so that the trains, the chief cause of delay on such occasions, were always well in place.

General Polkas corps leading, the advance marched fi'om Sparta on September 5. Moving rapidly, he reached Glasgow on the 12th, and under orders from General Bragg promptly seized the Louisville and Nashville railroad north of Bowling Green, at Proctor's station and Cave City station.

General Bragg now stood upon General Buell's com^ munications, and at the same time occupied a position .from which he could easily unite with General Smith, who, then operating about Lexington, was dispatched (on the 9th) to be ready for a concentration of all the forces. As stated to General Polk in a dispatch of the 10th, Gt^neral Bragg's design upon reaching Glasgow was to " strike a blow " at Bowling Green, but General Buell, who had not been idle, frustrated the plan. Wisely leaving a division to. hold Nashville, he had moved north in search of his enemy, with a force augmented by two divisions, which, in spite of Van Dom, General Grant had sent him. His advance reached Bowling Green coincident with General Polk's arrival at Glasgow, and by the time General Bragg had brought all his force to Glasgow the bulk of the Federal army was near enough to Bowling Green to be placed behind its fortifications before the Confederate army could have reached it. If General Bragg seriously entertained the idea of taking Bowling Green at that date, he lost his opportunity when he failed to march directly upon it

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after crossing the Cumberland River. It was evident, however, that the blow at Bowling Q-reen was a contingent operation, to be attempted or not, a^ conditions might permit, after the railroad communication with Louisville had been interrupted. When this had been accomplished it was plainly seen that the opportunity had escaped; consequently the design upon Bowling Green was abandoned. The union with General Smith had been practically secured, however; for, although separated from bim by some sixty or seventy miles, the roads were of unusual excellence and led through an abundant country, and no enemy was so placed as to impede the junction in the slightest degree. General Smith had informed General Bragg that he had captured a large amount of army supplies, so that the army was assured not only of strength but of plenty in that direction.

The object of the campaign being the reoccupation of Middle Tennessee and as much of Kentucky as could be secured, it was evident that (Jeneral Buell must be brought to a decisive battle, and, if possible, defeated. Unless this was accomplished the campaign could not be a success. But General Buell occupied a strongly fortified position at Bowling Green, was abimdantly supplied with provisions, and could fight or not as he saw fit. If he would abandon Us fortifications. General Bragg, who then knew nothing of the reinforcements from Graut, would have fought him wUlingly; but this it was thought he would not do. In fact, General Buell's advance a day or two later toward Glasgow was construed as a recon-noissance rather than the movement of his entire ai*my. It was evident that the country about Glasgow and Bowling Green was too poorly provisioned to await there his pleasure, for it meant starvation. It appeared, therefore,

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that any direct attempt upon Buell's army must be abandoned for the present. There was another objective, however, the capture of which would secure to the Confederates advantages second only to the destruction of Buell's army, and that was the city of Louisville. This was General Buell's base of supplies, and at this time was filled with army stores of every description. But more than all, it was the chief city of the State, and its possession would carry an amount of prestige which could be abundantly utilized, not only from a military standpoint, but from a political one as well, in securing the purposes of the campaign. To move upon it involved no loss of position, and every mile gained in that direction only placed General Bragg that much nearer General Smith and his abundant supplies. Since General Buell could not be successfully reached, it was obvious that Louisville must be secured. Fortunately, General Smith, by threatening Cincinnati, was drawing away the reinforcements intended for Louisville. Everything, therefore, pointed to a continuation of the march north. General Bragg, of course, saw it all, and began his arrangements to carry this plan into effect.

On the 15th he wrote General Smith to be ready by the 23d to cooperate witli him in the advance upon Louisville, while Smith, conscious of the importance of the movement, wrote on the same date urging a similar course upon General Bragg, and made his dispositions to that end, as shown in letters of the 18th, 19th, 21st, and 23d of September.^

Hardly had this combined movement been initiated when there occurred one of those side issues which in

1 "Official Records, War of Rebellion," voL xvl, pt. ii, pp. 830, 845, 846,850,856,859,861,866.

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the life of an army often exercises an important influence upon its fortunes. Greneral John B. Chalmers^ a favorite officer with the commanding general, who had been placed with his brigade so as to hold the railroad at Cave City, acting without orders, made an injudicious and unsuccessfid attack upon the fortified camp at Munfordsville, a point a few miles to the north of the post assigned him. Tlie position in itself was one of no special importance at that time, but General Bragg thought the affair might affect injuriously the morale of his army; and, as the place could be taken without any departure from the shortest and most available route toward Louisville, he marc»hed his armj' toward it and speedily cuptured it, with its garrison of 4267 men. This was accomplished on the morning of the 17th. Knowing that time pressed, it was supposed that the army wouhl at once resume its march toward Louisville. This, however, was not done. General Buell was reported advancing from Bowling Green. On the 18th he reached the vicinity of Cave City, and, pending the arrival of Thomas's division, took a strong defensive position. For the first time General Bragg now faced a test of higher generalship, and the manner in which he bore himself proved a shock to his subordinates. Singularly elated over the relatively insignificant event of Munfordsville, for a day or two he seemed unable to determine definitely his future course. Wavering between his original purpose of joining General Smith on the. one hand, and of fighting Buell at Munfordsville on the other, he finally adopted the latter course. But scarcely had he reached this conclusion when he discovered that with the arrival of Thomas, who came up on the 20th, General Buell had become too strong to be attacked with any hope of that complete success which

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was indispensable to his army as it then stood. General Bragg therefore withdrew from Munfordsville on the 20th, and resumed his march northward. Five days had been lost, and in view of the great objects of the campaign and the possibilities of those five days, it is not too much to say that they were thrown away.

Instead of keeping between Buell and Louisville, General Bragg now turned to the right, and on the 22d took up a position at Bardstown, some fifteen miles east of the more direct route to that city.

When General Bragg reached Bardstown he expected to find Smithes force close at hand, and he still hoped to be in position to carry out his design upon Louisville or turn upon Buell as seemed best, but instead of this he learned that Smith had been diverted by the escape of the garrison from Cumberland Gap. It had been expected both by General Bragg and General Smith that General Marshall, commanding the small cooperating force from southwest Virginia, would be at hand by this date (September 22), and that to his command, together with that of General Stevenson and the cavalry of General John Morgan, could be left the duty of opposing this force. But Marshall was not at hand, and as the escaping Federal garrison was well ahead of Stevenson, moving apparently on Lexington, General Smith saw no way to protect aU that he had gained at Lexington in the way of army supplies but by turning his own force against it. This he intimated to General Bragg on the 21st. In the same letter, however, he said: " My force is now at Georgetown and Paris, and will join you by a rapid maa-ch if, under existing circumstances, you so direct." And on the 23d he again wrote that with 11,000 men he would move to Frankfort on the 24th, so as to be in supporting distance for com-

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bined operations against Buell. But on the 24th ^ he reported the enemy near at hand, and said that he would turn to intercept him, and in the absence of orders to the contrary he did this on the evening of the same date. It took about twenty-four hours for communications to pass from General Smith to General Bragg, so that General Bragg learned definitely of Smith's diversion on the night of the 25th. Coincident abnost with tlie arrival of this information the head of Buell's cohmin entered Louisville.

This closed the first act of the Kentucky campaign. The Imlliant possibilities of the s^ituation at Glasgow ten days before had not been realized. Louisville and General BuelFs army had both escaped, and now, united, stood ready to initiate the second act of the campaign.

General Bragg, confident at Munfordsville, at Bards-town began to suggest failure, and in a letter of the 25th to General Cooper at Richmond laid the blame to tlie supineness of tlie citizens of Kentucky, and to the inaction of Van Dom in nortli Mississippi. In expressing the first he was forgetful of General Smith's warning to him that little was to be expected from Kentucky so long as Buell's army remained undefeated; and in the second he allowed himself to express a censure which the facts were far from warranting. In his effort to obey instructions Van Dom was defeated by Grant and Rosecrans at Corinth and luka. But General Bragg clahned that he himself had before him the armies of Grant, Rosecrans, and Buell combined, and that this would not have been had Van Dom moved into West Tennessee as ordered.

A truer estimate of Van Dom's part in General

1 *'Official Records, War of Rebellion/ voL xvi, pt. ii, p. 870.

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Bragg's campaign is contained in the indorsement of President Davis upon General Bragg's letter: "There was an evident error as to the withdrawal of the enemy from Tennessee. The battle of Corinth shows the impossibility of the advance refeiTed to, as the part required of Generals Van Dorn and Price."

History must search elsewhere for General Bragg's discomfiture. As already intimated, the impression prevailed at the time of its occurrence, and the record confirms it, that the loss of time incurred in moving from Glasgow to Bardstown was the cause of the failure. The garrison at Munfordsville surrendered on the morning of the 17th. The Confederate force could have been at Bardstown on the 20th. General Smith should have been urged to hurry forward toward Louisville; and, seeing that he did not turn back toward Morgan until the evening of the 24th, but was actively continuing his preparations to join General Bragg, the combined forces could easily have been at Louisville on the 23d, the day originally designated by General Bragg for that purpose, and, as it proved, two days before General Buell's arrival, who had moved with all possible speed.'

Better still would it have been had Munfordsville been ignored altogether, for the fruits of that success were a poor substitute for the greater stakes that were lost through taking it.

It is evident tliat the distance separating Bragg and Smith was a cause of embarrassment in framing the necessary orders for cooperation, as it was impossible to determine the relative importance of events that might be transpiring upon the two fronts; but this was a strong additional reason for shortening that distance as rapidly

1 Prior to General BueU*s arrival the city was hAd by a small and hastUy gathered body of raw troops.

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as possible, for in that way alone conld all the problems be properly weighed. As was proven subsequently, the situation was favorable for the coneentration, and it only needed positive orders from Bragg to Smith to bring it alH>ut^ and that, too, in ample time for the accomplishment of the greater objects of the campaign.

Prior to the 24th of September the advantage of position remained with the Confederate forces. But the arrival of General Buell in Louisville changed the situation materially. Coincident with his advent to the city, reinforcements were poured in upon him, so that in five days he controlled at that point an army numbering within a fraction of 70,000 men. General Wright was hurrying his preparations at Cincinnati, which point General Morgan, with the force from Cumberland Gap, was fast approaching. It was safe, then, to count upon a force in that quarter of not less than 25,000 men, giving to the Federal generals about 95,000 men available for field operation in the immediate future.

Against this array General Bragg could oppose about 52,000 men of all arms. It was a veteran force, however, and, handled properly, was capable of gaining far better results than it obtained.

The change in affairs in General Bragg's front rendered imperative a rearrangement of the lines of the campaign.

Two lines of action were left open to the Confederates : one looked to the occupation of Bowling Greeu, Cumberland Gap, and Nashville, and the obstruction of the Cumberland River below Nashville, with a view to reestablishing in part the line held the previous spring by General Sidney Johnston; the other looked to the occupation of the State of Kentucky, in order that the friends of the Confederacy there might be encouraged

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to organize a State government and actively unite themselves with the fortunes of the southern States.

Political reasons seem to have determined the adoption of the latter plan. In accordance with this view, General Bragg, on September 28, turned over the command of the Army of Mississippi at Bardstown to General Polk, and departed for Lexington to confer with Greneral Smith and make arrangements for inaugurating a provisional State government, the officers for which had already been selected by the representatives of Kentucky then within the Confedei'ate lines.

In order the better to comprehend this narrative, some further allusion to the number and disposition of the contending forces is necessary. On September 30 General Buell, with about 70,000 men, at Louisville, was ready to advance. General Wright, awaiting the arrival of Morgan, was not ready to move from Cincinnati, nor was it probable that his force would be before October 10, and as a fact it took no part in the campaign until it had about ended. Practically, therefore. General Buell's force was tlie only foe opposed actively to General Bragg, and was the one considered by him in the approaching campaign. General Bragg's force was divided between Polk and Smith, the first at Bardstown, the second scattered between Frankfort, Lexington, and Danville, but moving to a concentration at Frankfort. In round numbers it may be said that Polk's and Smith's commands numbered each about 26,000 men of aU arms, giving General Bragg, as has been already said, 52,000 men. But this force was widely scattered, the two main bodies being not less than fifty miles apart, while General Buell's force, concentrated and well in hand, stood with one half of General Bragg's army forty miles to the south of it, and the other half a

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somewhat greater distance to the east. With these facts in mind we return to the narrative of events as they arose.

Before leaving B^rdstown Cteneral Bragg had selected Bryantsville, in the fork of the Dicks and Kentucky rivers, as a temporary base; had ordered the supplies captured at Lexington to be sent there; and from thence had established, by way of Cumberland Gap, a line of communication with his base proper, the railroad in

East Tennessee. His instructions to Cteneral Polk were to remain at Bardstown, and, if pressed by a force too large to justify giving battle, to fall back on the line toward Bryantsville in order to control his communications and be in position to unite with General Smith's column. A reference to the map will show the relative position of these various points.

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Prom Louisville as a center, macadamized roads extended throughout the State. These highways were intersected at various points by equally good roads, and from every town of any importance in central Kentucky the same radiating and connecting system of macadamized roads prevailed, so that when, in addition to this fact, the abundance of the country is considered, it is not too much to say no fairer region for campaigning could be found on the American continent. There was one drawback at this season, however, and that was the scarcity of water.

On the 1st of October General Polk received from General Bragg, then at Danville, a letter dated September 30, directing him to move up toward Louisville and occupy Taylorsville, Shepardsville, Mount Washington, and Elizabeth (see map). All except the last named were villages situated upon the principal roads leading from Louisville to Bardstown, and were about half-way between the two places. In the same letter he told Polk that Stevenson's division of Smith's command, withdrawn from the pursuit of Morgan, and then at Danville, would be moved up to Shelbyville to replace Cleburne's brigade,^ which then would move to Taylorsville and report to him. 1\\ concluding, he informed General Polk that he would be at Lexington the next day, and on Friday or Saturday in Frankfort, where he would inaugurate the Governor of Kentucky. No sooner had Polk received these instructions than he began putting them into execution. Hardly had the first step been taken, however, when Wharton, who commanded the cavalry in the immediate front, reported that Buell was advancing upon him in heavy force. At the same

1 debume's and Preston Smith's brigades bad been detached to Gton-enl Kirby Smith's command at the ontset of the campaign.

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time Polk received a note from Cleburne at Shelbyville saying that the enemy in his front was within four miles of his position, and that he thought he would be compelled to fall back on Frankfort. The situation was thus suddenly reversed. Creneral Buell was moving to occupy Shepardsville, Mount Washington, Tay-lorsville, and Shelbyville; and upon each road he was reported in force, so that clearly it was no mere feint. General Polk directed his cavalry to further develop the enemy, and to that end moved up two brigades of infantry in support. All this he reported to General Bragg in a letter dated 10 a.m. October 2, and said that if an opportunity presented he would attack, but if this should be clearly inexpedient he would act upon General Bragg's original suggestion — that is, fall back toward Bryantsville by way of Harrodsburg and Danville, with a view to union with General Smith. He concluded by saying, "It seems to me we are too much scattered.'' The substance of this note was repeated to General Bragg at a later hour of the day. During the night of the 2d General Polk continued to receive information of G^eneral Buell's advance, and on the 3d Wharton reported that TaylorsvUle had been occupied the night before in heavy force, also that the head of the Mount Washington column had crossed the Salt River (twelve miles from Bardstown) that morning, that the Shepardsville column was moving forward, and that everything indicated an advance of the enemy to give him battie.^

All the information received by General Polk was to the effect that his force, and not General Smith's, was Buell's objective. Therefore, as he was not strong

1 See Colonel Wharton's dispatch, 12 M., "Official Records, War of BebeUion," yoL xyl, pt. U, p. 900.

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enough to venture upon a general engagement, he decided to retire slowly along the line ah*eady indicated by General Bragg. This determination had hardly been reached, however, when he received a dispatch from General Bragg, then at Lexington, saying:

October 2. A telegram from Frankfort represents the enemy moving in force on Shelbyville. It may be a reconnoissance, but should it be a real attack we have them. We shall be at Frankfort to-morrow with all of our force. Hold yourself in readiness, with cooked rations, to strike them on the flank. With Smith in front and our own gallant army on the flank I see no hope for Buell if he is rash enough to come out. I only fear it is not true. I will send you cavalry as soon as this move is developed. Hold yourself informed by scouts toward Shelbyville, and if you discover that a heavy force has moved on Frankfort strike without further orders, leaving your front and flanks well covered.

It was evident from this dispatch that General Bragg had a very imperfect knowledge of BuelPs movements, and this impression was confirmed when, later, the following order, likewise from Lexington, was received:

October 2,1 p.m. The enemy is certainly advancing on Frankfort. Put your whole available force in motion by Bloomfield, and strike him in flank and rear. If we can combine our movements he is certainly lost. Your information of the 30th was correct, but your courier was two days and nights getting here. Dispatch me frequently to Frankfort.

The order was explicit, and under ordinary circumstances required prompt obedience. But it convinced General Polk that General Bragg had a very imperfect knowledge of the enemy's movements. This was not

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surprising, however, seeing that he was far removed from the scene of action (some fifty miles), and occupied to a great extent with preparations looking to the inauguration of a civil government. General Polk felt, therefore, that he had some discretion in the emergency which faced him. In determining his line of action it was incumbent upon him to consider not only how far obedience to the order would jeopardize his own command, but how far failure to comply with it would endanger that of General Smith, with which General Bragg intimated an intention to attack the force moving upon Frankfoi-t. He rightly concluded that Smith's movement would not be undertaken until he was definitely informed of his (Polk's) movements; he therefore had no uneasiness upon this score. As to the effect upon his own command of compliance with the order, it was quite evident that a movement toward Frankfort u])on the road designated would speedily bring him in collision with all of Buell's army, an occurrence which he had already deemed unadvisable in view of the disparity of available forces. The matter, however, was one of such importance that he determined to lay it before his corps and division commanders; this he did, explaining fully the situation. Laying before them his orders, he pi*ac-tically said that from his knowledge of the situation he was prepared to disregard thorn, for the simple reason that he had no force " available" for any such movement. He was clearly of the opinion that he ought to retire slowly along the line originally designated by General Bi-agg, because by so doing he would cover the base and yet be in position to join General Smith at any time. All agreed that the command could not stay as it was, and yet it would be folly to attempt a march upon Frankfort along the line designated by General

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Bragg, unless it was desirable to bring on an engagement with General Buell j and this in their isolated position they were not prepai'ed to advise, unless it could be shown that by failing to do this General Smith would be endangered. General Polk's interpretation of General Bragg's intentions with regard to Smith was not wholly satisfactory to all present, but Polk was so sure that he was right, and that General Smith would not move until he could be heard from, that he assumed all responsibility upon that score, and asked what would be advised in the absence of the orders in question. Every one then concurred in the propriety of the course he had already marked out for the command. The moment this conclusion was reached General Polk wrote General Bragg:

Babdstown, October 3, 3 p.m. I am in receipt of your note of the 2d, 1 P^., directing me to move with aU of my available force ffia Bloomfield to Frankfort, to strike the enemy in his flank and rear. The last twenty-four hours have developed a condition of things on my right and left flank which I shadowed fortli in my last note to you, which makes compliance with this order not only eminently inexpedient but impracticable. I have called a council of wing and division commanders, to whom I have submitted the matter, and find that they unanimously endorse my \dews of what is demanded. I shall therefore pursue a different course, assured that when the facts are submitted to you you will justify my decision. I move on the routes indicated by you toward Bryantville. The head of my column wiU move this evening. I send this by a relay of couriers I have established at intervals of ten miles from this to Lexington via Danville.

On the 4th (while on the march) General Polk received from General Smith a dispatch dated Frankfort, October 3:

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The enemy occupied Shelbyville yesterday in force. Cleburne fell back to this point. My command is now all up and will hold this position. The cavalry have not yet reported any advance from Shelbyville, but report Taylorsville in possession of the enemy. It may be a reconnoissance in force, but should it be Buell's advance our commands at this point and Bardstown are too far apart and beyond supporting distance.

Accompanying this dispatch was another which Gen-eral Smith had received from General Bragg, and which he enclosed for General Polk's information. It was dated Lexington, October 3, and said:

We hear nothing from your front. What is your information T If the enemy is still advancing send another courier to General Polk to [come to] your aid, and you must hold position so as to use the bridge in case the enemy should turn on him. Our whole force must be brought to bear at the same time.

These communications confirmed General Polk's opinion npon the question of General Bragg's intentions on Smith's front. Smith was not to advance, but was to liold position at Frankfort until Polk could be heard from. Later, upon the same day (October 4), the following dispatch was received direct from General Bragg:

FRANKPOitT, October 3,1862, 8 p.m. I just have yours of yesterday P.M. I have sent you several dispatches since yesterday morning desiring you to move your force on the enemy, who was making a descent on this point. That move has proved to be only a feint, and has ceased. You will act accordingly, but I desire you to hold your command ready for a junction at any moment, and, if possible, place one flank at Taylorsville. Just as soon as Morgan gets in from his pursuit of his namesake you shall have cavalry. To-morrow we inaugurate the civil Governor

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here, and transfer to him all that department. The brigades of Cleburne and Preston Smith will soon rejoin you. We have five thousand men just arrived at Danville; two thousand more, I hear, are nearly up, and Breckinridge has at last arrived at Knoxville, and [on] his way with his division. This will strengthen us. Recruiting is slow, but improving.

This dispatch suspended the order of October 2, 1 P.M., directing Polk to move upon the flank and rear of the force threatening Smith at Frankfort, and practically left him free to shape his course in accordance witli the demands of the situation in his front, except that he was to hold himself ready for a junction with Smith at any moment, and was, if it were possible, to placQ one flank at Taylorsville. The placing of a flank as suggested was impossible, as Taylorsville was then inside Buell's lines; but lie was already on the march to join Smith,— not along the route which General Bragg had in his mind, however (the road from Bardstown to Frankfort), because Buell's position made that impracticable, but along a line from which by the requisite detour the junction could be accomplished at any time it should be ordered. Reports from Wharton showed that Bueirs left, with his center in easy supporting distance, was being steadily pushed in between Bardstown and Frankfort, so it was evident that if the junction was to be made anywhere near Frankfort, the retreat from Bardstown was a pressing necessity. In reflecting upon his course General Polk could not feel otherwise than that he had done everything that was possible to meet General Bragg's wishes, and that his course in declining to attempt the movement upon the flank and rear of the force in front of Frankfort had been justified not only by the situation but by the order suspending it. In time he was to learn differently. It was not

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during the campaign, however, but many months after, when, exposed to tiie criticism of the public press, not merely for the failure of the Kentucky campaign but for that of Murfreesboro as well, General Bragg sought to throw upon General Polk the responsibility for the failure of this campaign. In an official report bearing date May 20,1863, he states:

I ordered Major-General Polk in writing, dated Lexington, 1 P.M., October 2, and sent it by two routes, to move from Bardstown with his whole available force by way of Bloom-field toward Frankfort, to strike the enemy in flank and rear, and informed him that Major-General Smith would attack in front. When received at Bardstown on the 3d, the general submitted this order, which is not mentioned in his report, to a council of wing and division commanders, and determined to move as originally instructed by me on leaving Bardstown Fortunately, notice of this determination reached me at Frankfort in time to prevent the movement against the enemy's front by General Smith, but it necessitated an entire change in my plans,—the abandonment of the capital, and the partial uncovering and ultimate loss of our stores at Lexington.^

It is impossible to understand how General Bragg could have penned these statements when he knew not only that his own dispatches would disprove every word of them, but that it was a virtual admission of the claims of his critics that he was persistently ignorant of his enemy's position and blind as to his intentions. But we wiU not stop to comment here.

On the 5th we find General Polk, at Springfield, writing General Bragg: " I have kept you informed of our movements." He then reports the position of his commands, some at Springfield, the remainder on tjie roads to Har-rodsburg and Danville. General Polk naturally thought

1 See Appendix to Chapter V.

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that if General Bragg still wished him at Frankfort he would order him there. He received a dispatch, however, dated Frankfort, 7 A.M., October 4, saying :

I have yoTir dispatch of yesterday. Concentrate your force iQ front of Harrodsburg. A brigade of General Steven-son^s command at Danville and Camp Breckinridge will join you. Cleburne's and P. Smith's forces here will do the same. General Smith's whole force is concentrating here, and we will strike the enemy just as soon as we can concentrate. Send ahead to have provisions at Harrodsburg. Keep the men in heart by assuring them it is not a retreat, but a concentration for a fight. We can and must defeat them. Advise me frequently of your movements and if the enemy follow you.

Later he received the following letter, which is explicit upon both the civil and military situations, dated Frankfort, October 4:

We shall put our Governor in power soon, and then I propose to seek the enemy. Tour dispatch of the 2d, 10 A.M., including General Cleburne's, just received here. He has fallen back to Frankfort, but our cavalry is yet well in front, and no advance by the enemy was made this side of ShelbyviUe at three o'clock this morning. All our available forces are ordered up, and we will strike as soon as concentration is practicable wherever the enemy may be. ... I should suppose the enemy would move on this place, the capital and nearest route to our suppHes at Lexington, but it may be he hopes to strike you alone. Use every means to gain information, and let me hear from you often. If not otherwise directed, my staff will join me from Harrodsburg. I have ordered flour and bread to you, but the country around ought to supply you.

P. S.—1.30 P.M. Enemy in full force advancing on us; only twelve miles out. Shall destroy bridges and retire on Harrodsburg for concentration and then strike. Reach that point as soon as possible.

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These dispatches show veiy clearly that General Bragg was uncertain of BuelPs position; not from the want of information, however, but because he found it difficult to dismiss from his mind his conviction that Frankfort and Smith's column were Buell's objective. General Polk's information from Wharton, dated 10 and 11.30 A.M. of the 5th, showed General Buell to be in force at Bardstown and Bloomfield. He accordingly placed his cavalry so as to cover the line extending from Lebanon on the south, through Springfield, to Willisburg on the north. The following quotation from General Polk's official report of the Kentucky campaign is now presented:

On arriving at PerryviUe I eommunicated with the general commanding the forces, then at Harrodsburg, informing him that the right wing, under command of General Cheatham, had been ordered forward to take a position on the farther side of that town, and, as there was a scarcity of water, I had ordered General Hardee to haJt Buckner's division near Perryville and to post Anderson's on Salt River between the two towns. These dispositions were carried into effect, and I reported to the general commanding in person.

The enemy bad been held in check along the whole Une of march, from in front of Louisville up to our present position, by those gallant cavalry commanders, Colonels Wharton and Wheeler, and we were constantly advised of his position and movements. He left Louisville in five columns on as many different routes, extending from the road to Ehzabethtown around to that to ShelbyviUe, and we had reason to believe that much the larger portion of this force was concentrated upon Bardstown and followed our retiring army in the march to Perryville. The rest of his force pursued a route farther north to threaten General Eirby Smith.

General Polk's dispatches to General Bragg, together with the above extract from his official report, so accurately describe General Buell's actual line of advance

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that it is only necessary to add a word concerning the force in front of Frankfort and to mention tlie general designs of the two commanders-in-chief before explaining the relative position of the two armies as they approached each other at Perryville. General Buell had moved his right and center corps, under Crittenden and Gilbert respectively, direct upon Polk at Bardstown. His left corps, under McCook, he divided, moving one division (Sill's — some 8000 men) upon Frankfort, while the remainder (two division's) was thrust in between Frankfort and Bardstown. Sill was expected to occupy Smith while the remainder of tlie Federal army carried out General Buell's plan. This plan was to turn General Bragg's left and cut him off from Bowling Green and Nashville, and, if possible, Cumberland Gap. If this could be accomplished he expected to compel General Bragg to fight upon his tenns or else retreat from the State by way of southwest Virginia. If only the fii-st steps could be achieved, the Federal jurisdiction would at least be reestablished upon much the same lines as had been occupied at the beginning of the summer.

When General Bragg determined to establish a civil government in Kentucky, he conceded the greater part of the primary objects of General Buell's campaign. But the concession was intended to be temporary only. The civil government was to be inangurat<?d, the Confederate forces were to be united, and then General Buell was to be fought wherever found, and driven across the Ohio. This, in brief, was the plan of campaign outlined by General Bragg.

On the afternoon of the 6th of October Buell's forces were in the following positions: Crittenden and Gilbert, following upon Polk's track, were nearing Springfield; McCook was five miles from Willisburg in the direction

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148 CONCENTRATION OF CONFEDERATES. [1862

of Bloomfield; whDe Sill, supported by Dumont's small division, was approaching Frankfort.

That night the Federal army, Sill's column excepted, was instructed to converge upon Perryvillei McCook marched by the way of Macksville j Crittenden, leaving the direct road, took one at Springfield which by a slight detour approached Perryrille from the south. General Bucll himself moved direct from Springfield with Gilbert's corps.

While the Federal forces were executing these movements the concentration of the Confederate forces was progressing rapidly. Hardee, who had been halted at Perry ville by Polk, held the position with Buckner's division. In order the better to cover the concentration of the army, he was instructed, the night of the 6th, to recall Anderson to his assistance. This was accomplished early on the 7th. Meanwhile General Cheatham, in temporary command of General Polk's corps, was camped at Har-rodsburg, and Kirby Smith, retreating from Frankfort, had reached Salvisa, a town situated about as far to the north of Harrodsburg as Perryville was to the southwest (about nine miles). General Polk, writing a member of his family from Harrodsburg, October 7, said: " We have come to concentrate our army with that of Kirby Smith. It has been done, and we shall now give the enemy battle." But the question was, Where t It may seem strange that such a query could have arisen at that stage. It did arise, however, and General Bragg's inability to answer it cost him the campaign. He was as much in doubt at Harrodsbm'g as his dispatches, alread}'- given, show him to have been at Lexington and Frankfort. He could not divest himself of the belief that Buell's heaviest force lay toward Frankfort, in front of Smith, and he refused to believe that it had

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been following Polk and that it was then approaching Perryville.^

He ignored Hardee's earnest appeal, and refused not only to maintain the concenti'ation of his troops, but took Polk's largest division (Withers's) from him and sent it to join Smith, whom he ordered back to Versailles, in the direction of Frankfort, which movement he proposed to direct in person. General Bragg's intention had been to take Cheatham as well,^ but, yielding in part to Polk's urgent appeals, he wrote Polk that in view of the news

1 In his official report (May 20) of these events, Bragg uses a dispatch from Polk (written him at Harrodsburg, midnight October 6) to justify his declining to believe that Bnell was moving by the Bardstown line. General Polk said: *' I have directed Hardee to ascertain, if possible, the strength of the enemy which may be covered by his advance. I cannot think it large.'* This was the closing sentence in a report to General Bragg upon the disposition of the troops for the following day (the 7th), a part being ordered back to aid Hardee. The enemy aOuded to was that in Hardee's front near Perryville that afternoon. It proved to be nothing more than a heavy reconnoiterlng force. Buell's main column had scarcely reached Springfield, and McCook was but a short distance from Bloomfleld.

The question to be determined was whether the force threatening Hardee that afternoon (the 6th) at Perryville was BuelFs main body or not. Polk did not beUeve that it was, but, in view of what he knew about the position of the Federal army, he could not be sure, so he directed Hardee to find out. Pending Hardee's report, Polk held Cheatham at Harrodsburg instead of allowing him to join Withers, who was already camped four miles out toward Salvisa, to which point Ctoneral Bragg wished both divisions to move the next day.

2 ("Circular Confidential.")

Hbaix^uabtbbs, Army Mississippi, Habbodsbxtro, Oct 7,1862.

I. Cheatham's division will move forward to-night to Withers's position, and both divisions of the right (Withers's and Cheatham's) will move tomorrow to Lawrenceburg, thence to Versailles, and follow General E. Kirby Smith's command.

II. General E. Kirby Smith's command at Salvisa will move to-morrow to Versailles, throwing a division toward Frankfort. AUston's cavalry, now at Salvisa, will cover Cheatham's movement, reporting to Major-General Cheatham.

III. MajoT-General Hardee, commanding left wing Army Mississippi,

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from Hardee he had better take Cheatham's division to Perryville, rout the enemy he would find there, and then move to his support at Versailles, and concluded by saying that no time should be lost in these movements.^ General Polk protested against this disposition of the army, urged the strong expediency of concentrating all the forces at Perryville, and finally, seeing that General Bragg could not be turned from his purpose, begged that at least Withers's division might be returned to him; but all to no purpose. General Hardee's appeal, written from Perryville, throws such a vivid light upon the situation that it is given here entire:

Perryville, Ky., October 7, 7.30 p.m. My dear General: I am in receipt of your ''confidential

wUl follow these movements as eircnTnstances will allow, notifying these headquarters of his move.

Colonel Wood's infantry will join the guard at the depot at Bryant-ville, reporting to the commanding officer; these and his caralry will report to Colonel Wheeler, commanding cavalry of Hardee's wing. By command of General Bragg.

[Signed] Gko. Wm. Bbknt,

Chief of SUsff and A, A, G. To MajortGenebal Polk, Commanding Army MississippL

1 HKADQUABTBB8, DbPABTMENT No. 2,

Habbodsburo, Oct. 7,1862. General: In view of the news from Hardee, you had better move with Cheatham's division to his support and give the enemy battle immediately.

Rout him, and then move to our support at VersaiUes. Smith moved forward to-day in that direction, and I wish Withers to march to-night toward Lawrenceburg, crossing thence to-morrow to Versailles, and follow up Smith and report to him.

His wagon-train, except the ammunition and ordnance, had better cross at McCown's, turning off at Salvisa. No time should be lost in these movements. I shall follow Smith.

Respectfully and truly yours, [Signed] Braxton Braoo, General Commanding.

To L. Polk, Major-General.

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oircolar'' of this d&te, also your letter of instructions to General Polk.

From the tenor of the letter of instructions to General Polk, I presume that this is later than the confidential circular. Both are in the same enclosure and of the same date.

Permit me, from the friendly relations so long existing between us, to write you plainly. Dont scatter your forces. There is one rule in our profession which should never be forgotten—it is to throw the mass of your forces on the fractions of the enemy. The movement last proposed will divide your army, and each may be defeated, whereas by keeping them united success is certain.

If it be your policy to strike the enemy at Versailles, take your whole force with you and make the blow effective. If, on the contrary, you should decide to strike the army in front of me first, let that be done with a force which will make success certain. Strike with your whole strength, first to the right, then to the left.

I could not sleep quietly to-night without giving expression to these views.

Whatever you decide to do will meet my hearty cooperation. Your sincere friend, [Signed] W. J. Hardee, Major- Oeneral,

General Brai^g, Commanding Army,

N. B.—If you wish my opinion, it is that in view of the position of your depots, you ought to strike this force first

W.J.H.

Cheatham's division moved to Perryville on the afternoon of the 7th, and took up its position in the line already formed by Hardee.

Late on the same afternoon Buell formed Gilbert's corps about three miles in front of Perryville. IVIcCook'S corps rested that night nine miles in rear of Gilbert's left, and Crittenden's corps the same distance in rear of Gilbert's right; both corps were ordered to march, ready for battle, at daylight, and take position, one to the

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152 STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FOBCES. [1862

right, the other to the left of GUbert's command. Each had an excellent turnpike upon which to move, and the surrounding country waa so open and the ground so dry, that, had the necessity arisen, it would have been easy for both to move across the fields to Gilbert's support. The concentration of Buell's army, certainly for the purposes of defense, was thus practically accomplished on the night of October 7. It nimibered 58,000 men of all arms, exclusive of the commands of Sill and Dumont, and was divided between the three corps in the following proportions: Gilbert, 23,000; McCook, 12,500; Crittenden, 22,500.

This same night, at midnight. General Polk reached Hardee's headquarters. He found himself with about 16,000 men ^ in front of an enemy that he and his officers knew far outnumbered his own command. He seems to have known very nearly the actual disparity existing, and recognized that it was great enough to demand the utmost circumspection on his part. Fortunately, he considered that he was allowed some latitude in determining his course after he should reach Perryville and have consulted with General Hardee. He said:

" I did not regard the letter of instmctions as a peremptory order to attack at all hazards, but as requiring me to take into account such information as Hardee might furnish, and that it left me at liberty to exercise such discretion in the details of the attack as sound sense and the facts before me demanded, it being undorstood that I should carry the instructions into execution as judiciously and promptly as a willing mind and sound discretion would allow. As to my being held responsible for disobedience of orders in this matter

' See General Bragg's official report, Appendix to Chapter V.

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it never entered my head until the reception of your note."^ (April 17th.)

This he wrote when General Bragg, many months after Penyville, denied that he intended any latitude, or that the wording of the letter of instructions permitted any such construction.

Be this as it may, General Bragg made it quite evident to Polk and Hardee, the night of Perryville, that he was very much pleased with all they had done for him that day.

About daylight, October 8th, General Polk called a council of his principal officers, and, after stating his instructions and explaining the condition of affairs in his front, expressed himself as clearly of the opinion that the proper plan to pursue was to await the advance of the enemy, and at a favorable moment attack vigorously with all his force. He was opposed to an attack at that time, as, even if successful against the force in front, the remainder of Bueirs forces were so placed as to turn the attack into disaster, especially as there was no hope of help from either Withers or Smith.

His officers unanimously agreed with him, and General Polk, writing afterward, said:

I felt I was acting on the inside of the instructions given, and under the deep and painful conviction that the force at my disposal was totally inadequate to perform the duty assigned it; and while I must attempt that duty, I should do it in such a way as to prevent the wreck and destruction of the little army with whose conduct and safety I was charged.*

The Confederate line, facing the west, its left resting on the town of Perryville, was formed along the east

> Polk to Hardee, "Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. xvi, pt. i, p. 1101. * ''Official Records, War of Rebellion," vol. xvi, pt. i, p. 1102.

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bank of Chaplin's Creek, between the stream and the Harrodsburg road. Cheatham's division was on the left, Buckner's on the right, and Anderson's in the center. In front and upon the western side of the creek was a range of hills of the same altitude as the ground upon which Polk's line was formed. Beyond this range was a smaller creek, Doctor's Fork, a tributary of Chaplin's Creek, which united with the latter about two miles below the town. It was upon the high ground on either bank of Doctor's Fork that the battle of Perryville was fought.

Water was a most important item in General Buell's army that night; consequently, in order that he might command the stream, Gilbert pushed Sheridan's division across Doctor's Fork. At daylight Polk threw forward liddell's brigade, and quickly developed this advance. Supposing that it meant a continuance of the general advance of the day before, he wrote General Bra^ (6 a.m., Octobers):

The enemy seem disposed to press this morning. Their pickets commenced firing at daybreak. Understanding it to be your wish to give them battle, we shall do so vigorously; should we succeed, we will pass to the right, with the view of joining General Kirby Smith. If it should become necessary to fall back, we will do so on Danville and Bryantville, with a view of uniting with General Kirby Smith'^at that point. I have directed General (Preston) Smith to have all the trains belonging to this army now at Harrodsburg collected and moved out on the road to Bryantville, and to be ready to move on that place when it should become expedient.

P. S.—General (Preston) Smith's brigade should cover and protect these wagons should it become necessary.

The Federal advance did not continue, however; Gilbert merely moved his second division, Mitchell's, across

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the creek as a support to Sheridan, keepmg his third division, Schoepf's, in reserve upon the west side of Doctor's Fork. About ten o'clock Polk directed Hardee and Cheatham to advance their lines to the high ground between the two streams. Pending the execution of this order, General Bragg arrived on the field.^ He had been unable to find the enemy in Smith's front, so he again turned his attention to Polk's. After a full consultation, and an exanunation of Polk's dispositions, which were in the main approved, General Bragg courteously declined to assume command, and left Polk free to conduct the op>erations upon his own plan.

While these events were occurring upon the (Confederate line, McCook arrived (about ten o'clock) and formed his line along the western heights overlooking Doctor's Fork. The position which McCook occupied was to the right and somewhat to the rear of the line occupied by Gilbert's left division (Sheridan's), his right being posted some eight hundred yards from Gilbert's left, and separated from it by the deep ravine through which Doctor's Fork ran. This gap in the Federal line was to prove a source of disaster to it that day.

Advancing his skirmishers, General Polk developed the Federal line soon after it took position. He found that the heaviest pressure was upon his right, McCook having pressed forward his skirmish line. As it was of the first importance to protect this flank, it being the one which covered the communication with Smith, Polk moved Cheatham's division from the left of the line to the extreme right, and massed it in colunm of brigades

> There ia a discrepancy between this statement and one contained in General Harclee*8 official report, which says that General Bragg directed it. General Bragg did order it, but Polk already had reconnoitered the ground and had sent his inspector^general to execute it.

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under cover of the hills overlooking the confluence of Chaplin's Creek and Doctor's Fork. y^ This disposition threw the Confederate right somewhat beyond the Federal left, and placed the left in front of Sheridan's division, about covering his front. Preston Smith's brigade of Cheatham's division, which had been on detached duty, arrived about noon and was posted as a reserve. General Hardee, in order to cover the ground assigned him, placed his brigades with nearly a brigade distance between them, the intervals between the brigades in each case being covered by the reserve. The divisions from right to left now stood as follows: Cheatham, Buckner, Anderson, with Wharton'p cavalry brigade protecting the right, while Wheeler covered the left and contested Crittenden's advance. The ability and gallantry with which Wheeler conducted the duty entrusted to him so far retarded Crittenden's advance that it was twelve o'clock before he reported with two divisions, and late in the afternoon when he took position on Gilbert's right. The value of this service will better appear as the details of the battle are unfolded.

About one o'clock General Polk received an order from General Bragg to advance his entire force to the attack. Before the order came, Wharton reported a considerable body of the enemy moving rapidly down the Macksville road toward McCook's left.* To move to the attack just then would have exposed his flank and rear to a counter-attack from this force; Polk therefore held his men until the force in question reached McCook's line, and then gave the order to advance.

Cheatham, his right prolonged and covered by Wharton's cavalry, moved against the Federal left,^ and upon

' starkweather's brigade.

* For a graphic description of this gallant charge, see General Polk's report.

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the full development of this advance Hardee threw" forward his command. The whole Confederate line was speedily engaged. Powell's brigade upon the left, together with about half of Adams's brigade, struck the front of Sheridan's division and could go no farther. The remainder of Hardee's line, however, bearing to the right, passed Sheridan's flank, pushed its left through the gap between Gilbert and McCook, and quickly enveloped the right of McCook's corps. Cheatham, meanwhile, was meeting with brilliant success against Mc-Cook's left flank. Gilbert sent two brigades to McCook's aid, but to little purpose, and the whole of this corps was driven until darkness put a stop to the fighting. One of its divisions (Jackson's), after the death of its gallant leader, was so cut up that it lost its organization and had to be merged into other commands of the Federal army. It was fortunate for the Confederate army that Sheridan and Mitchell did not realize how small a force stood in their front, for, had they done so, the movement of Gilbert's corps upon Polk's left flank and rear would have been the inevitable consequence. Their failure to realize the advantage was due to the judgment and skill displayed by General Patton Anderson. Anderson remained with that portion of his division which was checked in Sheridan's front; realizing the importance of occupying the enemy, he deployed his force into a heavy skirmish line and pushed it as close up to Sheridan as he could. Influenced not only by Anderson's action, but by what he saw going on upon his left and rear, Sheridan warned Gilbert that he could not hold his position unless reinforced immediately. Had he displayed but a half of the enterprise characterizing his behavior upon subsequent fields, he would have blighted Polk's triumph almost before it began. As it was,

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Anderson held him to his position until Mitchell, closing in from the right, outflanked and drove the Confederate left back upon the town. The sun was setting when this was accomplished, but the triumph of the Confederates had already been achieved.

From the beginning to the end of the battle the south-em troops fought with conspicuous spirit. A large percentage, shoeless from the long marches, held their places in line throughout the battle, and when it was over the universal comment was that no field ever presented fewer stragglers. The Federal loss was 3220 killed and wounded, and 600 prisoners. Fifteen pieces of artillery were captured, and from 2500 to 3000 stand of small arms. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was 3145; missing, 251. General Bragg, in his report of the battle written two days after the action, and with the events of the day vividly before him, said very justly: "To Major-General Polk commanding the forces, to Major-General Hardee commanding the left wing, and Major-Generals Cheatham, Buckner, and Anderson, commanding divisions, is mainly due the brilliant achievement on this memorable field. Nobler troops were never more gallantly led."

As soon as General Polk could readjust his lines he rode with General Hardee to General Bragg's headquarters to make his report and to learn the decision as to the movements of the next day. This council was anything but inspiriting. General Bragg had so formed his campaign upon a different disposition of Buell's forces that the actual disposition unfolded before him seemed to rob him of power for clear thinking; and even self-control appeared about to desert him as he paced the floor rubbing one hand over the other. Hardee and Polk, sitting one on either side of the fireplace, could but ex-

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change glances of astonished concern. Recalling all they had experienced, and Bragg's set determination to find Buell elsewhere, they were far from reassured by the manner he faced the actual condition which confronted him. The presence of Buell's entire army was a fact too evident to admit of further doubt. Polk waa therefore instructed to retire his command to Harrodsburg, the details of the movement being left entirely to his discretion. At midnight the troops withdrew to the original position between the Harrodsburg road and Chaplin's Creek, and soon after sunrise were put in retreat. The trains and artillery moved upon the turnpike, the troops marching in the open fields to the right and left. The withdrawal was quickly accomplished, so that the afternoon of October 9 found the army in line of battle in front of Harrodsburg. General Bragg left Perryville at 5 a.m. and rode direct to Harrodsburg in order to hasten the return of Kirby Smith and Withers, whom he had already recalled to that point. These commands, as has been intimated, found no Federal force of consequence. Withers had come in contact with the rear of Sill's division on its march from Frankfort, by way of Lawrenceburg, to join Buell at Perryville, and had captured several hundred wagons; beyond this, the expedition had been fruitless. General Humphrey Marshall at last had reached Lexington, but his stay was short-lived, as he was ordered to follow Kirby Smith's movement with a view to a junction with the army at Harrodsburg. Summarizing now the events of this act of the campaign, we find that General Bragg had sent 36,000 men toward Frankfort to oppose 12,000 men, detaching Polk at the same time with 16,000 men toward Perryville to oppose 58,000 men, the distance between these two fields of action being about twenty-five miles.